VLADIMIR SOLOVYEV AND MAX SCHELER: ATTEMPT AT A COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION

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VLADIMIR SOLOV'EV UND MAX SCHELER

Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Phänomenologie im Versuch einer vergleichenden Interpretation

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To my friend,
TOM BLAKELEY,
who made this edition possible

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

This comparative study of the works of Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler explores some of the areas in which their thoughts seem to bear a direct relation to one another. The author shows, however, that such a correlation is not based on any factual influence of the earlier Russian on the later philosophy of Scheler. The similarities in their spiritual and philosophical development are significant as the author demonstrates in his chapter on systematic philosophy.

This comparison is not just of historical interest. It is meant to contribute to a better understanding between the East and the West. The author provides a basis for future discussions by establishing a common area of inquiry and by demonstrating a convergence of viewpoints already in regard to these problems. The author also discusses the potential role of the ideas of Solovyev and Scheler in the formation of a consciousness which he sees now emerging in the Soviet Union – a consciousness critical of any misrepresentation both of non-Marxist Russian philosophy as well as of Western philosophy in general.

In regard to the translation itself, three things should be mentioned. First of all, the distinction between the important German words "Sein" and "Seiendes" is often difficult to preserve in translation. Unless otherwise noted all references to "being" refer to "Seiendes." Second, the abbreviations of the works of Solovyev and Scheler used in the footnotes are clarified in the summary of the works of these authors found on page 310ff. below. Lastly, two transcription systems have been used for the Russian names referred to in this work. While the more traditional spelling is to be found in the main body of the text, the exacter transcription used by the *Sovietica* is found in Chapter Nine in the footnotes and in the summary of works at the end of this volume. The index of names applies only to the names found in the text itself and is, therefore, organized according to the traditional spelling of Russian names.

The major challenge facing the translator was the achievement of a balance between three quite different styles: that of Solovyev, of Scheler, and of the author. The frequently formal nature of the comparison made this

particularly difficult. The translator is very grateful to Prof. T. J. Blakeley of Boston College for his assistance in meeting this challenge. Much appreciation is also due to Maida Broadbent who coped with the preparation of the manuscript with much patience and good humor.

K. W.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY

The duality of human life and consciousness is the actual ground* of all reflection and philosophy. Man finds in himself the feeling of inner freedom and the fact of external necessity. He is firmly convinced that the ground of his being *(Sein)* and life lies in himself. Still at the same time he is clearly conscious that this ground is independent of him, that man is determined by something else which is external to him. This fundamental absurdity, this radical contradiction evokes in a thinking being the greatest wonder. It is just this wonder, not the amazement about some facts of external nature, which constitutes that chiefly philosophical feeling, *mála philosophikòn páthos,* which is the start of every philosophy: *"Dià gár tò thaumàcesthai hoi ánthrōpoi kaì nyn kaì tò prōton aèrxanto philosophēin."* [For it is owing to their wonder that men both now and at first began to philosophize.] [1]

Scheler's interpretation of Aristotle's first evidence, "put in the form of a judgment it states that *'there is something'* (in general) or, to put it more acutely, that *'there is not nothing'*,"[2] is not yet touched upon in this wonder. However, this wonder first presupposes Scheler's interpretation, the meaning of which is established later. For the fact which man becomes conscious of here as a contradiction,[3] is as such already present and recognized, whereas wonder begins not with the intuition of the givenness of this fact but already with the intuition of its specificity. The duality of our life and consciousness (one notices the meta-anthropological starting point), characterized by freedom and necessity in its extreme opposite position, makes manifest a being *(Wesen)* which is experienced simultaneously as the "ground" of our being *(Sein)* and life and as "something other," "external" to us.

In the depth of our own spirit as such we can detect that which is unconditioned, which eludes *(otrešajas')* all definite images of being *(Sein).* That is, the unconditioned is not as such something which manifests itself in being (*Sein*). Instead it is something which reveals itself as free of or as detached from *(otrešennoe)* any and every being *(Sein).* And it is beyond any doubt that in all human perceptions, the immediate perception of the absolute actuality exists deeper than each particular feeling, conception and volition. That which is reveals itself in this immediate perception as absolute, one and free from all definition.[4]

* *"Beweggrund"* as well as *"Grund"* will be translated in the following by "ground." However, the further meanings of "principle," "cause," "foundation," "reason," and "source" must also be kept in mind for an understanding of *"Grund."*

On the other hand "every being is *known* only in appearance. For every being *is* in appearance. In other words, every being *is* in knowledge, and there is no being apart from knowledge or without it, although knowledge naturally is not yet all of what is. That is so just as every being is certainly in a form and there is no being without a form, yet form of course is not all of what is."[5] Both of these aspects – the being *in appearance* (the more familiar)[6] and the being itself as such or *as the source or principle of appearance* (the less familiar or that which is sought after)[7] – give the predicative and the subjective form of the definition of truth. It is the task of philosophy to "make these forms substantial." "For this fact is common in a like manner *(meždu soboju obščim)* to all which exists, that it *is*, thus, being *(Sein, bytie).* From this fact it is easy to arrive at the assumption that philosophy has 'being' *(Sein)* as its fundamental object and above all must answer the question what actual being *(Sein)* is as distinct from apparent or fallacious being *(Sein)*."[8]

We have called the appearance of the being *(javlenie suščego)* or being *(Sein, bytie)* a predicative "form" only because we do not yet know what the content of this concept is. Being *(Sein)* is, therefore, a predicate – much to the surprise of existentialism.

> If one simply says "this thought is" or "this sensation is," then *thought* and *sensation* can only be *grammatically* valid [here] as subjects with the predicate being *(Sein)*. From a *logical* point of view, however, there is no way for them to be actual subjects since they are themselves only predicates of someone who thinks and feels. *It follows from this, that being (Sein) can in no way be their actual predicate.* Consequently, the statements "my thought is," "my sensation is" only mean "I think" and "I feel." Stated quite generally, "a thought is," "a sensation is" only mean "someone thinks," "someone feels" or "there is one who thinks," "there is one who feels." Finally, "being *(Sein)* is" only means "there is one who is."[9]

In the context of these excerpts out of the first volume of his collected works, *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge,* which appeared in 1877, Solovyev blames Western European thought for always hypostatizing or personifying predicative ways of being *(Seinsweisen)* or statements. "All the cardinal errors of institutional philosophy (Solovyev frankly asserts that there was no such thing in Russia)[10] amount to the hypostatizing of predicates."[11] In his master's dissertation[12] on Eduard von Hartmann's *The Philosophy of the Unconscious,* Solovyev was completely justified in reproaching von Hartmann for hypostatizing predicates. There he exposed the latter's metaphysics in respect to its act/potency model as a tremendous *lapsus ingenii.*[13]

In regard to existentialism, we would like once more to emphasize that Solovyev's position has throughout a meta-anthropological character and is,

therefore, in no way inferior in its approach to the investigation of being *(Seinsforschung)*. Just for that reason it assigns to every predominantly entitative attempt the "cardinal error" of "hypostatizing." In this sense, the intent of philosophical endeavor defined by Heidegger is also "Western," and so no less "crisis of Western philosophy" than all that accomplished in Western thought since John Scotus Eriugena (approximately 810–877). Consequently, for Solovyev's *A Critique of Abstract Principles* (1877–1880):

> neither this nor that being *(Sein)*, neither this nor that predicate in itself represents the actual objects of any knowledge (for there are no such things as predicates in themselves). Rather *that to which this being (Sein) belongs*, which is expressed in this being *(Sein)*, or *that subject to which the given predicates are related*, is the actual object of any knowledge. Accordingly, true knowledge in its universality, that is, philosophy, has as its actual object not being *(Sein)* in general, but *that to which this being (Sein) in general belongs, namely, an unconditioned being or a being considered as the unconditioned ground of every being (Sein)*. If *every being (Sein)* is necessarily *only a predicate*, then one cannot define that being as being *(Sein)*, because it cannot be something else's predicate. It distinguishes itself from every being in the sense that it is the *subject or the intrinsic ground of every being (Sein)*. If, therefore, we were to assume that the being itself were being *(Sein)*, then we would be maintaining that there would be being *(Sein)* beyond every being *(Sein)*, which is without meaning. Consequently, the ground of every being *(Sein)* cannot itself be conceived of as being *(Sein)*, but *just as little* can it be characterized *as non-being (Nichtsein)*. [For] non-being is usually understood as a simple absence or privation of being *(Sein)*, thus as nothingness. Contrary to this, every being *(Sein)* belongs to the unconditioned being and thus it is in no way possible to attribute to it non-being *(Nichtsein)* in this negative sense or to define the unconditioned being as nothingness. Although the being is not being *(Sein)*, every being *(Sein)* belongs nevertheless to it in the same sense that we, for example, have to say that man, as the one who thinks, is not thought, but that belongs to man. Just as someone who thinks *is* not identical with thinking, but *possesses* thought, so also *the being is not identical with being (Sein) but has* or possesses *being (Sein)*. To possess something means as much as to have power over it. Consequently, the being must be defined as the force or power of being *(Sein)*, as its positive possibility.[14]

This presents us with *the material object of philosophy*. Solovyev never tires of making philosophy's proper object generally evident. One senses a moment of movement in this "foundation of metaphysics" which is typically the counterpart of Kant. This characteristic is common in its larger outlines to Scheler's "foundation of metaphysics." Therefore, of crucial concern here are the concepts "thing in itself" and "appearance," especially their *fundamentum in re*. The untenability of a Kantian understanding of these concepts from the point of view of Solovyev and Scheler must likewise be considered.

In his answer to Konstantin Kavelin in *On the Actuality of the External World and the Foundation of Metaphysical Knowledge* (1875), Solovyev explains that:

The world is not only the mere totality of distinct beings, but also their logical and theological order – the cosmos.[15] The individuals as such constitute only the substrate of the world or that which underlies *(podležaščee, hypokeímenon)* it. The being *(Sein)* of the world as a unitary whole, which is defined by universal forms and a common purpose, presupposes nevertheless a separate and absolute primordial ground. This primordial ground is the foundation not only of the universal forms and the purpose of the world, but also of distinct being *(Sein), because distinct beings do not possess for themselves a separate being (Sein), but exist solely in their relation to the whole universe. The highest duty of philosophy consists in determining the absolute primordial ground or the metaphysical being in its veritable significance.*[16] This determination is possible because the actual universe, as the expression of the metaphysical being, is accessible to us by way of internal and external experience, and because the specificity of that which expresses itself is determined by the specificity of the expression. And if it should prove that the relations of the actual universe necessitate the assumption of determinations of its metaphysical primordial ground which are similar to those which we are aware of *in our own spiritual being (Sein),* then in accordance with this similarity to our own being we would acquire an indeed not only extraordinarily universal but also positive knowledge of the metaphysical being *(Wesen)* of the universe.[17]

The insight into this metaphysical being of the universe is absolutely evident on the basis of the immediate certainty that man also knows himself as a being.

The definition and demonstration of Solovyev's metaphysical primordial ground or the absolute being *(absoljutno-sušče)* also underlie Scheler's "second insight" "into the nature of philosophy."

The distinction which I here refer to concerns the difference between one non-non-entity* and another in respect to whether it "is" only by virtue of a one-way or mutual dependence on another entity or "is" in exclusion of any possible dependence on another entity – "is," that is, in an *absolute* way. An entity which – if it is – simply *is,* which has its being in itself and *only* in itself, thus not holding it in fee from anything else, we shall therefore call the *absolute entity,* however it may otherwise be qualified by subsequent ontological distinctions.[18]

And so the insight that there is an absolute entity, or an entity through which every non-absolute entity has and holds its attributive being, forms the second self-evident insight. For if (as we clearly recognize with each example of an entity no matter what) there is something (in general) rather than nothing, then in our "examples" to be reviewed at will that part of them which is relative not-being (both not-being-anything and non-existence) can indeed be attributed to the possible contingencies and relativities which their being possesses from other entities (including even the knowing subject), but this is never possible in respect to their positive being itself. It is no inference merely, but a direct intuition, which tells us that this being demands a source in an entity pure and simple which is devoid of any more restrictive determination.[19]

Scheler names still a third insight in the "order of self-evident insights," namely: "That every possible entity must necessarily possess a qualitative

* Scheler's translator has chosen to render *Seiendes* as "entity". We have used "being" instead in order to preserve the "non-entitative" content of Solovyev's thought.

quid-est, an essence, and also an *existentia.* These they possess without regard to what they otherwise may be or to the sphere of being they inhabit by reason of possible subdivision into ontological forms and categories."[20] We have already given this evidence as the "motivating principle of human being *(Sein)* and life" in the beginning of Solovyev's definition of the essence of all philosophy. The being certain of one's own being underlay the demonstration of this as far as it is expressed in the idea of an "absolute being." We have called attention to the meta-anthropological character of the definition, and we have posited analogy as a leap toward the metaphysical being in order to intimate with all this (which will be specified in the theory of knowledge), that only the anthropological datum of a "dualistic life" is immediately intuited, and thus given as a *datum.*

How these two definitions are met is a question which is reserved for metaphysics. In the meantime, and because we have already noticed Solovyev's position concerning knowledge as typically a counterpart to Kant's, we can say that the evidence of the essential correlation of *essentia* and *existentia* for Solovyev (with the reservation of a more exact explication of these expressions within metaphysics), is known and recognized throughout in the concepts "a being" *(suščee)* and "being" *(Sein, bytie).*

> If this dualistic essence presents itself as enigmatic and mysterious, then luckily we find the solution to this riddle, the elucidation of this mystery in ourselves. For man, each actual man, to the extent that he as the true subject and final basis of all his actions is an unconditioned being (for man is not perception, but the one who perceives, not thought, but the one who thinks; not will, but the one who wills; in a word, not being [*Sein*], but the one who is), he has beyond this in his consciousness the divine idea as an unconditioned norm by means of which he appraises all his actions. However, simultaneously he is subjected to natural and empirical conditions, in which he obtains the corresponding material for the definitive realization of his unconditioned nature, for the final realization of his idea through the fusion of the external multiplicity into an inner unity, and the accidental particulars into an all-inclusive whole.[21]

This review of the object of philosophy, disregarding the manner of obtaining it, can for the time being be summarized by the general formula of Scholasticism: *cognitio rerum ex ultimis causis.*

What is the status now of the axiomatic concept of correlation of the cognitive relation to the object, that is, the status of the act-center?

> The subject of philosophy, just as of all scientific knowledge, is the individual person *(lico)* as thinking. Thinking and knowing nevertheless exist in close internal connection with the other aspect of human nature, with the will as the principle of action and the active (practical) life. This connection is already immediately established in the nature of the one and of the other. On the one hand, all knowing comes about[22] by means of a striving for or a wanting of knowledge. On the other hand, willing has as its object that which is thought, that is, knowledge.[23]

From here on we encounter in the context of the question of the formal object of knowledge the "concept of truth" *(ponjatie ob istine)* as the following quotations indicate:

If we [for example[24]] ask: What is beauty? that is, What does beauty have for a content?, then we are properly asking: What is thought of in the concept of beauty? However, since the authentic object of thought is truth, then we are properly asking: What is truth in its relation to beauty? The status of the question of salvation is also similar. In this manner every theoretical question, that is, every question about the *content*, no matter what form the question assumes, is always a question about truth and it cannot relate to anything else.[25]

The concept of truth demands unconditioned reality and unconditioned rationality. As we saw, truth cannot be only relation, but it is also that which is given in the relation, that to which our subject relates. Truth is not determined by our relation to it. Instead, the opposite is the case. This or that relation of ourselves to the object (in feeling or in thought) must be determined by the unconnected truth of the object in order to be true.[26]

Thus truth consists above all in the fact that truth *is* (. . .), and the unconditional truth is defined above all not as the relation or the manner of being *(Ek-sistens)*[27] but as that which *is* in this relation or as a being.[28]

The conception of the free synthesis of knowledge and *The Justification of the Good* (1894–1898), the proven results of twenty fluctuating years of abundant, intensive and extensive philosophizing, are on hand for the concepts of the *Theoretical Philosophy* (1897–1899), in which the fully moral person confronts this "existing truth." The principle task of the moral man is to bring his life into accord with the existing truth. However, for this he must know its essence and demands. In light of the references just given, which now justify the assumption of the conceptual contents of metaphysics and ethics and "because of the unity of the idea, we do not need a logical determination of all its forms, for salvation[29] and beauty are the same as truth except that they are in the mode of the will and of feeling and not in the mode of conception."[30]

Based on this unity, the motive of theoretical philosophy is a twofold one.

In the first place we want to live within the power of our ethical nature in accordance with the true good, and for this reason we want to know its true essence and the true demands. But *at the same time* we simply want to know the truth for its own sake. Our conscience unconditionally approves this second wish of ours and so confirms in advance the primordial unity of the good and the true *(meždu dobrom i istinoju)*. This unity is manifestly a necessity since without it the concept of the true good itself, the foundation *(kotorym deržitsja)* of all morality, would be meaningless. . . . This means . . . life and knowledge are of one essence and inseparably in their highest standards.[31]

This axiom appears to go beyond what was said[32] in Solovyev's master's dissertation (1874) about the significance of theoretical and practical philosophy. There only the "unity of theory and practice" was required

for ethics. Within this claim, which has become so powerful in the philosophy of dialectical materialism, the assertions still are sufficient for *The Crisis of Western Philosophy:* "... thought is the deed, it is everything!"[33] for *theoretical* knowledge; "a practical truth which remains only theory is a contradiction!"[34] for *practical* knowledge.

With this statement of an epistemological-practical correlation of the essence of knowledge and life – a correlation which is found by Solovyev with his resumption of exact philosophy and its problems towards the end of the 1890's – we find ourselves already "within this combination of ... basic moral acts conducive to philosophical cognition."[35] For, "the concept of conscientiousness *(dobrosovestnost')* is included in the standard of truth. True philosophical thought must be a conscientious search to the end for authentic truth .... To the extent that the moral element is required by the logical conditions, it not only can, but it must form the foundation of theoretical philosophy in general."[36]

If the concept of conscientiousness or the act of having a conscience – "think conscientiously, remain true to yourself, do not deviate from purely striving for the truth to the end ..."[37] – is comprised of the personal acts of reverence and obedience, relating to the truth as the being, then these acts may be readily compared with Scheler's basic act: that *"the natural self and ego must be humbled."*[38] In the first place, Scheler urges that *"the whole spiritual person must love absolute value and being (Sein)"*[39]; this is an act of upsurge comparable to Solovyev's "inspiration" *(vdoxnovenie).*

> The effect of the ideal essences on us[40] is called inspiration. This effect generates in us the intelligible knowledge (and the creative power) of their ideal forms or ideas. It leads us out of our ordinary natural center and elevates us to the highest sphere, while bringing forth ecstasy in this manner. Thus, strictly speaking, inspiration is the effecting or the immediately determining principle of true philosophical knowledge. No objective action and no objective knowledge is possible without an intuition based on inspiration ....[41]

When Scheler speaks of the "nature of philosophy," he names a third moral act: *"Self-mastery must be achieved:* in this way it is possible to objectify the instinctual impulses of life, which are 'given' and experienced as 'of the flesh' and which must needs exert a constant influence on natural sensory perception."[42] We can confront this act in its concrete performance either with Solovyev's exhaustive statements about *The Ascetic Principle in Morality*[43] in general, or with his final remarks on the moral foundation of philosophy in the sixth chapter of his *Theoretical Philosophy*. In the first of these investigations, "our moral principle receives the following more exact definition: subordinate the flesh to the spirit because this is necessary for the value and independence of the latter."[44] The later work from the

phenomenological period clearly stresses the epistemologically relevant moment of this ascetic principle: "Every obligation of the theoretical philosopher as such consists solely in the decision and capability of depriving himself in the matter under consideration of all possible interests – besides the purely philosophical – above all, to forget every extraneous volition other than that of possessing the truth for its own sake."[45]

Since we would now like to introduce the crisis in interpretation, let us call to mind once more the basic cognitive objects of the relation of knowledge: the object, the center of realization, the evidential hierarchy, and the structure of the basic acts of the cognitive subject. What interests us here is the possibility of their being congruent with or at least tangential to the corresponding elements of Scheler.

I. The possible and the necessary object of philosophy is the absolute as the absolute being.[46]

II. The subject of philosophy is the inmost personal Self of a finite being.[47]

III. The order of highest evidences.

Solovyev:

1. Wonder *(thaumácein)* about.[48]
2. The evidence of the being.[49]
3. The evidence of the unity of essence and appearance: *suščee – vešč' v sebe – suščnost'* to: *bytie – javlenie – suščestvovanie.*[50]

Scheler:

1. Evidence that there is something in general and not rather nothing.[51]
2. Evidence of an absolute entity and consequently of an entity at all.[52]
3. Evidence of the unity of essence and existence: *essentia-existentia.*[53]

IV. The structure of the basic moral acts.

Solovyev:

1. Inspiration *(vdoxnovenie)*, on the one hand, as "the conversion of love," and, on the other hand, as the "spiritual upsurge" to the highest sphere. No objective knowledge is possible without an intuition based on inspiration.[54]
2. Conscientiousness in confrontation with the existing truth. But the "existing truth" is, as we shall learn in *Lectures on God-manhood* (1877–1881), a person.[55] Consequently, a personal act of response in reverence or obedience is necessary.[56]

3. Epistemological asceticism as the technique of liberation from all interests extraneous to the search for truth.[57]

Scheler:

"1. *The whole spiritual person must love absolute value and being;*
2. *the natural self and ego must be humbled;*
3. *self-mastery must be achieved:* in this way it is possible to objectify the instinctual impulses of life, which are 'given' and experienced as 'of the flesh' and which must needs exert a constant influence on the natural sensory perception."[58]

The structure of these acts or "the nature of the mental attitude which [formally] * underlies all philosophical thinking" is defined by Scheler for the present "as: *a love-determined movement of the inmost personal Self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibilities.*"[59]

It is necessary now that we have the impression of a perfect agreement of the two approaches – and precisely now in order to indicate how little one may leave such statements as they are – to point out some essential differences.

1. THE CONCEPT OF "SOMETHING" AND OF THE "ABSOLUTE BEING"

Solovyev's awareness of the world begins with wonder. This wonder is not, however, about "something" in itself, but instead about something quite definite, namely: about "the duality of human life and consciousness."[60] The first foundation of philosophical thought or the first criterion of philosophical truth unconditionally demands that theoretical philosophy contain in itself its starting point and that the process of thought in theoretical philosophy start[61] with the beginning itself. Naturally this does not mean "that philosophical thought must create anew out of itself its complete content without admitting anything from outside of itself."[62] Because of this, the concept of a definite something – and all awareness of the world is already individuated – is not able to ground philosophy in general.

* A translation of the word "formell," present in the German text, is lacking in the existing English version of *Vom Ewigen im Menschen.* I have restored it here to the quotation.

Concrete reality is the task of philosophy, but by no means its principle or its ground *(načalo)*. Thus, not even the concept "something" can serve in all its universality as the starting point of logic,[63] since this concept already possesses a certain, even if extremely insufficient, determination to the extent that "something" is not "nothing." However, the unconditioned primary ground *(načalo)* of logic, and consequently of the whole of philosophy, can only be the concept of an absolute or supra-being *(sverxsuščee)* .... Even the absolute is also "something": it is the potential unity (equivalency – *bezrazličie,* identity – *toždestvo)* of "nothing" and "something" and has as a consequence no determination at all.[64]

As he occasionally intimates in his critique of von Hartmann's metaphysics, Solovyev is doubtlessly acquainted with the concept of "absolute non-being" *(ouch ón)* as opposed to "merely relative non-being" *(maè ón).*[65] Nevertheless this concept cannot characterize the first of the self-evident insights for otherwise "having posited pure non-being as the absolute principle [one would have to] consequently remain with this beginning."[66] From his position Scheler emphasizes that "the *first* and most direct self-evident insight is that already postulated in establishing the sense of the expression 'doubt about something' (about the being *(Sein)* of something, the truth of a proposition, etc.) . . . ."[67] Solovyev, however, in our opinion correctly demonstrates the indubitability of the phenomenological fact *(ličnyj fakt soznanija).*

If I am thinking, then I cannot doubt myself as one who is thinking or doubt this "I" as a *phenomenological condition* for the thinking in question. However nothing stands in the way of quite concretely doubting *(usomnit'sja)* the certainty *(v dostovernosti)* of each empirical individuality itself which has been represented so far as the actual and constant embodiment of the "I" or has been identified with it. In this sense one not only can, but must doubt, even provisionally, one's own existence. This is by no means a logical contradiction for the one who doubts and the object of the doubt are not identical to one another here. The *first* is the constant and immutable subject of consciousness, the pure "I". The *second* is, however, that concrete individual which becomes and alters itself in its plans and in its scope, and from which unphilosophical opinion does not distinguish the thinking subject as such.[68]

Thus, Solovyev excludes altogether a "first and most direct self-evident insight" of the *ouch òn.* If Scheler's statement is to remain *strictly phenomenological,* then it can refer only to the relative non-being of the *maè ón* or the *dynámei ón.*

Perhaps a comment to Ludolf Müller's habilitation work[69] may be permitted here. This decisive feature in the starting point of thought appears to elude him because he, from the perspective of Schelling, allows the evidence that there is something and not rather nothing to provide a basis also for Solovyev's epistemology.[70] Here we arrive indeed on the trail of a possible source of Scheler, which supports the older references of Kurt Leese.[71] In the latter's opinion, "as a theologian, *Scheler* [is] a Schelling *redivivus.*"[72]

The question would then be here, whether this statement should remain limited to cosmogony, for Leese has this in mind since he is speaking of Scheler's "nature in God." As to the problematic of the first evidence, Schelling formulates in any case a position which in respect to this question suggests a negative answer: "That there should be a science now which eliminates from us every doubt about this question why there is something in general and not rather nothing, is indisputably an urgent, even a necessary demand not of this or that individual but of human nature itself . . . . If I cannot answer this last question, then all else sinks for me into the abyss of a bottomless nothingness."[73]

The substance of this starting point reflects more on Scheler than on Solovyev. To be sure, Müller makes apparent surprising congruencies between Solovyev and Schelling in their epistemology, their negative theology, and their doctrine of creation. But this does not say very much. For, his reference[74] to a complete congruence of Solovyev's problem of the external world and Schelling's "metaphysical empiricism" has the following consequence. Not only the "phenomenology" of the *Theoretical Philosophy,*[75] but also the fundamental axiom of the metaphysics of acts, the axiom that a spiritual ***relatum*** belongs to every object,[76] can no longer be methodologically compared with other philosophical models of the world. Nevertheless, Solovyev and Scheler come close to one another under these two aspects, as we shall establish in the epistemology.

II. SOLOVYEV'S "ABSOLUTE BEING" AND SCHELER'S "THE ETERNALLY ASTONISHING ROOFING OF THE ABYSS OF ABSOLUTE NOTHING"[77]

According to the meaning of the word, *the absolute (absolutum* from *absolvere)* means
1. something like being *detached from everything (otrešennoe ot čego-nibud')*, that is *free from everything (osvoboždennoe)*,
2. something like being *fulfilled, concluded, complete* and *whole (zaveršennoe, zakončennoe, polnoe, vseceloe)*.

Thus even the meaning of the word contains two [different] definitions of the absolute. The *first* meaning defines the absolute itself in its being for itself *(samo po sebe v otdel'nosti)* or in its complete detachment *(otrešennosti ot vsego drugogo)*, thus *negatively* in relation to every other [being], that is, to all that is individual, finite and many. The absolute is defined as something free from everything, as absolute *one*. The *second* meaning [however] defines the absolute *positively* in its relation to another being, as something that possesses *everything*, that can have nothing outside itself (since it otherwise would not be perfect and complete). Together the two meanings define the absolute as *hèn kaì pān.*[78]

This version of the "absolute being," which "underlies the whole system of integral knowledge, is distinguished *toto coelo* from the 'absolute' of the rationalistic philosophy"[79] of the West.[80] "It [rationalistic philosophy]

assumes the absolute only in *one* of the two meanings we have distinguished. However, since the one meaning [the *hén*] receives its entire content from the other [the *pān*], consequently nothing at all is thought of here as the absolute. This means that this concept, just as all other basic concepts of this philosophy – being *(Sein),* nothing, etc. – is an empty word."[81]

This bold and far-reaching statement is valid for the whole of subsequent Western thought with the exception of the Patristics. According to Solovyev, Schopenhauer's voluntarism first makes possible "a complete turn in the progress of the whole of Western philosophy. However the will as a metaphysical entity *(suščnost')* has no real meaning in Schopenhauer."[82]

For it is without any object, any purpose, any conception and therefore it possesses no advantage over Kant's "thing in itself" or over the "natural forces" of natural science. Indeed, Eduard von Hartmann, the reformer of Schopenhauer's doctrine, attempts in *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* (1869) to rescue its great insights for the reserve of modern thought. But in spite of all acknowledgement even "in Hartmann,[83] the abstract dialectic of these principles [the principles of the totally-unified being and of the spiritual actuality] still appears as something independent even in itself. To this extent even he necessarily falls under the influence of the general limitation of Western thought, which isolates abstract concepts and raises them to the level of independent hypostases."[84]

Correspondingly, an "indiscriminate absolute,"[85] which is not nothing (not something) and everything at the same time, therefore a "mere absolute," turns out to be either an empty word *(pustoe slovo)* or else a "non-absolute." For if it wants "to claim itself as a *mere absolute,* then it could not be *the absolute* just for the reason that its other, the *non-absolute,* would exist outside of it as its negation or limit, and the absolute would consequently be limited, exclusive and not free. Thus, the absolute must, in order to be what it is, be opposed to itself or be *the unity of itself and that which is opposed to itself."*[86] Neither Thomas Aquinas[87] nor Schelling,[88] the latter being mentioned for Ludolf Müller's sake, have the distinction in this question of being exceptions to Solovyev's general reproach about the hypostatizing of concepts and the voiding of content which is connected with this. On the contrary, they are especially heavily burdened by these features.[89]

We must now turn to the question whether Scheler, from Solovyev's point of view, is to be viewed as preserving or renouncing this Western tradition. Here one is first inclined to substitute for Scheler's separated or separable first and second self-evident insights – namely, the insights into "something" and "that there is an absolute entity" – Solovyev's

understanding of the "absolute being" as the synthesis of positive nothing (the first potentiality of the "absolute being") and something.[90] Such an identification is nevertheless clearly without sufficient reason. For "this absolute principle" (this absolute ground) constitutes for Solovyev "the necessary *prius* not only of our being *(Sein)* but also of our knowledge."[91] To the extent that it must be thought of as the unity of act, indeed the identity of act *(tožděstvo)* of *maè ón* (or of *dynámei ón*) and of *tí*, it is to be sure entirely indeterminate.[92] Nevertheless it is present not only as the concept, as "the thought which exists in the reason which thinks"[93] (not to mention Hegel's "logical idea"[94]), but also as an absolute actuality independent of all thought, never changeable[95] into a fact of empirical or logical knowledge or into a state of our consciousness or an act of our thought.

"To the extent that I recognize the unconditioned existence behind the object of my knowledge and consider this object not just as a state of my consciousness but as existing in itself, to that extent I recognize the unconditioned being in this object."[96]

In Solovyev's opinion, constructions which are ontological-ontical (ontologism) or logical-pantheistic (panlogism) are hardly able to guarantee such absolute sovereignty of the primordial being over against the intellect.

The majority of these systems which begin with the teachings of the Eleatic Parmenides *(hae archaé, to ápeiron, aóristos, mía eis phýsin* and *hèn kaı pān* are ontological concepts which correspond, therefore, without exception to *bytie* [being ⟨*Sein*⟩] and not to Solovyev's *suščee* [essence])[97] and which conclude with Schelling's philosophy of identity assumes – in that the concept of the absolute is rightfully recognized as the starting point *(načalo)* of philosophy – simultaneously erroneously that this concept in just that indeterminability and potentiality is also the end of philosophy. Thus all their philosophizing amounts to a simple assertion of the undifferentiated absolute (or of this absolute undifferentiation) against all determinate reality, that is, it amounts to a simple negation of the latter.

Because true philosophy or integral knowledge starts with the concept of absolute potency, it posits the absolute also as the end or the final result of philosophy: as already actualized that is, completely determined and totally actual. Because of this, philosophy appears as the limited development of the originary concept of the absolute from its indefinite potency to its actual, totally determined idea. Thus the absolute represents the *álpha* and *oméga,* the beginning *(načalo)* and the end *(konec)* of philosophy – but in different senses. The initial concept of the absolute and its final idea relate to each other [here][98] as the seed of a plant relates to the plant in its entirely developed and fruit-bearing condition.[99]

For Solovyev, the *prius* – not logical but ontological – of the basic evidence is the unity of the *maè ón* and the *tí* of the absolute being (with the predicates *hèn kaì pān*). Beside an absolute so conceived, or rather as opposed to it, there can neither really be an *ouch ón,* nor could the positive "as the eternally astonishing *roofing of the abyss* of absolute nothing"[100] distinguish

itself from the absolute as the foundation or background. Where what is, is "all" or "the whole" *(sušče vseedinoe),* there an absolute metaphysical nothingness can never be the *first* evidence!

For Scheler this impossibility is valid precisely as a founding insight and it is valid as such in opposition to his own "doctrine of prior givenness,"[101] formulated in *The Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge.* To be sure, the law "in the order of the source of our knowledge about reality, that is, in the 'efficacious' in general" is not pronounced here for "the absolute sphere of the actual and the valued (the sacred)"[102] but is reserved for the first volume of the metaphysics. But it is certain, that if "being real *(Realsein)* itself is only originally given in a resistance, in which some internal or external complexes of facts assert themselves against our striving impulses, both instinctual and will impulses,"[103] then the insight that an absolute entity exists, "through which every non-absolute entity has and holds its attributive being,"[104] must precede the insight of a metaphysical nothingness, if the latter be possible at all.

Scheler himself guarantees this sequence by the "law of prior givenness," which is declared for "the sphere of that which is intended as 'living'."[105] "The world intended as 'living' always has precedence over the world as 'dead', that is, the world intended only as 'non-living'."[106]

Since, according to Scheler, we are at the same time justified in substituting for the primordial phenomenon of life[107] a divine "attribute of urge,"[108] we are thus permitted, indeed we must "also assume a supra-individual, single life, for which the very laws of essence still are valid – the laws which we find in our sense functions and in the qualities and other aspects thereof (without thereby exhausting these laws)."[109]

These statements necessitate the assumption of an absolute being as unconditioned and given prior to any kind of non-being (according to potency). It cannot be determined with any certainty whether the "order of the highest self-evident insights" as presented in the culminating work of Scheler's second phase, *On the Eternal in Man,*[110] is knowingly abandoned and replaced; this did occur explicitly to other parts of his doctrine during and after his personal crisis. An authentic denial is in any case found nowhere although correlative thoughts in *Knowledge and Work*[111] and in the anthropological sketch concerned with *Man's Place in Nature*[112] do not dispute the results of our interpretation.

The doctrine of the fundamental insights indicates (even explicitly at times) that both thinkers wrestled with the intuitive-axiomatic founding formula of Descartes' "*cogito, ergo sum*" (Scheler especially through his doctrine of the givenness of reality[113] and the demonstration of the

correlation of essences of the irreducible spheres[114] and Solovyev above all in his *Theoretical Philosophy,* which is devoted to the "problem of consciousness" in general).[115]

Scheler believed that the insight *"there is something* (in general)" (he calls this insight "the *first* and most direct self-evident insight")[116] is fundamental "for establishing the sense" of "doubt about something."[117] Even more fundamental, however, is the awareness of absolute nothing. "But whoever has not, so to speak, looked into the *abyss of absolute nothing,* will indeed completely overlook the eminent positivity inherent in the insight that there is something in general and not rather nothing."[118] Consequently Scheler's relation to the starting point of "modern" philosophy is less critical than the "uncritical Russian's."

Solovyev prepared a brilliant investigation[119] of the *cogito vel dubito,* which Descartes himself called *une connaissance intuitive,*[120] with the result that "there is an unconditioned creditable knowledge which is indubitable and indisputable," namely, knowledge of the phenomenologically pure fact of consciousness *(naličnyj fakt soznanija).* Consequently, the question of presuppositions is resolved: "The pure subject of thought is a 'phenomenological' fact."[121] As such it is in no way subject to doubt. A *dubito* is possible first to the "empirical subject." On this occasion Solovyev showed himself to be a good phenomenologist even before the discovery of phenomenology.

By no means do we need to interpret this statement into the relation of Scheler and Solovyev. Already in 1914, as he commented on the *Theoretical Philosophy,* Aleksandra Gizetti chanced upon that which is essential in our statements, even though in respect to the "world outlook of Vladimir Solovyev" considered from the Socialist party's point of view he made many mistakes: "Some very important epistemological ideas are explored in this work which in one thing or another anticipate Husserl, for example, and in part bring about a synthesis of critical philosophy with positivism."[122]

We have obtained thus far some – although not yet all – essential matters and materials for the definition of the object of philosophy. We may say: "In essence philosophy is strictly self-evident insight, which cannot be either augmented or nullified by induction and which has *a-priori* validity for contingent existents: insight into all such essences and essential interrelations of beings as are accessible to us from available instances, in the order and hierarchy as they stand in relation to the absolute entity and its essence."[123]

All of Scheler's thoughts about "the nature of philosophy" are here in this last definition. We have only to add Johannes Hessen's criticism that

this definition delimits only a "phenomenological ontology." "This definition does not comprise the whole philosophy of ideals, especially logic and axiology."[124]

The method of insight or the process and execution of the movement of knowledge is "the moral upsurge as a personal act of 'the whole man'."[125] Scheler saw himself compelled to this assumption based on the revolutionizing of the "idea of the philosopher" by the metaphysical world-view of Christianity over against the classical tradition.

For, given that philosophy 1. has the final end of participation in the absolute being of Reality, and 2. is essentially cognition[126], philosophy could in this event[127] *no longer,* as peculiarly knowledge, attain its self-prescribed purpose. For human participation in an entity which is not objective but *active* in essence cannot be other than a collaboration in this activity, and therefore evidently not knowledge of objects. Furthermore such participation must first have been *completed,* by the entry of the inmost human personality, inasmuch as it is the seat of love (not knowledge) as well as action, into the Real primal entity, if philosophy wishes to attain *its own* particular kind of participation, or even to *initiate* it with regard to the primal Reality. It followed, therefore, in strict logic – postulating love as the content and activity as the mode of primal Reality – that philosophy, *by virtue of its own principle,* freely and autonomously limited itself and, when occasion arose, as freely and autonomously sacrificed itself and its source of knowledge, reason, to an *essentially different form of participation* in Reality.[128]

Naturally we are now in a position to demonstrate the correspondence between this doctrine and Solovyev's thoughts. Nevertheless, we shall name only a few key-words – referring to the description of the whole system. We will make an exception, however, for the phrase about the "self-limitation of philosophy."

Thus, it may be granted that God is love,[129] and that the eternal unity of freedom and necessity, that is, the triumph of God's eternally one and immutable self-sameness in love, constitutes the proper characteristic of the absolute.[130] It may also be granted that *The Lectures on God-manhood* teach the "conversion of love"[131] as well as the actual participation of the person in the essence and being *(Sein)* of God.

This relation of inner experience is given as a *real* idea in the *théōsis* of all creatures[132] through the spiritual man who accomplishes this unification as a person.[133] But what may we understand by that with regard to actual man?

We must mean that the three principles making up the essence of man relate to one another in the whole of humanity and in their entire effect as they were individually realized in the person of Christ. As we know, this relation consists of the free correspondence of both lower principles, the rationalist and the materialist, with the highest divine principle – not as a force but as salvation. These lower principles must be independent in order for them to be able to freely subordinate themselves to

the highest principle and in order for them to autonomously arrive at the recognition of this higher principle as salvation.[134]

Then it might simply be the case that the transcending of self in philosophy as the simple participation in knowledge in the primordial essence[135] is expressed in what Solovyev called "the sphere of the truly mystical" [136] and which is given in the "idea of an integral life" *(ideja cel'noj žizni).*[137]

Correspondingly, the object of mystical philosophy is not the world of appearances, which amounts to our sensations, and not the world of ideas, which are traced back to our thoughts, but instead the living actuality of essences in their intrinsic life relations. This philosophy is not concerned with the external order of phenomena, but instead with the internal order of essences and their life, an order which is determined by their relation to the first and foremost essence.[138]

An echo of that central idea, which is able to encompass the core of Solovyev's metaphysics in one single intuition as existent total-unity *(suščee vseedinoe)* can be heard already in this position which is equivalent to Scheler's essential definition of a "phenomenological ontology," as we remarked along with Hessen. This idea acknowledges at the same time the essence of Solovyev's doctrine of cooperation. First, this central idea, and only it, can open up for us an understanding of the necessity also for Solovyev's thinking of philosophy's act of self-limitation as opposed to its task of accomplishing a participation in the object of possible absolute knowledge. For our understanding, a brief mention of the central thought of total-unity, of the metaphysical cooperation of act, opens the way for a recapitulation of this doctrine.

Total-unity, as such, forms the basis not only for the spiritually individual character of the essence "man"[139] and consequently "the idea of man" in general – a remarkable identity in the views of both thinkers[140] – but also the manner of his personal becoming of self and becoming God.

Man is a divine idea. But he is moreover a free I (a subject which determines itself) as well as a being which is naturally animal. Since the unity of human individuality obviously requires that these three elements be brought into agreement with each other in a manner appropriate to the particular significance of each, thus the following task arises for man: to realize his divine idea (or himself as a divine idea) in his natural being *(Sein)*, that is, in his human (rational) element and in his natural (material) element. Because man is a divine idea only in inner unity with everything, in union with humanity or in unconditioned love, therefore the actualization of his divine principle in the lower elements by men is nothing else than the actualization of total-unity of the realization of absolute love in the relative world of reason and nature.[141]

Therefore, . . . , because the unconditioned meaning of everyone is understood in normal society in a positive sense, so that the task appears to be the realization of this meaning, it is in order to effect this task that a person subordinates himself – if he at a given time, that is, at a given stage of his development, does not have at his disposal the necessary means to solve this unconditioned task – freely and naturally to

one who – because he is situated at the highest level of spiritual perfection – can supply him with these means. The person subjects himself freely because the end of this subjection, that is, the actualization of his unconditioned task or the attainment of the ideal fulness of being *(Sein)*, is the particular goal of everyone, and anyone who wants ends also naturally wants the means.[142]

The idea of "total-unity" is thus the foundational intuition not only of the "idea of man" as a spiritual, unconditioned loving personal essence, but also, together with this first, of the synthesis of "integral knowledge," and of its necessity and comprehensibility. "Integral knowledge" is the intrinsic cognitive component of the "integral life." According to Solovyev the definition of knowledge in general must be preceded by an all-encompassing ideation of the meaning of its components. This is because knowledge in the order of grounding its logical givenness (not only as concept, but also as idea) – that is, total-unity, the idea of man as a spiritual personal essence, and the idea of integral knowledge – first is able to form the third organic member of the chain. In respect to the previous determination of total-unity and in anticipation of its complete and entire presentation in the sequel, here and now we may and must terminate the authentic version of Solovyev's "idea of knowledge" with the definition of the "true man" and "true knowledge."

From this point of view:

> . . . the true and normal man is unconditionally unanimous with everything or only thinkable in everything. Similarly everything is unthinkable without him. Man or humanity is an essence which contains within itself (in the absolute order) the divine idea, that is, total-unity or the unconditioned fulness of being *(Sein)*. In the natural order, this essence realizes this idea through rational freedom in material nature.[143]

In order to be the truth, therefore, our knowledge must

> . . . not merely consist in the comprehension of the actuality or reality of existent being *(Daseienden)*, but instead it must represent its meaning or reason. In true knowledge the universal meaning or the reason of things *(ratio rerum; ho lógos tōn óntōn)* must become intelligible for us. We must know each object in its relation to everything. That is, we must know the position, the situation or the significance which the individual object has in the over-all order or in the basic outlines of all existent being. The reason or the meaning of a thing consists namely in its relation to everything. However, since it is fully evident that the relation of each thing to the infinite set of other objects and phenomena can never be determined in its singularity, it thus follows in respect to the relation of the individual object to everything that one must understand under the concept "everything" not the external totality or the sum of all things and phenomena, which always remains indefinite, but a certain unity. This means, one must recognize a uniform ground *(načalo)* common to all things, which includes both all actual and possible being *(Sein)*, and which transforms the indefinite manifold of things as well as the infinite succession of phenomena into one single definite "totality," which is united within itself and complete. Thus, true knowledge is possible only in the form of rationality or total-unity. That

is, the truth of knowledge is not determined by the reality of its contents, which merely constitutes the matter of truth, but instead it is determined by the rationality of its form, that is, by the relation of this content to everything in unity or to the totally-one ground. But this rationality of that which can be known is not given, as we have seen, by experience. This is because in experience we always possess only singular and plural actualities, because there is neither an "all" (totality) nor a "one" (unity) in experience. The reason or the meaning of discernible things and phenomena can be known only through the reason or meaning of the subject who knows. The relation of the individual object to everything can be present to us only in so far as the principle of total-unity (reason) is present in ourselves. If it were different, then our cognition would remain, like that of the other living beings, limited to the immediate actuality of individual objects and phenomena which concern us. As a sensuous subject, man [only] perceives or passively suffers the given actuality. But as a rational subject, he determines simultaneously both the meaning of this actuality and its value in reference to that principle of total-unity, which he has in himself as his reason. So the criterion of truth is transferred out of the external world into the subject who knows. The bearer of truth is recognized to be man's reason and not the nature of things and phenomena.[144]

III. SUMMARY

In conclusion, we would like to stress once more the valuable features of this comparative interpretation:

1. *"Something" and "Absolute Being"*

Solovyev: The first and most immediate insight at the apex of philosophy is a completely indeterminate, absolute "something," which consists of a grounding and essential synthesis of the absolute being's *dynámei ón* and *tí*.[145]

Scheler: The unity of the first and second most fundamental self-evident insights is the absolute possibility-actuality of that which can be defined by the so-called "transcendental concepts of the Scholastics." This unity, as the absolute *ens-aliquid: unum, verum, bonum (pulchrum),* is contrasted as "the eminent positivity" to the first show of the abyss of the metaphysical nothingness.[146]

This means: Scheler's "something," as such relatively indefinite, becomes to be sure an entirely indeterminate absolute *tí* through a synthesis with the second and third insight. But since – based on their both becoming aware before the backdrop of absolute nothingness – the absolute being is determined in the sense of "rationalistic philosophy," as "merely absolute," that is, as "only one" without the "all" (this assertion acquires logical validity through the unavoidable inference from the fact that the show of absolute nothingness should found all possible "most fundamental evidences"), then it changes as a whole in the Western metaphysics of

hypostatizing which is criticized by Solovyev as empty. Scheler's structural formula: *ouch ón – tí – óntōs ón,* comparable to Solovyev's own structural formula: *maè ón (dynámei ón) – tí* as potencies of *óntōs ón,* must be understood and thought of as an empty word *(pustoe slovo),*[147] just because in it the absolute being is only the objective ontological correlative of nothingness (which it, as *pān,* is not able to be), but also because the "something" lacks any moment of efficaciousness within the order of givenness.

Scheler allows Descartes' *dubito* to be founded on the evidence of the *tí,*[148] whereas Solovyev, with a strict application of the phenomenological method, emphasizes the indubitability of the pure fact of *tí.*[149] This primary "something," "the absolute evidence *(samodostovernost'* = self-evidency*)* of pure *(naličnogo* = really present*)* consciousness, is the fundamental *(korennaja)* truth of philosophy. Every further development in philosophy begins with the verification of this truth."[150]

However the primary "something," as the "absolute evidence" of the beginning, has not only no need of the *ouch ón,* but also this "something" cannot even emerge from the primordial source of an absolute nothingness.

As far as the relations of Schelling – Scheler (K. Leese) and Schelling – Solovyev (L. Müller) are concerned: Schelling intuits for the evidence of the absolute being "the abyss of a bottomless nothingness,"[151] Scheler intuits for the same "the abyss of absolute nothing,"[152] whereas Solovyev, in and on the basis of his version of the absolute being, speaks out even against Schelling.[153]

2. *The Absoluteness of "Being" and "Nothingness"*

The "merely absolute" – we have established it as such by means of the thought that the primary evidence of absolute nothingness excludes the *pān*-character of the absolute being[154] – as *ens-aliquid: unum* is radically different from the full definition of the absolute being as the metaphysically actual *hèn kaì pān.* For "rationalist philosophy" comprehends "the absolute only in *one* of the two meanings" we have distinguished. However, since the one meaning [the *unum*][155] receives its entire content from the other [the *omne*],[156] consequently nothing at all is thought of here as the absolute. This means that the term 'absolute,' just as all other basic concepts" of "rationalist philosophy" – "being" *(Sein),* nothingness, etc. – is an empty word."[157] From this point of view, Scheler can by no means be considered an outsider to "Western tradition," if one judges him according to Solovyev's *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge.*

Nevertheless we can consider the following results as true spiritual

relationships: the free right to, law of and measure of the "self-limitation of philosophy," which is the central idea of Scheler's "system of conformity," and of Solovyev's "doctrine of integral knowledge,"[158] the individuation of the spiritual soul,[159] and the thesis of the "solidarity of all moral natures."[160]

CHAPTER TWO

SOLOVYEV'S IDEA OF "INTEGRAL KNOWLEDGE" AND SCHELER'S "SYSTEM OF CONFORMITY"

I. THE META-ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASPECT

"Knowledge in its unity is theosophy."[1] We would like to explain this sentence now. "Free theosophy or integral knowledge . . . must represent the highest condition of the whole of philosophy."[2] As such, theosophy constitutes the heart of Solovyev's idea of a cultural, epistemological and historical macrocosm obtained meta-anthropologically on the basis of the facticity of man. "The nature of man as such exhibits three fundamental forms of being *(Sein)*: feeling, thought and the active will. Each of these has two aspects – one exclusively personal, the other social."[3]

As far as the "forms of knowledge" are concerned, man can

> . . . have in mind in his activity of knowing: *either* the variety of factual knowledge obtained by observation and experience of the external world and human life; *or* the formal perfection of knowledge and its logical correctness as a system; *or*, finally, its total-unity *(vsecelost')* or its absolute *content*. In other words, man can have in mind *either* material, factual veracity *or* formal, logical veracity *or* finally, absolute veracity. The domain of knowledge in which the *empirical* content predominates and the main interest belongs to *material* veracity constitutes the so-called "positive sciences." "Abstract philosophy" is made up of that knowledge which is for the most part defined by universal principles and which chiefly concentrates on *logical* perfection or *formal* veracity. Finally, "theology" is constituted by that knowledge which has the *absolute* reality as its primary object and its point of departure. Central to everything in positive science is the *real fact*, in abstract philosophy the *universal idea*, and in theology the *absolute being* (*Wesen*). Therefore the necessary *material foundation* for all knowledge is provided by positive science, its *ideal form* by abstract philosophy and its *absolute content* and highest goal by theology.[4]

We have already anticipated the provisional determination of knowledge as "the total-unity," that is, as the *cooperation* of all which exists with the totally-one absolute being. Comprehended ethically and anthropologically and assuming not only spiritual individuation but also its related principle of solidarity, the element of realizing and the realization of the idea of *hèn kaì pān* of the "second absolute"[5] concentrates itself in the "organic unity of the whole of mankind." Mankind is an organism the unity of which has an absolutely essential relation to the sum of its individuations.[6]

Two developmental laws form the foundation of mankind's essentiality:

a phenomenological law which belongs to organic being in general as such,[7] and a law of phases for the different spheres and levels of *human* organic being *(Sein)* or of the whole of mankind. These are:

1. in natural unity or potential independence,
2. in unconditioned freedom or external connection,
3. in free, synthetic, internal unity.[8]

II. THE HISTORICAL ASPECT

There are three historical phases where this law is incarnated. Solovyev understands these as:

1. the despotic *monism* of the Mohammedan East (Islam),[9]
2. the anarchistic *pluralism* of Western civilization (Catholicism and Germanity)[10] and
3. the free, organic *synthesis* of the "integral life" *(cel'naja žizn')* of the Slavic world of the Russian people.[11]

The first phase of the development – or rather of the law of development, since nothing has "moved" yet in this phase – toward the totality of life[12] remains without any conscious experience of the integration structure of the organic plan of mankind and consequently without any modification of the possible contents of this plan.[13] This phase is represented by the spirit of Islam.

The second phase, which is historically the developmental path of the many, concludes in a consistent but unavoidable system due to the exclusively absolute manner in which the West understands the world. Solovyev calls this understanding "civilizing" because of his preference for Western values. He proposes as the definitive expression of this second phase:

1. regarding the will (Figure IC[14] = economic socialism [the egoism of everyone]).
2. regarding knowledge (Figure IB[15] = empirical positivism [knowledge of the laws governing phenomena]).
3. regarding creativity (Figure IA[16] = utilitarian realism [art which is still handicraft]).

Solovyev developed a structural principle[17] for the Slavic world and its most significant culture bearer, the Russian people.[18] In it, the third and final phase of free, organic synthesis – generally, of the ontological principles of integral life and specifically of *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* or of "free theosophy" – is introduced, actualized and imparted in an historically commissioned calling to the whole of humanity. From the standpoint of the problem of cultures, this principle appears at

first as *the* solution for the tension between East and West in so far as it attempts to relate the *hén* of the "exclusive unity of the contemplative East"[19] to the "exclusive multiplicity, the constant striving of the West,"[20] that is, to the variety of the *pān* by means of the *kaí*.

The decisive emphasis on Scheler's part[21] on the cultural specificity of the East, or rather of Russia, in opposition to Europe, raises the doctrine of the cultural and historical synthesis of the integral life and knowledge to the level of a serious counter argument. This argument by no means loses its significance with Solovyev's later insights about free theosophy[22] and free theocracy[23] because Solovyev is conscious that the collapse of Russian Messianism is the result of the fact that "the true believers will constitute in the end a numerically insignificant minority and that the majority of men will follow the Antichrist."[24]

In what follows we will summarize the system of integral life and knowledge in a diagrammatic form (Figure I) to facilitate understanding. This diagram is based on:

1. the public lecture, *Three Forces* (Moscow 1877),[25]

2. the "general historical introduction" to the incomplete work, *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* (1877),[26]

"The first chapter of this work," – that is, the "general historical introduction"[27] – "was reprinted later in the appendix to Solovyev's doctoral dissertation, *A Critique of Abstract Principles,* (1877–1880)under the title 'Concerning the Law of Historical Development'."[28]

III. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECT

Solovyev calls the free unity of the principles (subject-object) and the levels (absolute, formal, material): "free theurgy" in the creative sphere (A); "free theosophy" in the cognitive sphere (B); and finally, "free theocracy" in the active sphere (C).[29] *The idea of "integral life" is the organic synthesis of all three spheres.*[30] Concerning the "sphere of the mystical," it is "necessary to note that of all three general spheres priority belongs to the creative sphere. Because the mystical assumes first place even in this sphere, it consequently signifies the truly highest principle of the life of humanity as a whole. This is clear since this life is most immediately related in the mystical to the actuality of the absolute primordial principle, to divine life."[31]

Crucial here is the distinction between the concepts "the mystical" and "mysticism." Although a decisive, purely philosophical interpretation of these very central expressions[32] must be reserved for the treatment of

Fig. I.
Historical and epistemological aspects of the "integral life" according to Solovyev.

first force	second force	third force
despotic *monism:* (the Mohammedan East; Islam)	anarchistic *pluralism:* Western civilization – 1st principle: distorted Christianity (Catholicism): authority – 2nd principle: Germanity: unconditioned individual freedom	free organic *synthesis*: (the Slavic world; the Russian people)
hén	*pān*	*hèn kaì pān*
the stage of substantial *unity* and lack of distinction	the stage of historical *development* (based on its isolation it is lower than the stage of unity)	the stage of free organic synthesis to the *integral life* (it represents the solution to the cultural and historical tension between East and West)
A	B	C
the sphere of creativity subjective foundation: *feeling* (in the West: sensation-empiricism) objective principle: *beauty* (in the West: expediency)	the sphere of knowledge subjective foundation: *thought* (in the West: ratio-rationalism) objective principle: *truth* (in the West: the control of phenomena)	the sphere of practical action subjective foundation: *will* (in the West: the absolute, free-arbitrary-will-individualism, voluntary pessimism) objective principle: *universal welfare* (in the West: egoism of everyone)
first absolute level: *the mystical* (in the West: the obscure)	first absolute level: *theology* (in the West: theological dogmatism)	first absolute level: the spiritual society-the *church* (in the West: emanicipated Catholicism)
second formal level: fine *art* (in the West: *L'art pour l'art)*	second formal level: abstract *philosophy* (in the West: panlogism and the emanations of pure formalism)	second formal level: the political society-the *state* (in the West: absolutism)
third material level: *technical art* (in the West: pragmatic technology)	third material level: *positive science* (in the West: positivism)	third material level: *economic society* (in the West: economic socialism)

"organic metaphysics," it is still necessary to make a preliminary approach to *the* problem of Solovyev's philosophy. This philosophy defines "the mystical" as "the direct, and immediate relation of our spirit to the transcendental world."[33] "Mysticism" is "the reflection of our intellect on this relation, constituting a particular direction in philosophy."[34]

These initially purely formal definitions are later amplified. "The mystical" is epistemologically shown to correspond to art in three ways.[35] The following is intended to clarify the expression "mysticism." "The intuitions which recognize a supra-cosmic and supra-human principle as the true being, not only in the form of an abstract principle (as, for example, in the deism of Descartes and Wolff), but also with the entire richness of the being's actual life, such intuitions transcend the limits of institutional philosophy with its two types by adding a special third type of intellectual intuition, usually called 'mysticism'."[36]

Thus, this third type of intuition as such – that is, in as far as it makes use of its own method of knowledge (intuition) which is distinct from rationalism (abstraction) and empiricism (induction) – has its own position "in the center of philosophy itself." The "analogies": mysticism-theology, empiricism-positive science, and rationalism-abstract philosophy are, thus, only relations, not true correlative congruities.[37] This means that Solovyev understands mysticism as a theory of cognition which, standing opposed to both types of institutional philosophy just named, is a third positing-world-view metaphysics.[38] The concept of "the mystical" is to be thought of as the act-correlate of this metaphysics. Thereby, all attempts to relegate the content of both expressions to the realm of "religion" are for the time being stayed. There is no contradiction here to that act required of all thought which corresponds to truth: namely, the philosopher's act of the self-limitation of philosophy. This act is not concerned with recognizing the mystical as something essentially different from and opposed to philosophy, but instead with recognizing oneself as organically interwoven in the totality of life and consequently submissively ordered to this totality. It especially concerns "the realization in one's human (rational) element"[39] of that which is known and affirmed in the idea. That the mystical remains "in the center of philosophy" is not altered by frequent repetitions that "the 'reality' of the absolute principle as a being in itself independent of us cannot be proven purely logically, just as in general any independent reality of some other being outside of us is not concluded from pure thought . . . , (but)[40] these are given only by means of faith."[41] In the first place "faith" is equatable here[42] to the personal conviction of the "that" of existence in general – which, because it cannot be logically

proven,[43] has an a-logical character. Solovyev's late epistemological work, *Theoretical Philosophy* (1897–1899), constitutes an interesting phenomenological variant to this principle. In the second place, the mystical as gnoseology is concerned with the "what" of the being, not with its existence.[44]

"The path of 'finding' oneself anew 'in God' by losing oneself totally is called humility in the moral sphere and pure 'intuition' in the intellectual."[45] Whoever accomplishes this "must struggle continuously with the phenomenon, that his intuition surpasses the limits of his understanding and that his feelings betray facts and relations which he is unable to 'conceptualize'."[46] In this sense, Scheler's "marriage with things and God"[47] – "an activity which grows more profound, more central and more spiritual on the way to the attitude meant by Bergson"[48] – is just as much a "philosophy of total-unity" as Solovyev's prototype.

CHAPTER THREE

THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND METAPHYSICS

I. TYPOLOGY

A word must still be said about Scheler's "system of conformity" and its bases for comparison. Johannes Hessen determined eight essentially different basic components of this system as delineated in its totality in Scheler's unsystematic presentation.[1] These components make clear the autonomy and irreducibility of "religion" and "metaphysics."[2] Only a few indispensable statements are necessary.

First, Solovyev cannot in any way be considered an adherent of "gnosticism," which is opposed to the conformity relation and which is, according to Scheler, the first erroneous definition of conformity. For "the essence of gnostic systems of identity is that religion, both positive and natural, is regarded only as a *lower* stage of knowledge on the path to metaphysical knowledge."[3]

Solovyev assumes (as Scheler later did[4]) that the essence and existence of religion are *more originary* than all metaphysics.[5] This is not all. Solovyev wants his speculation to be first and foremost a rational appropriation of the mysteries of revealed faith.[6] On this ground there could be only a partial identity with Medieval Church Scholasticism. Nevertheless, any connoisseur of the "philosophy of total-unity" knows what Solovyev thought of the Scholastic tradition since John Scotus Eriugena.[7]

The dualistic accounts of faith and knowledge are irrelevant to the extent that they question the possibility and justification of metaphysics in general. With good reason Solovyev named such explanatory attempts "pseudo-metaphysics."[8] In his opinion, they posit the being only as a mere X. For both Solovyev and Scheler, Kant (spiritualism) on the side of the rationalists, and the positivists (materialism) who favour a return to empiricism, prove to be exponents of this pseudo-metaphysical "transitional doctrine."[9] In *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge,* Solovyev argues quite decisively and explicitly against this and for the possibility and consequently the justification of metaphysics in that he is equally polemical against vulgar *and* critical scepticism (e.g., Kant's doctrine of the "thing in itself" is characterized as the latter).[10] To make inferences about Scheler's

"system of conformity" is, after these references, at least permissible, although to make final conclusions would naturally leave much open and in question.

II. THE PROBLEMS

In Hessen's outline of Scheler's "system of conformity" the points: (1) drive for knowledge and awe; (2) variety of goals; (5) the different kinds of certainty; (6) the variety of personal bearers; (7) the sociological difference between school and church; and (8) the difference of expression between symbol and concept can be compared definitively with Solovyev's views *on the difference between religion and metaphysics.*[11] On the other hand, there is lack of clarity about "faith" and "the spontaneity of reason" as well as about "non-givenness *(Ungegebenheit)* of the personality of God."[12] These must be examined more carefully.

1. *"Faith" and "the Spontaneity of Reason"*

When Scheler says: "Religion's God and the world-basis of metaphysics may be identical in reality, but as intentional objects they are different in essence. The God of religious consciousness 'is' and lives exclusively in the religious act,"[13] and when Solovyev emphasizes that philosophy is never able to guarantee the unconditional credibility of the absolute existing truth but is nevertheless obligated "to seek it as far as possible,"[14] then they are both asserting *the essential inadequacy of metaphysics when confronted with the total phenomenon of religion.* When Solovyev designates *in a like manner* not only the reality positing assertion of a *philosophical* intuition but also the *religious* act of worshipping God as a "faith,"[15] then we must be critically aware of that in each statement. Accordingly "metaphysical empiricism" – and this is very important! – is not empirical metaphysics. This means that metaphysical empiricism, even for Solovyev himself, has nothing to do with religious faith. Instead it is only the latter's "analogon" in as far as certainty adheres to *philosophical* "faith" on the basis of phenomenological evidence while it adheres to *religious* faith through the self-manifestation of the person of God.

2. *The Ontological and Epistemological Contents of "the Mystical" in Solovyev*

A synthetic view of Solovyev's understanding of philosophy must articulate and contrast two fundamental problem areas – related to *idea (Vorstellung)*

and *will* – in the "idea of the philosopher" or, in Scheler's words, in the "philosophical attitude." These problem areas constitute the core of the *epistemological* on the one hand and, on the other hand, of the *ontological* dimension and intention of all those spiritual acts which try to attain the "goal" of their movement, of their "upsurge," be it in the *ideality* or in the *reality* of their object. In the former one speaks of "ob"-jects *("Gegen"-ständen)* and in the latter of "re"-sistances *("Wider"-ständen)*. There is nothing to stop us from using – although in another sense – the title of Schopenhauer's main work to designate how the object totality is given from the subject's viewpoint.

According to Solovyev's epistemological and metaphysical conception, we must take "the world *as will and idea"* in the sense of a totalized intentionality or as the object of philosophy, that is, of the philosophy of "integral knowledge." This axiomatic statement corresponds to a division in "world" or "object," because this complex logical or ontological fact has to be given to the will otherwise than it is given to the intellect. In clear dependence on Schopenhauer,[16] Maine de Biran and above all on Schelling's metaphysical, theosophical irrationalism, Solovyev clearly and unequivocally makes a distinction – as Scheler later will – between "reality as resistance experience," existing in an intentional relation to the will, and "ideality as phenomenology," which is related to the intellect.

Solovyev's synthesis of *maè ón (*or *dynámei ón)* and *tí*, as "the necessary *prius* not only of our being *(Sein)* but also of our knowledge,"[17] is the absolute actuality. This actuality is independent of all thought. It can never be changed into a datum of phenomenal empiricism or of logic. Nor can it be changed into a state of our consciousness or into an act of our thinking.[18] In relation to and in confrontation with this absolute actuality the will alone is in a position to guarantee that "direct and immediate relation of our spirit to the transcendent world,"[19] which is required by "the mystical" and is explained as metaphysically given. The will alone is able to verify the factual and unquestionable reality and existence of the absolute actuality in that mystical experience of resistance as the *"principium per se notum"* of "metaphysical empiricism," which Solovyev took over from the *Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation* – although critical of Schelling's presentation of it. The will alone is able to place at the disposal of philosophy as the phenomenology of ideality its true substrate in an act of complete certainty and evidence, a priori effected by the will, which is, as Solovyev says, "*faith* in the unconditioned existence of the object."[20]

From here on the *epistemological* aspect of Solovyev's "mysticism" begins the phenomenological role it was intended to play; it seems never

to have occurred to Solovyev to talk about simple-minded, bigotted fancies which reveal an extraordinarily important spirit-urge dynamism which transcends the metaphysical empiricism of a Schelling with the considerable restriction of its additions directed at the dualistic, gnostic self-deification in Schelling and Scheler.

The explicit Augustinian method of internal experience in conjunction with the a priori verification of reality can dispense completely with the question of existence. This is because it does not advocate the analytical character of Descartes' mathematical reform, but instead, based on the ever occurring suspension of the will-datum of a metaphysical empirical experienced reality, leads to the bracketing of existence and consequently to the ontological knowledge of essence.

The act that is correlative to this phenomenological form of knowledge is intellectual intuition – the epistemological aspect of the mystical. Therefore, we have good reason to speak of a phenomenological reduction even in *Solovyev's* philosophy; precisely because his philosophical conception is unthinkable without metaphysical empiricism and because these repeated arguments about the *rational* insolubility of the reality problem, which transcends all *epistemological* philosophy, admit no other interpretation. In addition, "this philosophy is not concerned with the external order of phenomena, but instead with the internal order of essences . . . , an order which is determined by their relation to the first and foremost essence."[21] To make this order still clearer, we repeat: that classic principle of the "self-limitation of philosophy" is necessary, which the Scholastics meant when they spoke of philosophy as the *"ancilla theologiae,"* and which both Solovyev and Scheler helped to rediscover in an extremely modern, sensitive and sympathetic explication. This principle solidifies itself in both their thoughts in that grand and courageous truth that man actually exists only in the total-unity of immanence *and* transcendence, that he therefore only truly knows that which he recognizes. This principle solidifies itself in the "idea of integral knowledge" and in the "system of conformity."

The revolutionary – in the best sense of the word – efficacy of the two conceptions consists in the simple fact that a phenomenology of the Christian metaphysics of love is basic to both of them. It was this new starting point which brought onto the scene the doctrine of personal acts, the knowledge of the conversion of love and lastly the principle of the intentional transcending of all philosophy, which no longer wanted to be mere epistemological critique or no longer believed that it could get by with such an arbitrarily posited limit of the relation of the essence "man," "finite spiritual person." With the help of these new discoveries the armour

of the modern institutional traditions was blown apart. Solovyev develops this relation in the following manner:

> Because man is a divine idea only . . . in unconditioned love, therefore the actualization of his divine principle in the lower elements by him is nothing else than the actualization of total-unity or the realization of absolute love in the relative world of reason and nature.[22]
>
> To effect this task a person subordinates himself, if he . . . does not have at his disposal the necessary means to solve this unconditional task, freely and naturally to one who – because he is situated at the highest level of spiritual perfection – can supply him with the means . . . .[23]

The "aim" of this subordination is "the total-unity or the unconditioned fulness of being *(Sein)*."[24] Its method, however, is the spiritual act of love of a finite human person. It is the "conversion of love" in the "act of upsurge" as the personal act of the total man (Scheler). Or it is "inspiration"[25] as the act-form of the mystical, or intellectual vision (Solovyev).

This intellectual vision as intellectual intuition occurs in comprehensive and potentially transcendental acts of integral knowledge in its creative tendency and through the determinateness of these acts as love in the personal upsurge of inspiration. The source, however, of this creative act of love is the center of the person himself as the totally-unifying philosophical subject; it is spirit. Spirit transcends the intentional value of all essential acts of which *ratio* is capable. Basic to the act-form of intellectual intuition is the modality of love and the being good of the object in itself and "in relation to" as the goal of love. Therefore, in view of its incapability of participating in the being *(Sein)* of the true being other than through knowledge, philosophy as theory of knowledge must limit itself to the simple cognitive relation – rather than seeking an idea of integral knowledge or a participation in the true being by means of an act of love as a personal act of the total man. This does not require cooperation because it transcends in an act of love. This is the mystical as Solovyev understands it.

The wish on the part of philosophy to discredit the mystical as a philosophical discipline and to banish it from philosophy's jurisdiction would mean in truth to bear false witness to the historical status of the history of the humanities. To join Windelband in avoiding a one-sided assessment of Medieval philosophy, "a more precise view would reveal that the mystical played just as great a role as Scholasticism in upholding scientific traditions and in the gradual accommodation to and transformation of philosophical doctrines effective for posterity. A strict separation of both currents is unfair to a large number of leading philosophical figures of the Middle Ages."[26]

Solovyev agrees with Scheler in designating the mode of being *(Seinsweise)* of the primordial essence as "absolute love," that is, as act. His mystical as intellectual intuition, as participating in the essential primordial being and as an act *(Aktussein)* with the same love content found in the conversion of the original movement of love, is consequently exactly what Scheler said "about the nature of philosophy" in his phenomenology of religion: "A love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles."[27]

We arrive at a surprising and overwhelming conclusion, which illuminates a bold intuition. Solovyev could have long stood on the foundation of that view called "phenomenological" since Husserl, because he allows the validity of a knowledge of essence and indeed recognizes essence in itself only in this form.[28] This knowledge of essence philosophizes without regard for the question of existence and assumes the absolute evidence of both formal axioms of a metaphysics of being. The first axiom is that "there is an *ens a se* – or existent whose existence is a consequence of its essence – which differs from the whole of contingent things, events, realities, i.e. from the whole of the 'world'." The second is that "this *ens a se* is the prime cause and basis of the fact that out of all intrinsically possible worlds this one contingent world is real."[29]

It at first seems that Ludolf Müller was correct in his formulation of the given presupposition when he says: "God's existence is known *a posteriori* and is a fact of experience. His essence is accessible, however, to speculation, *umozrenie*, to spiritual vision."[30] However, he, like Schelling, replies to the question of how man may experience this divine existing *(Existieren)* as follows: "Above all in history, the actual core of which is *history of religion* – in the religious experience of humanity."[31]

Although this is to a certain extent true and is substantiated even by Solovyev, the latter furnished above all a strictly *philosophical* explanation for the problem of the givenness of "God's existence" or of the existence of the absolute or true being.

The truth of knowledge is determined by the truth of the object. The object's truth consists first of all in its actuality and secondly in its universality. In respect to the actuality of the object of knowledge (because knowledge has an object which is in a certain respect actual) we reach the following conclusion. The object is determined in its real and total actuality: first, as unconditioned *being (ens, óntōs ón)*; second, as an *essence (essentia, ousía)* or idea which is somehow constant and one; and third, as a *being (Sein)* which is in a certain respect actual or as appearance *(actus, phainómenon)*. Correspondingly, the actual knowledge of the object (the objective knowledge) is also determined: first, as *faith* in the unconditioned existence of the object; second, as the intellectual intuition or *representation* [ideation[32]] of its essence or idea; and third, as the *creative actualization* or the realization of this idea in actual

sensations or in the empirical data of our natural sensible consciousness. The first expresses that the object *is,* the second, *what* it is and the third shows *how* the object appears. Only the totality of these three phases expresses the object's complete actuality.[33]

The "faith in the unconditioned existence of the object" is, however, nothing else than an *"experience of reality correlated with an organic function."* In Chapter XXVIII of *A Critique of Abstract Principles,* Solovyev explains that "sensible experience as knowledge of immediate actuality" is fundamental to this faith.

An "I," a "this one," is not certain about "this" object because of the activity of his consciousness and the manifold movement of thought. Nor is there certainty because the object of certainty represents an abundance of internal determinations or a multiplicity of external interrelations due to its different properties. The truth of sense certainty has nothing to do with either of these. Neither I (the one who knows) nor the object (that which is to be known) represent any manifold of mediating determinations. I (the one who knows) does not appear here in the sense of a manifold representing or thinking. Nor does the thing to be known appear with the meaning of manifold properties. Instead the object is merely there, and it is only there because it exists. That *it is,* is alone essential for sense knowledge. This pure being *(Sein)* or this simple immediacy constitutes the whole truth of the object.[34]

In other words and more concisely: *"Truth is reality, but for us reality can only be guaranteed by immediate sense certainty."*[35]

This "truth of fact," the "truth of the thing" or of "the nature of things" leads first into naturalism, from there through hylozoism to the universal ground of being *(Sein).* It transfers itself as matter into the phenomena of resistance and impenetrability. Nevertheless, a contradiction arises from the thought of the unconditioned (monistic) unity of matter. Is truth only the epistemological correlate of infinite matter? . . . If only matter is true, then the plurality of things and appearances has only apparent being *(Sein).* The consequence is pure abstract materialism. A dynamic atomism immediately opposes this materialism. Atomism recognizes the reality of the multiplicity of things and appearances. Nevertheless the true being *(Sein)* of the atomistic monads remains inaccessible to empirical science and can be comprehended only by logical thinking. Thus, phenomenal realism arises from substantial realism. Reality becomes appearance, being *(Sein)* becomes relation and matter becomes sensation. Sensualism, abstract empiricism and positivism develop from this "critical realism." Critique of sensualism results in idealism, critique of scientific empiricism in a transition to spiritual vision *(k umozreniju),* and critique of positivism in the necessity of rational philosophy. Dogmatic, critical and absolute rationalism, the three forms of rational philosophy, finally reach the limit of abstract philosophy in general. It becomes evident to abstract philosophy that objective knowledge can not be obtained either from sensations or from

concepts as the subjective conditions of consciousness. Thus, "in the realm of knowledge," abstract philosophy must turn "to a religious principle." How does this take place? First of all, by means of the "universal determination of the true object in its three fundamental elements." In Chapter XLII of *A Critique of Abstract Principles,* Solovyev starts with a descriptive assertion of the philosophical definition of truth. *Truth is not only being but also unity and totality. Truth is existent total-unity.* Of these three predicates, the first (that truth is being) expresses only the simple being *(Sein)* of that which is characterized as truth, the being *(Sein)* of the subject of truth. The statement "truth is a being" only asserts that truth *is* and, therefore, that *an actual subject* corresponds to this concept. However, in order actually to state that truth is requires at least a very general concept of *what* truth is, or more exactly, what truth could be. The two other predicates of truth – namely, being "one" and "all" – provide the answer. For "truth is determined" by means of them "in its objective being *(Sein)*, in its idea or in its objective essence." These two predicates give the objective content of truth to the subject assumed of it, to the being.

Thus, while truth as *being* is unconditioned actuality, on which all other actuality depends or by means of which all other actuality is determined, truth as *total-unity* represents the reason or meaning of total existence. This reason or meaning *(ratio, lógos)* is nothing else than the interrelation of all to one. The (plural) *reality* of truth shows itself always related to *rationality,* to (one) reason *(razum).* In its truth, that is, as something which is true, *our* subject consists of two elements inextricably bound up together. There is, on the one hand, the *real* element, "many," which is subjectively expressed in the plurality of sensations. On the other hand, there is the *rational* element, "one," of reason *(razum)* which thinks. Since in truth as total-unity each is inextricably bound up with all, so *our* subject as true being *(Sein)* is not in opposition to all, but instead exists and knows itself as inseparably bound up with all. It knows itself in everything. Thus, it also knows everything in itself. If this is really the case, "then the *real* element in our consciousness is *only the organic part of the total reality* as are the sensations of our consciousness; then our consciousness' reason (its *rational* element) is only the expression of the total meaning of things, *tou lógou tōn óntōn, tou katholikou lógou.*"[36]

But how can we know being, in particular how can we know that totally-one being, if true knowledge is only knowledge of the being? The answer to this question parallels a fundamental distinction between sensations and concepts. The *empirical* (real) and the *logical* (rational) elements of our knowledge are *two possible forms or modes of being (Seinsweisen) of that*

which is knowable by us. That which is known, the object of our knowledge, consists neither in the one nor in the other form of *relative* being *(Sein).* For this object is itself neither sensation nor concept. So too, our knowledge does not relate to sensations and concepts, but to that which *is* in them. It relates to what is felt in every actual sensation and to what is thought in each concept of reason. It relates, therefore, to the *being.* "This distinction between the being and its relative being *(Sein)* or the forms of being *(Sein)* has *real decisive significance for the total world-view,* even if in this general expression it appears as a dialectical subtlety."[37]

The distinction between being (Sein) and a being (Seiendem) makes manifest that the expression "being" *("Sein")* has two completely different meanings. According to Solovyev, this expression represents nature, substance (matter) for realism. In the critical further development of realism, in sensualism and empiricism, this expression represents sensation. For rationalistic idealism, it represents pure thought. Both philosophical directions start with an opposition between objective and subjective being *(Sein),* with the thing which is to be known and the reason which knows, without actually overcoming this opposition. Thus, sensation is not a condition of the subject for consistent sensualism, because the subject itself is not yet recognized as existent outside of sensation. For consistent rationalism, the pure thought is not the intellectual act of the subject, because the subject itself is not recognized as existing outside of the thought or the concept. Consequently, neither sensation nor thought turns out to be a determinate form of being *(Seinsform) of the subject.* Both represent only mere being *(Sein),* "being *(Sein)* in general, the identity of the subjective and the objective," an "empty word."

Solovyev does not want to be satisfied with this meaningless result. There is for him an essential difference between the existential predicates of the statements "I am" or "this being *(Wesen)* is", on the one hand, and "this thought is" or "this sensation is", on the other hand. In the first case, being *(Sein)* appears as the *predicate of a subject,* of just that being *(Wesen)* about which it is said that it is. In the second case, being *(Sein)* appears only as the predicate of a *sensing* or *thinking* subject, to which being *(Sein)* does not belong as an independent predicate. The predicate of the expression "I am" also contains my sensations and thoughts. For I am, among other things, also someone who feels and thinks. Thought and sensation belong, therefore, to the content of this being *(Sein).* They are determinate modes of being *(Sein)* or *partial predicates of a determinate subject,* of which we can quite generally say that it is. My thoughts or my sensations represent consequently a part of my being *(Sein),* a determinate

mode of my being *(Sein)*. Thus, all actual and possible modes of my being *(Sein)* – thought, sensation, will-act, etc. – are to be understood under the existential predicate of the expression "I am."

If one simply says "this thought is" or "this sensation is," then thought and sensation can be only grammatically valid [here] as subjects with the predicate being *(Sein)*. From a logical point of view, however, there is no way for them to be actual subjects since they are themselves only predicates of someone who thinks and feels. It follows from this that being *(Sein)* can in no way be their actual predicate. Consequently, the statements "my thought is," "my sensation is" only mean "I think," "I feel." Stated quite generally, "a thought is," "a sensation is" only mean "someone thinks," "someone feels" or "there is one who thinks," "there is one who feels." Finally, "being *(Sein)* is" only means "there is one who is." Consequently, statements in such an unconditional form are simply false. One cannot simply or unconditionally say: will is, thought is, being *(Sein)* is. Will, thought and being *(Sein)* are only in so far as there is also someone who wills, thinks and is. The death knell of all abstract philosophy consists in the unclarity of consciousness or in the imperfect use of this apparently simple and evident truth. All the essential errors of abstract philosophy are reducible to a conscious or unconscious *hypostatising of predicates.* One of the [two] directions of this [abstract] philosophy (rationalism) comprehends [only] universal *logical* predicates. The other (realism) concerns itself [only] with *empirical* partial predicates. To avoid these errors, one must above all recognize that these predicates in their abstraction in no way constitute the actual object of philosophy as true knowledge. Instead *the being in its predicates* is the actual object of philosophy. Only when this is recognized will our knowledge correspond to that which actually is, and no longer be an empty thinking in which nothing is thought.

Thus, neither this nor that being *(Sein)*, neither this nor that predicate in itself represent the actual object of any knowledge (for there are no such things as predicates in themselves). Rather that to which this being *(Sein)* belongs, which is expressed in this being *(Sein)*, or *that subject to which the given predicates are related,* is the actual object of any knowledge. Correspondingly, philosophy as true and universal knowledge does not have being *(Sein)* in general as its object, but has instead that to which being *(Sein)* in general belongs. This means that the object of philosophy is *the unconditioned being or the being as the unconditioned ground of any being (Sein).*[38]

Now that we have the presuppositions for a philosophical understanding of the answer to our initial question about the givenness of the "existence of God," or of the absolute or true being, the actual answer can be provided. Solovyev explains in this respect:

The unconditioned being is also *known* as the sole positive ground of each being *(Sein)* – and *in a like manner in every being (Sein).* Since it is that which *is* in *every* being *(Sein)*, therefore it is also that which is *known* in *any* knowledge. The unconditioned being can never be a datum of empirical or logical knowledge. Nor can it become a sensation or a concept. It also cannot be transformed into a state of our consciousness or into an act of our thought. In *this* sense, the unconditioned being is *unconditionally unknowable.* However, simultaneously, the absolute primordial ground is *unconditionally knowable even in empirical and logical knowledge,* because even here that which really is known – the actual object – is neither sensation nor thought, but instead that which is felt or that which is thought, therefore a *being.* Because I recognize the unconditional existence as the object of my knowledge and consider it not as a

mere state of my consciousness but as something which exists in itself, I therefore know the unconditioned being in this object. In anything which I know, I have before me not this or that sensible or mental predicate, but instead *the subject of these predicates.* Because the unconditioned being is *the one subject of all predicates,* of any being *(Sein),* thus it is also *the one object of any knowledge.* We know it in everything we know, and *without it we are unable to know anything at all.* Because any knowledge about a predicate or about being *(Sein)* relates to the subject of that predicate or to the essence to which that being *(Sein)* belongs, thus the unconditioned being alone is the existent object of knowledge.[39]

Solovyev's position of "metaphysical empiricism"[40] gives us the right moreover to transpose the original assertion – "truth is reality, but for us reality can only be guaranteed by immediate sense certainty"[41] – with equal validity to the transcendental sphere of being *(Sein)* and knowledge.[42] The consequences of these premises lead quite generally to the following conclusion: every intuition, in the execution of which phenomenon and that which is intended [meaning, idea[43]] coincide, is as such that which it is: that is, it has an evidential character. As opposed to this, faith can intend only that act which, based on some variations in the realm of phenomenal corporeality,[44] experiences the existence of another.[45]

Let us return to the question of the certainty of being *(Seinsgewissheit)* of the *óntōs ón* in particular.

Even Ludolf Müller, for example, recognizes that, according to Solovyev, the essence of the absolute being is obtained through intuition. The content of this intuition consists entirely in the fact that this absolute being *is.* Since the subject of the being necessarily belongs to the predicate of being *(Seinsprädikat)* on the absolute level, then there are only two possible interpretations of the truth content of the previous statements. The *first* is that the existence of this being fully disappears in the concept (or in the idea) of absolute being – as an essence-filled "intellectual intuition." This is because there is no third determination constituting the actual besides the concepts being *(Sein)* and essence.[46] If this were the case, Solovyev's philosophy would be spoken of as panlogism. However, his methodical stance makes it clear that this is not the case as can be seen from his three theses critical of Hegel[47] in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge.* The *second* interpretation is that the evidential existence of the absolute being breaks through illuminatively in the intuition of essence.

There can be no doubt that Solovyev considers the second position as the correct and only meaningful one. For he says that "the eternal truth is not force but truth, and its whole being *(Sein)* is exhausted by this."[48] One should keep in mind what we said about truth as reality in regard to the starting point of metaphysical empiricism.[49] What we are saying here

provisionally takes care of the meta-anthropological transcendental bracketing of the reality problem.

Since we have demonstrated the a posteriori character of the extra-subjective givenness of reality (of course, not in a religious-historical sense), but still wish to remain strictly in the realm of pure vision *(umozrenie),* or of intellectual intuition *(umstvennoe sozercanie)* and, thus, within the relevance and validity of evidence and intuition, the certainty of the absolute being's existence can, and must, be thought as mediated by an insight into its essence. Thus, Solovyev lets his empirical metaphysical statements be immediately followed by the axiomatic expression of the highest essential evidence of the intellectual intuition about the absolute being. This is, so to speak, the culmination of his intuitively illuminated thought structure: *"Essentia eius involvit eius existentiam."*[50]

In this way he constitutes the first and most formal proposition of his metaphysics of being *(Seinsmetaphysik).* Due to the nature of the case, however, this proposition is valid only in this single instance. This means that because only intuition knows the unconditioned and absolute being, and simultaneously its being *(Sein),* it remains entirely excluded from all phenomenology, which brackets the problem of existence; or it surpasses phenomenology as a method (Scheler) and as a possibility of philosophical knowledge (Solovyev).

All that can be given *beyond* this object in intellectual intuition is, therefore, pure *phenomenology of essence.* Such a phenomenology is supported by thought through the evidence of the being *(Sein)* of an *ens a se,* through the intuitive identity of object and act in the experience of fulfillment, that is, on the basis of *philosophical* faith. However, it is supported by the object and by the absolute bearer of the essence "being" through personal revelation, that is, through the act of *religious* faith. In the latter act, the inquirer can reach for the first time final and completely insubjective *(insubjektive)* certainty of the truth actuality of his formal or phenomenological[51] contents. This is based on the release from all efforts of a thinking which is positing and indeterminate.

"This end [the end of all philosophizing][52] is the philosophical recognition on the part of human understanding of that positive truth which is given in revelation. It is after recognizing the given religious truth that our understanding first acquires a strong objective base for its metaphysical labor. Our understanding brings philosophy out of the realm of the human play of thoughts over into the realm of divine truth."[53]

We believe that these sentences provide both Solovyev's own definition of his "essential ontic" *("Wesensontik")* and an adequate and consistent

explanation of first, the experiential character of the "concept of faith," and second, the evidently certain act-content of the "concept of faith." For the second presupposition of Scheler's metaphysics which has not yet been mentioned we refer to Solovyev's axiom that "there is not and cannot be any *such* essence as one which remains exclusively in itself, which is unconditionally isolated from all appearances and which exists beyond any appearance. [What is meant here is the 'thing in itself' which is declared 'trans-intelligible' by both Kant and the positivists.[54]] This parallels the fact that there is no appearance nor can there be any without an absolute independent essence, whose appearance it is."[55]

3. *Concerning the "Non-Givenness of the Personality of God"*

We can complete our comparison of "integral knowledge" with Scheler's "system of conformity" in regard to the problem of the "non-givenness of the personality of God." Scheler emphasizes the following *for metaphysics* in sharp opposition to the experience of religion. "However, the personality of God is withheld from every kind of spontaneous rational cognition in finite beings – not on account of any alleged limitations of the cognitive faculty, but because it belongs to the nature of a purely spiritual person in its objective aspect that its existence (if it exists) can only be known as a result of self-communication, that is, revelation."[56]

In order to explain the "reason" for this statement, an understanding of "act-phenomenology" as well as Scheler's "doctrine of the person" would have to be assumed. However, such an understanding has not yet been reached.[57] What is logically and unconditionally required here – the act-phenomenological advancement to the "absolute spiritual person" – can take place by means of a few axiomatic and definitional statements. These should temporarily exempt us from a more extensive comment on the "doctrine of presuppositions."

The first statement is valid for the theory of actuality in general and for its individualization (material) and its functionalization (formal): "It 'belongs' to the essence of an *object* to be comprehensible by an *act* . . . ."[58]

The second statement is a "definition of essence" and is valid for the relation between act and person: "The *person* is the concrete, itself essential unity of being *(Seinseinheit)* of the *acts* of different kinds of essences. This unity of being in itself . . . precedes . . . all essential act differences. The being of the person 'grounds' all essentially different acts."[59]

The third statement is valid for the relation between person and world: "Each *world* [as an intentional total-object][60] . . . is simultaneously only a concrete world and only as the world of a *person.*"[61]

The fourth statement is: "The personal counterpart of the *macrocosm* would be the idea of an *infinite* and *perfect spiritual person,* the acts of which would be given in an act-phenomenology according to their essential determinations. Act-phenomenology is concerned with the acts of all possible persons."[62]

"The actual positing of this idea of God never gives us philosophy. Instead, it could only give rise to a concrete person again, who stands in immediate communication with the one corresponding to this idea and to whom the concrete essence of this idea is 'self-evident'. Thus, any actuality of 'God' is grounded only in a possible positive manifestation of God in a concrete person."[63] This thought[64] is anticipatorily verified in its essentials in Solovyev's eleventh and twelfth lectures on God-manhood.[65] However, much is still left open which concerns the development of this thought from the meta-anthropological starting point of act-phenomenology. In regard to Solovyev's philosophy, this involves, firstly, the problem of the divisions "I (internal perception)-external world" and "person (act)-world"[66] and, secondly, the question about the concept of intentionality in general. This would have to be examined in order to demonstrate an explicit correspondence with Solovyev's thought. However, the novelty of Scheler's intuitions, which he liked to claim a "Copernican revolution,"[67] is apparently in historical contradiction to this. We would like emphatically to suggest that the Russian, Solovyev, has perhaps been neglected in the realm of philosophy in general as well as in the foundations of a thinking considered indebted to the Platonic-Augustinian tradition (considering the period between 1873 and 1900). In *Europe and the Eastern Soul,*[68] Walter Schubart made reference to this possibility.[69] In this respect the American[70] criticism[71] of him was not quite correct.[72] What we would like to indicate clearly, at least in an outline form, is a corresponding understanding of "I" and "person" in both Solovyev and Scheler.

4. *"I"–"External World"*

Through the addition of determinate and phenomenologically demonstratably distinct material of a simple formless intuition, the idea of the object and its correlate, the idea of the act, divide equiprimordially into the idea of an "I" and a "matter" (or into the corresponding directional difference of "internal" and "external" perception). Thus, the I can in no sense of the word be the condition of the object. It is itself only an object among objects. It has identity because identity is an essential characteristic of an object.[73]

In reference to the chapter "Sense-Certainty, This and Meaning" from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind,*[74] Solovyev, in *A Critique of Abstract Principles,* agrees with this position of Scheler. A similar starting point is

formulated in Solovyev's discussion of sense experience as knowledge of the immediate actuality (Chapter XXVIII). This passage reads:

> "I" have certainty through an other – that is, through the object. However, in sense knowledge this object appears likewise through another, namely, through the 'I.' Consequently the essence of sense certainty does not consist in pure immediate being *(Sein)* (in that which is ordinarily characterized as reality). Rather in each actual example or case of such certainty, thus in every case of sense knowledge, this immediate simple being *(Sein)* dissociates necessarily into two correlative expressions (the one who knows and that which is knowable), which condition one another. Therefore, even sense certainty proves to be conditioned.[75]

Following an analysis of the two related parts of sense certainty, Solovyev states:

> Thus sense experience itself shows us that its truth and essence consists neither in the immediate being *(Sein)* of the object nor in the immediate being *(Sein)* of the subject or of the "I." For that which is sensibly experienced (the immediate actuality) proves to be inessential for both. The "I" and the object are universal in a like manner. Thus, each individual "here," "now," and "I," which sense certainty has in mind, cannot consist in them as such.[76]

It is evident from these statements that the correlation "I"-"external world," in Scheler's sense, is already given for Solovyev. "Internal perception," which Scheler characterizes in more detail, constitutes also for Solovyev the mediating term of experience. Initially, Solovyev's meaning of "internal perception" was influenced by Schopenhauer (the world is immediately only my idea)[77] and was quite different from Scheler's doctrine of objective qualities for the perception of the world[78] ("all sensual perceptions . . . are completely subjective"[79]).

5. *The Constitution of the Concept of Consciousness*

"I myself, my I, is only a state of my consciousness."[80] This sentence from *On the Actuality of the External World and the Foundation of Metaphysical Knowledge* (1875), which was written as a defense against the polemical attacks on Solovyev's master's dissertation, corresponds to the concept of consciousness found in the *Theoretical Philosophy*. Consciousness is a co-knowledge *(Mit-wissen)* of internal states and "acts" *(dejstvija)*.[81] Thus, it corresponds to all three concepts of consciousness which Scheler mentions by name. Scheler equates consciousness:

first, with "every 'consciousness of,' every intentional meaning and being directed toward *(Gerichtetsein)*;

second, with . . . the totality of the phenomena of internal perception;

third, with the totality of the real experiences of an individual."[82]

Let us first dispose of the most serious obstacles. The "art" of seeing these

as one consists first and foremost in a clarification of terminology. We have already drawn attention to the fact that on Solovyev's part there is *no* "explicit" division of the contents "I" and "person," although the essential nuances distinguishing them are recognized. His strictly traditional terminology is in part explainable, on the one hand, by his attitude which is typically the counterpart of Kant,[83] and, on the other hand, by his spiritual abstinence[84] in accordance with the maxim: "Do not strive for novelty and originality."[85] This spiritual abstinence is somewhat similar to Scheler's humility[86] – a "virtue of the scholar,"[87] which Scheler unfortunately later no longer cultivated.

6. *"Person" – "Act"*

This did not prevent Solovyev from making us aware that as "person" man is the bearer[88] and act-center[89] of the idea. As we have indicated, it is also his opinion that the "conditioned"[90] correlation: I–external world could never realize this. In the third lecture on God-manhood, something like an act-phenomenology is already presented;[91] for the acts of willing, thinking, and feeling are "of a united spirit."[92] It is further *"evident that* [an act[93]] *my thought, for example, in which or for which all that is thinkable exists, can itself no longer be thinkable."*[94] This is an axiom out of Scheler's doctrine of actuality which we must already anticipate here in Solovyev. In acts of willing, thinking, and feeling the person is experienced as "a certain immediate appearance of true being *(Sein)* . . . and consequently the true being"[95] is experienced. Because of the objective incapability *(Gegenstandsunfähigkeit)* of the act and consequently of the person *"the being* [remains] *always something foreign to the understanding, something that has no place in its sphere, something irrational."*[96] *This means, quite simply, that the person is trans-intelligible.*

The formulation of epistemological non-givenness offers us the opportunity to clarify its relation to "Bergson's irrational intuition."[97] When von Hildebrand says in defence of Scheler that "Bergson . . . irreconcilably opposes *ratio* to his intuition and wants to put an immediate vital feeling in the place of all spiritual knowledge (spiritual knowledge includes here intuitive insight in the phenomenological sense . . . representing the prototype and summit of spiritual apprehension and the most actual and profound link with objective *ratio*),"[98] then he contradicts Scheler's own analysis. Such a statement cannot be correct, in our opinion, if the *Attempts at a Philosophy of Life*[99] are taken into consideration. Here Scheler explicitly emphasizes "that which Bergson calls 'intuition' does not . . . precede the level of energetic thought activity as the scientific researcher

practices it, but succeeds it. His intuition does not take place before a logical analysis of phenomena, but after it."[100] At the end of the treatise mentioned above, Scheler comments that Bergson has "greatly inspired" his own thinking.[101] This acknowledgement of indebtedness is certainly true for his intuitive starting point, since he calls "a philosophy which starts with the experience of the essential contents of the world,"[102] that is, phenomenology, only the more exact and more strict German method.[103]

The manner in which Scheler describes Bergson's idea of philosophy is unusually surprising, when compared to Solovyev's statements. To save ourselves some comparison, we need only group together, for example, the following: "... it [philosophy] should reconstruct the universe by means of 'intuition,' while it increasingly establishes immediate and experiential contact with the universe,"[104] and, in Solovyev's words, philosophy encompasses "the whole ideal cosmos, that is, the totality of ideas in their intrinsic relations or reciprocal actions as the objective expression of the true being."[105] As "the mystical," philosophy is "the direct and immediate relation of our spirit to the transcendent world."[106] The statement that the dialectic is only the continuous reproduction of the ideas[107] belongs among these phrases. However, because of the importance of this statement in Solovyev's system, the great difference not only from Bergson but also from Scheler is emphasized. This statement alone preserves Solovyev from the consequences of an actually "irrational" intuitionism. (von Hildebrand's reproach is valid on the other hand for Bergson and Scheler).

In complete agreement with this, Brugger's *Philosophical Dictionary (Philosophisches Wörterbuch)* mentions both thinkers in this very context.[108] None of the mistaken starting points, cited in his definition of "intuitionism" and "irrational" apply to Solovyev's thought because his concept of intuition requires that what is attained by intuition must "be justified additionally by systematic thinking."[109] This is precisely what differentiates his "intellectual intuition" from Scheler's and Bergson's insight. Referring for comparison to the *Ethics,* thus, primarily to the statements of the later Scheler, we see that "intellectual intuition" does not, like insight, synthesize its separate elements. Solovyev states that "because the actual relation between the ideas or the totality of the ideal cosmos is determined by its absolute center, the immediate intuition of this relation and totality is accessible only to the eye which is located in this center."[110] In view of this statement, "philosophy itself as a system [remains] a purely logical construction."[111]

For an understanding of the irrational, it is conceded that "the singular

as such [is] never completely apprehended by our conceptual thinking."[112] This statement corresponds to Solovyev's doctrine of abstraction.[113]

Two impressions are obtained from these comments and explanations. First, not only Bergson's but also Scheler's and Solovyev's versions of intuition lie on one and the same level in respect to their content and act-essence, provided that we do not talk about their different sources. Second, Solovyev, especially in comparison to Scheler's final metaphysical phase, links his thinking most of all to the correction of *ratio*. His *Logos* and *Sophia* speculations[114] entirely exclude any metaphysical irrationalism.

Concerning the question and problem of an irrational world-ground, we must add some limited comments about Solovyev's *"materia-prima* doctrine" and the "thirst for being *(Sein)" (žažda bytija)* or the immediate power of the divine.[115] Bernhard Schultze was certainly correct when he characterized Solovyev's "apparently antithetical" synthesis of intuition and construction as "semi-rationalism."[116] But let us return to the *analysis of consciousness.* In his *Ethics,* Scheler lets the word "consciousness" encompass "all phenomena which appear in internal perception."[117] This corresponds to his second definition of consciousness and alone appears linguistically meaningful to him. "Thus an act can never be given in any form of perception (or even of observation) – be it in external or internal perception. However, every I is given in the form of a single mode of perception, to be sure in the act-form of internal perception and its essentially corresponding form of multiplicity."[118] The unity of acts presupposes an even more encompassing concept of consciousness, which is that given in Scheler's first definition as "every 'consciousness of,' every intentional meaning and being directed toward."[119]

Franz Josef Brecht correctly exposed the consequences of identifying this understanding of consciousness with the idea of person. For, if it is true that "the person is the unknown, individually experienced unified substance of all acts which a being effects, however, a unified substance which is never giveable in a 'knowledge,'"[120] and if, moreover, it "belongs to the essence of the person that it only exists and lives in effecting intentional acts,"[121] then the idea of person must provide the concretization of the concept of consciousness "in a phenomenologically strict sense"[122] and "simultaneously the liberation from the predominance of *ratio."*[123]

We must assume this last and most encompassing content for Solovyev's concept of consciousness, even though he includes psychic functions and acts under "internal experience." From all that has just been said about acts[124] – that they have intentionality,[125] and that "the person expresses itself"[126] in acts – we have logically to equate Solovyev's

"internal experience" with Scheler's definitions of consciousness. Solovyev states that:

> The actual person ..., our true essence, "of which each is conscious and the existence of which is for each a fact of the greatest certainty," this actual essence of ours is by no means some transcendent substance, remaining beyond consciousness – the monstrous and still-born fruit of an illegitimate union of robust phantasy and abstract understanding. *The true essence of our person is expressed and is known in the actuality of internal experience, in actual willing, in actual thinking* and in the actual continuous combination of both in the *unity* of self-consciousness. This unity is the actual I. Conceptually, the immediate actual content of our consciousness does not yet correspond to the integral actuality, to that which is called the absolute. We doubtlessly have a certain actuality in our consciousness, *a certain immediate phenomenality (projavlenie) of the true being.* Thus, we know the true being even though this knowledge is not absolutely adequate at any given moment.[127]

"I," "spirit," and "person" are not at first strictly differentiated due to the terminological lack of clarity in Solovyev's analysis of consciousness. The concept "I" can mean not only the positive *intuitive datum of internal perception* – corresponding to the "psychic" in the sense of a "region of givenness of the I-totality" (the appearance of consciousness)[128] – but also the *trans-intelligible* person. However, in Solovyev's work against the positivists (*The Crisis of Western Philosophy*, 1874), the "actual I" of the "person" is already equated with the *unity* of self-consciousness; consequently, person transcends self-consciousness. The actual content of consciousness, *the phenomenality immediately given in the act of willing and thinking,* is considered the way to know the true being of the person.

7. *The Ontological Clarification of the "Person" as the "Existential Form of Spirit"*

The *Theoretical Philosophy* (1897–1899) makes up for the terminological neglect of the early writings by drawing clear conceptual distinctions. Accordingly, "one must differentiate in the knowing subject first, an *empirical* subject [equivalent to external experience]; second, a *logical* subject [equivalent to the experience of I and to the psychic phenomenon]; and third, the true *philosophical* subject [equivalent to the person and to the act]. This threefold substrate *(podležaščee)* may be designated by three distinct names: first, as *soul,* second, as *intellect* and third, as *spirit.*"[129]

However, spirit is the act-unity of the powers of willing, thinking, and feeling. Man, as the one who wills, thinks, and feels,[130] is at least a part of this spirit[131] in so far as he "is an unconditioned being as the actual subject and final ground of all his activities [acts]."[132] "The being [can again] be designated as spirit."[133]

With this undeniably meta-anthropological and ontological starting point Solovyev devotes himself to the problem of determining spirit's existential form. Although he comes into contact with this question indirectly through a critique of Plato's doctrine of ideas, his subject matter as well as his statements[134] clearly and emphatically contrast with the *purely logical* founding of Platonic idealism. Plato's metaphysical achievement consisted, in Solovyev's opinion, above all in bringing the ideal elements, which were already basic to Greek artistic religion or religious art, to philosophical consciousness. "The Greeks experienced from Plato only the philosophical formulation of that ideal cosmos already known to them in Homer's and Phidias' Olympus."[135]

For Solovyev, the weak point of this formulation is the exclusively intuitive and *act-less* character of the existing absolute. Plato's conception recognized the *epistemological* existence of the idea, but it did not realize the idea's *ontological* existence in the strict sense; that is, it did not know of the *bearer* of the idea. This latter fact is decisive for Solovyev's critique of Platonism. The remarkable statement "*the bearer of the idea or the idea as subject is the person*"[136] sums up his critique. This statement, along with the fact that Solovyev determines love as the moral principle of the idea-subject of the person, means that Solovyev has in mind the actual, further developed, and "complete truth of idealism rather than its one-sided expression in the Greek world-view. The absolute quality for the latter world-view was not the good or love, but instead salvation, that is, again only an *object.*"[137]

Solovyev's critique anticipates here the judgment of Windelband (1891) and Heimsoeth, according to which "the identification of spirit and incorporeality, the severing of the world into spirit and body ... [is] unplatonic." The incorporeal world, which Plato teaches, is not yet the spiritual world."[138]

Solovyev sees the questionability of the merely *epistemological* unreality of Plato's doctrine of ideas as well as its paralysing effect on the human *will.* The negation of the moral principle in general results from this doctrine.[139] Something "which is only conceived of as an ideal cosmos, as the all or as the harmony of all ... is presented to man only as *pure object* and consequently *only in an ideal intuition* ...."[140]

A serious consequence results from this for a judgment of the Greek idea of knowledge. This consequence is nevertheless compulsory for the new formulation of the idea of knowledge within the Christian order of love. The first aspect here is discussed by Solovyev in the following quotation:

Socrates reduced virtue to knowledge and thus did away with virtue's essential specificity. In a still more determinate way his greatest pupil recognized a condition, void of all desires and any will, as man's supreme happiness, and as the norm and goal of human life. The ideal man for Plato was the philosopher. A philosopher is characterized (in the *Phaedo*) as constantly dying in respect of the practical life.[141] He exists in a condition of *pure intuition* of the eternal ideas, a condition which excludes any active striving and any actual willing.[142]

Plato calls this condition *insight* which is attained by liberating and separating the soul from the body and which is considered the true occupation of philosophers.[143]

To answer the question of a revision of the Greek idea of knowledge in accordance with the principles of Christian anthropology, Solovyev develops an *earlier form of Scheler's act-phenomenology*. This is better called an *act-metaphysics* in relation to Solovyev's philosophy, since Scheler unfortunately confirmed in his later years the much expressed fear that the will could not be introduced into his system of pure Socratic knowledge in spite of all act-"phenomenology" – or perhaps on account of it. Thus, when in Plato,

as in Buddhism, the simple extinguishing of the will is set up as a moral goal, this is apparently effective because the absolute norm, the divinity, is understood only as a pure, impersonal and willless object. It manifests itself, therefore, only to pure intuition as a morally indifferent condition – since "good" and "bad" characterize the will and not knowledge. If an active will principle had been conferred upon the divinity, the moral task of man would no longer consist in the simple annihilation of his own will, but instead in its transformation into divine will:[144]

In Solovyev's opinion, only a metaphysics of love does justice to this logically conclusive consequence of the essential difference between the Greek and the Christian idea of knowledge. Solovyev's thought proved to be more fortunate and more careful than Scheler's in the founding of this vast and hitherto entirely neglected task, especially in his observation and methodological grasp of the knowledge of faith as a negative norm. Solovyev started with the classical principle of Jamesian theology: *fides sine operibus mortua est*[145] and with a valid synopsis of the mutually explanatory ideas on belief and love of Paul and John.[146] Finally, he built the act-metaphysics as an indispensable element into his philosophy, which has been designated above as revolutionary.

This philosophy clearly abandons the foundation not only of the Academy but also of its modern variations through Plotinus and Spinoza. In connection with Leibniz and the latter dynamic voluntarism, it takes a truly realistic turn. As we have previously mentioned, this modification is introduced by a theory, corresponding to that of Scheler, the experience of resistance together with its metaphysical application:

If we, for example, touch or push any material object, then we experience *first* this object, this other, the external force. The external force becomes actual for us. Within the same experience, we experience *secondly* ourselves, because this is *our* experience. By means of this experience we bear witness so to speak to our own actuality as the one who is experiencing. We become something for ourselves. Thus we possess powers which first of all have an effect outside of ourselves, which have actuality for another. Secondly, these powers experience[147] the effect of another or for which this other possesses actuality or which is presented by means of the other.[148] Finally, they[149] possess actuality for themselves – that which we call consciousness in the broadest sense of the word. Such powers are more than powers. They are *essences (suščestva).*[150]

Solovyev argues further that it is "necessary for the reciprocal action of the fundamental essences, that each has its special quality which makes it distinct from everything else . . . ."[151] For "the essences not only have an effect on each other, but each has a determinate effect and no other."[152]

This unconditioned quality of the fundamental essence allows it to be the content of all other essences and consequently allows all other essences to be its content. This unconditioned quality determines all actions and perceptions of the essence,[153] because the essence not only acts as it is, but also receives the effects of others in correspondence to that which it itself is. I say that this unconditioned quality constitutes the true, intrinsic and immutable character of that essence. It makes it that which it is or it constitutes its *idea.*[154]

It is clear from what has been said that we understand ideas as completely determinate, separate *forms* of metaphysical essences. These forms are particular to just this essence[155] and can in no case be considered the result of our abstract thought. From this point of view, an objective being accrues to the ideas in relation to our knowledge. At the same time, however, a subjective being accrues to them; that is, they are themselves subjects or, more exactly, they each have their own particular subject.[156]

Based on this careful investigation, Solovyev implements a distinction in the concept of essence as idea. In other words, ideas are "not just objects of intuition for us, but they are also simultaneously subjects of being *(Sein)* for themselves."[157] "If ideas were only *objectively* different, in accordance with their cognitive qualities, but not distinct in their internal being *(Sein),* then they would only be ideas for another [being], but not actual essences. This we know is unacceptable. Consequently, the bearer of the idea or *the idea as subject* is a *person.* Both these designations, 'person' and 'idea', are reciprocally related to one another as subject and object. Thus, they necessarily require one another to fulfill their effect."[158]

We should explain that up to this point Solovyev has directed all his attention to providing the *ontological* foundation of the concept "person." This took place in the interest of and to accentuate the clear distinction between philosophy of being *(Seinsphilosophie)* and phenomenology, a distinction which Solovyev himself takes into consideration in his descriptive

analysis. The following statements belong unequivocally to the realm of ontology: "every idea, that is, every positive content, necessarily presupposes a determinate subject or bearer, which has at its disposal quite determinate powers to actualize this idea"[159] – "reality accrues to an idea only if it is presented by a quite determinate essence"[160] – an idea can, in other words, "only possess reality as the content of the being which is the subject or the bearer of this idea."[161] Only phenomenology and its method, however, are capable of explaining the whole system of acts which is basic to the relation between being and content, between bearer and idea.

During this investigation which commences from a second starting point, one notices that within the act-phenomenological determination of person "the idea as the object or content of a being"[162] extensively loses its *epistemological* character as "the object of intuition – for us."[163] This is because now the idea has an essential ontic foundation and, therefore, a strictly trans-intelligible meaning. The extent to which such an understanding of idea – that is, as the "content of the being itself," as the latent and cognitively transcendent person – eludes every attempt at an epistemological reflection about intuition, follows clearly from the importance of non-givenness within the relation "being-idea." We are once more referring to our presentation of Solovyev's act-phenomenology.[164] For "the idea as the object or the content of the being is actually that which the being wills, thinks, feels or perceives."[165] "As soon as these powers – will, reason, and feeling are given – it is obvious that a determinate object for the will, for rational knowledge, and for feeling must also exist. It is also clear that man cannot will for the sake of mere willing, cannot think for the sake of the thought . . . and cannot feel for the sake of the feeling."[166] Solovyev wants to encompass with the trans-intelligible state of the "idea as the object or the content of the being" only that act-phenomenological, unequivocal meaning which corresponds to and is fundamental to that statement – also referred to by Scheler – "become who you are" or, we should say, "become who you could be."

Here we encounter the fundamental phenomenon of love. Its interpretation provides the transition to the classical act-phenomenological understanding of the still strictly descriptive determination of the idea of person. "Just as will, reason and feeling are powers[167] of one spirit unifying them, so also the objects which correspond to them are only different modes (ideas) of one absolute principle unifying them . . . ,"[168] in which "all remaining ideas are included. This is the idea of absolute salvation or, more exactly . . . of absolute love."[169]

In this sense, willing, thinking, and feeling are only particular acts, and

"the good, truth and beauty are [as intentional objects] only different images of love."[170] This absolute principle in Solovyev's special doctrine of total-unity, which as we have said is a variation of Scheler's principle of the "conversion of love,"[171] is transferred by him with strict consistency to the realm of the relative forms of essence. There he makes use of its act-phenomenological function for the idea of man. "Basically every idea is a salvation – for the bearer of a determinate idea it is just his salvation and his love. For *each being is that which it loves.*"[172] All the necessary elements of Scheler's statement interpreting the phenomenon of love within the framework of his act-metaphysical clarification of person's being have been acquired from the philosophical and descriptive conception of Solovyev's structure "idea-person-love." "Love is the movement in which each concrete, individual value-bearing object attains the highest possible values for it and in accordance with its ideal determination. Or love is the achievement of its ideal value-essence, which is specific to it . . . . Whether self-love or love of another is meant here, is left undecided . . . ."[173]

Solovyev's concept of "the idea as the object or content of the being"[174] encompasses two things. *First,* it encompasses "the *objects of intuition – for us,*"[175] that is, all epistemologically relevant objects of the perception of another and of self which can relate to a psychic I. *Second,* it encompasses, and this is decisive here, "also the *subjects of being (Sein) – for themselves*"[176] to the extent that they, as intimate, cognitively transcending persons, accessible only in the total act of love in agreement with the statement "become who you are," exist in metaphysical, coincidental unity with the primordial ground of any given being, to whom this "become" belongs as its unrepeatable individual possibility. The ontic self-becoming of the person as an ontological essence datum or, as Solovyev says, as the "objective idea" occurring in the "movement of love," is consequently the experiential mode of the *participation in being (Seinsteilhabe) by an ontic, spiritually individual man in his own or in another's person through the illuminative forms of self-love or love of another.* This experiential mode act-phenomenologically transcends mere knowledge. If we have discovered a parallel to the metaphysical commitment of Scheler's *ordo-amoris* doctrine by an act-phenomenological interpretation of Solovyev's thought that "each being is that which it loves,"[177] then the connection between Solovyev's concepts of spirit and person makes itself manifest.

What is the relation of person to spirit? In continuing his inquiry about this question he adds: "The idea is actually that which the being wills, thinks, feels or perceives."[178] Further on he makes a statement which is

extraordinarily expedient for act-metaphysics and which has become very important for modern philosophy since Scheler. "It[179] becomes by this means the *subject* or the *bearer* of the idea."[180] We have presented the being as *spirit,* not only in the transcendental aspect but also in the anthropological aspect. We may understand the idea as the center of intentional acts if we refer to Solovyev's explanation that "the bearer of the idea or the idea as subject [is] ... a *person.*"[181] *Thus, we can summarize the statement, "the being becomes the bearer of the idea through willing, thinking and feeling"*[182] *as spirit becomes person through willing, thinking and feeling or through love in general. Solovyev's descriptive clarification of the being (Sein) of the cognitively transcendent center of intentional acts culminates in this doctrine. Simultaneously, the ontological relation of person to spirit as the being is decided since the person proves to be the ontic "esse actu" of spirit.*[183] *It becomes evident that the knowledge arrived at by our inquiry is identical in meaning to Scheler's version of the relation between person and spirit.* He states in his *Ethics:* "Person is the essentially necessary and sole form of existence of the spirit, in as far as the concrete spirit is concerned."[184] Now we can and must refer back to that sentence from Solovyev's *On the Actuality of the External World and the Foundation of Metaphysical Knowledge*[185] with which we introduced his analysis of consciousness: "I myself, my I, is only a state of my consciousness."[186] We posited this statement for Scheler's "internal perception" on the grounds that the act of internal perception approaches Solovyev's experience of the I in respect to its power and ability.[187] We silently permitted Solovyev's statements to be interpreted in the sense of Scheler; that is, we imputed to Solovyev what is valid for Scheler concerning: I-external world and body-environment.

8. *Phenomenal Corporeality and the Idea of Life*

We have developed the doctrine of the association I-external world. And, "just as psychic experiences are experienced only as together in one 'I' in that they are bound together in a special sort of unity, analogously all organic sensations are necessarily given 'together' in one body. (...) Therefore the actual body is the fundamental form in which all organic sensations become combined and by virtue of which they are organic sensations of this body and no other."[188] "This sentence is [also] valid" for the relation between I and body:

> In the sphere of internal intuition all contents become also contents of actual perception, in all degrees of clarity and distinction, in so far and only to the extent that their being *(Sein)* or non-being *(Nichtsein),* their being so or being different

(*So- oder Anderssein*), posits some variations of the body. I characterize this fact with the words: all internal perception takes place through an "internal sense." It is by virtue of this sense that all content of possible internal perception which does not posit a variation of the body remains in the "subconscious" sphere. It is also by virtue of this sense that it is not the internally perceived itself but the form of givenness of the "phenomena" appearing in factual perceiving which also participate in the forms of multiplicity, which are essential for the fact of the phenomenal "body." Thus, the factual perception of the I and of the sphere of "pure" psychic facts is not immediate perception, which would give those facts themselves, but instead it is bodily or sensually mediated. Therefore, it is just as capable of deception as factual external perception by means of external "sensibility."[189]

This aspect is also taken into consideration in "metaphysical empiricism." Its trans-intelligible evidence is, to begin with, only that of an existent. (We will especially emphasize within the theory of knowledge that an intentional relation between experienced quality and the object is basic to all specifications. The proof of this is unmistakeably certain,[190] in spite of all of Solovyev's apparently contrary statements about the purely subjective character of sensation.[191])

What we would like to assert at this point from Scheler's position is only "that not only external perception but also internal perception is linked in its factual exercise to the 'sensibility' and to the motion and impulse structure of the body."[192] In other words, a primordial division exists between body and I, based on which the one serves as a foundation for states, functions, and sensations, while the other is the basis for the psychic experiences of internal perception.

We will attempt to locate this delineation in Solovyev's system using primarily for the phenomenon of the body *On the Way to True Philosophy* (1883), which was originally written as a preface. We must assume a threefold concept of I, the first of which (the empirical subject) we do not identify with the phenomenon of body but which we may be permitted to place in the same sphere. In respect to the body as an irreducible value region, Solovyev names it characteristically the expressive field of the vital soul. "The body itself does not live, but the soul which forms the body lives in and by means of the body. (. . .) One must, therefore, recognize that consciousness and personality (or I and person),[193] the conscious (or psychic)[194] life and the personal (or spiritual)[195] life, are not the 'product' of the organic body itself, but they are instead products or appearances of the soul through or by means of the organic body."[196]

The soul "as a metaphysical substance . . ."[197] is the "bearer of life."[198] This definition already holds true for the *Theoretical Philosophy* in an act-phenomenological sense.[199] This life remains naturally and vitally bound up with the foundational region of the "body."[200] However, the complete

and total concept of the meaning of life explodes and releases an understanding of the relativity of the body and is valid inclusive of the I and person. "Life is the most universal and all encompassing name for the fulness of actuality in general and in everything. We may speak with equal justification of divine and human life, as well as of the life of nature."[201]

This understanding of life will be considered in the context of Scheler's metaphysics. The integral concept of life, the term related to "metaphysical substance," appears also as the correlative antithesis to person. Solovyev himself says: "Our I, that which lives and thinks in us, is the subject of consciousness before it becomes a phenomenon of consciousness, that is, ... it is soul, individual essence ... ."[202] We may complement this or rather interpret it by adding that the I is for this reason person. The identification of soul and metaphysical substance as the act-center ("that which lives and thinks in us") has already occurred in this statement, formulated by Solovyev himself.

9. *The "States of Consciousness" and Their Interrelation*

We could now assign what Solovyev calls the "states of consciousness" to the realm of the body, just as we have done in respect to the concept of I with the psychic experiences and in respect to the idea of person with the acts. Yet this would be going too far for Solovyev's use of language. Let us first observe that, if we were to allow the "states of consciousness" to belong to the sphere of the body, then we could only speak of a foundational order. Then the correlation would be valid on the basis of the medium of internal perception – be it modal or functional, that is, as a psychic process. It is only important here that the "experiences of an I adapt themselves to the presence of a body."[203]

What Solovyev means by "states" is neither the one: they themselves, nor the other: the functionality of their experience. Rather, he characterizes both as "states" and probably also the quasi-reflection of the act, that "glimmering of the totally unqualified 'consciousness of' which occurs in the execution of the act."[204] He says the following in his master's dissertation while discussing the concept and content of "internal experience":

> In knowing myself, my "internal states," my thinking and my feeling, I am clearly not related to any object which is external and for that reason unknowable in its essence. It is evident that my thought or an act *(dejstvie)* of my will do not exist beyond my "consciousness of" them, separate from this "consciousness of." Therefore, their complete actuality is expressed in my "consciousness of"[205] my internal states. I know them as they are, because they cannot exist in actuality beyond my consciousness. *Thus, we possess in internal experience no longer what*

is thinkable or objects, but the actuality. It is evident [the following has already been quoted to demonstrate the objective incapability *(Gegenstandsunfähigkeit)* of the act[206]] *that my thought, for example,* [the "for example" justifies the extension of the validity of this statement to acts of willing or feeling, that is, to all acts in general[207]] *in which or for which all that is thinkable exists, can itself no longer be thinkable.*[208]

This text, in our opinion, unequivocally identifies "states" and "acts." On the other hand, it explicitly expresses a knowledge of the cognitive transcendence of the person's being *(Sein)* or of its acts[209] vis-à-vis all "psychology." We may conclude that, although the terminology is conditioned by the linguistic usage of the theory of consciousness at that time, nevertheless the essential difference of the phenomena is valid as observed. Thus we can say: *"The true essence of our person (ličnost') is expressed and is known in the actuality of internal experience, in actual willing, in actual thinking and in the actual continuous combination of both in the unity of self-consciousness.* This unity is the actual I."[210]

This may be characterized as a definition, although Solovyev gave the true determination of person, corresponding to a completely different aspect, on the one hand, in *A Critique of Abstract Principles* and, on the other hand, in his *Defense of Spinoza's Philosophy* (1897).[211] Scheler's comment on the relation self-consciousness – person loses its polemical character *ex sese* when confronted with this definition. For "self-consciousness is [only then[212]] not yet person, when in the consciousness 'of' oneself all possible modes of consciousness (e.g., the modes of knowing, intending, feeling, further modified as loving or hating), of comprehending oneself are not unified."[213] One need only compare the idea of integral knowledge with this to realize that this unity is already indisputably evident in Solovyev's statement.

We have now delineated the presuppositions needed for an understanding. They are naturally true only to the extent that they result from the essence of the contents. This statement is implied in the foregoing. For example, what we have called along with Scheler "the philosophical act of spiritual upsurge" or "the basic moral act" and "the order of the highest evidences" corresponds to this criterion. The definition and delineation of the possible objective regions with which philosophy as such is concerned also belongs here. However, what we were compelled to consider during the comparison of the total-unity idea of knowledge and the system of conformity no longer belongs here.

A brief résumé of this interpretation will demonstrate once more its results:

We characterized Solovyev's attainment of knowledge as an essence

phenomenology resting on an intuition which transcends both of metaphysics' most formal principles due to the evidence about the simultaneous character of being *(Seinscharakter).* After the cultural-historical genesis of the "integral life and knowledge" we produced a link with Scheler. The problem of the givenness of the absolute being in the sense of a perfect and unique identity of essence and existence manifested itself for comparison. The doctrine of the person and the theory of actuality in their essential determinations as well as the contents of "I" and "body" including their foundational relation were discussed with the question about the personality of "God" and how this personality is to be epistemologically clarified. "Person" and "act" proved to be cognitively transcendent as opposed to the meaning of the division "I"–"psychic" and "external world"–"physical."[214] The essential determination of "spirit" and its relation to person lead us from Solovyev to the metaphysically relevant principle: spirit becomes person through willing, thinking, and feeling.[215] Scheler confirms the ontic reversal of this: "Person is the essentially necessary and sole form of existence of the spirit, in as far as the concrete spirit is concerned."[216] As "metaphysical substance" the person is at the same time the "bearer of life" – a statement which differentiates Solovyev from Scheler. A clarification of terminology solved the problem of the apparently false association of states (bodily: body–I) and acts (spiritually: person), wherein Solovyev permitted both of the terms in question to be synonymously "internal experience" while acts as such, due to their objective incapability *(Gegenstandsunfähigkeit)* only to be unqualified "consciousness of."

10. *Phenomenological Delimitation of Body and Spirit*

The larger outline of a phenomenology of consciousness centered around this concept would be complete if it were only important for the continuation of our inquiry to make a mere description of all the necessary forms and phenomena of givenness available for an understanding of the concept "consciousness in general."

However this is not the case. If our phenomenology of consciousness is to avoid the danger of becoming transcendental idealism, *its* meaning must be the determination of the *objects,* to which "consciousness in general" is capable of corresponding. Therefore, before we can validate the definitional and axiomatic statements of the doctrine of the presuppositions of consciousness in the following section, we must reduce the different, descriptive consciousnesses to that real substrate which encompasses them and which we have called the "idea of man."

It is not enough to see the psychologically and phenomenologically sketched outlines of a consciousness as the "totality of phenomena of internal perception," as the "totality of real experiences of an individual" and finally as "every intentional meaning and being directed toward" *in its formal identity with a body, a soul, and a spirit.* Formal identity means the complete parallelism and agreement, on the one hand, of the limits of the experience and, on the other hand, of the becoming aware (or of that which appears and the appearing itself). Rather, the "idea of man" itself proves to be the ontological site to which we must return if we wish to follow those demarcation lines reaching downwards to the roots of human existence. These lines make man's essence fundamentally incommensurable to the world of the animal, to the phenomenality of the living in general. This essential line of demarcation is completely obscured and withheld from immediate awareness by the highest and most all-encompassing determination of "consciousness in general" as "every intentional meaning and being directed toward." It is precisely this that offers us the opportunity to especially treat the question of what distinguishes man from an animal, or the ideative structure of the spirit from the sensitive-vital structure of the body. We will pay special attention here to the ontological materials, and not, however, to the merely epistemological materials.

Max Scheler determined this basic difference in the forms of the course of the behavior of animal to environment and of man to world. He summarized these events each into three acts, on the one hand, for the animal realm and, on the other hand, for the human. Within the secure boundaries of the structure of the animal to its environment, behavior takes

1. its "impetus . . . from a physiological-psychological condition . . ."[217] of the drive-constellation of the animal – and shows itself

2. as ". . . making some actual changes in the environment as a result of the animal's free action with respect to a dominant goal set by its drives"[218] in the performance of which

3. ". . . a concomitant change in its physiological and psychological condition"[219] is the third act.

"The course of animal behavior therefore always has this form:

$$A(\text{animal}) \rightleftarrows E(\text{environment})$$

The situation is altogether different in the case of a being that has spirit."[220]

"*First* its behavior is 'motivated' by a complex of sensations and ideas raised to the status of an object. It is, in principle independent of . . ."[221] the physiological condition of the human organism.

"The *second* act . . . consists in the voluntary inhibition, or release, of a

drive and of the corresponding reaction. The *third* act consists of a final and intrinsic change with regard to the objective nature of a thing . . . .

The course of such behavior is 'world-openness':

$$M(\text{man}) \rightleftarrows W(\text{world}) \rightarrow \ .''^{222}$$

"Objective being or objectification, therefore, is the most formal category of the logical aspect of 'spirit'"[223] and is again "essentially linked with the second dimension stage of the reflexive act"[224]: the "self-consciousness."

"Man alone – in so far as he is person – is able to go beyond himself as an organism and to transform, from a center beyond the spatiotemporal world, everything (himself included) into an object of knowledge."[225] As we have just discussed in the act-phenomenology *only the center of the spirit itself, the person in so far as it is "not an object or a substantial kind of being, but a continuously self-executing (essentially determinate) ordered structure of acts,"*[226] *remains an exception in this capability "of expanding the 'environment' into the dimension of a 'world'"*[227] *and of objectifying "re"-sistances.*

From the determination of presuppositions, an axiomatic doctrine of human characteristics *(propria)* may be constructed based on these ontological and epistemological facts.

First, "Only in man do we find the fully developed categories of thing and substance."[228]

Second, "Next, man has, from the start, a unified space."[229]

Third, "Spirit is the only being incapable of becoming an object. It is pure actuality. It has its being only in and through the execution of its acts."[230]

Thus, "on the basis of the essential bond between act and idea"[231] we arrive at the essence of spiritual ideation to which the production of highest axioms[232] is transferred. Hegel had characterized such axioms as "windows into the absolute."[233] The goal of the structure of acts which lead to the act of ideation is the "suspension of reality,"[234] that is, the so-called "phenomenological reduction." This suspension or reduction is grounded in turn in the prior experience of actuality (existence as the experience of resistance). This suspension of the character of actuality signifies for Scheler the de-actualization of the feeling and impulse center by the pure "will" of the spirit.[235]

Looking back at our original question about the essential difference between man and animal we can make the following summary. Opposed to the pure sensory-motor instinctual structure of the animal with its ontological and epistemological materials of instinct, being a resistance, associative memory, practical intelligence and body–I are freedom, being an

object, and self-consciousness in the essential phenomenology of spirit. Also opposed to it are substance, space and time (empty forms) as examples of spiritual categories. Finally, the spirit itself as pure actuality is opposed to it. This pure sensory-motor instinctual structure of the animal can be generalized as phenomenal corporeality in regard to the finite human person's participation in this structure. Spirit's basic act is the ideating knowledge of essence. The technique of this basic act is to suspend resistance (the phenomenological reduction) in order to objectify the reality as *specificity,* the resistance as *object,* and the consciousness as *spiritual person.* These are the essentials of Scheler's anthropology, presented in *Man's Place in Nature,* about the phenomenological delimitation of body and spirit.

11. *Conclusions about the "Non-Givenness of the Personality of God"*

The analysis of consciousness resulted in the all-embracing correlative concept of person as the center of the execution of acts, the essential content of which is "intentionality."[236] How has this helped to answer the question about the personality of "God"? Only part of the answer is given when we say that God's "personality" can only be given to a concrete person "who stands in immediate communication with the one corresponding to this idea"[237] and refer in this connection to Solovyev's *Lectures on God-manhood* (1877–1881). The earlier reference to these lectures concerned only the knowledge of the person of Jesus manifesting "the father," knowledge which was obtained through experience (simultaneous experience and subsequent experience).[238] In the fifth lecture on God-manhood, Solovyev "ascends" first *to the microcosmic relation "person-world,"* and then *to the macrocosmic relation "God-absolute world,"* from the insight into the intentionality of the act as being directed toward an object[239] as well as from the insight into the essential correlation between idea and act-center.[240] "Here for the first time we have the concept of a living God!"[241]

The meta-anthropological character of this ascent is unmistakable. To clarify this ascent, we must employ Solovyev's "concept of analogy," which has been previously mentioned. The method corresponding to this concept is introduced and defended against its critique in *On the Actuality of the External World and the Foundation of Metaphysical Knowledge* (1875). This work appeared after Konstantin Dmitriyevich Kavelin attacked the epistemology of *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (1874–1875). Solovyev asserts the following in answer to Kavelin's

objections about the possibility of a knowledge by means of analogy that has the content of self-consciousness:

> The sole essence which I am able to call my own is that which is immediately known to me in . . . psychic states.[242] If this is the only way for me to know immediately my own essence, then essential knowledge in general in its true sense is limited for me by this internal self-consciousness. I can acquire every other essential knowledge, the knowledge of the essence of another, only by means of a certain combination with this immediate internal self-consciousness, that is, through this or that "extension of the determinations of my own internal being to that of another being *(Sein)*." One must distinguish essential knowledge *(sušč̌estvennoe poznanie)* from that knowledge of essence [of another] *(poznanie o sušč̌estve)*. Essentially I can [only][243] know my internal states – as the immediate expression of my own essence. However, I can also have a mediated knowledge of the essence of another, although this is no longer an essential knowledge in the strict sense. (. . .) Thus, that which is unconditionally inaccessible to external objective knowledge is a pure X, the internal substantial side of the other. Analogy with the content of internal self-consciousness makes it accessible and known.[244]

This much is certainly valid for Scheler, too. He refers to "seeing the self-evident *quiddity* of objects themselves;"[245] this amounts to the principle of intentionality and is analogous to Solovyev's view, to the special insight that it belongs "to the essence of act differences to be in one and only in one person."[246] Scheler emphasizes that "I can therefore very well know the nature of a contingent reality with which I am not acquainted as a reality, and which indeed I cannot know as such on account of the limitations peculiar to my organism. It is precisely on this possibility that the possibility of metaphysics rests."[247] This means however that "all essences, and relations among such, which are found from the contingent world-reality accessible to our organism are to be assumed as somehow realized in the inaccessible world-reality, if it has been shown that we could not ascertain their reality even if it subsisted."[248]

Our interpretation encounters a serious difficulty when we try to apply and transfer this method, common to Solovyev and Scheler, to the transcendent relation: person and person of persons. In the continuation of his analysis, Solovyev says: "This analogy is not abstract but completely immediate."[249] This statement, though immanently interpreted in what follows it, corresponds exactly with the doctrine of the "immediate perception of the absolute actuality in all men."[250] Since the form of this process of contact has already been determined as intuition, it is certainly not "perception" in the ordinary sense.[251] As intuition, the form is just as evident as Scheler's insight that "The object of religious acts is at the same time the cause of their existence. In other words, all knowledge of God is necessarily knowledge from God."[252] The only question remaining is whether this evidence of the "personality of the absolute being" results

from the phenomenology of the religious act or from the meta-anthropological positing of intentionality in the world-ground.

In the first case, the "act" of a finite person aims at the center of an "absolute object." The second supposition concludes analogically the intentional correlation "act-object" or "person-world" from the first premise. "For, a priori, what is valid for the essences of an object is also valid for all objects of the same *nature*, irrespective of whether those objects are potential objects of our causal experience."[253] This conclusion is transferred to the relation: macrocosm and the idea of God in the absolute world-ground. "And so the metaphysician knows a priori and self-evidently that even in all parts of world-reality (including the real world-ground) which have no direct or indirect causal connection with the vehicles of perception in our psycho-physical organism, the same essences are realized . . . , the same structure of a world of essences . . . is realized in that part to which we have potential access through perception and observation."[254]

For comparative purposes we consider both possibilities of the cognitive relation as given. Nevertheless, it should first be noted that Solovyev decisively rejects any causal connection methodologically obtaining the "absolute being," that is, all "proofs for the existence of God" (originally in recognition of the transcendental subjectivity of Kant's apriorism[255]). For him, "the divine principle is the real object of religious consciousness."[256] Here we can equate "religious consciousness" and "religious act" with a clear conscience. For "in every actual religion, as opposed to theological reflections about religious objects, the deity, that is, the supreme object of reverence or of religious emotion [or feeling or act[257]] is recognized as that which is experientially given."[258] Because of this, "philosophy's task can only be to transform and extend this experience, that is, to make our concepts of the facts given in actual religion exacter, clearer and more complete. Philosophy can study religious objects, but it cannot create them. Due to the nature of philosophy, it can offer no certainty as to the existence of religious objects."[259]

Let us recall here in the development of the idea of conformity the important difference between the objects intended by religion and metaphysics. "For religion proceeds directly from that basic definition of the absolutely real (of the *ens a se*) which is inaccessible to unaided metaphysics – the personality of God, which attests its existence in revelation."[260] The philosophical relevance of the "relation" of the clearly religious "act," or perhaps better of an empty intuition (having nothing to do with wishes, needs and yearnings in general),[261] to a personal "object" (for Solovyev:

a "supra-personal" "object")[262] as its realization makes evident an essential connection.

This would be the first possible contact with the being. The "personal character of God" precedes any philosophical clarification of this possible contact. In the second case, a truly philosophical ascent, or better, an ascent freed from all religious, phenomenal givenness, takes place from the analysis of act,[263] the final results of

> which are in radical contrast with the nature of religious self-evidence. The judgments which they express are permanently hypotheses, which are never strictly verifiable and never more than presumptively evident – since, in addition to their basis in manifest, but non-existential, knowledge of essences and essential relations, they must constantly and necessarily seek support also from the material inductions of the positive sciences. For all judgments of positive science are by nature probably, but not manifestly, true.[264]

We near the end of our reflections resulting from the clarification of the use of "analogy." The knowledge of essence of another *(poznanie o suščestve)* which has been intuited is equivalent, *on the one hand,* to Scheler's evidence of another I.[265] *On the other hand,* it is equivalent to the unique other highest principle of the metaphysics of being *(Seinsmetaphysik)* recently discussed. When one distinguishes in Solovyev what belongs to the I from what belongs to "person," the vagueness in Solovyev's statement that the epistemological gain is mediated, while analogy itself, that is, its execution, is immediate and intuitive, is cleared up. This statement becomes completely compatible with Scheler's determinations about the perception of another I. The person is that which can only be mediately known, conceptually out of the intentionality, and analogously to its self-givenness in the analysis of act. On the other hand, the I-thou evidence is purely intuitive.

Solovyev repeatedly and unmistakeably characterizes the insight of the existence of an "absolute being" *without* the givenness of personality, as "immediate" and "intuitive."[266] The two modes of essential knowledge, *suščestvennoe poznanie,* and *poznanie o suščestve,* finally run together in this obscurity and simultaneous uniqueness of their datum. The doctrine "of the perception of the absolute actuality"[267] is relevant here.

The "idea of philosophy" again reaches its starting point and the mosaic of thoughts – which form a circle, and make emphatically evident the massive intuition of a "whole" – extends beyond itself. The commitments of the system of conformity, which we have linked with a possible interpretation of Solovyev, prove finally to be an "idea of a free synthesis of the believing and knowing spirit." This synthesis is comprehended as unconditioned and

necessary in so far as knowledge alone is anti-Socratic and quietistic,[268] that is, it corresponds exactly with the principle *fides sine operibus mortua est.*[269] When we substitute the *scientia* of a pseudo-Socratic ethics for the *fides* of James' epistle, this principle culminates in a unique manner in Solovyev's *The Life Drama of Plato* (1898). Scheler himself later succumbed to ethical quietism. His axiom of the non-intention[270] of the good is based on an increasingly pan-emotionally shaded pseudo-Socratism.[271]

There is still more to be said on the subject and this will also imply the same reserved attitude taken for the idea of the autonomy of knowledge. Even faith itself can "always and everywhere be taken by surprise."[272] The following is especially valid for the understanding of the idea of an act-center as a spiritual person. "Exclusively factual, blind faith does not correspond to the dignity of man."[273] This is comparable to Scheler's statement about traditionalism and metaphysical agnosticism.[274] "We cannot now avoid seeing that the most adequate possession of God, the maximal participation of our being in his, cannot be achieved unless we first attain to a simultaneous vision, free from all contradictions and incompatibilities, of the religious God and the metaphysical 'world-basis' together."[275] This is the full, complete and universalistic meaning of the philosophical idea presented as an "integral system of knowledge" (Solovyev) or as a unity of religion and metaphysics reconciling all tensions (Scheler).

CHAPTER FOUR

SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY

According to the general determination of integral knowledge its object is the true being – not only in itself but also in relation to the empirical actuality of the subjective and objective worlds. The true being is the absolute primordial ground [the absolute primordial principle – *absoljutnoe pervonačalo*] of these worlds. As a result there are three organic parts which constitute the structure of the total philosophical system of integral knowledge. For if the object of philosophy consists of two elements, namely the absolute primordial ground [the absolute primordial principle] and the second actuality which arises from it, then these two elements can be thought of only in three relations:

First, in direct unity,

Second, in opposition [to one another], and

Third, in actual, differentiated [recognized] unity or synthesis.

Thus, we obtain three philosophical sciences. The *first* considers the absolute ground [the absolute principle – *absoljutnoe načalo*] in its own universal and necessary (thus a priori) determinations. The other, finite existence, exists in these determinations only as a possibility. This is the moment of direct unity.

The *second* [philosophical science] considers the absolute ground [the absolute principle] as that which generates or posits finite actuality outside of itself. This is the moment of dissociation.

Finally, the *third* [philosophical science] has as its object the absolute ground [the absolute principle] as that which unites the real world again with itself in an actual, systematic unity.

This natural triple division of philosophy is of a very old origin and is encountered in some form or another in all complete and to some extent well-developed systems. Although in actuality each individual system is only a *one-sided* expression *(projavleniem)* of one or another *moment* in philosophical knowledge it strives to represent the *whole* of philosophy in spite of its *limited* horizon. I am retaining the old nomenclature: *logic*, *metaphysics* and *ethics*, to designate the parts of free theosophy. However, I will use the expressions: *organic* logic, *organic* metaphysics and *organic* ethics to differentiate them from the corresponding parts of other philosophical systems.[1]

We have condensed the extensive ideas which are developed in this context into a clear diagram (Figure II). In the interest of a better understanding, this diagram also assumes the "super-structure" of metaphysics.

I. "ORGANIC LOGIC"

"True logic," as opposed to "textbook logic," recognizes that the "individual elements of our knowledge are [just as] non-self-sustaining as the individual parts of an organism." It acknowledges the "relativity of our whole cognitive realm [and therefore] turns towards the absolute primordial principle as the

Fig. II. Solovyev's system of philosophy: analysis of "free theosophy".

the absolute PRIMORDIAL PRINCIPLE – the subjective and objective WORLD
the absolute PRIMORDIAL GROUND – as empirical ACTUALITY

the MODE of the being to being *(Sein)*	the RELATION	the philosophical DISCIPLINE
1. the moment of union	potential	logic
2. the moment of dissociation	real	metaphysics
3. the moment of reunion: synthesis	ideal	ethics

actual center. As a consequence, the horizon of our knowledge is enclosed. The individual parts and elements obtain an internal unity and a spiritual connection. This presents itself as an actual organism, which is why it is correct to designate such a logic as organic."[2]

To develop this starting point, which is related to today's systems theory, Solovyev formulated altogether seven relations in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* (1877). Their content attempts to comprehend the the idea of organic logic. The answers to the questions corresponding to these relations result in the designation of the idea of organic logic as "free theosophy" or "theosophical knowledge."

1. The question of the object of knowledge.
2. The question of the goal of knowledge.
3. The question of the general matter or substance of knowledge.
4. The question of the form of knowledge.
5. The question of the efficient cause *(dejatel'nomu istočniku)* or the productive cause *(proizvodjaščej pričine)*.
6. The question of the starting point.
7. The question of the developmental method.[3]

The conclusions of the investigation come from the following answers to these questions.

To Question 1: "The *object* of free theosophy is the true being *(istinno suščee – tò óntōs ón)* in its objective expression or in its idea."[4]

To Question 2: "The *goal* of true philosophy is to contribute in its realm,

that is, the realm of knowledge, to the transference of the center of the being *(Sein)* of man out of its given nature into the absolute, transendent world; in other words, to further the inner union of the being *(Sein)* of man with the true being."[5]

To Question 3: "The *matter or substance* of true philosophy as integral knowledge is given by the totality of phenomena, not only the mystical, but also the psychic and physical."[6]

To Question 4: "Although universal truths or ideas are bound to phenomena according to matter, they must be different from phenomena according to *form* and they must possess their own being *(Sein)* independent of phenomena. Thus a special form of cognition is required to know them, which we, along with many earlier philosophers, will call 'intellectual insight' or 'intuition.' Intuition constitutes the actual original form of integral knowledge."[7]

To Question 5: "The efficient or immediately *determining principle* of true philosophical knowledge is inspiration *(vdoxnovenie)*."[8]

To Question 6: "The being which we have determined as the *absolute ground* of every being *(Sein)* or the supra-being is the *first and supreme principle* of organic logic. This [absolute] ground represents the unconditioned first principle of our total philosophy because organic logic constitutes the first fundamental part in the philosophic system of integral knowledge."[9]

To Question 7: "The *method* of this science [organic logic] can only be pure dialectical thought, that is, a thought which develops itself intrinsically and which is independent of any kind of external contingent elements."[10]

This doctrine of the principles of "organic logic" concludes with the definitions of the methodological concepts "dialectic," "analysis," and "synthesis," which have a strong functional orientation toward Hegel. We will present these definitions as Solovyev expresses them because he uses the expressions "dialectic," "analysis," and "synthesis" "in a somewhat different sense than that which is ordinarily attributed to them." After this we will proceed to the actual theory of knowledge.

By *dialectic* I understand thinking which derives its concrete content in the form of a concept out of a universal principle. Since this content is already evidently contained in the universal principle (otherwise thinking would be a creation from nothing) – although only potentially – the act of dialectical thinking consists precisely in bringing this potential content into actuality. The process is the following: the basic concept presents itself like a seed, which by and by develops into an ideal organism.

By *analysis* I understand thinking which starts with the fact of a concrete given being *(Sein)* and which ascends to the first universal principles of that being *(Sein)*.

By *synthesis* I understand thinking which starts with two different regions of concrete being *(Sein)* and which leads to their higher unity by determining their intrinsic relation.[11]

We will have to refer to these determinations within the framework of the doctrine of functionalization. However, let us now proceed to the theory of knowledge.

If we, in anticipation, start with Scheler, then we must distinguish in his ideas three foundational concepts and regions:

1. The "*ordo amoris* doctrine," assuming spiritual individuation;[12]

2. the "philosophy of perception" with its development of different concepts of stimulus, of the sense "image," "sensation," and "perceptual content";[13]

3. "phenomenological eidology."[14]

What one should note at this point is that the problem area of the theory of knowledge, in any case in respect to Scheler, may not be limited to the mere representation of the act of ideation itself. This is because of the decisive importance of the question of what can be known within the realm of the essentially possible, of the intelligible (not by the concept datum "man," or "rational animal," or "transcendental subject," but rather) by the individualized spiritual being. Something like a "relativity of value" would not in our case be apparent without a prior vision, even a prior insight into the structural principle as the foundational element of knowledge in general. Until Katharina Kanthack specifically discussed this phenomenon[15] and the difficulty of clarifying it in the late forties,[16] it had hardly attracted any attention.

To compare this to Solovyev we must establish the same foundation in him, at least in its general outline. In this respect the following must be distinguished:

1. The relation between the "absolutely free person" *(esse)* and the "empirical, determined person" *(operari)* in connection with spiritual individuation.[17]

2. "Metaphysical empiricism" which we can not equate with Scheler's doctrine of the givenness of reality, but which we can still relate to it and do relate to it *mutatis mutandis.*[18]

Keeping in mind the relation of the reality problem to Solovyev's "doctrine of faith," one tries not to make the following objection: Scheler's explanation, as determined by the impulse-dynamic components, body-corporeal object (he connects both of these in the concept of "resistance experience"), has no application for the question of the existential givenness of the absolute being, since the "body" as the epistemologically correlative

object is cancelled here. The first reason not to admit this objection is that the relation of composition is introduced into Scheler's world-ground by the positing of an attribute of impulse.[19] The second reason is that there is a possibility that we can prove our equation by referring to Solovyev's Sophia as the "great body of God."[20] Even if we exclude the fact that Solovyev consciously founded his doctrine of reality impulse-dynamically, then we must still resolutely maintain that the evidence of the doctrine of reality itself must be strictly philosophically clarified. Scheler seems to us to offer much material for this purpose.

3. The doctrine of ideation of "spiritual vision," of Solovyev's "*umosozercanie*."[21]

We can summarize the contents of Scheler's epistemological foundational sequence in the following statement: "The primary and true principle of individuation lies already in man (not primarily in the '*angel*' as Aquinas teaches), in his spirit (that is, in the real substrate of his person). Body, social relation, and the successive flow of development are rather those things which first make possible a system of the types of men according to their spiritual nature and a relative generalization of their 'properties', and 'character traits'."[22] Based on this insight it is clear that knowledge becomes more individual the more it knows its duty to the "call" of the person.[23] This is obvious if one locates such a view – and this corresponds throughout to the desire of the *true* phenomenologist, Scheler – within the larger context of Medieval philosophy as a totality, and does not oppose the Scholastic attitude. Certainly this view is directed against the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas who in an original and far-reaching manner enriched the hylomorphism handed down by *the* Philosopher (Aristotle) whose works Robert Grosseteste translated for him into Latin. Scheler's presentation of the problem of individuation in the statement just quoted does not appear to correspond to Aquinas' achievement. The extraordinary *opus* of the great Scholastic offers no opportunity for an interpretation such as Scheler's.

> It is therefore St. Thomas' opinion, that the body is determined as a being of this kind by the form, as an individual however by matter, not by matter in itself, but in relation to dimension;[24] the spirit, on the other hand, because it is a form subsisting in itself without matter, has by this form not only its essence determined according to its kind, but also its individuality: the holy teacher concludes from this that it is only in the corporeal world that several individuals of the same kind are given. In the spiritual world each individual is different from the other even according to kind.[25] . . . The human soul however stands . . . in the middle here. Because it has a being *(Sein)* in itself, it also has by means of this being *(Sein)*, disregarding the body, its individuality. But just as the soul's being *(Sein)*, so its individuality is fulfilled by the union with the body.[26]

The important points of this difference between the corporeal and spiritual worlds is the Scholastic identification of the Thomistic *substantia incompleta* with Aristotle's *ousía deutéra* and its application to the doctrine of the soul. In connection with this the differentiating moment of the *formae subsistentes* – as the presupposition to the principle of individuation of the "*angel*" in Thomistic Scholasticism – deserves special attention. This opposition – not only of form to matter, but also of form as pure subsistence to the necessary assignment of the *forma corporis* to just that *body* – supports our view that ultimately a hypothetical basis for the proof of the following statement is obtained from the matter-form structure; namely, that the human soul "because it has according to its nature the potentiality and the determination to animate the body, [is] not complete in its kind of being without the body" and becomes "complete as an individual first through its union with the body."[27]

"Just as man is man because he is made of body and soul, and he is *this* man because he consists of *this* body and *this* soul, so also a spiritual substance is a human soul because it is in a body; and it is *this* human soul because it is in *this* body."[28] One must therefore acknowledge that Thomas Aquinas – as opposed to Scheler's interpretation – neither opposes a "true individuation of the human soul" nor teaches that the soul – as one frequently assumes and also imputes to Scheler's polemical view – can only be determined by "*materia quantitate signata*." St. Thomas states in his *Summa contra gentiles* in all clarity and in defiance of both misinterpretations: "*Quidquid in rebus est subsistens ex materia et forma compositum, est compositum ex materia et forma individuali.*"[29]

The reason for these generally widespread interpretations – which even Scheler was not critical enough to take measures against – undoubtedly is the lack of a clear distinction between the Medieval theory of universals, that is, the argument resolved by Abelard concerning the existential foundations of universal concepts, and the matter-form structure of Scholastic ontology. For "because the universal as universal is not actual, and consequently each thing can only be in as far as it is individual, thus things must also be *individual* by means of the same cause by means of which they are. To the extent, therefore, that something according to its being *(Sein)* depends not only on the efficient cause, which produces it, but also on a subject as its material cause, to that extent its individuality must also depend on this subject."[30]

It is well-known that not only Duns Scotus, who loved to contradict his older colleague, but also other eminent Scholastics such as Suárez and Fonseca did not follow the statements of their great predecessor in the

question of the metaphysical difference between the principle of individuation of the pure spirit and of the human soul.

Suárez, in agreement with Scotus, required the recognition of the principle that "that . . . by means of which what is, is an individual (the constitutive principle of individuality), . . . is not to be sought in anything else than in its being *(Sein)* itself; this is equally valid for matter and form, each considered for itself, as for the bodies consisting of form and matter and in general for every being."[31] Scotus had already taught three hundred years before Suárez that individuality could "only be explained from the fact that things possess a reality, beyond that which is essential to the kind, which is essential to each individual as such."[32] He based this insight on the fact of the so-called "formal distinction"[33] of the universal and of the individuality of the essence. He opposed his "*distinctio ex natura rei*" to the Thomistic "*distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*" and maintained his lay midway between Aquinas' and the "*distinctio realis*." However, from the standpoint of realism one can say of this "formal distinction," that a difference which is actual in the object as thought, but which is not real, is unthinkable.

Still the view on this point which was opposed to Thomas seems to have later asserted itself even among the Scholastics. This distinction has the form that it does in modern thought thanks to Suárez. He assured the leading position in the progress of the history of the humanities to the Jesuit order just then founded. Previously the Dominicans and Franciscans had long struggled in vain with one another for this hegemony. Supporting Suárez in the problem of individuation, the young tradition of the commentator at Coimbra continued via the neo-Thomism of the 19th century up to the present. Thus, we can find Scheler's profound phenomenological insight into the roots of this question justified in the view represented by the Jesuit order. Joseph Donat says the following in his *Ontologia* in reference to the authority of the great Spanish philosopher: "*Recte quidem dicitur essentiam specificam non includere in se varias individualitates. Sed ex eo tantum sequitur, individualitates esse extra conceptum essentiae et ratione distinctas esse, non vero principium individuationis realiter distinctum postulari, nisi ordinem logicum in physicum transferre et utriusque parallelismum statuere velimus, quae translatio vere hanc doctrinam tacite regit.*"[34]

The "drive-constellation" *(Triebeinstellung)* is proposed as the second epistemologically relevant element. It "assumes the experience of some corporeal organization. Once such an organization is given, then the matter of drive-stimulation is possible only within the limits permitted by the milieu already conditioned by the drive-constellation."[35] In other words: "The milieu objects, which become determinant for practical activity become

such to the extent that they are themselves already cut out of the totality of world-facts on the basis of the value orientation of the corporeal experiences and the rules of preference immanent in them."[36] "That is, of the facts as they would be 'given' to a 'pure' external and internal perceiving, evaluating and willing not conditioned by a body and its drives."[37] "The circumstantial milieu of a being is thus the exact counter-image to its drive-constellation and its structure, that is, to its composition. Its richness or poverty (given the same world-facts), just as the predominant values in them, are dependent on this constellation."[38]

The "*ordo amoris*" as "the fundamental moral principle according to which a subject morally exists and lives"[39] corresponds to the above but in the next higher sphere of the *emotional* value-feeling.

> [Man] becomes aware of the world and himself through the windows of this encasement – nothing more of the world and himself and nothing other than what these windows show him according to their situation, size and color. For the world-structure of each man – organized in its total content ultimately in accordance with its value-structure – does not wander and change when man travels ever further in space. The world-structure is filled ever anew with determinate individual things, but in such a way that even this realization follows formative laws, which are prescribed by the value-structure of the milieu.[40]

The following statement is true for both approaches: "It is his world of essential values which isolates that being *(Sein)* knowable by him, and not the things knowable by him and their properties which determine and delimit his world of values."[41]

Thus the *ordo amoris* just as the *vital* as well as the *emotional* (thus also spiritual) structure must be consistently and comprehensively thought. Although we will return to the "drive-constellation" for the presentation of Scheler's doctrine of perception, an understanding of this doctrine assumes a knowledge of the structural unity of the vital and person centers, as Scheler himself has also demonstrated for the "laws of significance of the emotional life."[42]

> What I can perceive, that is, the objective totality of possible perceptions, alone determines the "image" . . .; however that which is also realized out of this objective free space of possible nuances in an undisturbed process of automatic perception (based on each particular sense's organization) determines negatively or positively the sensory-motor behavior which the stimulus releases in the direct formal unity of the temporal process of the physiological sensory-motor functions with the centripetal processes. An exception to this are the initial spiritual acts which are based on the functions of man's vital soul.[43]
>
> Thus the law is valid: *an organism has only those sense-qualities as the alphabet of its possible world-image which can be attracting signs or awareness signs for objects which are meaningful for its dynamic motor behavior.* Sensation appears in the last analysis only as a means to specify indices for present or prospective resistances. These resistances are opposed to the movement of the organism. Sensation, *with the help of*

these indices controls movement, supervises it and purposely measures the ennervation of the movement even before its success or failure.[44]

The following outline (Figure III) shows the dynamic and real ontic connection of these determinations:

Fig. III. Scheler's theory of perception: the ontological structure of the epistemological dynamism and real ontic.



We speak of "image" or "objective appearance" in opposition to two things:

First, in opposition to the sole real "forces," that is, not phenomenal and not of an image nature. The "images" (and their metric spatio-temporal relations as well as their extension and form) manifest these forces. Thus "images" are both *consciousness-transcending* and completely *unreal*. *Second*, in opposition to the contents of perception, the consciousness-transcending objects of which are the "images" which are therefore never absorbed in such contents.[45]

The image itself preexists the selection which those psycho-physiological unitary

functions of seeing, hearing, sensing and perceiving (the leading higher functions) execute on the image-content and on its . . . fulness with their sharply emphasized intentional character. (. . .) The following existential levels of being *(Sein)* are to be distinguished:

1. forces,
2. objective "appearance" and "world of images,"
3. images which have been formally and mechanically reduced,
4. phenomena of consciousness.[46]

Perception is consequently an act of decomposition which analyses the "image" according to its aspects. If one overlooks the differences which accompany the vital fundamental tone of this doctrine, then the four regions participating in the act of perception are transferable in an astonishing way to the corresponding views of Solovyev. The absolute being as master of being *(Sein)* is concealed in the concept "forces." Its manifestation in prime matter, which takes the shape of divine Sophia and beyond that of the world-soul, replaces "objective appearance." The divine Sophia and beyond that the world-soul are evident for us in the "world of images." All of what Solovyev has said about the impotence for metaphysical knowledge (this is true *ceteris paribus* also for the insight into the essence of any real object)[47] by means of universal concepts (abstraction, *otvlečenie*)[48] or by formal a priori reason *(razum)*[49] – "be it abstract rational (Wolff's dogmatism), be it speculative dialectical (Hegel's idealism)"[50] – corresponds to the "formal and mechanical reduction."[51]

In other words: "The less conceivable an appearance is for objective intuition, that is, the less it is determined by the merely general forms of the idea, the more the *inner* essence of the world appears in it . . . ."[52] It is certainly true that our intellect,[53] "which is incapable of comprehending all at once the complete fulness of actuality, and which can only concentrate on one thing at a time, by abstracting from all the other"[54] decomposes all essentially possible image contents just as Scheler lets happen on the part of the divine structure. The statement "that the unconditioned truthfulness of its results can in no way follow from the conditioned necessity of abstraction"[55] has consequences which bring together both thinkers in the intuition of essence.

Let us briefly look at the meaning of its execution which Scheler names "ideation."

Ideation, therefore, means to grasp the essential modes and formal structures of the world through a single case only, independent of the number of observations and inductive inferences which belong to intelligence. The knowledge so gained is then universally valid for all possible cases of the same essential nature, and for all possible subjects who think about the same case, quite independent of the accidents of the senses and the manner and degree of their stimulation. Insights so gained, therefore,

are valid beyond the limits of sensory experience. They are valid not only for this world, but for all possible worlds. In technical language we call them *"a priori."*[56]

We can define this knowledge as that which is exactly the same throughout all possible qualitative and quantitative changes in the possible contents of our senses and our observations. It is what remains completely constant during this change. It is knowledge of those constant specifications of all objects, which we call knowledge of essence and of ideas, or knowledge about simple essential relations and idea relations.[57]

[It is] in the most formal sense the participation of a being in the specificity of another being, without modifying this specificity. *Only the existence of a thing remains constantly and necessarily beyond knowledge and consciousness. It is as such trans-intelligible.*[58]

The species or image theory of the Scholastics and of critical realism is excluded on the basis of this *existential* relation of knowledge.[59] It is important to note that the concept of "image" of the perceptive doctrine: that is, the "contextual image" (*"Umweltding-Bild"*) has nothing at all to do with the " 'immaterial images', which would be only conditions of our consciousness or the contents of a kind of mental-container, and which entirely or in part contain all things once more, only in an 'immaterial form.'"[60] This would involve images of the urge phantasy *(Drangphantasie)* of the world-ground – an idea which we would equate with the purely spiritual *lógos*, assuming a theistic view of the world.

As far as the mode of participation of a being in the specificity of another is concerned, images are not compared with images, rather "the same specificity is comprehended in both main classes of acts which make up our spirit: intuition and thinking, or having images and having meaning. Specificity itself is in the strictest sense comprehended (whether wholly or only in part) where that which is meant [or that which is thought[61]] . . . coincides with that which is intuited [or with the image][62] . . . . The thing 'itself' according to its specificity is more adequately evident in the spirit in this experience of coincidence or in consequence of this experience (evidence)."[63]

In regard to the objective aspect of knowledge, we have not taken into account up until now – aside from merely naming it in connection with Solovyev's metaphysical empiricism – the problem of reality as "the purely dynamic and emotional understanding of nature as the expressive field of the image-creating All-Life *(Alleben)* no less than All-Life itself. All-Life is image-creating because of the dynamic, materializing factors and because of the eternal one 'urge,' the partial functions of which are these 'factors.'"[64] "This eternally creating, dynamic primordial ground of nature"[65] transcends all comprehension of ideas and intuition of primordial phenomena. Since its positings are the *reality a priori given to all thinking,* both resistance experience and trans-intelligibility hold for its experiential component and its relation to knowledge.

Johannes Hessen has summarized these facts in his penetrating and suggestive account of Scheler's epistemology as follows. "Just as the existence of things is associated with the will, so their specificity is associated with the intellect. The former is trans-intelligible to the cognitive spirit, the latter, on the other hand, is intelligible. Spirit's knowledge takes place immediately, without the mediation of a representative factor. This is possible because specificity can be both transcendent and immanent, as opposed to existence which always transcends consciousness."[66]

Our account of how Solovyev tries to solve the epistemological problem, namely, which conditions first make contact with the being possible, begins with the specification of the cognitively finite spiritual person.

> If . . . will is the totally-one metaphysical essence, then all existents as a whole and each individual existence in particular is only the manifestation of this one will. This means that each single appearance has the one independent will as its intrinsic essence. *Every individual being which wills is thus completely conditioned in its manifestations, on the one hand, and completely free in its intrinsic essence, on the other hand.* Although its total activity is determined by motives, and the power of the motives over it is determined by its natural character, *this natural character of the individual being itself, however, is the product of its free will as a metaphysical essence. (. . .)*
>
> The antinomy of freedom and necessity is resolved and the contrary views are reconciled by transferring the freedom of the will from the *operari*, where those who recognized freedom posited it, and where the determinists correctly denied it, to its *esse*.[67]

This means:

1. Absolute will is free in the positing of each of its individual beings: absolute person-*esse*-freedom.

2. The individuated will of the absolute person is determined by the individuation of its own positing of being: empirical character-*operari*-necessity.

In presenting Scheler's *ordo amoris* we are completely aware of the meaning he gives to the concept "character."[68]

The problem facing us was first properly penetrated in *A Critique of Abstract Principles.* On the one hand, individuation itself experiences its essential distinction in the spirit and that which makes possible "for the first time a system of the types of men according to their psychic existence."[69] On the other hand, only the intuition of total-unity helps discover its ultimate and most profound significance as well as the solution to the epistemological question of the possibility of an absolutism of value. "Each being *(Wesen)* and each thing has for itself an unconditioned, determined, *intelligible* character which is its own and which determines particularly the modes of its expression, that is, its empirical character."[70]

The following holds for the difference between man and other beings. All

impersonal beings *(Wesen)* "possess only a determinate generic character without differentiation of the individual being *(Einzelwesen)* in respect to the intelligible nature. In *man* on the other hand the intelligible character is differentiated for each individual being *(Einzelwesen).*[71] But the fateful question still remains. How is precisely that intelligible character of each being *(Wesen)*[72] determined? Why can precisely such a being *(Wesen)* due to its transcendental character act *only so* and not otherwise? Kant's rationalistic ethics[73] avoids answering this question. Consequently it avoids a definite answer to the question of the freedom of the will."[74] (Even Scheler himself is almost equally guilty of this).

Only the complete determination of individuation can answer this question. The center of individuation is the *person*, not matter.

Person, as opposed to thing, means a being *(Wesen)*, which is *not* comprehended by its being *(Sein) for another*, that is, it cannot naturally be only a means in the service of another. Instead it exists as an end *in and for itself.* It is a being *(Wesen)* . . . which is consequently something *unconditionally internal and independent.* This, however, is *freedom* in the truest sense of the word, that is, not in the sense of *liberum arbitrium indifferentile, but,* on the contrary, *in the sense of the complete determinateness and immutable specificity of each being (Wesen), which manifests itself identically in all its acts.*[75]

However the significance of an unconditional object or end can obviously not belong to a partial or contingent being *(Sein).* Only the absolute fulness of being *(Sein)* has the right to such a significance, that is, all or all in one (the totally-one or absolute). Consequently, each can only be the unconditioned end or object for another, if it contains or bears in itself in a determinate manner everything, if it expresses through itself in a determinate manner this totally-one; in other words, *if each is a necessary and irreplaceable member in the existence of the totally-one organism according to its own essence or idea.*[76]

"[And] if man as a natural, material being *(Wesen)*, but likewise also man as a free, rational being cannot be the unconditioned end or object of unconditional love (for to consider someone as an end or to know someone's person means to *love* someone in the true sense of the world),[77] *then man can be such an end and object only as a divine being, man in God, or man as God.*"[78] "If such a divine significance can belong evidently to each being, not in its singularity, but only in its connection to everything, then this connection itself is obviously . . . a certain . . . *inner relation of love and free unity.* In other words, we must assume that . . . human beings are joined among themselves . . . even on the part of their intrinsic essence by an intimate relation, in that they constitute the one divine organism or the living divine body."[79]

Thus, true *amare Deum in Deo* excludes any relativity of knowledge, although the perspective remains irrespective of this especially in regard to the interrelations of the person-ideas. The first version of the idea of total-

unity is significantly influenced by Leibniz's monadology. One notices the classes of acts, striving and representation of essence, that is, the dynamic, psychic concept of matter. Nevertheless the system of *harmonia praestabilita* is perceptibly disturbed within the merely "natural order." The actualization not only of the idea of the person but also of the idea of total-unity is possible only with the assistance of a "conversion of love" of God, that is, by "shared-love" *("Mitlieben").*[80]

Here we find the *ordo-amoris* doctrine in cosmic proportions and with a radius which is also able to capture the meaning of individuation. Solovyev perfects here in an upward direction what Scheler accomplished in a downward direction, in the domain of the vital. These two doctrines of the idea of man complement one another. "If, therefore, the form of freedom and rationality is given by the human principle in the actualization of the divine idea, then the *material foundation* of this actualization is *the given nature* and above all the given nature of *each man,* that is, *the totality of the* natural characteristics, *impulses, instincts* and *interests* which constitute his external empirical character, which serves in this way as the necessary foundation for real being *(Sein)* or the appearance of the eternal essence of man."[81]

Solovyev's doctrine of individuation, including the essential connection to the totally-one, universal order of love, the problem of substance,[82] and the correlation of essence and existence,[83] contained in the *Lectures on God-manhood*, gives the most meaningful formulation of the above. The presentation of the first problem, namely the answer to the question about the specification of the cognitively finite spiritual person, can be provisionally concluded with a quotation from Solovyev's ninth lecture:

> All beings *(Wesen),* in their primordial unity with the divinity, constitute *one* divine world. There are three main realms depending on which of the three fundamental modes of being *(Seinsweisen),* the substantial, the intellectual (ideal) or the sensible (real), dominates in beings or by which of the three divine acts (of willing, of thinking, of feeling) beings are predominately determined.
>
> [But] although the ideal beings (or intellects), which constitute the object of the divine work [of divine acts], possess in themselves as individuals no substantial being *(Sein)* or no unconditioned independence which would contradict the unity of the being, nevertheless each individual being *(Wesen)* represents by itself a certain ideal particularity, a certain characteristic specificity. This makes that object what it is and distinguishes it from all others. Thus, the object constantly has an unconditioned, independent meaning, if not in accordance with existence, still in accordance with essence *(non quoad existentiam, sed quoad essentiam),* that is, according to that intrinsic specificity by means of which the conceivable or intellectually intuitable relation to all others or its concept *(lógos)* is determined independent of its real existence.[84]

The outline of the doctrine of ideation will include the clarification of the

second aspect, the mode of givenness of "existence" in general. The results of the inquiry just concluded may serve as a bridge for us here. The presupposition for this transition consists "in the fact that our subject, according to its nature – before any actual consciousness – as something determinate, which possesses its own character [*ordo amoris*[85]], necessarily already exists in a certain determinate reciprocal action with other objects. As a consequence of this reciprocity it carries within itself a determinate image of each object with which it is correlated, even when this image is not transferred into a conscious act of its spirit [intentionality[86]]."[87] This statement proves the correctness of our foundations for the problem of knowledge. Let us now direct our attention to this problem itself.

Solovyev states:

> Because our actual sensations alone are incapable of synthesizing that objective image in which the object exists for us, it follows that this image according to its essence precedes all actual sensations. Our sensation of the object, therefore, necessarily presupposes that we first represent (*voobražaem* [ideate[88]]) the object. In other words, we impose the image of the object onto the sensations given in our consciousness. Or the impression of the object on our sensibility evokes a corresponding reciprocation between our understanding and the idea of the object. The reciprocation ferries the image of the object into our actual consciousness and connects our given sensations with this image. Our understanding organizes the chaos of external impressions and sensations by relating them to that image or to the idea of the object. The idea exists in our spirit independent of sensations and thoughts, but it becomes materially actual in them and evident to our actual, natural consciousness [apriority of essence[89]].
>
> This idea conceals itself from our external eye in the invisible (unconscious) depths of the spirit. [However] our understanding, stimulated by external impressions, raises it out of the depths to the surface of daily consciousness. It actualizes *(voploščaet)* this incorporeal (*besplotnuju* [immaterial]) form in that material world which consists of the factual conditions of our sensibility. This act of our subject, which actualizes the idea in the sensations and thus gives them a determinate objective form, is [nevertheless] not one-sided.[90] If the metaphysical relation between us and the object, which lies beyond the limits of our natural consciousness and which is expressed in our constant idea of the object, is in a certain respect reciprocal and therefore, not only determined by the essence of the knowing understanding but also by the essence of the object itself (by the objective idea), then such a reciprocation must also occur in our physical or phenomenal knowledge. This is in fact the case. Those physical effects of the object on us, which are subjectively expressed as our sensations and which first motivate our understanding to its constituting activity [positing of act[91]], these perceptible effects of the object on which our knowledge empirically rests still intimate more or less clearly the essence of the object, although they in no way perfectly reproduce (*iščerpyvajut* [exhaust[92]]) it. They relate to it in a certain way and are determined by it. For although the impression of the object is factually dependent on completely external and contingent circumstances, its quality is still conditioned to a certain extent by the agent itself, thus by the object. This dependence can certainly be extremely complex and very tenuous. It is nevertheless present. If no such dependence were to exist at all, then there would also be no reason to relate this effect, this sensation, to this object, or to connect them with this idea.
>
> Consequently some connection must exist between our sensations and the essence

of the object. And because our understanding organizes and objectifies the given sensations, that is, imposes on them the form of a certain idea preexisting in understanding, it finds already in these sensations themselves (in their qualities) a certain disposition (*predraspoloženie* [receptivity]) for precisely this idea. The sensations themselves have, so to speak, an inclination to this ideal image, since this image expresses the inner metaphysical reciprocation between us and precisely that essence. The sensations are the external indication (*projavlenie*) of the essence.

If, therefore, the transformation of a changing and disorganized mass of sensations into a unitary and complete image of an object, an image which stands unmoved before us in the midst of an obscure stream of impressions, is a creative act of our spirit, then such a creation not only is not a creation out of nothingness but also cannot be compared even with the limited creation of a sculptor or an architect. The latter transform a dead mass, which is not at all participating in the work, into a beautiful statue or into a magnificent building.

The material of our sensations is in no way such a dead mass which would be indifferently related to the idea. On the contrary, even if our sensations are evoked only by a distant impression of the object and, thus, participate only more or less in its essence, they necessarily still contain determinate characteristics of the idea or, as it were, certain impressions of the original image and traces of its origin. Sensations are not completely indifferent to that ideal image which our understanding imposes on them. Instead, they conform to the ideal image in this or that respect. Thus, the creative act, which our understanding effects in order to actualize the idea in the sensations, is more comparable to the activity of a poet. The poet does not find in his material, in the human word, a dead mass, but instead a somewhat intellectualized organism which is able to grasp and appropriate his artistic idea and to give it a life of flesh and blood.[93]

Scheler comments, and we agree, that this means "... nothing else than that we ... have reached quite unexpectedly the doctrine of the objectivity of qualities, and thus the justification of the trans-conscious existence of 'images'."[94]

Solovyev summarizes this:

All [prior] statements make clear that the process by which we actually know an existing object has as a whole three phases, which correspond to three fundamental determinations in the object itself.

First: we claim with immediate certainty, that there is an independent object [present], that there is something beyond the subjective states of our consciousness [this is equivalent to the trans-intelligibility of the experience of reality[95]]. The most profound intrinsic determination in the object itself corresponds to this certainty, its determination as being or unconditioned. Owing to this determination the object is neither completely attributable to something else nor attributable to some relation. Instead it remains always in itself in all relations. This being-in-itself of the object cannot be given in some relative states of the one who is knowing, in sensations or thoughts. Instead it is accessible to the subject only in its inner unity with the object. On the basis of this unity the one who is knowing is in the object and the object is in him (the former's unconditioned being *(Sein)* is equal to the unconditioned being *(Sein)* of the object). This connection itself lies deeper than our natural consciousness, but even here it finds a certain expression, namely in the act of immediate certainty, which precedes each sensation and each reflection.

Second: we intellectually intuit *(umstvenno sozercaem)* or present (*voobražaem* [ideate[96]]) in ourselves the one and immutable idea of the object. This idea answers the question: *What* is this object? The second fundamental determination of the object

corresponds to this presencing of ours [representation] or intellectual intuition [ideation]. Owing to this determination, the object is an essence or idea which is identical to itself and which due to this identity remains unchanged in all external situations *(položenijax)* and relations of the object. This idea is not uncovered by a single sensation and can, therefore, not be accessible to the subject in its external empirical knowledge as sensible, but instead it must be accessible to the subject in its own internal essence or idea. This second level of knowledge, therefore, this essential representation of the object [ideation[97]] in the subject, rests on a reciprocation between the spiritually comprehensible (*umopostigaemoju* [intelligible]) essence of the subject or its idea and the likewise spiritually comprehensible [intelligible] essence or idea of the object (objective idea), for which a certain constant image of the object serves as the expression in our spiritual being (subjective idea) before each sensible impression and the material knowledge connected with it.[98] However, this image is only transferred into actual knowledge by sensations, which evidently evoke *(vyzyvajut k projavleniju)* it in our natural consciousness. This occurs such that the well-known saying "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu*"[99] is to a certain extent justified, if one understands by intellect (*um, intellectus*[100]) only our spiritual activity conditioned by the given natural actuality. However, if one does not make this arbitrary limitation and understands by "*intellectus*" the nature of our understanding *(uma)* in its proper sense, then one must say on the contrary that *nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit prius in intellectu.*[101] In other words, that which according to essence precedes, the ideal image of the object, presents itself in the actual appearance as secondary or derivative. That which has metaphysical priority appears physically in second place. The logically *prius* proves to be genetically *posterius.*[102] Although, according to this, the true intellectual intuition or representation [ideation[103]], by means of which the true image or the idea of the object is given, belongs to the realm of metaphysical relations which exist between our subject and the object, it still appears to a certain extent in our natural consciousness. This appearance of its phenomenal forms, an appearance subject to external physical conditions and taking place by individual intellectual acts in individual moments of time, is usually characterized as representation (*voobraženiem* [reciprocation between the subjective and objective ideal essences]) or, as phantasy. However, this psychological (as opposed to metaphysical) representation presupposes already actual sensations in the natural realm and is conditioned by them. This psychological meaning of our knowledge or its relation to the empirically given facts of our natural consciousness leads us to the third phase of objective knowledge, namely:

Third: we actualize *(voploščaem)* the image of the object proper to our understanding *(umu)* in the data of our experience, in our sensations, and according to the relative qualities which correspond to our sensations. Thus, we confer on the image a phenomenal being *(Sein)* or we establish it actually in the natural realm. Without such an establishment *(obnaruženija)* or actualization *(voploščenija)* of the idea in sensation it would itself have no objective significance and would represent no object. On the other hand, the idea itself would possess no actuality in our natural consciousness but would remain exclusively in the depths of metaphysical being *(Sein)*. The object itself would not actually exist and it would [likewise] have no external natural actuality without this reciprocation with another, a reciprocation which manifests itself in the total multiplicity of external impressions and sensations. On their part the sensations could not represent the actuality of this object, if they were not determined by its idea. In the object itself a determination of its being *(Sein)*, which is in a certain respect fundamental, corresponds to this third phase of our knowledge, which we could designate as physical creation. The determination is that the object as a natural appearance is actual. The object requires this determination because without it, it would possess no complete actuality.

Thus, the truth of knowledge is determined by the truth of the object. The object's truth consists first of all in its actuality and secondly in its universality. In respect to the actuality of the object of knowledge (because knowledge has an object which is in a certain respect actual) we reach the following conclusion. The object is determined in its real and total actuality: first, as unconditioned *being (ens, óntōs ón);* second, as an *essence (essentia, ousía)* or idea which is somehow constant and one; and third, as a *being (Sein)* which is in a certain respect actual or as appearance *(actus, phainómenon).* Correspondingly, the actual knowledge of the object (the objective knowledge) is also determined: first, as *faith* in the unconditioned existence of the object; second, as the intellectual intuition or *representation* of its essence or idea; and third, as the *creative* actualization or the realization of this idea in actual sensations or in the empirical data of our natural sensible consciousness.

The first expresses that the object *is,* the second, *what* it is and the third shows *how* the object appears. Only the totality of these three phases expresses the object's complete actuality.[104]

This extensive quotation from Chapter XLV of *A Critique of Abstract Principles* encompasses the core of Solovyev's theory of knowledge. We should highlight the following:

1. knowledge is an existential relation;

2. for this reason knowledge is "certainly not a copy (or a representation) of things in 'immaterial images';"[105]

3. knowledge is functionalized as the apriority of essence;

4. the concept of phantasy has an identical meaning for both Solovyev and Scheler.

To point one:

Solovyev calls the relation between the cognitive subject as such and a being (object) a having existence *(Seinhaben)* which is possible only on the basis of an "inner unity with the object."[106] In virtue of this having existence "the one who knows is in the object and the object is in him, his unconditioned being *(Sein)* [is] equal to the unconditioned being *(Sein)* of the object."[107] This unity has a metaphysical ground.[108] It constitutes that "connection [of the reciprocation of ideal essences[109]] which itself lies deeper than our natural consciousness"[110] (this is equivalent to the logical presupposition of intentionality).

To points two and three:

The apriority of the image excludes any comparison with the Scholastic theory of species or of abstraction. On the other hand, Solovyev's version of intelligible reciprocation, which at first seems very similar to the axiom "*Cognitio fit a cognoscente et cognito*," makes impossible an explanation in terms of an imageless illumination of the specificity of a thing into spirit "as an intention and the fulfilment of this *intentio* in the 'having' of the specificity of the thing itself."[111] This impossibility follows from the above because "having existence" and "intentionality" are metaphysically present.

We will demonstrate in the metaphysics that the intelligible essences or ideas, of which Solovyev predicates an epistemological reciprocation, are not *species* or image in the sense of the theory of adequation repudiated by Scheler but instead precisely *the evident specificity of the thing itself.* If "a certain constant image of the object . . . in our spiritual being . . . *before* all sensible impressions and the material knowledge connected with them"[112] is conceded to the existence of apriority on the basis of the metaphysical unity of the one who knows and that which is knowable, or the intended and intuited (the consciousness of their fulfilment is evidence), then this is the basis of a distinction from Scheler but not a contradiction with him. Fundamentally Solovyev's theory of intelligible reciprocation is just as much "illumination" as Scheler's evidence of specificity. The only difference is that it is anticipated in Solovyev in the *metaphysical* sphere, constituting intentionality and apriority of essence, and is only more functionalized in the *epistemological* sphere, while in Scheler it is ontologically "valid" and ontically "illuminating."

However, this nuance remains debatable because Solovyev's recognition of objective qualities, which is affected by the nature of the things themselves, justifies an interpretation in Scheler's sense from Solovyev's own point of view. We are able sufficiently to support this statement by positions taken in the first dissertation and in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge*, especially in regard to the occasionally problematical question of the meaning of "image." As far as *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* is concerned, Solovyev polemicizes resolutely against Kant's theory of apriority. He argues in the direction "that the union of the logical and empirical elements absolutely does not occur by *means of our subjective* knowledge (as Kant maintains in his 'synthetic a priori'), but occurs, on the contrary, *before our knowledge* and is *presupposed* by our knowledge."[113]

Only this presupposition, only the *metaphysically* guaranteed unity of the relational terms makes knowledge of the independent being, that is, metaphysics, possible at all.[114] This means further, and this is the statement which we value especially for its relation to the problem of image, "*An essential identity of the metaphysical essence with the one who knows, that is, with our spirit . . . is presupposed.* Thus [meta-anthropologically[115]] this essence is determined as the totally-one spirit. Its 'our' is a partial appearance or an 'image,' so that we can attain an actual knowledge of the metaphysical essence by means of our inner experience."[116] In relation to this statement we may quite certainly equate "image" with specificity.

Since "intellectual intuition" constitutes the act correlated with essence, it finds its congruency in the *concept of functionalization.* This assumption

follows necessarily from the valid claim of the equality of image and specificity. If we disregard the fact that in Solovyev's epistemology the concept of functionalization *precedes* the intuition of essence, while in Scheler's it *follows* it, then the concept of functionalization has the same meaning for both of them, that is, "essential insights are 'functioning' . . . though they are in no way explicitly 'visible' to the mind."[117] This position is also fundamental to Scheler's statement that "essential knowledge is functionally transmuted into a law governing the very 'employment' of the intellect with regard to contingent facts; under its guidance the intellect conceives, analyses, regards and judges the contingent factual world as 'determined' in 'accordance' with the principles concerning the cohesion of essences."[118]

This means that functionalization assumes the insight of essence (within the epistemological sphere of the here and now). Solovyev apparently reverses this position of Scheler in his "*nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit prius in intellectu.*" "In other words, that which according to essence precedes, the ideal image of the object, presents itself in the actual appearance as secondary or derivative. That which has metaphysical priority appears physically in second place. The logically *prius* proves to be genetically *posterius.*"[119]

In relation to the analysis of our problem we may instead say that functionalization is the ontologically foundational moment of all essential ontic and therefore precedes every specification in here and now knowledge. This is because Solovyev does not obtain functionalization as such but instead lets it arise and become conscious. It occurs along with the ostensive function of the datum, originally "given" – even if trans-intelligible, since trans-conscious – but already in the metaphysically relevant participation in the being *(Sein)* of the total-unity. Scheler's foundational evidence of insight is valid even for Solovyev *before* all functionalization of its possible essential knowledge because of this pre-eminently existential character of all knowledge in general. The only difference is that all which appears out of metaphysical trans-consciousness and as appearing is also "intuited" is already functionalized with the first visual contact with the world of being *(Sein)* (of appearances, in Solovyev's sense) and is first able to present itself in this manner to spirit.

To constitute a determinate objective appearance [out of the data of experience] which present in themselves neither a determinate unity nor an objective reality, clearly a certain independent (that is, not consisting in sensations as such) act is necessary, which we call representation (*voobraženiem* [ideation[120]]). The actuality of the objective appearance is therefore not given by sense experience but instead by representation [ideation[121]]. It [the actuality] is not set free in the perceptions of the senses, but in the images or ideas of the understanding *(uma)*. This assertion, which replaces sensual-

ism by idealism, is not directly dependent on the theory of innate ideas. As we shall see later this theory is essentially correct, but connected with many misunderstandings. This is due to the fact that up to now this theory has been expressed in an unsatisfactory form.[122]

Analogous to Scheler's definition of the knowledge of essence,[123] Solovyev also considers "such a kind of knowledge . . . indispensable . . . which . . . perceives the object constantly and at once (at one stroke), that is, in each individual case, in the first just as in the millionth, not as this single case, but instead as the universal law; which considers the object not in its given actuality but instead in its unconditioned necessity; which does not see in this object, what it appears to be, but instead what it is. For this constitutes the truth."[124] "In the so-called spiritual vision *(umozrenii)* or in pure (formal) thought we have (a kind of knowledge) which presents the element of universality and necessity [an element which is always personal even for Solovyev[125]], and which is independent of the number of observations and experiences."[126]

A new light can now be cast on the problem of consciousness as well as the concept of states. The states of consciousness called transcendental (as opposed to the immanent, psychic states), the specific contents of which represent objective truths and which are obtained by intellectual intuition, play "the major role in the matter of knowledge, in the theoretical relation to the objects."[127]

The difference in the status attributed to the concept of functionalization must affect the question about the assumption of identity between the metaphysical essence and the one who knows. Both thinkers emphasize

that the forms and laws of thought, just as the forms of pure intuition of our spirit, can at least in part strictly coincide with the existential forms (which as a sphere are incomparably more extensive than our forms of thought). *For in the last analysis it is precisely the same spirit . . . of the absolute being which determines the structure of the "possible world," of the world of essence in its ideas and primordial phenomena* (and coincidence in their essences and in their structures in both cases). *The same spirit participates in each different, individuated act-center of man.* It grows slowly towards the fulness of the divine spirit to the extent that it can functionalize its essential insights and learns to synthesize the ever various subjective spiritual structures expressed in and through us by the history of the spirit.[128]

Although we have excluded the indication of the following position from the text just quoted, Scheler later progresses far beyond the goal of an "*unio mystica*" fixed in 1922.[129] This takes place by means of "a mutual identity, in which not only man 'learns' *in Deo*, but also *Deus* 'learns' *in homine et per hominem.* This identity is not one of *content*, that is, more than a functional and act-like constant identity. It is an identity which is *functional* and which is *constant* in relation to the most universal essence of spirit. However,

the identity is one of becoming as far as content and structure are concerned."[130] There remains a strict delimitation between his original conception and any spiritualistic or cosmic, vital pantheism.

> An *unio mystica* in the sense of a real melding or an after the fact knowledge, that the finite person is *realiter* only a mode or function of the divine spirit, is not meant, but instead only a possible interpretation of the identity of the specificity of the spirit and its idea in God is meant. Also an identity of the essence of man and God is not meant, but instead only an identity of the essence of the spirit with the essence of God, only to the extent that (among the infinite ideas of God) the essence of this created world is prefigured in its realm of ideas. Indeed even the essence of each finite spiritual person is a true part of this essence.[131]

We can justifiably speak of a comparison of Scheler's views with those of Solovyev only in regard to Scheler's original conception, from which the "ecstatic" metaphysics of Scheler's final phase still appears to be completely excluded. And it is only meaningful to juxtapose Solovyev's assumption – that those contents, which belong to the specificity not only of the absolute being but also of our own thinking are identical with one another – with Scheler's original conception.

Solovyev explains in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* that:

> Positive dialectic identifies itself (our pure thinking) with the Logos of the being only according to the universal *essence* or *formally*, not however according to *existence* or *materially*. It recognizes that the logical content of our pure thinking is identical [completely corresponds] to the logical content of the being. In other words, the same (more exactly, precisely such) determinations which we think dialectically also belong to the being, but are completely independent of our thinking (according to existence or actuality). And it is not only the case that these determinations belong to the being itself as such [that is, exclusively] in its proper actuality as the idea of itself. It is rather the case that these determinations are also accessible to us in our own living actuality prior to any reflection and any dialectic. They are accessible in ideal intellectual intuition *(v ideal'nom umosozercanii)*. Our dialectic is merely the valid *(svjaznoe* [logical]) reproduction of these ideas in their universal logical structures *(sxemax)*.[132]

We need not say anything further here about dialectic. Even taking into account other total incongruencies, the dialectic encompasses what Scheler calls "synthesizing" – the assembly of essential insights using Hegel's triadic method.[133] Solovyev first begins to free himself from this method in his ethics.[134]

To point four:

Finally, the concept of phantasy is noteworthy in both thinkers. In Scheler's statements concerning this concept, phantasy is thought of on the basis of drive and urge phenomena. Nevertheless the following statement of Scheler would be acceptable to Solovyev even without a relation to the vital: "The same partial aspect, where the content of perception and the image

coincide, is always the content of phantasy considered from the subject's point of view."[135] For in as far as the trans-conscious "representation" or "phantasy"[136] of the images or ideas of objects becoming manifest in individual spiritual acts precedes all perception and first makes perception as such possible, even Solovyev would agree with Scheler's assertion that it is "phantasy *eo ipso* [which is] the single intuitive cognitive power."[137]

The epistemological act-trinity of *faith* (experience of reality), *representation* (ideation) and *creation* (positing of appearance or phenomenological un-bracketing) – *vera, voobraženie i tvorčestvo* – has been essentially expressed. We will turn to metaphysics following a short diagram (Figure IV) to refresh our memories.

Fig. IV. Solovyev's epistemology: its analysis and its position within the conceptual picture of his metaphysics.

matter	form	concept of constitution	cognitive means	cognitive relation	comparative index
materia prima	existence	the being	–	immediate certainty	problem of reality
Sophia	specificity	essence	image	ideation	apriority of essence
world-soul	phenomenal being *(Sein)*	appearance	sensation	experience	phenomenal un-bracketing

II. "ORGANIC METAPHYSICS"

Hegel's triadic structure provides the starting point for Solovyev's reconstruction of the primordial being in its relation to creation (nature). In Chapter IV of *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* Solovyev therefore determines the "concept of the absolute" (as well as the categories "a being," "essence," and "being" *[Sein]*) as follows:

> The relation we have defined between the being and essence and being *(Sein)* presupposes a primordial distinction in the being itself, that is, in the first center. As we have seen, this first center is the self-verification of the absolute being or God as such on the basis of essence and over being *(Sein)*. It is the self-positing or self-actualization (*samoprojavlenie* [self-communication]) of the absolute being. Each self-actualization [self-communication] contains three moments in that which is self-actualizing:
>
> 1. The self-actualizing as such, which actualizes [communicates] itself in itself or in relation to itself *(o sebe)*. In this form actualization exists [only] in a hidden or potential state.
>
> 2. The actualization [communication] as that which verifies itself in another or on [against] another, the discovery, determination or indication *(vyraženie)* of that which is actualized [communicated], its word or Logos.

3. The return of the self-actualizing [of that which communicates itself] into itself or its finding itself actualized *(samonaxoždenie)* in the actualization [which has come to pass].

The absolute itself as a being in itself (1) necessarily differentiates itself and (2) verifies itself as such (3) without ceasing to be itself in this differentiation. It is evident that the absolute being or the first center can actualize [communicate] itself only in relation to its own other or to a second center, which provides the matter or the substrate [*das Substrat,* accusative[1]] of the actualization [which consists in the matter or in the substrate of the actualization]. It can differentiate itself consequently into these three forms *(obrazax).* We have, therefore, in the absolute being as the first center three positive principles [grounds], three necessary modes or manners of its actualization, and then a fourth, negative principle [a fourth negative ground] or its other, our second center. For being *(Sein)* or nature does not belong to the primordial principles [primordial grounds], since it has [only] a relative or derived meaning.[2]

As we know from the theory of actuality, also relevant for Solovyev, the act-center is equal to the person. A further examination of the metaphysics of world-ground modelled on the revealed mystery of the trinity will show that three different classes of acts – namely, willing, representing, and feeling – are assigned to the "absolute being" on the basis of a meta-anthropological transposition of the human body-soul relationship. Although they belong to the "absolute being" as a whole, they are act-centrally hypostatized.

In connection with this Solovyev notes:

The En-Sof [nothingness or the unlimited, the idea of the concealed, ineffable divinity in the speculative doctrine of the Cabala] is the absolute itself in itself *before* actualization. The Holy Spirit is the absolute itself in itself *after* actualization (whereby one must understand *before* and *after* not as *temporal* determinations but as *essential* determinations). Logos is the absolute not itself in itself but *in* the actualization. Thus, by the absolute itself in itself I mean only the first and the third principle [only the first and the third ground]. It is easy to see from this, that only the Logos has a direct relation to the fourth principle [ground] or to prime matter *[materia prima]* and determines this as idea.[3]

He says further: "Logos actualizes, on the one hand, the absolute as such, on the other hand, prime matter. By or by way of Logos *the absolute* is determined *as the being, prime matter as essence and the relation between them as being (Sein) or more exactly the manner or mode of being.* The being, essence or content and being *(Sein)* or the mode of existence are the three first logical categories belonging to all which exists."[4]

In other words, while being *(Sein)* presents itself as the self-determination of Logos, the nothingness determined by the Logos or the unlimited of the *En-Sof* corresponds to the being, and the prime matter determined by the Logos corresponds to essence. Since this *materia prima* does not represent the being as such, but instead its other, which belongs to it however as its power, it follows that: "The being [is] also the positive principle [positive

ground] of matter and consequently the principle [ground] of its own other. The *will,* however, is the principle [ground] of its other."[5] The essence can not be the object of the being's will, if it cannot be *represented* by it [the being[6]]. It is self-evident that the Logos particular to the absolute determines the nature and content of this representation. This determining is the proper activity of the Logos. For the essence, as the other or as prime matter, represents only the principle, which excites this activity and is fundamental to it *(substratum, hypokeimenon).* [Thus] it is not the case that the being receives in the representation its content by the essence, but, on the contrary, the essence has its total content from the absolute Logos, since the Logos determines the essence. It becomes *actual* essence by means of Logos, since it is itself in itself only empty matter or a pure potency of being *(Sein).* If we call this potency *essence* or *content*, then we are characterizing it not in its abstract in-itself, but in its relation to the being, as a potency already *determined* by Logos.[7]

While human knowledge of the effecting of the essences by being *(Sein)* rests on the dualism of the *objective* world (of external experience) and the *subjective* world (of internal states), this (only relative) difference (between objective and subjective) has a foundation in the absolute, for which no actual being exists outside of itself, only to the extent that one transfers this difference to the internal realm of the absolute and lets it be determined by its own will. Since the being not only factually *represents* the essence which is to be represented, but also *posits* it by its will verifying it, the essence consequently obtains the significance of a *separate* actuality which begins as such to influence the being.

[This] influence of the essence on the being already determined by its *representation* and its *will* gives to its being *(Sein)* the new quality *(opredelenie)* of a *feeling.* There are two kinds of reciprocation between objective being *(Sein)* (the representation) and subjective being *(Sein)* (the will) for finite beings:

1. There is the reciprocation between the external, empirical activity or the objective, substantial representation and our material, physical subject, that is, our animal organism, which is nothing else than the actualization *(projavlenie)* of an unconscious material willing. The sensations of the external senses, the external or corporeal sensitivity is evoked by this first reciprocation.

2. There is the reciprocation between our internal objectivity, that is, our thoughts, and our internal subjective being *(Sein)*, that is, our personal, conscious will, by means of which the so-called internal feelings arise.

Clearly, this distinction cannot exist in the absolute being because internal and external feeling, spiritual and corporeal sensibility coincide in it.

We have, therefore, three fundamental categories by means of which the immediate relation of the being to its own other or to essence is characterized, or *three fundamental determinations of its being (Sein).* The being *wills* its essence. It *represents* it and it *feels* it. Its being *(Sein)* is determined accordingly as *will, representation* and *feeling.*[8]

The question of the subject or bearer whose predicates are these modes of being (Seinsweisen) results from the relation of the three modes of being (of will, of representation and of feeling) to the being. Solovyev discusses three possibilities:

1. The three predicates belong to *one* subject.

2. *Each* of the three predicates has *its own* subject, corresponding only to it.

3. The *three predicates* relate to *three different subjects. Each* subject possesses *all* three predicates and can only be differentiated from both the others by means of a different correlation of the predicates in it.

Since the first assumption leads to a meaningless consequence because it is tautological (the will wills what it wills; representation represents what it represents; feeling feels what it feels) and the second assumption proves to be inconceivable (because it suspends the freedom of the subject and thus its independence), only the third possibility remains. "We have, therefore, three independent and integral subjects of being *(Sein)* or three beings, to each of which all three fundamental modes of being *(Seinsweisen)* belong except that they accrue to each subject in a different way." "I call *the first subject* or the first determination of the being *spirit (dux, pneūma, spiritus)*, *the second – intellect (um, noūs, intellectus* or *mens), the third – soul (duša, psychaė, anima).* Thus: *spirit, intellect* and *soul.* The *spirit* is the being as the subject of the will and as the bearer of salvation. As a consequence or for this reason it is also the subject of the representation of truth and of the feeling for beauty. The *intellect* is the being as the subject of representation and as the bearer of truth. As a consequence it is also the subject of the will of salvation and of the feeling for beauty. The *soul* is the being as the subject of feeling and as the bearer of beauty, but likewise only to the extent that it is subject simultaneously to the will of salvation, and to the representation of truth." [9]

The *idea* constitutes the content of these three subjects. It proves to be "*the objective unity of the three subjects*, the substrate of which [refers to 'unity' [10]] is the essence of the prime matter." [11] We can also say that "this idea is properly that which the being [as personal act-center] *wills,* what it *represents,* what it *feels* or senses. This is its proper object or content. The idea as the *content* of the will of the being is salvation. As the content of its representation, the idea is the truth. As the content of its feeling, it is beauty." [12] In other words, "salvation is the unity of the subjects or the idea in as far as it [the idea] is *willed,* truth – in as far as the idea is *represented* or *thought,* beauty – in as far as the idea is *felt.* Perfect unity, however, consists in the fact that the idea, namely what is conceived as truth, is exactly

the same as and nothing different from what is willed or wished as salvation and what is felt as beauty. It follows that these three determinations are not any separated essences, but are instead only *three forms or modes in which one and the same, namely the idea, appears for the different subjects.* Thus the whole fulness of divinity dwells in the idea."[13]

Fig. V. Solovyev's metaphysics of the world-ground: the trinitarian subject in its relation to the material object of the second potency (*materia prima*, idea) and the presentation of the doctrine of categories.



These statements have established for the most part the outlines of the relation "absolute being–prime matter." What interests us in this relation is not so much the "speculative derivation of the principle of the trinity"[14] under the assumption that "*this truth imposes itself on reason and can be logically deduced provided one admits that God is in the positive sense and complete in this term.*"[15] We find nothing directly corresponding to this in Scheler. What interests us rather is the metaphysical contours of Solovyev's counter-image to the crisis of Western philosophy in connection with the concept of prime matter. It is the doctrine of the unity of the true, the good and the beautiful *(de proprietatibus entis)*, the content of which can be seen

as relevant to Solovyev's view of intentionality. Finally what interests us is what he designates as the proper and ultimate, scientifically comprehensible purpose of *this* organization of the world-ground: "The spiritualization of matter and the materialization of spirit or the internal correspondence and the equilibrium of both principles."[16]

What Solovyev has said so far is summarized in Figure V.

Let us now devote our attention to the problem of "attribution," a problem first isolated by us. What is important for us here is Solovyev's statement at the end of *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* which we encountered under point 2 "in relation to metaphysics," that is "*the recognition of the concrete totally-one spirit* – in place of the earlier abstract essences and hypostases – *as the absolute primordial principle.*"[17] "*The immediate potency of being (Sein) or prime matter*"[18] confronts this center *as the essentially necessary correlative idea.* This "prime matter is only the necessary appendage of the free being without which it cannot be conceived. On the other hand, prime matter is its first substrate, its foundation (basis), without which the being could not appear or be as such."[19] Towards the end of *The Philosophical Principles* Solovyev himself explains this attributive counter-position in the world-ground as follows:

> The being can be determined as spirit. For although spirit is also determined above all as that which wills in accordance with the relation to the other, this is not an expression of its proper activity [unity of being *(Seinseinheit)* of all possible classes of acts[20]]. To will something, it is necessary to have everything at one's disposal. *Simple willing, which presupposes no activity in the one who wills, is not even will.*[21] *This material blind striving is the thirst for being (Sein): žažda bytija. The absolute being, however, as such possesses everything in an immediate act. Thus its other can only be in it as pure potency.* In that it possesses everything in itself the being cannot will to create anything essentially different. It can only will to have its own content as another. Every creation consists in this.[22]

We cannot equate this "thirst," this "longing" for being *(Sein)* with Scheler's "striving," although the wording and especially the intentional character of the concept "thirst" seems initially to suggest this.[23] This is because the object of Solovyev's statement about relations is too vague to allow this. Thus the object cannot be the "goal" of an "intentional" movement. *Consequently what remains is only an interpretation more in the sense of Scheler's "primordial-urge." We can state with certainty that Solovyev's world-ground is determined as "spirit" and "urge," all the more so because the latter is mutatis mutandis "released" by Logos in the realm of spirit; surely as distinguished from Scheler, an absolutely powerful spirit.*

Indeed, one can hardly consider Scheler's problem to have been solved. For even the Russian version of this bi-polar unity of tension fails, but with

this difference. The reversal of the sign allows the accent to be posited in favor of the spirit, and not of the urge. Thus the "*onus probandi*" falls to the latter. If one correctly reproaches Scheler that the doctrine of the original "powerlessness of the spirit"[24] is a *contradictio in adiecto* precisely in his system, then this criticism is valid with exactly the same logic for Solovyev's "material, blind striving, the thirst for being *(Sein)*," which should have only the character of a "pure potency."[25] As we have said only the signs have been interchanged here. To express this discovery formally we can designate the bipolar tension of the world-ground by the equation: + spirit − urge (Solovyev) = − spirit + urge (Scheler). The plus sign would be equal to power and minus sign to powerlessness.

The following diagram (Figure VI) is an attempt to illustrate this in accordance with Scheler's lecture "The Forms of Knowledge and Education,"[26] which must be considered the first version of his "theory of attribution."

Fig. VI. The starting point of Scheler's "theory of attribution."



As far as our interpretation of Solovyev's *žažda bytija* is concerned, Wladimir Szyłkarski, who has done serious work on Solovyev, characterizes this expression surprisingly and without further comment as "urge." The following passage is taken from his criticism of the doctrine of *materia prima.* "Solovyev's theory of *materia prima* certainly gives occasion to serious reflection. It is hard to conceive how the urge for existence *(Dasein)* can occur in matter, if matter represents only a merely *possible* existence, which is in no way different from pure non-being *(maè ón).* Who is the bearer, the *'subjectum'* of this irresistible urge? And *how is urge possible at all in the totally-one . . .*?"[27]

To justify our own version we would like to criticize this quotation from a literary point of view. It is confusing to speak of an urge for *existence (Dasein)* without further ado. Those who philosophize today hastily connect it to the concept of *existence*, a concept which Solovyev's formulation certainly excludes. In our context, being *(Sein, bytie)* is the expression of a metaphysical relation. It is precisely this fact that makes a critical treatment of Solovyev's theory of attribution so difficult. At the very most we could establish a congruency with the concept of "act-mode." In a first approximation, existence *(Dasein)* corresponds to existence *(Existenz, suščestvovanie)* or to being a phenomenon *(Erscheinungssein, javlenie).* Further, Szyłkarski calls potency *maè ón*, but also "*pure* non-being." This equation is likewise misleading since Solovyev himself characterizes absolute nothingness or *ouch ón* as "pure, unconditioned non-being," and distinguishes it from possibility or potency *(maè ón)* as "merely *relative* non-being."[28]

Wladimir Szyłkarski traces signs of the bipolarity theory of a dynamic structure directly back to "Plato's doctrine of matter" *via* German idealism. We believe, however, that the predecessors and sources of Scheler's metaphysics named by him present a better picture. Spinoza would naturally be the first to be named. He was Solovyev's "first love in the realm of philosophy."[29] One should also take into account "that the static pantheism of Spinoza was indispensable as a presupposition for the appearance of Hegel's historical pantheism, and subsequently for positive Christian philosophy."[30] Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* (1806), first encountered by name in *A Critique of Abstract Principles*,[31] must already be presupposed for showing the necessity of a being in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge.*[32] Scheler says the following about this: "Of the philosophers of the 19th century it was Hegel, in *The Phenomenology of Mind,* who first strongly expressed the idea [of a responsible involvement of the a-temporal becoming of the divinity in the history of the world, or better in the world

as history[33]]."[34] *Eduard von Hartmann* is the third source of Scheler's metaphysics. He "took up again the same idea in the one-sided form of a redemption of the divine from its blind *fiat* of the will, which determines the existence of the world, by man on a metaphysically pessimistic foundation. He unified Schopenhauer's doctrine of salvation by the 'negation of the will' and Hegel's view of a development and progress in the world."[35] Whoever is acquainted with Solovyev's master's dissertation need not concern himself any more with connections. We can agree that despite all appearances to the contrary Solovyev was no disciple of von Hartmann.[36] This is not contradicted by the fact that Scheler relates to von Hartmann's *Doctrine of Categories* (1897) for his "learning" of the world-ground[37] where, on the other hand, only *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* (1869, 1st edn.) and the *Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness* (1879, 1st edn.) is relevant for Solovyev's *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (and also a little later[38]). The reason for this is that not only the "metaphysics of urge" but also the "interweaving of teleological and dis-teleological views of nature, which was handed down to Schopenhauer by Schelling"[39] are already present in *The Philosophy of the Unconscious.*

There are clearly amazing similarities in portions of the metaphysics of the two thinkers.[40] These similarities make understandable the suspicion that their roots are common. We would like especially to call attention to the proximities of the theory of *non-non-fiat* and the understanding of freedom and necessity. Scheler's idea of *non-non-fiat* is already anticipated by Solovyev in his French book.[41] He says there that:

> *We know that the actual cause (archaè taēs genéseos) of creation is that will-act by means of which God refrains from repressing the potential actuality of the chaos by means of his omnipotence,* or ceases to work against this possibility by means of the special power of his first hypostasis. God limits himself to reacting with his second and third hypostases by justice and love, truth and grace. The first hypostasis of the all-holy trinity, the eternal father, refrains from opposing the potency of the chaos in its specificity (in repressing it by his omnipotence). This was the first condition or the actual cause of creation (on the basis of which God the Father is above all the creator of the world).[42]

Scheler repeats this thought in his lecture at the Berlin Lessing Academy. There he announces his metaphysics with the following words: "We do not attribute the becoming of the world to a 'creation from nothing,' as theism does. Instead we attribute it to the *non-non-fiat* by means of which the divine spirit releases the demonic urge in order to realize the only 'existing' idea of the divine."[43] One sentence later he varies the solution to the antinomy "freedom-necessity," as we are already acquainted with in Solovyev in the sense of the counter-position "*esse-operari*"[44]: "By freedom of the will

we understand only the act which corresponds to existence or the realization of the project, not the act which corresponds to the content, that is, the specificity of the project, which is strictly motivated."[45] This means, in Solovyev's vocabulary: "This eternal unity of freedom and necessity, of itself and of the other, constitutes the proper character of the absolute."[46] Naturally, one can no longer speak in Solovyev of a "self-deification" in Scheler's sense, that is, of a "co-actualization of God by man,"[47] although much could still be said on this subject.

At least the following points are certain:

First that in Solovyev's system the freedom of the "divine being" is suspended with the positing of spiritual individuation. For:

> Each objective image, receiving an unlimited divine will according to its kind *(posvoemu)* based on the particularity belonging to it, appropriates this will corresponding to this particularity, that is, it makes it its own . . . The unlimited power of being *(Sein) (tò dpeiron)*, which in the divinity is always eclipsed by the act – for God always (eternally) wills or loves everything and possesses everything in and for Himself – ceases in each individual being. The unlimited power is eclipsed by its [own][48] actuality, for this actuality is not everything, but instead one out of everything, something particular *(osobennoe)*. This means that each being loses its immediate unity with the divine. Further the act of the divine will, which is unlimited in the divinity because it is never separate from all others, acquires such a limit in the individual being. However, because this being differentiates itself in this manner, it acquires the possibility of influencing the one divine will, in that it determines this will from itself in this manner and not in any other. The particular idea, with which the act of the divine will joins itself, differentiates this act from the absolute immediate unity of the divine will by communicating to the act its own character. The particular idea acquires the act for itself and obtains in it the vital force of actuality. It [the force[49]] gives to the idea the possibility of existing on its own and of affecting the quality of an individual being or an independent subject.[50]

We are aware that this does not demonstrate the loss of divine freedom because absolute and partial freedom can exist basically with one another. But to make love and necessity synonymous and to place or posit it [love] "as such" or as *necessary* in the world-ground causes a strictly determined chain reaction as soon as the phased actualization of the absolute being and *Sophia* becomes evident.[51] The "free act of the *world-soul* . . .,"[52] that is, its cosmic sin before God, is then an incomprehensible accident; for, it can neither be called "love," since love equals necessity, nor "freedom," since Solovyev has given freedom the meaning of essential fidelity. For ". . . freedom in the true sense of the world [consists in] the complete determinateness and the immutable peculiarity of each being, which manifests itself identically in all its actions."[53] It is easy to see that according to this determination the betrayal of the world-soul must redound to the absolute itself. The necessities, differentiated in *The Justification of the Good* as

mechanical, psychological and rational-ideal,[54] first enter again into play with the fact of the striving of the divine principle following an adequate embodiment of its idea or what is the same, following reunion with the fallen world-soul.[55]

And it is *secondly* certain that, as far as the cosmic drama of the world-soul can be assumed, the perfection of the divine principle only occurs by *théosis* or the deification of all creatures,[56] that is, "by a long series of deeds freely performed."[57] Something like an "act of deification" is clearly given in this cosmic and theogonic process or event. However, only *absolute intentionality* is present in this process, that is, its goal determination is unconditionally necessary and certain. The unity of *cósmos* and *théos* (related to man: of ecstatic and spiritual metaphysics), on the one hand, and the act-central unity of willing, thinking and feeling, on the other hand, do not allow any other explanation. Therefore, we can only speak of a final, passive co-actualization of God in Solovyev's thought.

Why is there this dilemma? We believe that the fate of this absolute chain of determination can be redeemed by not accepting a personal bearer of the positive non-value "evil." Solovyev later understood its roots and undertook the necessary corrections.[58] *We relate this with the renunciation of the total Sophia speculation, in as far as the existence and recognition of a personal evil excludes Origen's ideal of an apokatástasis tōn pántōn.*[59] Solovyev was to avoid projecting the foundation of this convincing train of thought. This is significant and can be related to the philosophy of *Eros* as a crisis in his thought.[60]

Thirdly, and finally, we can say that Scheler escapes even less the suspicion of absolute determinism in that he distantiates himself from the world image of theism and finally, in open contradiction to this, precedes towards this image. The statement from his ethics "God does not impart reward and punishment" is already a step along this way. Even the basically correct insight, of the still earlier contributions to the *Phenomenology and Theory of Sympathy and of Love and Hate* (1912) that "any existence of evil [is] necessarily co-conditioned by the lack of reciprocal love, the latter, however, is co-conditioned by a lack of original love"[61] fails in respect to those other insights of the "conversion" of love[62] and the idea of the "*ordo amoris* in general."[63] First of all the statement that evil is *ultimately* based on deficient love toward the bearer of evil reverts to the metaphysical level of God on the basis of the reversal of the Greek axiom "love is the movement of the lower to the higher, of the *maè ón* to the *óntōs ón,* of man to the God who does not love Himself."[64] Secondly, Scheler's "*ordo amoris*" is a fatalistic concept.

If we completely disregard these "obstacles" in Scheler's Augustinian middle period, which is intentionally *theonomic,* then he still renounces the concept of freedom in the true metaphysics of his final period. There he says that "by freedom of the will . . . only [the] act, which corresponds to the existence or to the realization of the project"[65] is understood. Its content or specificity is "strictly motivated by necessity."[66] What can freedom mean when it is referred to unconditioned necessity in order to be itself? "The ground of things is becoming and is simultaneously with the world as history . . . . God's self-realization does not occur without world history, the history of man."[67] "This being *(Sein)* would deserve to be called divine being *(Dasein)* only to the degree to which it realizes its eternal *deitas* in the processes of world history and in and by man."[68]

To use a Scholastic manner of speaking this means that Scheler posits a mere *libertas ad unum* in the primary ground of the world. The opposite choice at once excludes the being *(Sein)* of "God" and his "world." One may argue whether or not in spite of this a *libertas a necessitate interna* is present. On this point we agree with Solovyev's Schopenhauer interpretation,[69] where the question is ultimately resolved in favor of necessity. "I can do what I will; I can, if I will, give all my goods to the poor and become myself a beggar – if I will. But I cannot will this, if opposing motives have more power over me, than I have to will. If I had another character than that which I have, if I were a saint, then I could will this. However then I would also not be able *not* to will this. Then I would will this necessarily and do this necessarily."[70]

Disregarding the fact that motivation in general contradicts divine omnipotence, the willing-to-be-itself of the a-temporal ground of becoming of the world as *deitas* presents the strongest motive for movement to it, that is, compels it necessarily to realization, without suspending the self-consciousness of its freedom. Determination would therefore only be in question, if the *result* of "history" as the "manifestation of its eternal ground"[71] remains and must remain unknowable *in the here and now of its process.* Nevertheless Scheler "knows" it and expresses its definitive determination as the already come to pass "ideation or spiritualization, in the sublimation of the drives and in the simultaneous actualization, or vitalization of the spirit."[72]

With this idea Scheler's thought flows in an unique way into the restoration philosophy of total-unity, the goal of which we have just characterized as "the realization which is the total incarnation of the divine principle, that is, the communal spiritualization of matter and materialization of spirit."[73] The consequence of this value accentuation, at one time spiritual (Solovyev) at another vital (Scheler), is that the transparent *amor intellect-*

ualis Dei, which gives Solovyev's system a Spinozistic-like glow, as the logically interpreted grounding of the thought of creation expires in Scheler, in the dark mysticism of a dynamic *natura naturans.* For it is "the all-powerful drive charged with infinite images – which must account for reality and for the contingent qualities of this reality which are never determined unequivocally by the essential laws and ideas."[74]

We will now leave the question of the relation between freedom and necessity. The aim of our discussion has been to show that both metaphysics suspend freedom at the onset, and determine the goal of history as necessary. Solovyev's thought permits at least one contradiction[75] within the becoming, while Scheler's permits a great many contradictions.[76] The following two diagrams (Figure VII and Figure VIII) communicate this picture in the essential outlines of the metaphysics of history.

Fig. VII. Solovyev's metaphysics of history: the idea and actualization of God-manhood.





THE ACTUALIZED, COMPLETELY SPIRITUALIZED, AND MATERIALIZED TOTAL-UNITY

We must clearly eliminate two thoroughly "essential" differences between both metaphysics. These differences are evident in the radically different meanings of "spirit" and "love." If we consider Katharina Kanthack's requirement that "at most an *immanent* examination of the system [is] acceptable . . . as opposed to a single case,"[77] then Scheler especially develops the different meanings in correlative counter-position. In order to grasp this situation we must first be aware of the separate specificity of both of these ideas.

Kurt Leese characterized the erroneous determination of the *first* idea as follows: "The constant weak point of Scheler's anthropology and theology is the weakness of the spirit."[78] It is a repetition of what Solovyev calls von Hartmann's incredible *lapsus ingenii.*[79] The criticism which *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* directs against *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* is also applicable to Scheler. Von Hartmann's "hypostatizing" of pure logical potency[80] represents the classical precedent for Scheler's tendency to avoid the value commitment on the part of a personal God and to advocate pan-emotionalism and the irresponsibility of the "spirit" for this world as a way to avoid man's natural powerlessness.[81] The vengeance of spontaneity surfaces here. Once affirmed, the consequences ensue with logical precision. Scheler is aware of the danger and he summons the total power of his spirit in order to avoid it, on the whole however he is not successful.

Fig. VIII. Scheler's metaphysics of history: man in his cosmic position between the world-ground and Deity as the personal center of act-deification.



The world-ground develops itself in polarized movement between spirit and urge. Nevertheless spirit is originally powerless. This "must" mean that spirit is not even will but only representation. On the other hand, urge which is equiprimordial with spirit, is absolutely spiritually blind and "completely indifferent to good and evil"[82] at the start of a-temporal becoming. This means that urge is *completely unintentional* since value and non-value are predicated in this manner. For this reason will cannot be in a position, even potentially, to grasp at all, let alone to comprehend, an idea presented to it after spirit's release of will. If the will, desiring by chance the momentarily offered content, should rush forward to determine the goal of the idea's release and should become conscious of itself so to speak by its probing movements[83] in order to be able to follow the ideation attempts of the spirit (the category of attraction), then the self-redemption of God and our own act-*deification* for him, in him, and with him would be the most sublime *accident* of world history. Since the absolute powerless spirit of the beginning cannot will but can only represent, there would be no meaningful way for it to release the primordial urge. Similarly, there is no meaningful way to think of the urge itself as releasable by the spirit because the urge is originally spiritually blind and irresponsibly arbitrary (in Scheler's understanding).[84]

Without any personal originality and with the necessary renunciation of an intuition of chance for Scheler, we are left only the choice of contrasting Solovyev's modest yet more destructive criticism of von Hartmann's *cosmogonic* metaphysics with Scheler's *gnosticism.* We cannot say that the absolute powerless spirit is pure *potency* or *non-being* (although this idea could not claim any essential insight for itself and in a sense represents an hypostatized concept). Scheler is not such easy prey for his critics. Nevertheless, he cannot prevent us from making his powerless spirit into *representation.* Representation is a mode of specificity which is completely meaningless without correlation to the will. He also cannot stop us from saying the same thing about his attribute of urge, which Solovyev said about Schopenhauer's will. Thus, independently of Solovyev but based on the results of his interpretation,[85] since Schopenhauer's will as a cerebral phenomenon independent of and freed from any representation no longer deserves this characterization, and can be understood as absolutely spiritually blind urge, "will in general without an object of will, without a goal, will without representation . . . is obviously an empty word, which has no advantages over Kant's 'thing in itself' or physic's 'forces of nature.'"[86]

"Urge" is, however, originally a "will without representation," because as absolutely spiritually blind – precisely as urge – it is unable to perceive representations at all. Scheler does not even come to our assistance by

expressing the functional identity of spirit and urge. It is significant that Scheler explicitly emphasizes the intentional specification that the spirit is not responsible for this world.[87] This must lead to necessarily insurmountable difficulties in respect to its consequences and to the explanation for the "vicissitudes" of history (we add to this, for metaphysical evil). That Schopenhauer's general thesis: world as will (primordial urge) and representation (powerless spirit) conforms to Scheler's metaphysical structure of attribution, which we have drawn attention to by the study of Solovyev's master's dissertation (von Hartmann is the reformer of Schopenhauer's voluntarism), is self-evident. Therefore we need not discuss this conformity any longer.

However what is the significance of all this in regard to *love*? Above all the change in Scheler's metaphysics must effect love and its logical starting point. The first version of the book on sympathy understands love as "the movement, in which each concrete individual value-bearing object attains the highest possible values for it and in accordance with its ideal determination. Or love is the achievement of its ideal value-essence, which is specific to it."[88] "The 'being' *('Sein')* which is of concern here is . . . neither an existential, empirical being *(Sein)* . . . nor an 'ought-element' *('Seinsollen')*, but instead a third . . .: the same 'being' *('Sein')* referred to in the statement 'Become who you are.'"[89] Clearly this meaning preserves the logical commitments over against spiritual individuation. It is clear, however, that the statement "Become who you are" is not satisfied if "I" have an essential insight in "who I am." Thus the "movement in which each concrete individual object, which *bears* values, *attains* the highest possible values for it,"[90] must be a completely real *process* in the *bearer of value.* This means that it must be assigned to the "become." The early Scheler's intuitions on the problem of "love and knowledge,"[91] especially the conversion of love's direction of movement – observed in the Greek principle – as well as his intuition that love first founds all knowledge and is, therefore, different from knowledge, completely agree with the aforesaid requirement. They are certainly in a similar agreement with Solovyev's philosophy of Eros. A spirit with the power of will must manifest itself in the "gentle" force of illuminating, spiritual Eros. Scheler, the Augustinian, can still thoroughly affirm this principle. Solovyev followed this path for his answer to the question, "How does the effective relation between spirit and urge occur?" This solution cannot satisfy us since to accept it love must be sacrificed.

We wait in vain for a solution to the determining power of spiritual Eros, of divine love in Scheler's final phase, which is characterized by the powerlessness of the spirit and the omnipotence of the urge. Thus we are forced to consider Scheler's "meaning of love" – which is closely related to the ideas

of person, man, and God – as essentially erroneous. Solovyev demonstrated that the "movement" of love was a real possibility for an existential ascent to the heights of the personal potential of the loved "thou" in and by means of its experiential unity with the loving and loved "I." In Scheler's later phase the "movement" of love is valued only as a *cognitive function.*[92] This insight discloses the reason why Scheler's fight for the interpretive meaning of knowledge and against its autonomy which is sterile as a dogmatic estrangement from life and which is tyrannizing as mere language of domination for the sake of capital, ultimately was a fight against Don Quixote's windmill. In as far as love is equivalent to knowledge or becomes[93] and no longer "will be" in the transformation of Scheler's idea of God, that is, in as far as love dispenses with practical acts in order to realize the observed essences of value for itself, it is unable to break through the *l'art pour l'art* of philosophy.

If we disregard the autobiographical interpretations of Scheler's radical reversal after 1922,[94] then Scheler has completely misunderstood Augustine; whom Solovyev in his way has also misunderstood due to a false reproduction of the relation of the divine persons among themselves and to creation.[95] "Love" is for Augustine the one and total trinitarian act of being *(Sein)* (God the Father), of knowing (God the Son), and of doing (God the Holy Spirit).

> The idea of an extremely differentiated participation in divine nature is metaphysically basic to his construction of the universe. Nevertheless towards the end of his life he christianized this old and fundamental thought of Plato. He attributed differences, that is, different levels of being *(Seinsstufen),* to transcendental relations between the divine persons. As creator, God is the origin of the being *(Sein)* of all things. As word, God is the light of knowledge, and the source of all truth. As the granter of grace – as the Holy Spirit – God is the origin of all good.[96]
>
> Creation consists therefore in an inconceivable fulness of images and likeness which owe their unity, truth and beauty to the divine primordial image and to the supreme likeness, to the very image of the Father, to the eternal word, "in which everything becomes."[97]

Against this background, Scheler's "titanic" gnosis first appears in its central, apparent presence and, therefore, from man's point of view as an "inward driven monophysitism" of pure intuition. Dietrich von Hildebrand proves in his essay on Scheler[98] that *this is the original position of the Pseudo-Socratic, which endangers Scheler even in his Augustinian phase: the* participation in the holy person of God, in "the person of persons" by acts of "knowledge" of a loving nature which are simultaneously or subsequently executed. Nothing is said about a "doing" of love. *To the God of the theory of value belongs the ideal cosmos: to man as agent – first accrues the ecstasy of creative All-Life, then the spiritually and value-blind urge, and*

finally the demonic of matter. At the end there is a monistic, gnostic dualism, the strangeness of the titanic cosmic.[99]

As far as Solovyev is concerned, he certainly was aware of the Augustinian and Leibnizian tradition of the anthropological starting point of the idea of God in the trinitarian relation of the spirit to itself *(sum sciens et volens; scio, me esse et velle; volo, me esse et scire).*[100] He also understood love as the totality of these classes of acts.[101] His idea of transformation is extraordinarily interesting in respect to Scheler's doctrine of the spirit (direction and guidance). This idea is based on the postulate that "the law of conservation of energy [is] also completely valid for spiritual life."[102] "Therefore even spirit requires for its conservation and 'strengthening' the 'weakening' of the flesh and its [the flesh's[103]] transference out of its active state into its potential state."[104]

Closely connected with this is Solovyev's version of the theory of ideal and real historical factors.[105] This version still looked very promising before the bankruptcy of "free theocracy" and is carried through in its essentials up to the final phase. In *A Critique of Abstract Principles* he states: "Idea and fact, utopia and actuality are relative expressions which are constantly changing into one another. If one may and must disregard certain utopias, it is not because they are utopias, that is, have no place in the given external actuality or appear only as thoughts in it. Rather it is because they are bad ideas. This quality deprives them not only of an application but also of a legitimate place in the world of ideas."[106]

One notices how evident the organologically deterministic basic conception of the world-vision is here, which is shared by Scheler in his own way. However – and this is essential in respect to Scheler – spirit, as Solovyev understands it, is certainly weak and it becomes even weaker, as its life matures, in favor of grace (*ves' mir vo lže ležit:* "The whole world lieth in wickedness:: [I John 5:19]); nevertheless, it is never powerless. On the other hand, spirit always remains powerless enough to require the merciful, communicative superior power of the absolute spirit completely to fulfill its spiritually individuated vocation. The excellent interpretation of *The Life Drama of Plato*[107] makes it "clear, that man can become divine only *by means of the actual power of God who did not come into existence but is eternally.* [It is] clear that the path of supreme love, which perfectly unites the spiritual and the corporeal, is necessarily, even initially, itself the union or cooperation of the divine and the human. It is the divine-human process."[108]

We do not want to establish at this point how relevant the metaphysically constructive pattern of the early works is for the later and most valuable

works (*The Life Drama of Plato* appeared in 1898). Assuming a relevance or in regard to Solovyev's metaphysics in general, we would like once more to stress that the love and the freedom of God owing to their necessary character have without a doubt an irrational significance. Moreover, in respect to the statement that the "absolute spirit" is first "actualized" by the love of Logos for prime matter ("actualized" as the "being," "essence," and "being" ["*Sein*"][109]), the love and the freedom of God have an hypostatized, divinatory significance. Basically we consider the problem of this relation to be the weakest point in Solovyev's speculation. If it is seriously criticized, it leads to a terminological *regressus ad infinitum.*

As much as Solovyev exposes the potential starting point of von Hartmann's metaphysics,[110] he himself also thinks of the world-ground, like von Hartmann, in "formless, abstract hypostases" or "potencies."[111] For how does it help to say that the "absolute principle"[112] or "the absolute actuality"[113] or even "the absolute being or self-being"[114] is the *real bearer* of the first and second potencies of being *(Sein)* (or of the absolute in possession of power and of power itself),[115] if Logos first of all "actualizes" by rendering possible the reciprocation of two *potencies* not only the absolute *as* "the being" but also prime matter *as* "essence" as well as the relation between them, that is, *itself as* "being" *("Sein").*[116]

We are urged by Solovyev to think of the absolute *as such*, that is, as "positive nothingness"[117] or before any relation to its second potency in the three persons *En-Sof* (Cabala), Holy Spirit, and Logos[118] although the following statement by Solovyev contradicts the above. He says that only "the *En-Sof* [is] the absolute in itself '*before* appearance,' the Holy Spirit however [is] the absolute '*after*,' 'in accordance with' appearance, and Logos . . . [is] not the absolute itself in itself but '*in*' appearance."[119] We are forced to make this positive assumption since Logos must certainly already *be* in order for the essentially necessary correlation between the absolute in itself and prime matter to be able to occur at all.

Then the question arises: How are we to think of the existential modalities of the absolute in itself? It is clearly not yet "a being" or "essence" or "being" *("Sein")* since the Logos first establishes these "three first logical [and naturally also *ontological*[120]] categories common to all existents"[121] by the "direct relation to the fourth principle or to prime matter."[122] In our opinion this problem is scarcely solved by characterizing the existential mode of the absolute as "supra-being."[123] This only bypasses the difficulty and involves concretizing the position of *maè ón* or *dynámei ón.*

It is therefore clear that the concept of a supra-being *(überseienden)* absolute is to be understood as purely and simply synonymous with the

absolute of the foremost potency of being *(Sein).*[124] If this were not the case, then "a being," "essence," and "being" *("Sein")* would be devoid of meaning. It is further clear that absolutely nothing can arise out of a first and second *potency* as long as there is not also *something,* which *bears* these potencies. Solovyev distantiates himself from Hegel's dialectic by arguing that Hegel only develops the *concept* of being *(Sein),* while he himself develops the *actual* true being *(istinno suščee)* in his philosophy of total-unity.[125] However, we must point out that Solovyev first obtains this true being from the *relation between two potencies,* the correlation of which is "fate."[126] This means that God actualizes himself. Although this statement is correct, it is made false through the implicit essential correlation with prime *matter.* He says in regard to this: "Absolute spirit requires matter for its actualization; the supra-natural divine nature [?] requires nature in order to actualize *(dlja projavlenija)* its divinity."[127] Prime matter *(materia prima)* must be understood, on the one hand, as something which belongs to the primordial principle, as something at the disposal of absolute spirit. Thus this (prime) matter is subjected to absolute spirit. On the other hand, this matter is "the necessary condition of the spirit's existence." This means that "it [matter] is prior to absolute spirit; the latter depends on the former."[128]

This is the reason why we are forced to reject the following statement by Szylkarski: "Solovyev's matter [is] the *hýlae* of Plato and Aristotle and the *materia prima* of the Scholastics."[129] We cannot accept any of these three assertions. Plato did not have the concept of *hýlae.* As he found it necessary to assume a secondary cause *(xynaition)* in non-being in order to explain the world of appearance, this non-being secondary cause *(tò maè ón)* became the same for him as for Leucippus and Philolaos, namely, empty void space.[130] Aristotle was the first to represent the developmental relation in the bi-polarization of form *(eîdos, morphaè, lógos)* and matter *(hýlae).* In this division, *dýnamis* belongs to *hýlae,* and *entelécheia* to *eîdos.*[131] In as far as Aristotle determines that which is "as the essence which develops itself in appearances,"[132] this correlation becomes relevant and valid within the realm of the corporeal world *(Légo hýlaen tò prōton hypokeîmenon hekástō* [Matter means just that first substrate of each object]).[133] This means that the correlation is between idea and being *(Sein),* and not, as for Solovyev, already between the being and idea. The Scholastic distinction between corporeal and spiritual substance:[134] *"Essentia substantiae simplicis est forma tantum"*[135] completely explains these different coordinations.

This inquiry has two consequences which are decisive for Solovyev. First, his *concept of the absolute* (or of spirit or of God) is inseparable from (prime) matter. Second, his understanding of idea is the foundation for a

material apriority, in as far as he distinguishes *eîdos* from *lógos* and links *eîdos* with *hýlae* to a total essence. The Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, on the other hand, equates *eîdos, morphaé,* and *entelécheia* as image, form and essence (the latter at least in relation to simple spiritual substance), and opposes them to matter.

We can leave metaphysics and turn to ethics following this outline (Figure IX) of Solovyev's "idea-synthesis," as it was developed in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge,* and after a few more comments on epistemology.

The constructions of the ideas of organism and personality *should* follow the development of the idea as real and determinate nature.[136] The

Fig. IX. Solovyev's "idea-synthesis": outline and deduction.

first center the ABSOLUTE as such *absoljutnoe* *kak takoe*	the actualizing LOGOS (magic generation) *osuščestvljajuščij* *Logos*	second center *MATERIA PRIMA* (prime matter) *pervaja materija*
absolute determination: the BEING *sušče e*	absolute relation: BEING *(SEIN)* or the MODE OF EXISTENCE *bytie ili modus* *suščestvovanija*	absolute determination: the ESSENCE or the IDEA *sušč nost' ili ideja*
first relative determination: THE SAME *to že*	first relative relation: SOMETHING *nečto*	first relative determination: THE OTHER *drugoe*
second relative determination: first SUBJECT as EFFICIENT CAUSE *podležaščee*	second relative relation: UNITY or ACTUALITY *edinstvo ili dejstvitel'nost' – ješč' v sebe*	second relative determination: second SUBJECT as EFFICIENT CAUSE *podležaščee*
third relative determination: FORM *forma*	third relative relation: IDEA as matter and form = REAL and DETERMINATE NATURE *suščestvo*	third relative determination: MATTER *materija*

categorial determinations of the being, of essence and of being *(Sein)* "are produced by Logos as such *prior to the intellect*[137] and its conditions, therefore *magically*, even though their second intelligibility is self-evidently conditioned by the intellect."[138] The phenomenon *(javlenie)* originates in this "second intelligibility" from the relation between the second relative existential modality of unity or actuality (thing in itself) and the knowing intellect.[139] As far as knowledge in general is concerned, we would like briefly to repeat that it is possible as *external* or *internal* experience and as *ratiocinatio.* In external experience only *appearances* are known.[140] *Ideas,* on the other hand, are given as such in different degrees of adequation in *intellectual intuition (umstvennoe sozercanie),*[141] which is an augumented form of internal experience. This means that they are *intuited*.[142]

Now we are first able to understand the purpose of abstraction. It serves here only as an "abridged sign, as a pattern of experience,"[143] as an "*abbreviation* of sense perception or as the reflection of intellectual intuition."[144] It pays for its formal and universal validity with a de-ideation *(Ent-Ideierung).*[145] "Each universal concept is a negation of an appearance and an indication of an idea."[146] *The circle of phenomenal immanence is therefore broken by a spiritual act which does not belong to reason.* Solovyev seeks to reveal the nature of this act on the model of artistic ideation and to make it coincide in understanding with its intentional object (idea).[147] He assigns to art the vision of the ideas as individuals, to philosophy however "the whole ideal cosmos, that is, *the totality of ideas in their internal relations or reciprocations, as the objective expression of the true being.*"[148] Philosophy begins therefore with the task of reflectively representing the ontological relations of the ideas and comprehending their universal connection in abstract thought with the assistance of the formative elements and formal units of the ideas obtained through intuition.[149]

The idea as "nature," that is, "something actually and determinately existing,"[150] is "the unity or synthesis of matter and form. Only such a synthesis constitutes determinate existence or reality."[151] Since Solovyev recognized Kant's categorial apriorism,[152] we must examine in more detail this view of idea, which appears at first to be in contradiction to apriorism. Based on its (certainly very limited) presupposition

the representing intellect necessarily provides the form of the appearances, evidently since something can exist for the intellect and in it only in the form of its own being *(Sein).*[153] That which underlies this form, that is, the things or subjects effecting the form, constitutes thereby the matter of appearance. If, as we have said, every effect or appearance presupposes at least two causes which are reciprocally related to one another,[154] then one of them – the receiving subject or the intellect – is the formal cause and the other – that which effects the former – the material cause. If, however,

the representing intellect can represent and effect only in accordance with the determinations of its own nature or its own being and consequently provides the necessary form for all appearances existing for it, then this must obviously also be said about other subjects. Just so spirit and soul [in the absolute trinity structure][155] are permitted *(dolžny)* to receive and effect only according to the determinations of their own nature. In this sense they also bestow form on the appearances and *for them the intellect can only be a material cause.* Therefore, each of the subjects appears for itself as form. The others however only appear for it as matter.[156]

One subject excludes the other on this basis and they are unable to achieve unity. "Consequently they can have a necessary common form only in that which is similarly universal and objective for them, that is, in the idea."[157] The idea as a mere form of the unity of subjects would however lead to a tautology: "The unity of the subjects consists in their unity. There can be no doubt that unity is possible only in the universal form of unity, but also that this form alone is insufficient. *To be actual the principle of unity must possess a particular positive content or matter.*"[158] The synthesis of both claims is the idea as reality or as determinate existence.[159] As we have just critically considered, one is at first inclined to foist upon this presentation the classical doctrine of matter and form (hylomorphism).[160] However, from the perspective of the complete works of Solovyev we obtain instead an essentially different picture. Solovyev does not follow the Peripatetics and his "synthetic idea" is completely different from the Scholastic concept of matter and form. Solovyev's idea as the unity of form and matter would be comparable to Medieval philosophy's "corporeal" substance.[161] A material apriority is principally basic to his understanding of and insight into essence. This is so already with the intuition of the idea and the plasticity of its content,[162] and is completely evident in Solovyev's explanation of this view using the example of a true unity of peoples.[163] For what is Scheler's "redness" other than "the positive, determinate content" of that exemplary idea which can join together peoples in the fulness of their evident givenness into a religion?

As already was done in the epistemology, the refutation of the "crushing" veto of categorial apriorism first has to take place here. Solovyev certainly recognized its claim and esteemed it as the accomplishment of Kant's philosophy.[164] However, that which obtains its form from the knowing (representing) intellect is not chaos. Instead it is the appearance of an idea-synthesis of matter and form, which can be intuited; that is, it is a positively determined reality, an existing nature. Thus understood, even the intellect becomes a matter of intuition, if another intellect represents it.[165] We have already drawn attention to "the true synthetic method of [Solovyev's] philosophy"[166] – as opposed to Kant's – which expresses "a relation

[between intellect and object] which in itself is more basic than our natural consciousness."[167] For Solovyev, "forming" does not mean that understanding prescribes laws to all nature. It means instead that the understanding makes conscious the laws in the material of experience given to it – as metaphysically already ideal, that is, be-mattered and in-formed – and learns to functionalize them. "Knowledge of the a priori is therefore in no way a priori knowledge. However, while a posteriori (though not for that reason acquired by induction), it is knowledge which is a priori true of all objects provided they share the essence in question."[168]

In *The Crisis of Western Philosophy,* Solovyev says the following which is in accordance with Scheler's view: "An important and indubitable truth [of positivism[169]] [is] [first][170] that independent actuality cannot be given in external experience." Second that "independent actuality is not given in a priori knowledge .... If it is known neither in a priori thought nor in external experience and cannot, on the other hand, be unknowable [since Kant himself knew it[171]], then it is absolutely necessary that we assume that it is known in internal experience [a posteriori through a priori valid intuitions of being *(Wesen)*[172]] for there is no ... other source of knowledge."[173] Let us at the same time recall the epistemological principle "*nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit prius in intellectu*!"[174]

As far as the relation between this position and Kant's is concerned, one might say that on the whole it corresponds to the theory of virtual innateness – *petites perceptions,*[175] a theory which originated with Leibniz and which Kant still recognized and reconstructed in his pre-critical inaugural dissertation *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*[176] (1770).[177] We are aware of the nuance which Scheler offers here,[178] but it is insignificant. Solovyev also breaks off at this point.[179] What is important to us is only that essential knowledge is obtained in both cases and that it has a material, a priori existential content.

Solovyev assists us repeatedly by referring to the essential perspective of the forming intuition: "The representing intellect can represent and effect only in accordance with the determinations of its own nature or its own being *(Sein).*"[180] In connection with spiritual individuation and the doctrine of total-unity Solovyev aids us in advancing further into Scheler's thoughts. What we have in mind here is the idea of *ordo amoris* as a strictly determined, functional formative unity. In the following we will consider more closely from the point of view of a theory of values the fact that the statement of this idea, in an attempt to surpass Kant, involves a fateful relativity of knowledge.[181]

We have reached the result that both Solovyev and Scheler express

similarly a material a priori (that which exists *prior* to abstraction as itself or as such, that is, as essence) which epistemologically depends on either a functionally subjective, radically individual formation or selection (Scheler's *ordo amoris*) or an individually transcendental formation or selection (Solovyev's individuation and doctrine of total-unity). The mode of givenness in respect to the *objective* idea is determined by the phenomenologically reductive intuition of essence (Scheler) and intellectual intuition (for which the phenomenal character of the reduction is first suspended in the act of "faith" in Solovyev). The mode of givenness for the *personal* idea is determined by the direction of the movement of love and its preferential evidence (Scheler) or by exaltative love (Solovyev). In Solovyev the question of a logical criterion remains open in the realm of the self-givenness or adequation. Scheler created an indispensable cognitive discipline for this in his important investigations of the phenomena of value-deception and re-feeling value. These investigations are in part directed at Nietzsche and are to be found in the *Treaties and Essays.*[182]

It seems that Solovyev's work claims to be purely Socratic.[183] Actually he is less in danger of this than Scheler.[184] Scheler's *phenomenological* reduction develops more and more into an *anthropological* one, which is characterized by the suspension of actuality and the fact that things lose their being and become images (the ethical meaning of Nirvana).[185] This does not mean that we agree with those who object that Scheler flees from the world and existence.[186] Indeed the question of the place and accomplishment of the will is painfully evident here. Scheler answers this when he says that "it is precisely the spirit that initiates the repression of instincts. It does so in the following manner: subject to its own ideas and values, the spiritual 'will' withdraws from the opposing vital impulses the images necessary for action. At the same time, it lures the drives with a bait of appropriate images in order to coordinate the vital impulses so that they will execute the project set by the spirit."[187]

However this information does not hold up under a serious critique. Scheler has obviously reduced the will to a mere – *sit venia verbo* – "stagehand." However, who stages the first set if the will is supposed to be "one who is guided" by ideas and values?

We once more reach von Hartmann's "primordial chance." Leese therefore says:

> Scheler cannot therefore carry out this idea that the powerful is originally the lower, and the powerless the highest. The implementation suspends the starting point. (. . .) One can therefore only say: the unfolding of the spirit, which is in itself powerful, and its realization in actuality is rhythmically conditioned but in no sense caused by stoppage and inhibition or by discharge and relaxation of instinctual life. If it were

otherwise, then one who is in principle ascetic could not be spiritually impotent and a man with strong impulses could not be creative and spiritual to a great degree.[188]

Solovyev falls into a similar difficulty in as far as he lets the first potency of the absolute be "in possession of power"[189] and the second potency be "power itself."[190] Both are cases of pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps. The inactuality of Scheler's will results in an ethical and metaphysical version of a Socratic type based on the epistemological limitation of the act-intentions to the simple phenomena of reduction. On the other hand, Solovyev's idea of integral life culminates in the straightforward content of the doctrine of total-unity, that "good and evil are characteristics of the will, and not of knowledge."[191]

The Socratic character of Scheler's epistemology has been established as a quietism of the will. On the basis of an anthropological reduction which is not yet a phenomenological reduction, as von Rintelen maintains, the following view of his theory of value is justified, although not as such recognized by us. This view is that his theory of value could be understood as a "conception of the [mere] ideality or phenomenality of values"[192] even considering his frequent and clever attempts to avoid theoretically the instinct-dynamic consequences of his metaphysics in *Man's Place in Nature.*[193]

III. "ORGANIC ETHICS"

No less important for Scheler's discussion of the concept and content of the "*ordo amoris*"[1] is the question of its genesis, or how this order is given, if the *ordo amoris* is a priori present. This question is even more significant in the ethical realm since it is equated to the concept of "*ethos*." Why it is significant is implicit in the following considerations. We regard the alternative only as methodologically relevant since Scheler's statements make it sufficiently evident that his own ideas are to be interpreted only in the sense of the second possibility named above. "The '*ordo amoris*' is therefore the core of the world-order as an order of God."[2] This statement in its early conception (1916/17) can be adequately compared with Solovyev's doctrine of individuation and total-unity in as far as the hierarchy of integral existential regions not only culminates in the idea of a personal center of the world but also these existential regions eternally have above and beyond themselves their essential ideas and also their goals in the personal center.

What we call "knowing" – this existential relation – always presupposes this primordial act: an abandoning of oneself and one's states, one's own "contents of consciousness," a transcending of them in order to establish experiential contact with the world according to possibility. What we call really actual presupposes first of all the will-act

of a subject, an act which realizes. This will-act presupposes love which precedes it and gives it direction and content. Love is therefore what awakens knowledge and will – it is the mother of the spirit and reason itself. This one [love] which participates in everything and without the will of which nothing real can be real, and by means of which all things somehow spiritually have part in one another and are unanimous with one another; this one which created them and towards which they strive together upwards within the limits appropriate and alloted to them; this one is the all-loving and therefore the all-knowing and all-willing God – the personal center of the world as a cosmos and a whole. The goals and essential ideas of all things are eternally pre-loved and preconceived in it.[3]

We will not present the corresponding texts from Solovyev since they have already been sufficiently discussed.[4] The essentials of this view of the person of man – that "love is the mother of the spirit and of reason itself" – means however that the *ordo amoris* is equivalent to spiritual individuation. This means that love determines for man the being of his world *(Weltsein)*, or "where his feelings are attached is for him the 'core' of the so-called 'essence' of things." "His factual ethos, that is, the rules of his value preferences or non-preferences, determine the structure and content of his world-view, his knowledge of the world, his idea of the world as well as his submission to or dominance over things."[5] "Within the humanly completely valid value-order determinate qualities of values are assigned to each particular form of the human. Only their harmony, their combination in the construction of a common value culture, is able to present the total extent of human feelings." "If man overturns this order, which exists in itself, in his factual life or in the structural order of his love-acts, in preferring or not-preferring, then he overturns simultaneously the divine world order according to intention itself – which is in him, and therefore wherever he overturns this, he subsequently also necessarily overturns his world as the possible object of knowledge, and as the field of willing, acting and effecting."[6]

If these observations are valid, if man is actually prior to all thought (Descartes) or will (Schopenhauer) an *ens amans* (in Pascal – dualistically), if his essential world of values "determines and delimits the being *(Sein)* knowable by him and isolates it from other beings *(Sein)*,"[7] then necessarily all is, so to speak, in order. The fault of *fatality*, which Scheler excludes from the essence of "fate" and "environment," falls as a shadow back upon the innermost center of man.[8] There are two ways to extinguish this fault, to ban it from the personal core of man. On the one hand, there is the *positive* way by a pioneering in value theory by the moral genius.[9] Then, there is the *negative* way of comprehending the actual disorder of the correct "*ordo amoris*": *deception* in the insight of the a priori connections between values. "A mistake in preference must always underlie a choice of an end which is based on the lower value."[10]

Let us consider the first case of an explanation of the anthropological and moral *status quo* equivalent to the value-relative behavior of whole ethos-groups as well as consciousness of this state of affairs due to the brilliance of a moral genius. Taking the example chosen by Scheler – of the "tragic guilt" of Jesus and disregarding the misinterpretation of the situation – we consider the further possibility of a moral elaboration of value of an evolutionary character by means of the intuition of a morally, tragic genius after Jesus to be out of the question. A total growth – not the moral genesis of an individual – in the insight of the *essentially possible* moral values in general is incompatible with the existence of Christianity. This naturally does not make an increase in the density and profundity within the different ordered regions impossible or superfluous. We recognize an early starting point of cognitive value-relativism in Scheler's "factually lacking guilt while necessarily appearing simultaneously guilty" "even before the most just judge – disregarding God alone."[11] Clearly the later turn towards dynamic pantheism had to build upon this starting point.[12]

Fig. X. Clarification of the phenomenon of value-deception in Scheler.



Figure X is a diagram of the phenomenon of value-deception. It refers especially to Scheler's *Ressentiment in the Structure of Morals.*[13]

Value-deception accompanies ressentiment, that is, the negatively applied feeling of the inability to actualize perceived values for one's self. Based on this:

> The phenomenon of value-blindness or value-deception can occur for all such values vis-à-vis which the subject in question feels himself powerless. The primary source of the blindness, the errors and illusions of value-consciousness are: the lowering of *values* or *the* values, which one recognizes, to the level of one's own factual desires or of one's own ability to strive for as opposed to the conscious act of "resignation" about realizing these values; the limitation of value consciousness to one's own situation of striving, instead of measuring this situation against the previously purely accepted values; the illusory classification of value regions as "high" or "low" according to the structure of one's own desires and willed goals.[14]

It is particularly important to consider the starting point of this process, the result of which is: "The man filled with ressentiment . . . re-'evalues' the idea of value itself, in that he denies an objective world order."[15] One notices that this process has its roots in an *immutable specification.* For even:

> The man of ressentiment began with the intention natural to each man which is to direct his willing towards "the good." Uncorrupted by certain erroneous motives, he sees this "first" as something objective, eternal and independent of human whim and wish. But the less this effort is successful, the more enviously and hatefully he must consider those who are "good" according to the objective value order. The tendency increases to deprive the idea of the "good" itself of its rights in that he lowers it to the mere X of his factual desires and factual state.[16]

This text justifies our statement that one cannot yet speak of a de-actualization of the will here. Instead the opposite is the case. The will, which wills to act, "fails" in its "ability to act," or more exactly, it "fails" in its individual limitation. The voluntaristic selection theory, therefore, applies to this situation. Scheler presents this theory in his *Ethics*[17] according to which "experience [does] not [function] as generating and creating but instead as primarily negating and operating a selection within the free-play of the original contents of the will already determined in matters by certain value-qualities. It is above all a school for intelligent 'renunciation' of original will-goals and not a positive source of their creation."[18]

In respect to this experience of failure Scheler distinguishes two *types of reactions* towards the content or object of the will. The first is *positive resignation.* The second is *negative "re-feeling" (Umfühlung).* This expresses a possible existential incapability to actualize quite determinate (here uncertain) values (a statement of serious import for morality). However there are no grounds here to accuse him of cognitive relativization of value since the *ordo* is originally completely in sight (in traditions where the ethos forms have been relativized, for example, the bourgeois and the capitalistic

drive-constellations[19] historical analysis is necessary to disclose the original *ordo*). Failure as possibly being a matter of guilt can remain assigned to men in as far as the one who "re-feels" could also have taken the way of resignation, which esteems values.

The *circular character* of Scheler's emotionalism denies even this interpretive opportunity. Two originary dispositions, the *noble* and the *vulgar*, carry with them the manners of reacting (resignation or ressentiment).

> One who is noble experiences values prior to comparison. One who is vulgar experiences them first in and by means of a comparison. In the common man, the structure: "the relation of the value of one's self and the value of another" becomes the *selective condition of his understanding of values in general.* He is unable to apprehend any value in the other without at the same time considering him as "higher" and "lower," as "more" or "less" than his own self-value; therefore without measuring the other against himself and himself against the other.[20]

We need not add anything further other than that the erroneous phenomenological starting point for a "re-feeling" is already necessarily given in this false relating of the measure of value to one's own person.

Based on the existential turn of the problem the resulting *emotional circulation* in the *doctrine of virtue* achieves closure: "*Disposition (Gesinnung)* has in itself a matter of values, which is independent of all experience and successful action. It determines the value-world of the personality."[21] The latter is of value and virtuous "*because* the moral 'goodness' of a person (in its *original* sense) – and even *solely* for the *absolute* sphere – is determined by the measure of love, which the person has."[22] In other words, "virtue . . . is entirely personal and individual as a living consciousness of the power for the good."[23] This means: *in as far as "living consciousness of the power for the good" must be thought of in the love of the person in question, and the latter must be thought of again as founded in its spiritual order of love, then virtue, its correlate and its opposite – ability to act and powerlessness –, are ethos-forms "and" ordered ranks of value which are related to the essentially possible regions of love and knowledge of individuated specification and inseparably connected with it. The necessary consequent of this is the relativization of the order of value of the pure object world.* "Even here it is the insight into the a priori structure of the region of values, which is independent of all experience of goods and all positing of purpose, which draws after it in the sphere of the 'ought' and of judgement the 'necessity' of the 'ought' and of the judgement."[24] In other words: "The 'willing' of the person can never be better or worse than the person whose will is in question."[25]

Dietrich von Hildebrand correctly attacked and condemned the statement[26] that it belongs to the nature of every possible personal growth of

value, that the person never wilfully intends its own moral value.[27] This statement could only be rooted in the foundations of that total intuition. Clearly the radical change in the idea of God cuts to the quick of this

> by this means, that we . . . as it were set up the realm of absolute ideas and values, which correspond to the essential idea of man, immensely higher than all previous value systems in history. We, for example, give up all ordering of goods, purposes and norms in ethics, religion, law, and art as merely relative and historically as well as sociologically conditioned from each point of view, and preserve nothing other than the idea of the eternal Logos. It belongs not to a nation, nor to a culture, nor even to one or all previous cultural eras to penetrate the extravagant mystery of the Logos in the form of an essentially necessary history of the spirit. This task is assigned instead to all cultural subjects altogether (including those of the future) in unanimous temporal and spatial cooperation because each cultural subject is individual and unique.[28]

To "give up" all previous historical value systems and simultaneously to posit the becoming of the ideas of Logos means to lose completely not only the absolute specified fulness of a "universally valid objective good and the specific content which results from it,"[29] but also the idea of total-unity in the sense of an absolute realm of individuations centering around an absolute being "knowable" in the fulness of its specificity. For since "we not only reproduce '*ideae ante res*' in the divine spirit, which were thought even before the becoming of the real world" but "rather the differentiation of the ideas from the Logos . . . first takes place under the 'directed' impulses of the originally spiritual blind creative urge,"[30] and "the spirit in God and world can never create anything real but can only guide and direct the urge and the nature in God, which express and realize themselves in the world . . . completely indifferent to good and evil, thus *the world-ground 'as spirit' is not responsible for this world.*"[31] The perfect idea of the good and its correlate, the realm of individuations joined in total-unity, can only be located *first at the end of all becoming of world, self and God.* For "these ideas are not prior to things and not in them or after them, but instead *with* them. They are generated only in the act of constant world-realization in the eternal spirit."[32]

If this statement is valid, including the simultaneous expression of an act-deification of man for God's sake, then this consequence "must" arise: *The highest point of the ideas, the ability to know the specificity of God, can first take place at the final culmination of the process of God's becoming.* However, this means that the specific content of the "idea of the eternal Logos" knowable in the here and now in general by all as the totality of moral beings is necessarily a relative concept of its "good." This is equivalent to the value of the holy being *in finito* transcendable. We want to comment critically on the phrase "under the 'directed' impulses of the originally

spiritually blind creative urge."[33] First, "directed" urge would be equivalent to *intentional* striving and therefore no longer spiritually blind. According to Scheler's own determinations, it would be cognitively relevant even if trans-conscious. Secondly, according to the inviolable connection between act and object the "intentionality" of the urge necessarily *presupposes* the *existence of an image or meaning value.* However, both images and ideas are to be thought of as grounded in the urge of All-Life.[34] The thought of a directed urge can therefore not be without a contradiction immanent to the system. The following diagram (Figure XI) represents the structure of Scheler's ethics of emotion.[35]

Fig. XI. Scheler's axiology: ontological, existential-ontic, and epistemological structure.

INDIVIDUATION	= spiritual specification
ORDO AMORIS	= existential-ontic individuation
ETHOS	= axiological individuation
SECTION OF THE WORLD	= the selective, moral, emotional, material APRIORI

KNOWING:		WILLING:
love (hate) preferring (not preferring) feeling	resignation in-actuality *(Inaktualität)* practical morality	deception re-feeling
actualizable existential values practical order of ranks conscious *ethos*	reflection trans-voluntary specific values theoretical order of ranks holy cultural vital civilizing	pseudo-values ressentiment

According to Scheler it is the task of man to first create the final version of the absolute idea of the good by a progressive deification of self and of God. In the here and the now this absolute idea both epistemologically and existentially transcends its momentary specification because the act-centers which actualize it progress in their possibilities of being good. On the other hand, the foundational starting point of Solovyev's ethics is the final value-result of this process of transcending, a result which cannot relapse, which is irrevocable and which cannot be increased. It is the idea of the good completely specified. In the first edition of *The Justification of the Good* Solovyev states:

> The moral significance of life is originally and ultimately determined by the good itself. The good itself is accessible to us by way of our conscience and our reason in as far as these internal forms of the good [conscience and reason] have been liberated by the moral act from servitude to the passions and from the limitation of personal and collective self-love. Here is the extreme (supreme) standard (criterion) of all external forms and appearances . . . . *Man is principally or according to his determination the unconditioned internal form for the good as the unconditioned content. Everything else is conditioned and relative. The good in itself is not conditioned by anything. On its part it conditions everything and actualizes itself through everything.* Its purity (distinctness) is constituted by the fact that it is not conditioned by anything. Its fulness (abundance) is due to the fact that everything is conditioned by it. Its power or efficacy is due to the fact that it actualizes itself through everything.[36]

These statements adequately express the subject and object poles of the ethical correlation. Above all they make the unmistakable claim that *the idea of the good is in fact specified a priori* (following a brief discussion of the doctrine of Sophia we will come back to this) and that it *cannot be increased.* The fact that there is growth in the ability to know this idea is not in contradiction to the above. Solovyev himself states that man is "not born with complete ideas, but only with the readiness to become conscious of them."[37] This answer is helpful for some of the epistemological obscurities which still remain. In the "Introduction" to the *Moral Philosophy* as science, he further states:

> The same rational consciousness which initially gives man the universal idea of the good as the unconditioned norm gradually communicates the valued content of the idea of the good along with the further increase in the formal idea of the good. This takes place because rational consciousness strives to set up such moral requirements and ideals as are universal and necessary according to its nature and which express the self-development of the universal idea of the good without merely externally adding this or that material motive foreign to it. At a certain level of clarity, distinctness and systematization this process of human consciousness, which works out the true content of morality, becomes moral philosophy or ethics, representing different degrees of completeness and consistency in various systems and theories.[38] *Reason,* which founds a moral philosophy, only *develops* its own initial idea of the good (or, what is the same thing, the original fact of moral consciousness) and does this *on the basis of experience.*

Thus reason does not transcend the limits of its intrinsic realm. In the words of institutional philosophy: the use of reason is *immanent* here and is as a consequence not conditioned by this or that solution to the question of the *(transcendent)* knowledge of things in themselves. In simpler words: *in moral philosophy we only experience our internal relation to our own acts,* that is, what is unconditionally accessible to our knowledge, since it is what we ourselves do (produce [*proizvodim*]). The disputable question whether we can or cannot know that which exists in some other realm of being *(Sein)* independent of us thereby remains unnoticed. Morality is known in its ideal content by precisely that reason which grounds it. Knowledge, thus, corresponds to its object here (knowledge is adequate to its object here) leaving no place for critical doubt. The course and results of this thought process speak for themselves since nothing other than the universal logical and psychological conditions of each and every spiritual activity is presupposed. *Ethics does not claim to be a theoretical knowledge of metaphysical essences,* whatever their nature may be. As such *[samo po sebe]* it is indifferent to the dispute between dogmatic and critical philosophy, where the former maintains that such knowledge is actual, therefore also possible, while the latter denies the possibility and therefore also the actuality of such knowledge.

Although ethics is independent of theoretical philosophy in this general formal respect, there are still *two metaphysical questions,* the answers to which obviously have serious significance for the existence of morality itself.[39]

The first question is related to the objective credibility of knowledge. Are things in fact as we know them? Doubting our cognitive ability leads ultimately to doubting whether being *(Sein)* itself can be known. Theoretical philosophy, especially in its critique of knowledge, is able to *doubt* even the actuality of moral objects. However, it can never *demonstrate* that they do not exist since *the testimony of the conscience* contradicts such a demonstration. "Even if it were possible to be certain of the *non-being* of other essences (as objects of the moral act), then this would only be significant for the objective aspect of ethics and would not touch upon its proper and fundamental realm. This fact sufficiently guarantees *the internal independence of moral philosophy* in the first point – on the part of a critique of knowledge. The second point relates to the metaphysical question of the freedom of the will."[40]

In relation to *the second point*, Solovyev emphasizes that *freedom of reason* has nothing to do with *freedom of the will.* The latter consists in the fact that the will is determined only by itself. According to Duns Scotus' indisputable formulation "*nihil aliud a voluntate causat actum volendi in voluntate,*" nothing other than the will itself can make the act of willing will. Solovyev does not simply say that such freedom of the will does not exist. He maintains only that it is *not given in moral acts.* For in these acts the will is only *something determinable,* which *is determined* by the idea of the good or by the moral law. This idea and this law are all-encompassing, necessary and are not dependent on the will for their content or for their origin.

The content of this idea of the good must be correspondingly developed in order to be able to determine with complete, internal necessity the conscious choice of man in favor of the idea of the good, and in order sufficiently to motivate this choice. Thus the intellect can present this idea in its total efficacy *[v eja vseoružii]* to the will. Moral philosophy does exactly this. Therefore, ethics is not only compatible with determinism, but it is even the presupposition for knowledge of necessity at its supreme level *[etika obuslovlivaet soboju vyssee obnaruženie neobxodimosti]*. If a morally highly developed man subordinates his will with complete awareness of the idea of the good, which he knows universally and which he has thoroughly thought out, then every one knows that this subordination to the moral law is not an arbitrary act but is instead *completely necessary.* There is nevertheless an *unconditioned freedom of choice* only it does not exist in the moral determination of self, in the acts of practical reason, where Kant sought it. It exists instead at the opposite end of the internal world.[41]

The good, therefore, cannot be the immediate object of an *arbitrary* choice made *on one's own authority* and *according to one's own liking.* The preference of the good over the non-good is based rather on the *existential superiority* of the good. Man does not choose the good because it pleases him but rather because the good is precisely good and something positive and because man himself is capable "of comprehending its [the good's] meaning *as a value.* What determines the opposite act when I reject the good and choose evil? Is it because I do not recognize evil and mistake it for something good, as a well-known school of ethics assumes?"[42] Since there is no objective reason for a rational being to love evil *as evil*, the question would have to be phrased as follows:

Can a given rational being with complete and clear knowledge of the good be nevertheless so unreceptive to it that it unconditionally rejects the good and accepts evil? Such an unreceptivity toward the completely recognized good is *something unconditionally irrational* and *only such an irrational act corresponds to the strict concept of unconditioned freedom of will or arbitrariness.* We are not justified at the onset in denying its possibility. We can only seek positive grounds for or against it in the darkest depths of metaphysics. Before we inquire whether there is such a being who, even with complete knowledge of the good, can arbitrarily reject it and prefer evil, *we must in any case clearly justify to ourselves what the idea of the good contains and what follows from it. This is exactly the task of moral philosophy.* This task is presupposed even with this view of the metaphysical question of the freedom of the will (with a serious answer to this question), but it in no way depends on it. We can and must know *before all metaphysics what* our reason finds as good in human nature and *how* it develops and expands this natural good by elevating it to the meaning of integral moral perfection.[43]

Why reason does this was extensively answered by Solovyev in *The Justification of the Good* (1894–1898). It is the meaning of the world. A special section of the chapter "On Christianity" in part II of the early ethics, *The Spiritual Foundations of Life* (1882–1884), is devoted to "The Meaning of the World."[44] The world is the returning of the world-soul to God on the world-historical path of cosmic-theogonic restoration; it is the ascent of the world-soul again to the throne of Sophia-glory. "By a long series of acts

freely performed [it] must reconcile itself with itself and with God and must be born again in the form of an absolute organism."[45] This means that the idea of total-unity or of God-manhood as the idea of the good in general and in its basic meaning is also the great standard of ethics, which was known since the *Philosophical Principles* in regard to the consciousness-immanent cooperation of the three classes of acts.

Even prior to the explication of the thoughts just developed in *The Crisis of Western Philosophy,* the following was required "in relation to ethics": "The recognition that the ultimate goal and highest good are obtained only by the totality of beings by means of the necessary and absolutely expedient course of world-development. The end of world-development is the annihilation of exclusive self-assertion of individual beings in their material difference and their restoration as belonging to the realm of spiritual beings which are encompassed by the universality of the absolute spirit."[46] If therefore "the life task of man [is] determined . . . by the intrinsic characteristics of the good,"[47] then this itself must not only be present but also be given at least in universal certainty of specificity *(Soseinsgewißheit)* even if it – and although it – first transcends knowledge. We say "at least in universal certainty of specificity" and note, nevertheless, that "the idea . . . must not be thought of as something abstract in God, who is eternal reality, but as something thoroughly real."[48]

This statement does not hold for Scheler, which is in his favor. As we have just pointed out, after his metaphysical turn he can recognize nothing but ideas "in" and "with" things. However as far as Solovyev is concerned, in his *Lectures* and certainly in the complete *Ethics,* he justifiably goes far beyond the level of mere idea-concretization within the relation Logos-Sophia when he introduces the historical fact of Christ's existence into his philosophical doctrine of the ought. Christ himself "just as the reality of his character, which is preserved in the gospels, can be subject to no serious doubt." Moreover "it was not possible for anyone to invent him. This thoroughly historical figure is the figure of a perfect man, but not of a man who says: 'I have made myself into God', but instead one who says: 'I have been born and sent from God, and I was one with God before the creation of the world."[49] This implies that "Christ [is] understood not only as the unconditioned ground [principle] of the good, but also as the fulness of the good."[50] This requirement completely corresponds to the absolute specification of the idea of the good. Nevertheless "the agreement of the common will of humanity to reunite all with God [is] necessary for the universal incarnation of the spirit of Christ or for the appearance of the realm of God."[51] And this is "the reason why not only the moral development of

humanity but also its external history did not cease after Christ's appearance, although Christianity is the unconditioned and ultimate manifestation of truth."[52] Certainly not only that which was already fulfilled but also that which was promised stands immovably fixed "within the limits of eternity." "But the task of the present is in our hands. We must ourselves effect the moral rebirth of our own lives."[53] Even the special function of moral philosophy as ethics or as philosophical anthropology serves this universal task. "Its assignment is to determine and clarify the necessary reciprocity between all fundamental elements and regions of the personal-social totality, according to its definitive norms and under the conditions of historical actuality."[54]

Until *The Sociology of Knowledge* Scheler can completely ascribe to this. He even does this repeatedly, for example, in the early study *Models and Leaders* (1911–1912) or in the second edition of his book on sympathy (1922–1923) in the chapter "The Cosmic Feeling of Oneness in the Emotional Figures of History."[55] In the posthumous volume *On Ethics and the Theory of Knowledge* he says: "Christianity is not the most perfect religion, but the absolute religion. The so-called 'absoluteness of Christianity' (Troeltsch), that is, that it cannot be surpassed by further historical development, belongs to the essence of the Christian religion, since only the Christian religion corresponds to the unique ontic relatedness, the unique related consciousness of Christ with God."[56] For the communication of the idea of salvation and of the good "is, as in Christianity, not only revelation and illumination by a special act-orientation of God (understanding, will), but it is instead communication of person and substance to mankind by 'generation,' that is, the highest conceivable form of communication and essentially different from act-revelation. *Thus the uniqueness is also absolutely valid, not only for the past and the present but also for all of the future.*"[57]

In this context we may also refer to the cosmic, vital feeling of oneness because of its[58] still valid specification of God-man. On the basis of the introduction of the aforesaid "phenomenon," the "specificity [of which] had not yet occurred to the author in the first edition,"[59] Saint Francis' love of God and the world turns into an intuitive understanding

> in which the world is the immediate object of an inspirational kind of contemplation and as ecstatic enthusiasm. As a result, each determinate thing and each determinate form of existence perishes as it were in the flood of total being and All-Life given in that condition . . . . On the other hand, that first form, in which the world is given never completely independent of the love of that spiritual person, and out of which the world originated and is continuously guided, appears to us in the profoundest form and in the uniquely wonderful dimension of the relation of the love of God and of world given in the works and sermons of Saint Francis of Assisi.[60]

On this subject Scheler later becomes his own critic, which is a common occurrence. He states that the true cosmic, vital feeling of oneness[61] was reawakened "in the soul of Saint Francis as the art which has become organic 'self-abnegation' and 'devotion' of his vital-spiritual center in the core of creatures – as an ever pulsating devotion before the divine life 'in' all creatures."[62] The faint suggestion that "a divine life" could have the character of spiritual value – as in Solovyev or in the sense of Christ's statement "I am life" – is completely excluded first of all by assuming a vital, dynamic Eros root, as opposed to *agápae*,[63] and secondly by the first embryonic indication of the theory of attribution developed later ("spiritualization of life" and "animation of spirit").[64]

A revision of Scheler's views at the turning point of his diametrical change already precedes its clear and unmistakably outlined projection at the tenth anniversary of the Berlin Lessing Academy.[65] We mean the theory of the "deification of the founder" in the sociology of knowledge, with which the phase of Scheler's "latent self-defence" is introduced, as Dietrich von Hildebrand stated.[66] Scheler calls the following the essential expression or assumption of this theory:

> [There is a] transformation which occurs by means of the sociologically conditioned cult-form of the community out of a "subject" or religion – a "subject" with which one "identifies" according to disposition and basic spiritual attitude, for whom one achieves practical and theoretical inner dispositions by imitating his personal acts, whose orders one obeys, whose teachings about the divine one believes and who is the essential "model," a model even for the internal and external paths of man to God – into an object worthy of worship, an object of religion, that one makes into a distant object of mass worship.[67]

If we apply this general thesis to the religion of God-manhood, then this means that "the cult of the resurrected Christ, which Paul was first to institute in its complete power and extent, is the root of the Christian Church just as the subsequent deification of Buddha first formed the metaphysical doctrine of salvation and the ethics of original Buddhism into a 'religion.'"[68]

We are very grateful to Scheler for this statement since it for the time being frees us from a demonstration which is difficult in the sense of our interpretation. He clearly did not notice how much the following statement leaves him open to attack. He uniquely caricatures his understanding of his own personal situation when he says that the deification of the founder is "a release from responsibility which greatly flatters and immeasurably accommodates the weakness of human nature. Before deification the founder as the subject of religion imposed this responsibility on his followers."[69] The attack consists above all in the fact that the reduction of Jesus' teachings

to an original "metaphysics" of salvation makes relevant the counter-argument in regard to a simultaneous determination of becoming of the world-ground, that is, of metaphysical salvation and the good. Solovyev's statements on the question of the "founder" and his "deification" issue from a different viewpoint without the intention of confronting the specific content.

Moreover:

> If we want to see in Christ only some stage of relative moral perfection . . . [then] the lack of still more perfect personalities in the course of almost two thousand years of human development [is] a completely incomprehensible fact. However, if Christ should be regarded as the absolutely highest type of human development, even if a type attained naturally, then he should have appeared first at the end and not in the middle of history. Secondly, however, in no case could he appear only as the product of historical development since the difference between absolute and relative perfection is not quantitative or gradual, but instead qualitative and essential; and because the first can never be logically deduced from the second.[70]

With this we leave the theories of attribution and of the deification of the founder to their own immanent contradictions, completely disregarding the further question about the degree of validity which the system of conformity may still claim in regard to the statement that "religion" is mainly the result of a process of objectification.[71] (The corresponding ideas of Feuerbach appear to play an important role here. The essentially ontic character of the phenomenon of religion, which was the achievement of Scheler's *On the Eternal in Man,* is strictly speaking lost again in as far as it almost necessarily leads to deception should the claim of an ontically actualizable basic condition be preserved.) Even if we do not oppose the fact "that the sociological character of all knowledge, of all forms of thought, intuition and cognition, is indubitable; that not the content of all knowledge and still less its factual validity, but rather the selection of the objects of knowledge according to the ruling social interests and the 'forms' of spiritual acts in which knowledge is obtained are constantly and necessarily sociologically co-conditioned, that is, by the structure of society,"[72] all this does not change the fact that the reality of value is basic to the whole world of being *(Sein).* The reality of value must be "attributed not to relative, sociological oppositions, but instead to the absolute opposition of the good and the self-asserting evil."[73]

The theory of value is the proper foundation of philosophical ethics. This central discipline makes again evident the unmistakable grounds for comparing Solovyev and Scheler. Obviously we should not let our working hypothesis justify some kind of dogmatization on the basis of Christian revelation of the contents of ethics guaranteed by the world-view. This is unnecessary for a thinker of Solovyev's stature even with all the religious intentionality

of the "*omnia in Christo renovare,*" as Kobilinski-Ellis said.[74] This comment seems to repeat Pius X's programmatic slogan *("Omnia instaurare in Christo").* To prevent such misunderstanding, he makes fundamentally evident even in the introduction of his moral philosophy that it is relatively independent as opposed to theoretical principles which are of a positive religious or metaphysical origin.[75]

When we speak of a "similarity" in the theory of value of both thinkers naturally we only mean that their central statements are related. By such statements we understand first the value-theoretical *state of affairs* itself, then its *givenness* in and on the basis of the *function of feeling,* and finally or simultaneously the *cognitive significance* of feeling. We maintain that the statements specifying the contents of the above-mentioned points are similar and logically identical in Solovyev and Scheler.

As far as the view of the phenomenon of value in general is concerned, Solovyev emphasizes in *The Meaning of Love* (1892–1894) that above and beyond intellect[76] man has "the ability to 'value' *(ocenivat')* his states, his acts *(dejstvija)*[77] and all facts in general not only according to their relation to other individual facts, but also according to their relation to universal ideal norms. His consciousness is determined by reason of the truth above and beyond the phenomena of life."[78] The key concept "reason of the truth" relates this statement significantly to the later attempts of the *Theoretical Philosophy* (1897–1899). As we have already discovered, the latter has an unmistakably phenomenological starting point – a factor which is closely connected with the value-theoretical reflections. For the *Theoretical Philosophy* (where the meaning of the above-mentioned concept is concentrated) what is decisive is that "true philosophy [first[79]] begins when the empirical subject is lifted up into the realm of truth itself *by means of supra-personal inspiration (vdoxnovenie*[80]*)*."[81] Epistemologically the *insubstantiality of the person as the center for executing intentional acts* is meant here.[82] "This means that truth is not dependent on factual thinking. On the contrary, the 'value-content' and the philosophical interest of factual thinking depend on truth. The total significance of the thinking subject depends on whether or not it determines itself as the form of an unconditioned content or as reason of the truth."[83] These statements disclose five fundamental determinations of the theory of value:

1. Man "values."

2. Value-content and reality of truth are correlative and they are independent of the cognitive subject.

3. The insubstantial person in the execution of its acts is the act-center of epistemological valuing.

4. Valuing itself represents an intentional movement (the specificity of which is determined by love as we will discuss in relation to the person).

5. Whether or not the person determines itself as reason of the *truth* depends on the motive of the movement (inspiration, love) and on the direction of the movement (away from the I toward the object) – in regard to their negative components: lack of participation, hate, egocentricity.

In regard to the integration of valuing the last statement says further that integration is regularly interrupted because of a series of *negative* functions of feeling which run parallel to the *positive* ones. At a particular point we must use this statement again in confronting Scheler. Already in *A Critique of Abstract Principles* Solovyev offers a criterion for the ordered ranks of value. He names four (in a stricter sense, two) ordered realms of values. These are the following in relation to the functional modality of "pleasure":

"*first* – material pleasures of man as an animal organism,
second – aesthetic pleasures,
third – spiritual pleasures and finally
fourth – pleasures of the will or properly moral pleasures."[84]

Assuming Solovyev's existential formulation matter – matter: spirit (man) – spirit (God), and without considering a biological connecting term and a religious-spiritual starting or final term, the aforesaid four value levels have the following relation to one another (Figure XII).

Fig. XII. Cross-section and relation between the ordered ranks of values in Solovyev and Scheler.

SOLOVYEV		SCHELER
material	material value	civilizing vital
aesthetic spiritual moral	feeling-value cognitive-value will-value	cultural
religious	mystical value	holy

The value of feeling, the value of knowledge and the value of will according to the trichotomy of *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* confront in the unity of the spirit – which inseparably connects them – the (civilizing) material part of man. The *vital value* is nevertheless in no way discredited by the apparently materialistic and anti-pluralistic subsumption, since due to his idealistic position Solovyev assigns a unique middle position

to the concept of life. As a consequence of this middle position Solovyev neither excludes vital relatedness nor entirely includes it. This means that matter and spirit possess actuality only "in some third, which is neither soulless matter nor incorporeal idea"[85] rather precisely "life." As we have already stated elsewhere, life as such can be understood in a divine, in a human or even in a natural sense.[86] This means nothing less than what is, lives, or: *Solovyev's idea of life is universalistic.*

The essentially ontic irreducibility of the constitutive sphere of the "flesh" is not by any means therefore suspended. One can refer in this context to the thoughtful and profound reflections on the "Lord's Prayer" in *The Spiritual Foundations of Life* (1882–1884).[87] Elsewhere in the same work he says: "The incarnation and resurrection of the divine Logos in Christ signifies a three-fold victory, for the three principles of being *(Sein)* manifest their absolute significance here."[88] This touches upon not only the root of the idea of life, but also its most sublime bud: the "meaning of love."

But, it is not the case that Solovyev does not mention the *value region of the holy.* In a later statement of the same "Critique . . . ," where he completes the ordered ranks, he says that it is "factually certain that in man next to rational consciousness, which makes him human, there are always material impulses, which make him natural, and mystical impulses, which make him divine or demonic."[89] The omission of the act-central counterposition of the satanic, a criticism of Prince Yevgeny Trubetskoy, has already been made up for here. The *Philosophical Principles,* like Scheler, had only opposed the *profanum* or *naturale* to the *sacrum* or *divinum.*[90] In *La Russie et l'Église universelle* (1889) and *Three Conversations* (1899–1900) the bearer of non-value itself becomes increasingly a pure spiritual person.

We consider this development of Solovyev to be completely comprehensible and Scheler's act-phenomenological radical self-limitation to only *one* static dis-antithetical determination to be puzzlingly inconsistent. Scheler's determination is dis-antithetical because the profane (as the counterposition) can by no means be opposed to the holy as the latter is situated on an essentially higher plane. All cultural values are also profane since the essentially ontic reality of the holy transcends man's originary ability to actualize. Without abandoning the foundations of a strictly philosophical attitude, Solovyev therefore says the following: "This element in him is not strong enough in and for itself to actualize itself perfectly. For this to occur it must be stimulated by a new creative act or by its influence. This is called grace in the Bible."[91]

On the basis of the anthropological ambivalence of the spiritual-material (Solovyev), which completely corresponds to Scheler's image of the idea of

man,[92] this ontological-ontic powerlessness holds true also for the attempt at a radical self-deification. Here "radical" is meant in its proper sense. If man is always secondarily capable of being the bearer of evil (this statement is necessarily evident for two reasons – first: man's "urge-side" is originarily affected by evil, second: due to the inviolable connection between act and object, the object "man as in part evil" presupposes an anti-divine center of act-direction), then the cause of evil itself must transcend the nature of man. This makes logically necessary the presupposition of a purely spiritual person as absolutely evil. We must consider in our presentation of the order of values and their bearers the essential contents of *The Phenomenology of Love and Hate,* including the consequences which Scheler missed, to close this gap in Scheler and to make what we have said more relevant to Solovyev.

Let us intentionally consider Solovyev's basic idea (of total-unity) as the original starting point. If we inquire in the realm of human experience after the originary and fundamental principle of unity, we discover the "idea of love." We are theoretically and logically assuming a "nature" of man which is distinguished from the nature of animal by a qualitative more (which is also granted by the categorial pluralism of dialectical materialism).[93] This idea is clearly already present in the realm of spiritual values (Scheler's the true, the just, and the beautiful). Similarly certain is the discovery of the "personal" idea of God as the absolutely *absolute* and as the absolutely *individual* bearer of its essences. Both Solovyev (in the *Lectures*) and Scheler (in the *Problems of Religion* and generally already in a chapter of his *Ethics*[94]) act-phenomenologically demonstrate that this is a necessary consequence and requirement of the existence of the ideal cosmos.

Therefore *spiritual* values become, either really or possibly, *holy* values by the acts of man who knows these in their ground.[95] "Love" is such an act. As the idea of a relation (first) among men, it is the voluntary recognition of and respect for the metaphysical (not factual) self-value of everyone just as it is defined by gospel law: "Love thy neighbour as thyself."[96] Solovyev[97] and Scheler[98] have shown that one *must*, in the question of the true, the good and the beautiful, push forward by the intuition of love necessarily to a highest, original, universally creative and individual spiritual person. They have demonstrated that the idea of the holy is nothing other than the freely achieved actualization of the value-essences created by this idea. Scheler obscurely calls this the simultaneous and subsequent execution of the divine act of love. Solovyev considers it the actualization of the true, the good and the beautiful. This act is "love" (certainly not just in the *epistemological* sense). It is the solely human act although by far more difficult than the act determined by instincts.

In his sympathetic study of *The Life Drama of Plato,*[99] Solovyev reaches the insight that any attempt at love from below must fail. If this holds true for a genius such as Plato (we can recall that Justin Martyr called Plato a "Christ before Christ,"[100] who would have let no occasion pass for actualizing his experience of longing – we know that this desire should consist in the participation in the being of the ideal cosmos – and therefore remained without any personal guilt), how much more it must be true for those to whom the self-manifestation of the divine man later appears superfluous! In general they have not exactly preached love, not to mention a life necessarily modelled on this ideal. For all that, however, there are still individuals, who as Wiechert said, "lived for an idea and needed the patience of the holy ones,"[101] which failed them. He himself was among these. We wish neither to ignore the proper value of such an attitude nor to characterize as wilful those who evidence it. If, however, the music of the origin of all love becomes a mystical symphony even in the *Phaedo*, this may (considered as a speculative legacy of Plato formed from a personal experience, and not as if he alone led knowledge back to this primordial source of all being *(Sein)* in general) in a certain sense mean that, as Leo Kobilinski-Ellis noted in a limited manner,[102] the Hermetic-Orphic tradition was able to preserve this core of primoridal manifestation up until Plato.

Even the solitary figures in the Christian epoch can only create out of this tradition. It is an open question whether one can at all – or with what degree of difficulty – exclude the essence and existence of the primordially eternal love, manifested in the crucifixion of the divine man, from the horizons of those thinkers living in the Christian period. Nevertheless, it is significant that the question of the possibility of a co-actualization which participates in this love got no farther in pre-Christian classics than the Platonic theory of love, which although vast in its scope is unfortunately not carried out, as Solovyev regretfully comments,[103] and remains as it was developed in the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium.* On the other hand, even Solovyev's own existential confessions of the totally-one possibility of love "from above" can serve as proof for the validity of these statements based on his experience of existence and his exemplary behavior.

Again Scheler discovered a fundamental law for the emotional acts of love and hate which compels us to recognize that all love originates in God.[104] However "hate" is an equiprimordial intentional movement

a positive act, in which a *non-value* is immediately given just as a positive value is given in the act of love. Whereas *love* is *a movement from the lower value to the higher* and in which the higher value of an object or a person first flares up, *hate is*

an opposed movement. Thus it is also evident that *hate is directed towards the possible existence of lower values* (which as such is itself a *negative* value) and towards the suspension of the possible existence of higher value (which again is a negative value).[105]

We do not need to dwell on the question which Dietrich von Hildebrand raised. He asked whether and to what extent Scheler in determining the value content of "good" and "evil"[106] on the basis of their essential belonging to the sphere of *willing* offended against profounder and truer intentions and whether one of the major accomplishments of his ethics, the overcoming the limits of ethics established by Kant, is negated.[107] It is not necessary for us to deal with this question because it does not touch upon the value-matters basic to the directions and impulses of the movements of love and hate, of "good" and "evil." Scheler assigned correlative *forms of hate* (analogous to those of love) to the three levels of the existence of the person: "The hate which encompasses this *highest* level of existence (where the salvation of the other person is hated) is 'diabolical'; hate which concerns the *spiritual* existence, 'evil'; *vital* hate is only *'bad.'*"[108] Precisely in view of his phenomenological investigation of emotional qualities, *it seems to us unconditionally justified to move forward even in the intentional movement of hate to a relative-absolute spiritual bearer of act.* And it is clear that no metaphysical dualism is meant here. The universal power and metaphysical sovereignity of the divine person must be infinitely above its essential opposition. This is why all of the suffering and futility of the acts of this hating being who intends the annihilation of this divinely sovereign person, that is absolutely superior to it, come to expression precisely in the fact that it is possessed by the *consciousness and eternal certainty of the futility and powerlessness* of its act (in this sense Satan is the *spirit of ressentiment as such*). *Some of the opinions* we mentioned above *come close to posing the absolute bearer of acts of spiritual hate in a pre-human ontic dimension.* Speculatively the individual character of the one who is hating (problem of individuation), and a necessarily only *relative adequation* to the essence of God require that it presents in the final analysis this essence *as hating;* for it is absolutely subjected to this essence because relative adequation can mean only a *gradual superiority within the realm of purely spiritual persons.* Just as "the moral 'goodness' of a person (in its original sense) is determined by the degree of love which it possesses – and only in this way in the absolute sphere,"[109] so in the same way this ontic law must work for the "evil" of hate. Therefore it is perfectly conceivable, and even required by thought, that the progressively limitless, that is, primordially eternal act of love of the divine person, be paralleled by a *pseudo-correlative* sabotage which actualizes the *culmination of the possible hate of a spiritual*

person without being essentially similar in positive hatefulness to God's act of love; the latter is an evident condition of hate's reaching the highest grade of metaphysical possibility. Thereby two things have been said which are given in a phenomenologically essential sense:

1. If there were over against the creative act of love of the "person of persons," namely God, *a similarly primordially eternal act of annihilation* of an essentially hating spiritual person, namely Satan, then there would follow with absolute necessity *metaphysical nothingness, that is, pure and complete nothingness.* The impossibility of this assumption – which is refuted by the existence of being *(Sein)* – demonstrates the impossibility of a metaphysical dualism.

2. If a metaphysical dualism would be accepted, then the hate designed to annihilate all values would no longer mean absolute hate, since this would require both an absolute personal bearer and an *absolute object.* Even though this object would be the very essence of the hater himself (in complete analogy to God and his love), there would still be a problem. The latter would himself as a person still have to *exist* even *after* the act of annihilation, since hate as absolute has an eternal character. An instance where the act of love and the act of hate would be identical *in their absoluteness* would contain the following contradiction: the personal bearer of both the former and the latter could not be absolute to the extent that both are *destroyed* and become *metaphysical nothingness.* However, as Scheler has made clear, *hate always presupposes love for its being* (this axiom is implicit in Solovyev), since it comes to be *through lack of love for the bearer of evil;* thus, it is of the essence of hate to be deprived of love; and, therefore, hate would remove itself, and could "free" itself from this essence only if its bearer succeeds either in *loving itself* or in *annihilating* the absolute bearer of the act of love.

However, it belongs to the nature of hate as such that neither is possible. In this relation of essential law *absolute* hate is distinguished from *relative* or human hate only by the fact that the former is irrevocable. It is only in this way that absolute hate – as eternal, but not as *primordially* eternal (which would mean *being (Sein) without beginning*) – can exist. And here we are talking about the absolute act-center of hate on the basis of its twofold impotency between love which allows being and the arbitrary freedom of annihilation: this is the *absolute bearer of all ressentiment* which, as Solovyev pertinently notes, as person "neither eats nor drinks nor sleeps and lives unmarried."[110] In other words, it is *not* he who like the wise man respects the values even ontically in the original ontological order of essential relations and respects their measure; *rather* it is he who *completely negates*

them and seeks gradually to arouse the same in others through *seducing* them into "*re-feeling*" their values.

The *cause* of the absolute actualization of this opposition between love and hate cannot be described philosophically any further. One can only add that it had to have had a *beginning* as Scheler deduces from his "principle of the solidarity of all moral beings"

> that the existence of the evil is always co-grounded – whether empirically verifiable or not – in a guilty *lack* of love on the part of all toward the bearer of the evil. For, since love, to the extent that it is perceived, determines a response of love, so any existence of evil is necessarily co-conditioned by the lack of a *response* of love, while the latter however is due to a lack of *original* love. The perception involved can always be essential, according to the laws of the possible comprehension of the other, without a prior positing of the peculiar bodily reality of the beings and their causal effects on each other. These propositions are completely independent of the factually empirical human encounters. They are also independent of the question as to who *concretely* is guilty, who has acted ethically and who has not. They are also *independent of men as contingent earthly beings.*[111]

One should be clear that this statement can be taken as correct but that it has frightening consequences, unless one assumes an absolutely hating act-center and if Scheler's notion of *ordo amoris,* that is, an absolutely emotional specification of knowing, feeling and willing, is valid; for "the lack of original love" must necessarily be attributed to the ontic individuation. And then, of course, one can no longer talk of moral solidarity in the strict sense. On the other hand, it is clear that any talk of a "lack" on the part of the highest spiritual person, God, cannot mean some sort of anticipation of *guilt* on his part. The latter is totally excluded by the absoluteness and universality of his love. And this is hardly contained in Scheler's statement since it is limited, on the one hand, strictly to the *human spiritual person* and, on the other, by the *co-founding of the evil of a bearer* (which is therefore human).

There can be no serious doubt that by means of the guilty deprivation – we mean withholding – of *human* love the evil of the one excluded from love is nourished on the basis of this insecurity and that the essence of its good is threatened. However this explains nothing about the "origin" of evil. For even the guilty lack of love of one man to another, who may claim and expect love, is based on evil. And the *fate* of an order of love, or here at least of an order of *non*-love, an *individuation of present emptiness* or *poverty of love* – this must exist according to Scheler's analysis of hate – cannot be this ground or root, for it contradicts the meaning of moral responsibility. Since, further, if there can be no love "for the good," [112] there can also be no "hate for the evil" as an idea *without a bearer,* but only the *personal value* "good" and *one who loves,* only the *personal value* "evil" and one who hates. Then, just as the pure act of love is thought of as executed

by a pure spiritual person, God, the pure act of hate must also be thought of as executed by the person of a pure spiritual being *(Geistwesen)*.

On the grounds of this demonstration we consider it therefore necessary to oppose to the three levels of Scheler's existence of the person with their corresponding forms of love and hate in the realm of the absolute validity of the person of persons the (in the sense of a metaphysical possibility) absolute essence and existence of its contradiction as the *bearer of the highest possible act of hate of a purely spiritual person*, of the hate of Satan (in distinction to the satanic hate of man who can only will to destroy the salvation of an "other," but who can never will to destroy the essential being *(Sein)* of "God"[113]). This second absolute is necessarily *relative* in relation to the absolute in general, God. It is this hate which first attains a possible – even if powerless – adequation to the abundance of divine love. Thus the purest form of the rejection of God cannot be atheism (the natural consequence of the tendency to keep the human within the direction of the vital or economic values), but only the hating *anti*-theism (the – in a certain sense positive – self-assertion of the man-God which wills to surpass the human). *To be valid these relations suggest, therefore, with increasing approximation to the anti-theistic form of the rejection of God another bearer in the act-essences of the finite, human, spiritual person since* – as we have just noted – *act-essences which transcend the realm of humanly realizable value-qualities, act-essences therefore of the ideas and values of the holy or damnable cannot appear without the assistance of their proper bearers.*

And what would be the cause of the absolute realization of this opposition of love and hate? We pose this question again not in order adequately to answer it now, but to show how there is a corresponding humility in respect to the problem raised by this question in the thought of Solovyev's fellow-countryman, Dostoyevsky. This takes place with the assistance of Reinhard Lauth's introductory words. He first interpreted for us "the philosophy of Dostoyevsky"[114] in its unanticipated constructedness, systematization and clarity. "In a word, human thought fails completely when it tries to comprehend the meaning of the fall of man. Dostoyevsky cannot explain the fall of man. His description begins with the curious words: 'It ended in my corrupting them all. (. . .) I only know that the cause of the Fall was I *[Son smešnago čeloveka]*.'"[115] Thus, a prudent limitation is imposed upon the metaphysics of evil, a limitation to experiential knowledge. This does not prevent Dostoyevsky from handing Ivan Karamazov over to the hallucination of a quite personal, Satanic gentleman. But it did preserve him from the Sophia speculations of his young friend.[116] As far as this is concerned

we have no particular reason to attack Szyłkarski's argument[117] that Solovyev did not renounce this doctrine of wisdom – the silence about this in the last years of his life could suggest the opposite. We emphasize, however, that this necessarily brings about an immanent contradiction in the metaphysical consequences of the third of the *Three Conversations*, his last work. Ludolf Müller's comment belongs here. According to him, Solovyev recognized – an implication of the doctrine of Sophia – "that the world was ruled by evil and death even before the arrival of man," that "therefore . . . death [could] not have first come into the world with Adam's sin" or, in other words, "that our world is not the absolutely perfect work of God, originating immediately from the hand of a divine demiurge."[118] In our opinion, Müller incorrectly overlooks the problem of the following relation: freedom of the finite spiritual person and divine foreknowledge. It is, therefore, possible that God already admitted sin – the *mysterium iniquitatis* – as a future fact into his "world" plan, and not just in his plan for *salvation.*

This concludes the objectivation of the ordered ranks of values. Now we will turn to the analysis of givenness: "The moral nature of man is the necessary condition and presupposition of God-manhood,"[119] which – as we have said – "represents" in the historical, factual person of Jesus Christ an "ideal which is not first to be actualized but an already actualized ideal."[120] The moral task is located in the intentional movement which is created by the goal-directed striving to equalize the differences of value between these two positions. Solovyev connects them individually to the concepts of the natural (pure) man and the spiritual man. *The meaning of life* requires only that the trans-conscious involuntariness of this process of intentional movement become conscious, willed, free; in one word, actually *personal.*[121] This means nothing else than the "spiritualizing" or the "civilizing" *("Versittlichung")* of the moral materials which are "already naturally present."[122]

Consequently the intentionality of the cosmic-theogonic process becomes spontaneity as opposed to a "duty of perfection," which "we [must] comprehend not only as a task of our personal lives, but also as an inseparable part of the world historical process,"[123] and the goal of which culminates in the "re-establishment of the world-whole."[124]

The real principle [of this] perfection is contained *in the three basic feelings,* which belong to human nature and constitute its natural virtue: in the *feeling of shame* which preserves our higher dignity from the attacks of animalistic desires; in the *feeling of sympathy,* which makes us equal to all others; and, finally, in the *religious feeling,* in which our knowledge of the highest good is expressed. *The one or more exactly the trinitarian foundation of moral perfection is contained in these feelings and in the*

testimony of the conscience accompanying them. These feelings represent the good nature which strives from the outset to agree with duty (for bound up with them is the awareness, even if unclear, that they are normal, that we must be *ashamed* of the immoderateness of animalistic and of the slavish subordination to this animalistic nature, that we must feel *sympathy* for others, that we must feel *reverence* before the divine, that all this is good and the opposite is bad). A conscientious reason, which universalizes the impulses of the good nature, raises these impulses to law. *The content of the moral law is the same as that which is given in the good feelings,* only clothed in the form of a universal and necessary (obligatory) requirement or command. The moral law grows out of the language of the conscience, just as the conscience is the feeling of shame which has developed itself in its formal aspect, and not in its physical one.[125]

Scheler speaks in a similar sense of "reverence as a kind of shame become spiritual."[126] These statements are only a material-analytical résumé of what is discussed in nearly 150 pages of Solovyev's ethics. *Their results agree essentially with those of the emotional value-theory,* if one consults in regard to the feeling of shame first the study "On Shame and Feelings of Shame"[127] which appeared in the *Nachlaß*, vol. I, and then, for comparison, the *Phenomenology and Theory of the Feelings of Sympathy.*[128] It is also remarkable that Solovyev's analysis of conscience as an emotionally relevant norm,[129] encompassing all of mankind and hidden in its nature has "been elucidated in recent times especially thoroughly by structural psychology."[130] In Scheler's phenomenological work on shame the essence of reverence is extensively and comparably interpreted.[131] The following definitions serve as evidence for these statements:

The *feeling of shame (čuvstvo styda)*[132] is by all means the factually unconditioned distinction of man from the lower realms of nature. . . . Man raises himself here in actuality out of the whole of physical nature, and not just out of the external one, but also out of his own. Man demonstrates precisely by these means that he is not only this natural, physical creature, but that he is also something else, higher. . . . Consequently I prove in fact, that I am not the same as my physical nature when I am ashamed of it. . . . *I am ashamed, therefore, I exist; I exist not only physically, but also morally; I am ashamed of my animality, therefore I exist as man.*[133]

This means that I become "man in the fullest sense of the word due to this feeling of shame."[134]

Scheler formulates this as follows:

If one disregards all particular contents "about" which we are ashamed or which "awaken a sense of shame," and all relations which belong to an experience of shame, then the shell, the "horizon," as it were of the impression of shame, appears to cling to a unique experience. This is always present, when some of the . . . spiritual intentions, which when vitally executed are lost in some purely material and supra-biological contents and goals, on the occasion of a sudden reflection on the body which is constantly and obscurely also given. It then finds itself linked to a spatially and temporally narrowly limited animal-like existence with a great many of its needs.[135]

It is only because a *body* belongs essentially to man, that he can be in the situation of *having to be* ashamed of himself. And it is only because he experiences his *spiritual*

personal being (Sein) as essentially independent of such a "body," and of all that can come from the body, that it is possible for him to be in the situation of *being able* to be ashamed.[136]

In regard to "sympathy" and its functional components we must be a little cautious since Solovyev starts here with thoughts similar to those of Schopenhauer, and indicates first in his ethics that he had liberated himself from their untenability and weaknesses. This is especially true of the "doctrine of identification" of sympathy as well as the "metaphysical-monistic interpretation," elaborated with youthful enthusiasm in *A Critique of Abstract Principles,* which is founded on this doctrine – modified by Solovyev in the sense of a Christian idea of love.[137] This latter aspect – the early introduction of the Christian idea of love – preserves him fortunately from tripping over the argument significant to Scheler that "in each of its possible forms, sympathy [is] in principle value-blind."[138] Even for Solovyev, the movement of love which brings about knowledge is properly the decisive event as opposed to which sympathy can have only a functional significance. This is already expressed in *A Critique of Abstract Principles.*[139] In *The Meaning of Love* this insight becomes grounded.[140]

The complete superiority of the determinations of *The Justification of the Good* over the uncritical point of view of *A Critique of Abstract Principles* is easy to recognize. In his ethics, Solovyev achieves a balanced classification of Schopenhauer's achievements (also respected by Scheler) in regard to emotionality, immediacy and the metaphysical and ontological unity of sympathy,[141] without being liable to Scheler's reproach directed at Schopenhauer. The theory of consciousness' displacement of the one who feels sympathy into the thou-position remains perhaps a problem in Solovyev's work on ethics. This was the first view which Scheler rejected in his critical appropriation of existing doctrines.[142] It is remarkable, nevertheless, that he speaks of "a kind of reflection" as a hypothetical illuminative aspect while Solovyev links absolute immediacy and involuntarism to his theory of displacement. This fact alone suggests that Solovyev is coming to terms here – only for clarification – with the completely inadequate language of his day.

Naturally he does not offer the clean distinction between "post-feeling" *("Nachfühlen")* and "sympathy" *("Mitgefühl")*, and as a result the difference between the *value*-intentionality and the intentionality directed at the quality of the *other feeling* is also not relevant. However what is essential here is only that Solovyev correctly recognized the substantial function of the unseparated sympathy. Ultimately both thinkers agree that "it could therefore very well be the case that post-feeling as sympathy *communicates*

objective value-knowledge of a metaphysically real being just as it necessarily *prepares* conceptual knowledge of the specificity of this real being."[143] In respect to metaphysics this means

> that independently existing persons in relation to one another are "determined" ontically to a life of community and are teleologically ordered to one another (independent of the actual duration and degree of their living together). It is this ontic "determination" which is comprehended in sympathy intuitively according to the aspect of the balanced value-completion of men, and which is expressed at once in sympathy as a form of consciousness. And it now follows that *since an essentially teleological relation of mutual being determined for one another necessarily requires a reason which is superior to all finite persons and which posits purposes and determinations* – which, in that it caused the existence of the persons, is thought simultaneously as idea in each in itself individuated specification – *pure sympathy, precisely because it is not associatively, genetically explainable, becomes the co-foundation of an inference to one and the same creator of all persons participating originally in this feeling.*[144]

The ideal relation of this statement by Scheler to the almost identical starting point of Solovyev's ethical doctrine of total-unity is unmistakable. However, we will let the Russian version of sympathy reflect this. "The true essence of pity or sympathy *(čuvstvo žalosti)*[145] precisely does *not* consist in an *immediate identification* of oneself with another, but rather in the recognition of the significance which belongs to the other as his good right."[146] The generality of this determination is made concrete "in the fact that a given being feels in a corresponding manner the other's suffering or the other's needs. This means that it is more or less distressed in relation to this suffering, in that it expresses its *solidarity with the other* to a greater or lesser degree."[147] "Neither an immediate identification nor a 'suspension of the limits between the I and the non-I' is to be found in this description of a fundamentally altruistic stimulation at its highest level."[148] "[For] when I see a being suffering, I do not identify myself thoroughly with him, but instead I place myself through thought in his situation. In that I recognize his similarity to me, I pass his feeling-states into mine or – as we say – I put myself in his place. This *equivalency*, which is not one of identity, between the other and myself is raised by reason to a clear and sharply outlined thought."[149]

Let us concede that this presentation possibly implies the attempt at a *genetic* theory of the feeling of sympathy. It is still remarkable that Solovyev makes clear the phenomenological fact demonstrated by Scheler: that sympathy is a "suffering the suffering of the other 'as this other'."[150] It is therefore only logical that its metaphysical relevance in Solovyev completely coincide with Scheler's *evaluation* of sympathy as such a datum. Thus in *The Justification of the Good* Solovyev says: "Just as the feeling of shame does not give us a *theoretical* concept of the spiritual

principle in man, but completely *proves* the *presence* of this principle, so sympathy does not tell us anything definite about the *metaphysical being* of cosmic unity, but nevertheless proves to us in fact *the presence of a certain connection of all individual beings among themselves, which is prior to all experience.*"[151] In regard to the question of its possible cognitive efficacy, this means that it possesses the *indicative function* for a "certain universal objective truth . . . , namely the truth of essential unity *(Wesenseinheit),* or of the real solidarity of all beings with one another."[152]

If we connect the meaning of this statement with the essentially anthropological determinations of *A Critique of Abstract Principles,* then we can consider the congruency of Scheler's and Solovyev's version of the feeling of sympathy as essentially established. According to these determinations "the true, normal man is unconditionally *unanimous* with all or is only conceivable in all. Likewise all are unthinkable without him. *Man* or humanity *is a being which contains in itself* (in the *absolute* order) *the divine idea* – that is, *the total-unity* or the unconditioned fulness of being *(Sein).* And it actualizes this idea (in the *natural* order) by means of *rational freedom* in material nature."[153]

In the second edition of his book on sympathy, Scheler still grounds the thought of the "solidarity of all moral beings"[154] in a unity, which is related to their creator, of individuated specificities of finite persons,[155] which are simultaneously thought of as idea by God. Following a similar development in both thinkers this thought flows in Solovyev in a circle back to its original source.

Beside these two basic feelings of our spiritual life we also possess a third, which cannot be reduced to these other two, but which is just as primary as they are. This does not determine the moral relation of man to the lower parts of his own nature and to his equals, but it determines instead the moral relation of man to something particular, which he knows as something higher and as standing above him. He cannot be ashamed of this or pity it, but he must bow himself before it in veneration. This *feeling of veneration (čuvstvo blagovedenija ili blagočestija)*[156] (devotion, *pietas*) or of reverence *(reverentia)* before something higher constitutes in man *the moral foundation of religion,* his religious manner of living.[157]

There is no need to explain that it shares with shame and sympathy the intentional character – at least – of a vague "feeling of something." Scheler himself says that its "object . . . in any case is felt and given as the bearer of a higher positive value."[158] Solovyev knows how to use this indicative function in a manner to which we have just called attention with his "idea of philosophy," but which, in our opinion, Scheler's act-phenomenology first taught us properly to discover. Solovyev says the following after understanding the *correlation between the act and the essentially possible object,*

which itself founds act-phenomenology: "If I feel an inner relation between myself and another, this feeling bears witness no less to the actual existence of the other than to my own. This inference is justified not only for the feelings of participation and pity but also for the religious feeling."[159] This means that "in the true religious feeling the *reality* of what is felt is given."[160] For "we cannot doubt the reality of what . . . is already given in the fact of our feeling itself."[161] Solovyev already knew in his *Lectures* how to make clear why we could not doubt this.

The results of all of this – and we must say this with gentle irony – gain significance from Scheler's very modern and impressive theodicy. For "the reality of God is not an inference from a religious feeling, but instead the content of this feeling – the very thing which is felt."[162] In one word, "God is in us – consequently, He 'is'!"[163] For those who know Scheler's *Problems of Religion* it is self-evident that our "for" represents a logical connection of unimagined significance. Even the statement that "the *object* of religious acts is at the same time the *cause* of their existence"[164] is proof of this. And when he later says that "God, by his very nature, is revealed only in and through these acts,"[165] this reflects on the whole the modest starting point of Solovyev's position. That this position is modest when compared to the ingenious intuitions of the Augustinian Scheler cannot be doubted. Such a confession, however, in no way prejudices the fact that Solovyev's quiet, isolated ideas and attempts are in their way no less great and remarkable.

Following the analysis of the three basic ethical feelings, we would like to dwell briefly on that doctrine of the theory of value which is linked in Scheler's manner of speaking to "preference" or "non-preference." The fact that we cannot make evident this process in Solovyev's thought is due to the manifest originality of the grand and bold projection of Scheler's emotional ethics. One knows that with these intentional functions we "comprehend the hierarchy of values, their superiority and inferiority."[166] To be more precise, Scheler means that value as such is "felt," however its position in the hierarchy itself results from an "evidence of preference." But this is "by no means so that the feeling of a value or several values is 'founding' for the manner of preference; as though preferring was added as a secondary act 'onto' the values grasped in the primary intention of feeling. Rather all *extension of the value region* (of an individual for example) takes place only 'in' preferring and not preferring."[167] "The values originally 'given' in these acts can be secondarily 'felt'."[168]

It is clear that we do not intend to scrutinize Solovyev closely for this theory and also to find it by using all possible "ingenuity." Our question is

only: How are the values *hierarchically* fixed, which are "given" by emotional functions of feeling and are specifically "intuited" in the exploratory movement of love? We can quite certainly respond: *with the aid of intentional functions* (therefore analogous to Scheler). This information still requires an explanation. In regard to this Solovyev himself may answer. In his clearly transconscious position on this problem he says that

> everything that is and everything which can be, is exhausted in the moral relation by three categories of its value. For we are either concerned with what is *higher* than us, or with that which is *lower* than us, or with that which has the *same value*. It is logically impossible to find a fourth . . . . This threefold relation in a completely general form is a fact . . . . The moral task can only consist in the perfection of what is given. This real threefold relation must be transformed into the trinitarian norm of a rationally fulfilled activity of the will.[169]

If we correctly understand this statement in its essential correlation with shame, sympathy and veneration, then this can only mean that *these three functions are constitutive for all experience of values within the regions assigned to them: lower, equal, higher.* Thus the absolute validity and objectivity of the hierarchy "as such" is preserved from any "overthrow." In fact Solovyev used the *emotional* foundations of morality *only to constitute the hierarchy of essential values.* This, of course, implies everything which we have extrapolated from this situation in the interest of our comparison; above all that decisive insight which consists in the demonstration of a "material ethics" in general. The fact that from the theoretical standpoint there are such similar results in the "practical philosophy" of both thinkers can only be explained through the metaphysical backgrounds of their systems and their traditional ties.

We will not discuss any further the difficulties and obstacles which now for the first time really set in: the problems of moral plurality, or the individual rules of preference. This is not because we wish to avoid them but only because their presentation goes beyond the limits of this comparison. Still we would like to recall one, namely the central experiential act of love. Scheler says the following about this: "The essential for the act of love [is] not . . . , that it direct itself *after* felt values or *after* preferred values towards this value as an answer, but rather that this act plays the properly *exploratory* role in our grasping of values – and only *it* plays this role –, that it represent so to speak *a movement, in the course of which new and higher values, that is, completely unknown to the subject in question, light up and flare up.*"[170]

For Solovyev the significance of this process is closely tied to the idea of total-unity and can only be explained on the basis of this. For "since man is a divine idea only in internal unity with everything, in the unity of humanity

or in unconditioned love, so the actualization of his divine principle by him in the lower elements is nothing other than the actualization of total-unity or the realization of absolute love in the relative world of reason and nature."[171] If we vary this relation in respect to its *ethical* relevance, then the following holds true: "*Love is* . . . not linked with any particular virtue, but instead . . . [is] *the ultimate expression of all basic requirements of morality in the three necessary regions of its relation to a lower, a higher and a similar form of being (Seinsform).*"[172]

Thus, only to the extent that man is a divine idea, that is, only to the extent that he unconditionally loves, can the region of individuation disclose itself to him, can he himself view the *ordo* of the essence of value. For only in this case can reason validly "decompose" the material of the world of values accessible to it by intentional functions, since it is threatened in its insight by an egoistic direction of movement which is contrapuntal to love. "In other words, man as rational receives his true and positive content from his mystical or divine element [unconditioned love[173]]; *and if we call the system of rational knowledge philosophy, then we must recognize that philosophy receives its content from religious knowledge or theology in as far as we understand the latter as 'knowledge of all in God' or knowledge of the essential total-unity.*"[174]

One may well dispute whether we are justified in giving the so obstinately decried "philosophy as mysticism" such a turn. It is and remains, however, certain that the act-phenomenological intuitions of the ontological-ontic order of the crucial points clearly correspond in the system of both thinkers. This is not surprising if one considers that a similar recourse to the Platonic-Augustinian tradition lies behind both. This is clearly self-evident in regard to Solovyev. Leo Kobilinski-Ellis said: "No one besides Solovyev had such an intrinsic, intimate understanding for the deepest depths of the soul of the man, Plato, and for the ultimate secrets of the doctrine of Platonic philosophy,"[175] not to speak of his relation to the "founding father of Medieval philosophy, St. Augustine."[176] Scheler, however, assures us that phenomenology could be, "from a historical point of view, also regarded as a revival of an intuitive Platonism; obviously with the complete elimination of the Platonic reification of the ideas and all mythic admixtures. And it is understandable, on the basis of this feature, why phenomenology has also recently established greater contact with the whole Platonic-Augustinian philosophy of the Patristics and the early Middle Ages."[177]

The following figure (XIII) illuminates the relation between Solovyev's metaphysics and ethics. In the context of what is at the moment relevant here, we must critically comment that the order of the essential values of

Scheler's *Ethics* is implicitly suspended by his later theory of attribution. The polarity of spirit and urge in the world-ground itself, if thought consequently, excludes any claim by the sphere of the "spiritual" values to be "higher" than the realm of the "vital."

Fig. XIII. Solovyev's ethics: the emotional-material apriority of value as the germ of the actualization of ideal God-manhood.



A few explanations are still needed which will be of great assistance not only for what has already been offered but also for the "meaning of love," the heart of any philosophy of life. They should, therefore, be the *structural link between philosophical ethics* as the discovery and evaluation of the a priori content of that which is evidently given[178] in moral knowledge, *and a strictly personalistic philosophy of Eros.*

The emotional structure in Scheler's sense – therefore the *ordo amoris* of a man – constitutes the region of possible feeling of values.[179] Values are known "in feeling and preferring in different degrees of adequation."[180] The highest degree of this knowledge, "self-givenness," still lies in the cognitive region of the functions of feeling just as of the class of emotional act-experiences founded on these functions.[181] Scheler constantly emphasizes the ontological validity and constancy of the hierarchy of values.[182] "Self-givenness" of a value only means, therefore, the vision or the intuition of its ontological position. Experiencing a value becomes consequently "experiencing the *position* of a value." Given the assumption of an a priori emotional act of preference and its evidence, a pure objective content of values could not otherwise be expressed along with the simultaneous possibility of a relativization of the rules of preference. In general Scheler's doctrine of insight into value – the essence of the process in which the hierarchical specificity of the value itself should be communicated – is somewhat unclear in that the emotional act-experiences of preference are played off against the "feeling of value in the strict sense."[183]

Scheler assigns to the "class of intentional functions"[184] the feeling of value, that is, the possession of certain value-qualities which are *originally* given in a kind of "objectifying act," "which does *not* require *representation* as a mediator."[185] In other words, *feeling value is intentional feeling*! In the process of this "intentional feeling the world of objects themselves 'discloses' itself to us, precisely from its *value*-aspect."[186] From the point of view of the "class of emotional act-experiences," preference and non-preference, and in opposition to it, the next higher order of experiencing value – and of experiences of value – comes into play. For,

> all values essentially exist in a hierarchy, and are therefore, higher and lower in relation to one another, and this is precisely comprehensible only "in" preferring and not preferring, thus the feeling of values themselves is also essentially and necessarily grounded in a "preferring" and "not preferring." *Therefore it is by no means the case that the feeling of a value or several values is "founding" for the manner of preference;* as though preferring was added as a *secondary* act "onto" the values grasped in the *primary* intention, [that] of *feeling*. Rather all extension of the value region (of an individual, for example) takes place only "in" preferring and not preferring. The values *originally "given"* in these acts can be *secondarily "felt."* The structure of preferring and not preferring at any given time therefore circumscribes the value-qualities which we feel.[187]

In this connection one is even more curious about an assertion of Scheler within the section "Feeling, and Feelings" of his *Ethics*. He says that there is "always a manifold of *'felt'* values,[188] at least intended in preferring."[189] If we correctly understand this, it can only mean the conditionedness of the act-emotional preferring as opposed to the presupposition of a

differentiated value-matter "objectified" in the intentional functionality of *feeling* (value-matter does not need to be object-matter). However this would be a *reversal* of the essentially ontic foundational order, previously constituted by Scheler, in the structure of valuing itself.

As far as value-deception is concerned, ultimately no one is completely free of ressentiments, therefore, no one ever fully actualizes his rules of preference. If one were to object that the act of preferring is an a priori emotional functional unity which so to speak without consciousness and beyond-consciousness chooses what is correct out of the object world of possible value-preferring, we would only note that even Scheler himself – whether aware or not, it is all the same in this case – must confer upon reason an enormous and mandatory significance, if he wants to maintain the *causes* of value-deception. For it is precisely this and its axiom: a felt value of the other must be re-felt when one's own consciousness of being-able falls short of the desired obtaining of this value, which nears the root of the origin of ressentiment. If this were otherwise, then the phenomenon of value could never be relevant for *thought*. A structure, however, which is subject to the influence and command of reason is in this sense no longer a priori – or it is such only to the extent that apriority in general is still valid in the reason of grounding. If the scholastic *principia per se nota* are a priori, if for example the principle of contradiction is a priori, then these are valid absolutely and cannot be influenced by the will – or by any emotion. If the evidence of preference of an emotional act is a priori, then its statement is just as absolute as the above, that is, it cannot be influenced by reason or the will.

Scheler's explanation of ressentiment, which occurs on a pan-emotionalistic and immanent basis, and which is just one of several possible explanations of ressentiment, thus becomes at the very least questionable. If an emotional a priori is affirmed, then – in Scheler's sense – it is only in the form of the "self-givenness" as a simultaneous "expression of the *position* of the value." It is our opinion that no self-givenness of a phenomenon of value can be guaranteed by not only Scheler's view of *"ordo amoris"* but also the *"ordo amoris"* taught by Augustine (with its enrichment by Bonaventura, Pascal, and Newman). This is particularly true for Scheler's *"ordo amoris"* in regard to the *understanding of the value of another.* This cannot be assisted by categorial expressions of "over-lap" and "penetration" since to posit them would introduce such a complexity of individuations that the *ordo amoris* itself would already lose its constitutive specificity. In regard to the Augustinian *ordo amoris,* we base our assertion that "self-givenness" is already impossible on the truth of the axiom that "one does

not love what one does not *know*."[190] Thus, we are able to affirm the grounding of the *ordo amoris* only to the extent that the function of feeling communicates in an a priori valid way certain – at first unknown – phenomena of value. However their positional value can and must be determined by the disclosure of their contents *by reason* (see the relation of Solovyev's intellectual intuition to dialectic).

We further maintain that pseudo-values also can arise in the functionality of feeling (e.g., the problem of passionate love), which although a priori given may not claim recognition. This occurs – and this is our most serious reservation – when the emotional laws of functionalization of the spirit corresponding to the possible actualization of an emancipation from the intelligible *ordo* of reason malfunction, even though Scheler correctly criticizes rationalism by establishing this as its area. His own discovery of the "laws of significance of the emotional life" however becomes, precisely for this reason, mere ressentiment toward previous pure rational philosophy when he assigns to them – tantamount to a philosophical *status quo ante primum peccatum* – the absolute certainty of their existential relations. However, even in his own opinion, this *status quo* is lost for reason; and we may add that it is no less lost for the structures of feeling (as Pascal already showed).

As we have said, Scheler ascertains the ontological position of a value by preferring (or not preferring according to the individually determined functional modality). However, thereby the unconditioned absoluteness and constancy of values surrenders theoretically and practically to a relativistic and subjectivistic *ordo amoris* and its individually determined emotional functionality, *if there is no determination of how many values are recognized by all and in which universally valid value-regions.* In this question Scheler is not limited by axiomatic determinations. His personal attitude, nevertheless, practically justifies the possibility of such a subjectivization of values.

Now that we have drawn these conclusions about Scheler's *panemotionalism*, which threatens to put seriously in question the profound and unassailable insights into the essence of *intentional* emotionality in general, they must once again be related to the equally sublime truth-content of Solovyev's intuition of total-unity with its simultaneous, conscious recognition of a *material* ethics which is of the extent required by Scheler. That intuition, which encounters in the ultimate and most enigmatic the anthropologically central mystery of the manifestation of Christ, is that the total man exists under the sign of sin and bears within himself this sign as a grave wound in his spirit *and body*. This alone is and remains for us the decisive

reason why a philosophy is always necessarily condemned to fail which refers decompositionally to only *one* potency of man's being *(Sein)* and potentiality and which in its structure gives testimony even to a complete intactness. The one ontological hierarchy of value, therefore, can be unmistakably known and recognized only in the interplay of all the powers of human spirit and life – of knowing, feeling and willing – just as Solovyev has convincingly presented it in his philosophy of total-unity, but not, however, as Scheler would like it to be, on the basis of a monistic pan-emotionalism.

Figure XIV shows that a relativization of the essential *ordo* (the representation of the *being* of value correlated to the individual *ordo amoris*) can only be avoided by a dynamic pantheism given a subjectivistically understood doctrine of *ordo amoris* (a subjective representation of *e*-valuing).

We can now establish such a structure of hierarchy and positional value as the basis of the microcosm of the individual as a trans-intelligible person. The Scholastic *"indivuum est ineffabile"* holds true of this person, not however the radical expressions of Scheler's act-phenomenology. The inability to disclose the personal core is also relevant to the ineffability,[191] but not to the full trans-intelligibility of the person in general, especially in those instances where its acts are *not* being co-executed or subsequently executed by another person who wants to participate in it.[192]

Scheler teaches that the person is *completely* given in each act.[193] If by this givenness "self-givenness,"[194] therefore, complete disclosure of the person in its specificity is meant, then we cannot agree. If however it only claims that the person is confronted in each act as the dark silhouette of the brightness of consciousness, then this assumption would be acceptable. This outline of the person which is only intimated is understandably filled also in the givenness of another. The substantial unity of spirit and body prevents once and for all the person of man from being completely given or disclosed to himself. Participation in being of the person, nevertheless, is always co-given as that dark silhouette not only in the immanence of its unity of body and spirit but also externally in the structure of the act-essences. And this happens on the basis of the immediate understanding of the *form of being (Seinsform)* of its origin, and, therefore, the perception of the other is possible *without* co-execution or subsequent execution of act. The high point of the self-disclosure of the person nevertheless transcends upwards into the consciousness of the person of persons – God.

Two things have been said here:

1. There is intelligibility and the possibility of participating in the being *(Sein)* of a person in general – even without a parallel series of acts for the

Fig. XIV. Objective *(Solovyev)* and subjectivistic *(Scheler)* *"ordo amoris"*.

objective



subjectivistic



perception and participation of another. This should however not mean that the knowledge of the being *(Sein)* of a person (as another) and participation in it could not also be essentially enriched by a co-execution or subsequent execution of its acts – especially when its acts take place on the basis of other value-matters or with other intentions towards them. However, it is clear that the co-execution or subsequent execution must always already presuppose an understanding of the original acts – at least in accordance with the hierarchy of values – not only macrocosmically but also microcosmically; this means not only in understanding the hierarchy of the world of values in general but also in understanding the intention of the other person as another in actualizing one of the values given to it in this world.

2. There is trans-intelligibility and transcendence of the person in the disclosure of its being *(Sein)*. Person (other than that of God) can only be given to itself and to another as a silhouette and can be only as such capable of participation in being. For God alone the understanding and the disclosure of His person is of self and whole. All finite being of person however can intend the highest degree of possible disclosure of self only in Him from Him, that is, on the basis of the vision of its idea in God. A philosophy of total-unity which lets the meaning of cosmic being *(Sein)* be entirely disclosed only in the self-givenness of the person of God[195] is therefore able to comprehend all finite personal being and the transcendence of the essences in general by the all-intuition of their positing in Him, that is, the person as *self-given*, and interpreted according to the degree to which they essentially participate in this person of persons.

On these grounds the following may be said about the relation of the finite person to the finite person (or to the environment) *(Mitwelt)*:

1. All persons, based on their common macrocosmic and microcosmic *outline* (each as a unity of qualities), are given for one another by an immediate understanding of their formal quality, and only to the degree of the bipolar unity of each of their *ordo amoris* which can be related to the most heterogeneous regions of being *(Seinsgebiete)* with similar hierarchial structure of values (these regions of being, and only they, must be bipolarally related to one another and colored in all nuances of the spiritual and the vital – in the categorial plurality of the macrocosmic and microcosmic worlds of values). A disclosure of persons in all degrees of adequation (not to "self-givenness" in Scheler's sense, but correlatively to the *ordo amoris* actually confronted) is possible only to the degree of the bipolar unity of the *ordines amoris* of two persons (this means profoundly and ultimately by love). Participation in the being *(Sein)* of a finite person is then the culmination of the possible understanding of such a person, that is, of

the possible regions of being for it in relation to all levels of the world of value; or simply its *ordo amoris* in its relatedness to the possible desire to understand an other; in relation, therefore, to the value-hierarchically universal *ordo amoris* of another person with its completely particular existential structure. It is clear from this that regions of understanding must be cancelled to the extent that an adequation of relatability – be it in the spiritual (e.g. between the intelligent man and the genius), be it in the vital-emotional (between two members of the same sex, as opposed to the bipolarity between man and woman)[196] – can, on the one hand, not be ontically attained and must, on the other hand, remain unfulfilled.

2. It is and can only be a *single* man, assuming spiritual individuation, who is able in a relation of understanding to satisfy the expectation of fulfillment by an attempt at intentional fulfillments, which anticipates this expectation up to the limits of the absolute transcendence of the being of the person who is waiting. The ultimate happiness of the being of the absolutely trans-intelligible personal core (which is still transcending such an attempt), which is and can be given to man himself as a darkly outlined longing, is possible only by means of the absolute beyond *(Hinaus)* of the person beyond itself and all finite personal beings. *Happiness* is then the intentional attempt at a mutual understanding which is conditioned in its possible range by the mutual correlation of the *ordines amoris* of the participants. It is the attempt to gain possession of the momentarily transcending being "thou" by humanly possible fulfillment in bodily-spiritual total surrender. *The most intrinsic paradox of this attempt, in which this ultimate letting oneself go can only be achieved – and also can only be attempted – with the motivation of the blissful taking into possession of the "thou," reveals that it must necessarily fail if it does not recognize the phenomenon of transcending and its ultimately longed for possible fulfilment on the part of God himself.* Only for the single person, in whose essential being absolute happiness and the transcendence of all possible transcending is included, only for the single *unintentional* person in general, who is at once a *total-intentional* person, can the divine act of love which has in itself the motive for its positing, be nothing other than precisely pure, all-possessing love. Therefore, there are no paradoxes in this unique divine love, since it in surrendering itself – and in order not to have to perish in this act and to fulfill its most intrinsic meaning, bliss (for that must truly be a pitiable love which would cost one's being *[Sein]*) – no longer needs to leap into some transcendence in order to still save, perhaps its being *(Sein)* and along with it the loved "thou."

IV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EROS

"Passion," not of thought but of the thinker, of the man of flesh and blood, is the sudden gate of entrance of a "living," understood vitally and physically, into the space of the spiritual, which overflows with radiating peace. Therefore, it proves to be a threat to man's balance – the "emerging reason of the truth" in the realm of the anthropologically existential, as Solovyev says.[1] Because of this it must be excluded even at the onset of thought from possibly influencing the spirit and its intentional evolution by means of the technique of ascetic reduction.[2] This act, however, may not "be permitted" to take place as opposed to the integral – that is, intended in the all-inclusive sense – phenomenon of "Eros" because it would otherwise suspend the phenomenon and hide it from observation. The act is unable to achieve this in that in the center of Eros itself the essentially bodily and spiritual unity of tension of the existential idea "man" – as a substantially indivisible whole – manifests itself experientially in a wonderful manner. Thus, this is the place of a possible crisis in the thought of a human spiritual person. For *éros* is, as *aphrodítae ouranía*, at once the origin of that "love-determined movement of the inmost personal Self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles"[3]; from Plato to Scheler that "*dynamis* at the centre of the Person, the mainspring, the Something which produces the soaring of the Real world"[4]; Solovyev's "ecstatic" "inspiration"[5] of knowledge, the "mystical exaltation" or the "pathos of love."[6]

The vision of the thundering team of horses was not the "discovery" of Solovyev's compatriot Nikolay Gogol.[7] Ever since "obscure antiquity" Plato had the idea of putting in our hands the reins of a chariot which is extremely difficult to drive. "Let us therefore speak in that way. We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer."[8] Filled with the dynamic force of that other orgiastic *aphrodítae pán-daemos*, inspired metaphysics boils upward out of the unfathomable dark depths of All-Life and requires "Dionysian surrender in the feeling of oneness and the becoming one with the urge,"[9] the turbulent force of which "makes [everything] into mere ripplings within a single gigantic stream of passionate emotions, the direction of which is given by the value and individually determined act of love."[10] Those who know the context here will realize how much painful irony is contained in these words. We will say nothing more about this.

The "idea of life" discloses the decisive difference between the Eros philosophies of Solovyev and of Scheler, even though their boundaries

appear to be exactly congruent. What shall we choose from the abundant material touched upon of such encounters which ultimately fail to meet? First let us become aware of Scheler's attempt to glide from the spiritual emotional into the vital physical, "to take possession of the divine life of nature for himself from within."[11] His (certainly reinterpreted) Franciscan spiritualization of the feeling of oneness and "'devotion' of the vital spiritual center of the person in the core of creatures"[12] is very related to Solovyev's "world-love"[13] flowing out of the ground root of a similarly "organological view of the world."[14] The example of the "strongly fideistic words of Abbot Isaac of Syria"[15] which is referred to in order to explain the meaning of love, could also have thoroughly served as a basis for Father Zossima's speech in Dostoyevsky's *Brothers Karamazov.* In relation to the "organological world-view," which is precisely "what belongs constitutively to the cosmic feeling of oneness"[16] – for "cosmic feeling of oneness can be essentially given only when the world as a 'totality' as a total organism is given in the intention of the view of the world, which runs through 'one' life: therefore in the case of an 'organological world-view'"[17] – in relation to it it is relatively easy to track down a point of contact with Dostoyevsky by way of the connecting link, Fechner.[18] As far as Scheler is concerned it is enough to say that Fechner is considered in Scheler's book on sympathy to belong to that small group of thinkers "who rediscover and represent this idea [of an 'organological world-view'][19] in protest against the general view."[20] The relation between Scheler and Dostoyevsky would then be established through Fechner.

The relation holds substantially true at least in regard to their common contribution to the problem of "love and knowledge."[21] In Dostoyevsky's "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man"[22] only love is able to guarantee perfect knowledge.[23] Its knowledge is "a deeper and higher one than that of our science."[24] In view of Reinhard Lauth's interpretation of Dostoyevsky's philosophy as well as in reference to his studies on "love,"[25] personality and "views on marriage,"[26] we would like to waive the discussion of the convergence of Dostoyevsky's metaphysical intuitions with the thought of his young friend, Solovyev – or just the opposite, which remains an open question here[27] – because of this Russian author's unique views. The *doctrine of de-egoization* which is common to Dostoyevsky, the philosopher, and Solovyev can be easily abstracted from the former's rich literary heritage.

Ultimately all of this can be summed up in the basic assertion that in the final analysis Dostoyevsky, Solovyev, and Scheler have obtained their most significant insights from the inexhaustible source of "the Christian idea of love." It may confront us now as "the . . . great principle of ethics

and religion . . . the principle of religious moral reciprocity . . . moral solidarity,"[28] or as the – we would like to say typical Russian – "love of the earth"[29] which is uniquely and iridescently reflected in Scheler's ecstatic-religious and cosmic-vital "feeling of oneness."[30] In general from the second edition of the book on sympathy onwards any analysis and comparison of the thought of Scheler and of Eastern Christianity presupposes a detailed knowledge of the problematic cultural relations. Meanwhile one can still easily grasp the common significant idea of the Eastern understanding of the world and the love of God as well as their condensation in Scheler's constructive spiritual dynamic. He himself refers "to the wonderful figure of Father Zossima from *The Brothers Karamazov*"[31] to illustrate the idea of solidarity.

In his lecture on "The Christian Idea of Love and the Contemporary World" (1917),[32] Scheler interprets the principle of moral solidarity with words which make manifest an astounding parallel with Dostoyevsky in the notes of the creed laid down by Zossima in "On prayer, on love, and on sympathy into other worlds."[33] "For the universe is like an ocean" – thus Dostoyevsky lets Father Zossima manifest the components of the picture of the essence of the moral community of love. "All is in flux and in mutual relation *[soprikasaetsja];* a movement evoked somewhere is reactively answered *[otdaetsja]* at another point of the world."[34] On the other hand, Scheler says the following using almost the same image which is, however, very quickly repressed by an abstract theorizing model:

> There is no moral gesture so trivial that it does not radiate, like the splashing stone, an infinity of ripples – circles soon lost to the naked eye. But if a physicist can pursue the tremor beyond this natural barrier – how much farther can God the omniscient pursue the moral repercussion! *If* no impediments intervene, A's love for B not only awakens B's reciprocal love of A but stirs a natural growth of *general*, life-warming love in B's responding heart; hence B's love of C and D; and so the flood rolls on within the moral universe, from C and D to E and F *ad infinitum.*[35]

Or Zossima teaches: "Love it, prostrate yourself to the earth, and kiss it. Kiss the earth tirelessly, love insatiably, love all, love all. Seek rapture and the ecstasy of love."[36] And the wave of this stone surges "at the other end" of our relation in the corresponding philosophical lecture of his favorite pupil, Alyosha. It is said that Solovyev was the model for the figure of the youngest Karamazov: "To work the earth means not to misuse it, to exhaust and destroy it, but it means instead to improve it and to lead it upwards to a greater power and fulness of existence."[37]

This transposition cooly and indifferently effects the ecstatic, experiential fervour of the images. However it has enough of its own inspiration and linguistic force to allow the significantly identical mutuality of the under-

standing of the world of an artistically structured insight and an abstractly cognitive insight still to be clearly and unmistakably perceived. From a moral point of view the actualization of this "idea of work"[38] is an unconditioned necessity and a moral task. For "matter has a right to its spiritualization."[39] It is not by chance that Solovyev's formulation of the idea of total-unity is copied in Dostoyevsky's thoughts about the *Brothers Karamazov*. "Love has an essential effect which is always attached to it," Lauth comments. "It leads to a synthesis. Love embraces all in its unity with inspiration."[40]

In the sense of this whole, the metaphysical All-Life plays a decisive role. As we have just indicated the idea of this integral life is also the place where the speculations of Eastern and Western thought – only Dostoyevsky, Solovyev, and Scheler are intended here – meet and indeed again part; the more so as Scheler's transformation proceeds towards a total vital monism and a despiritualization of the content of this idea. As opposed to this the essentially possible interpretation of the world-ground in the sense of a theistic (deifying) pan-vitalism breaks down at the "phenomenon of death" both for Dostoyevsky and Solovyev. In the face of this fact both preserve the humility of an existential Christian relation which sets the limits of a not-being-able-to-do-otherwise *(Nicht-anders-Könnens)* to their thought – even if it should be true that indisputable connoisseurs of Eastern monasticism, e.g. Konstantin Leontyev, do not respect the famous sixth book of *The Brothers Karamazov* (*Russkij inok* – "The Russian Monk") "as a truly orthodox work."[41]

Consequently the "phenomenon of death" becomes the decisive crystallization point of our attention. For it is clear that the total manifold of the stones of a mosaic, only the important parts of which we are trying to make clear here, must remain neglected, if we still want to bring to cognizance the central thought of Solovyev's philosophy of Eros and its essential transcending of Scheler's sexual and personal love.

This thought explodes as a lightening-like intuition in the high tension field of the polar opposite ideas of the fundamentally ontic phenomena "life" and "death." Even Plato proved the idea of an immortal soul with the irreducibility of their essential unities.[42] The surprising finding, that this insight remained a mere certainty, mobilized not only the genius of Russian philosophy[43] but also the rediscoverer of the Platonic tradition on German soil. Scheler's early attempts to clarify the question of "Death and After-Life"[44] – like Solovyev's final and difficulty developed insights[45] – bear the mark of *thaumácein* and of the disquiet of the spiritually challenged. The last positive limit for the proximity of these works and the concurrence of their significance must be the radical caesura in Scheler's thought,

approximately starting, as we have just said, with the second edition of the book on sympathy (1923). The fact that his study "Death and After-Life" lies well before this caesura and still more its very content reveal that "life," equal to "primordial phenomenon," is still seen and understood here as a manifestation of the "spirit" "in nature," that is, as an "experience of the deathward direction"[46] not however as a manifestation of the "nature of the spirit."[47]

"In the form of this certainty death does not stand at the real end of life or it would be only an expectation of this end based on the experience of other beings. Instead it accompanies the whole of life as a component of all of its moments."[48]

In this statement Scheler quite clearly knows about the "relative correlation of the essences of [vital] life and death." This insight "that death rules not only *our bodies*, but also the *body of the world*: the rule of nature is the rule of death!"[49] was placed by Solovyev in the dialectic not only of its consolation but also of its merciless universal cruelty at the beginning of his *Spiritual Foundations of Life* (1882–1884) *in general,* that is, of the culmination of life in the existentially specified form of the highest spirit. "Death makes the secret of life externally manifest and shows us that the life of nature is a hidden dissolving of itself."[50] This means: "If the evidence of death is a constitutive element of our experience of life, then"[51] "only a general repression of the evident idea of death by a life impulse . . . [can make] that phenomenon possible" "which I would like to call the 'metaphysical thoughtlessness' of man."[52] This explains why it is possible that one could be satisfied[53] with a *mere "idea"* of immortality and makes as such Solovyev's "actualization" of the "meaning of love" – that positive overcoming of the evidence of death as opposed to all (excellently demonstrated by Scheler) negative *frightening away in ressentiment of the dread of life*[54] – impossible from the outset.

This is another case of a serious and traceable tragedy.[55] The great phenomenologist fell prey to this temptation which he himself had seen through so thoroughly. More compelled than free, he took the risk of the half demonic and half child-like[56] vital realization of the Thomistic statement: *Anima quodammodo omnia.*"[57] This was ultimately not only a profound mistake but also a defenseless surrender to his ontic discontinuity.[58]

"'After-life of the spiritual-corporeal person' – these words first become meaningful in view of the phenomenon of death, in view of the existence and ineluctability of the fate of all mortals."[59] They are Scheler's clear and true starting point which remains permanent not only in a modern interpretation of Plato's idea of immortality, but also in its realization. The trans-

cending of itself and its tremendously filled, potentially energetic "flowing outwards" *("Hinausschwingen")* into the dimensions of the spiritual "phenomenon of 'carry-over,' *('Überschußphänomen')*"[60] shows the force that is there.

> In the immediate experience of the "carry-over" *("Überschusses")* of all spiritual acts of the person, yes – of the essence of "spiritual acts" over their bodily states, yes – of the essence of "bodily state," and in the act of dying in the experience of the "carry-over" of the person over the bodily unity – here, therefore, is the intuitive essential datum, which fulfills the idea of the after-life in all its thousandfold forms from the belief of the barbarians up to the most enlightened ideas of Kant and Goethe. And it is now clear that this phenomenon of "carry-over" can only be clearly given if and to the extent that the first series of reflexions holds true, if and to the extent that death itself is given, if and to the extent that man not only knows and judges that he will die, but lives "in the face" of death.[61]

With the later "discoveries" of the "cosmic, vital phenomenon of the feeling of oneness," of the "All-Life," and of the "urge aspect of being *(Sein)*" up to the world-ground, and even in it itself, all these insights are put out of circulation. The "phenomenon of death" as such has the appearance of a kind of "irrelevance." Consequently, the execution of the ingenious project of metaphysically interpreting the Christian doctrine of resurrection reverts to Solovyev.

Even on the first pages of *The Meaning of Love* the results of the – under the new aspect of cosmic-vital feeling of oneness subsequently supplied by Scheler in the second edition of the book on sympathy – "metaphysics of sexual love" as well as of the "creative power of life," and of the "eternal" "pioneering of the noble life which wants to pass over and beyond its given level to a higher form of existence"[62] are radically called into question. To follow this judgement a comparative description is necessary. Sexual love for Scheler is "nothing else than the emotional comprehension of value in the form of an anticipation of more promising chances for the qualitative advance of mankind. It is as it were the emotional prior plan of 'possible' men who as vital beings are better than those who only 'were.' Yes – it is already an anticipatory making contact with the Eros of All-Life itself, which always strives and tends to produce something new, better and more beautiful, than that which 'was.'"[63] Solovyev's justifiable polemic against the vitalistic theory of selection of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann is to the point. "The more important the descendants are, the stronger the love of the parents must be, and *vice versa*: the more powerful the love which joins two given persons, the more remarkable the descendants must be which we according to this theory must expect from them . . . .[64] *In actuality how-*

ever we find nothing like this, no correlation between the strength of the passion of love and the significance of the descentants."[65]

Following a review of many examples of classical lovers in literature and history (the anti-vitalistic standpoint toward the "positional value" of love in regard to a "selection" of men in the service of God's intentions, that is, the preconceived "vocation" of history-forming culture-bearers as individual persons, is concluded later by a reflexion with the assistance of the Holy Bible) he correctly offers the following analysis. "As we have seen first a strong love remains often unrequited [and also without descendants[66]]; second, with a strong mutual passion it leads to a tragic end without having given rise to a new generation [Romeo and Juliet[67]]; third, happy love, if it is very strong, usually remains equally sterile."[68]

This cancels the accentuation of Scheler's "pan"-emotionalism without losing the original Augustinian insights of his ethics and theory of knowledge.

Love is certainly greater than rational consciousness,[69] but it could not act as an internal saving force without the latter, a force which increases individuality [individuation] and by no means annihilates it. *It is only thanks to rational consciousness* (or, what is the same, thanks to the consciousness of the truth) *that man can distinguish himself, that is, his true individuality* [individuation] *from his egoism.* If he sacrifices this egoism and surrenders himself to love, man finds in love not only a living but also an animating power [which guarantees that] he does not also lose his *individual* essence with his egoism, but – on the contrary – *makes it eternal.*[70]

Putting it into the context of our account of Solovyev's epistemology and metaphysics, his "consciousness of truth" is knowledge (as a relation of participation in being *[Seinsteilnahmeverhältnis]*)[71] of the metaphysical, spiritual position of individuation proper to each[72] (as the cognitively theoretical and practical task of the "emerging reason of the truth")[73] in the ideal cosmos of "total-unity."[74] Solovyev then says in the same breath: "Every man is capable of knowing and actualizing the truth. Everyone can become a living image *(otraženiem)* of the absolute whole, a conscious and independent organ of universal life *(vsemirnoj žizni).*"[75] Here, therefore, Solovyev's "universal life" and the "one" "universal *agens* of life"[76] in Scheler's thought confront each other and make completely clear the distance between them and their complete incongruency. The "unitary *supra-individual* life" of the *Forms of Knowledge*[77] and of the vital-creative sexual metaphysics[78] has become the attributive power of urge of the world-ground – and no longer the *spiritual* primordial form of existence of the absolute being itself.

Even Solovyev's interpretation of the "meaning of sexual love" culminates in the idea of the possible elevation of value and being of life proper, the

goal of which is "not only in the natural but also in the spiritual order the creation *(sozdanie)* of a new man."[79] This succeeds however – not in a better and more beautiful *vital* essence but instead – by "the factual actualization of true human individuality,"[80] that is, as androgynous whole to its complete essence. "Such a union of two given limited natures is required to create out of them an absolute, ideal person."[81] "True man in the fulness of his ideal person can obviously not be only man or only woman, he must be the higher unity of both. To actualize this unity or to create the true man – as the free unity of the masculine and the feminine principle, in which both these principles retain their formal limit *(obosoblennost')* but have overcome their essential difference and their dissociation – this is precisely the true most intimate task of love."[82]

The kind and manner of realization of value preference necessary for this is now – we would not like to do Scheler an injustice – an aspect which again truly links both thinkers. Love quite decisively possesses epistemological primacy here. For "the particular form of the absolute content" or the "image of God," that is, the primordially eternal idea of the ever personal single individuation in the universal intuition of Logos, is "known by us *theoretically* and *abstractly* in *reason* and by means of reason, however it is known *concretely* and vitally in *love*."[83] In the "special" idealization of the loved object," which the act of love thus executes and by which act the object "is presented in a completely different light to the one who loves, as that in which his fellowmen see him," it is a matter "not only of a special moral and intellectual 'valuation' *(ocenke)* but also of a special *sense* perception:[84] the one who loves sees in fact, perceives as seeing, what the others do not see."[85] Since we presuppose a knowledge of Scheler's arguments on this point they will not be reviewed here. The statement should suffice – *in nuce*: "Love itself is what brings to the surface in the object . . . the ever higher value completely continually and in the course of its movement – just as if it [the value] radiated 'by itself' from the loved object even without each striving activity of the one who loves."[86]

Since "the separation of the sexes, not removed by the external and transitory union in intercourse, . . . [is] itself already a state of disintegration and the principle of death,"[87] the goal of real immortality in the *fulness* of the specificity of the value-essences remains in this sense ultimately unobtainable. For "only the *whole* man can be immortal, and if physiological union is not actually able to restore the totality of the human nature, then this means that this apparent union must be replaced by true union, by no means however by abstention from any union, that is, by no means by striving to arrest the separated, disintegrated and consequently moral

human nature *in statu quo.*"[88] This deed must guarantee "the true spiritual love" in which not the "union of flesh" but "its rebirth, salvation, and resurrection"[89] will be expressed. For this, however, man does "not [possess] by himself the power."[90] "Thus man (the man) is not the creative, grounding principle in respect to its feminine supplement in itself but instead as the mediator or guide of the divine power."[91]

This means: "I can only recognize the unconditioned value of a given person or believe in it (without this true love is impossible) to the extent that I affirm it (the person) in God, thus only to the extent that I believe in God himself and in myself – in myself as someone who has in God the center and root of his being *(Sein).*"[92] Based on this vision the "thou" of the one who loves is "one and the same person in two different forms or in two different regions of being *(Sein)* – the ideal and the real. The *first* [person[93]] is first of all *only idea.* But in true, faithful and *perceiving* love we know that this idea is not our arbitrary *invention* but that it represents the object's truth, which is only not yet actualized in external real appearance."[94] "*This ideal person or this idea which has become person is only an individuation of total-unity, which is indivisibly co-given in each of its individuations.*"[95]

The question of *how* its insight is to be realized nevertheless intrudes as the salient point of this intuitive totality. Scheler tried to clarify this within the relation person-act by requiring co-execution – "cognitively in 'understanding' and 'observation,' morally however in the 'followers'."[96] The "ultimate moral personal value is therefore only given to us in the co-execution of its own act of love. We must love what the model loves, in 'co-loving' *('Mit-lieben'),* in order to obtain the givenness of this moral value."[97] If we wanted to attach credit to this statement of Scheler, then human love theoretically would have ceased to exist. According to it there would be neither one who loves nor a person who is loved – with the exception of God or Christ as the real model itself – since each, in order to love must "co-execute" the act of love of the loved person. This would lead first to a heteropathic arrest and finally at best would lead up to a completely diluted and absolutely meaningless *copying of God's love* (man as the "ape" of God) – not however to a love of the spiritually individuated human person *for* God. No trace remains of a free "pardoned, originarily human directional *conversion* of God's love" as a *new* directional experience; of *original*, personal, that is, individual love of man to man "in" and "from" God; of spiritual individuation and *ordo amoris.*

Obviously Scheler undoes his most valuable insights here, of course without knowing or wanting to. For, if the preceding statements are true,

then how could the "ultimate moral personal value" bring to the surface *"for me"* in general the self of the person? If the act of love which "I" execute – execute with a quite plain experience of direction towards it [the other person], should be not at all "mine" and ultimately no act of "love" at all, then would it not be only an act of infinitely pale "imitation" of the *divine* totality of love *towards itself* and the world? As Karl Pfleger delicately suggests in his important article, "The Essence of Love According to Modern Russian Gnosis,"[98] this is a very essential failing of Scheler's metaphysics of love.[99] The eschatological and metaphysical "creative" function of Eros as the idea of Solovyev's and Fyodorov's thought[100] remains without a doubt epistemologically transcendent of the former's metaphysics. Based on the fateful comprehension of the relational datum: love – person of Scheler's phenomenology of act and object, the essence of love is loved away here. In complete contrast, the one who loves must try universally to reach the center of the loved person, *copying the manner* of the divine total act *as he himself* with his quite particular act-intention which is determined in an original and not to be repeated manner by individuation. In the light of such love the loved person actually and existentially grows into its ideal value-essence. "However the complete realization . . . of the individual . . . essence . . . is to be the actual not only subjective but also objective *reunion of the individual man with God*, the restoration of the living and immortal image of God in him."[101]

The crisis of Solovyev's own Eros philosophy is introduced by the following speculations on the "eternally feminine" *(večnaja ženstvennost')* as a "living spiritual being." With its specification the culmination of the idea of love converges towards the metaphysics of the doctrine of *Sophia.* The crisis is linked to those "Three Encounters"[102] in Moscow (1862), London (1875), and Egypt (1876), at the basis of which lies the ecstatic experience of three visions of the "divine Sophia-wisdom" or "of the eternally feminine." The materialized essential traits of this image of the person are recognizable in the main icon of the cathedral in Novgorod. This presentation of Sophia was extensively described by Solovyev in his lecture on Comte held at the University of Petersburg (March 7, 1898) on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Comte's birth.[103] The completely personal experience of this ecstatic vision affected Solovyev's whole metaphysics. It comes therefore as no particular surprise that the "speculations on Sophia" are questionable from a strict philosophical point of view. Ivan von Kologrivov speaks quite openly in this sense of "aberrations" and circumscribes them as "Vladimir Solovyev's attempt to fuse together his gnostic, erotic feelings and his Christian world-view into a cult 'of the

eternally feminine'."[104] Elsewhere he says with critical candor: "He was indisputably a mystic but in his mystical experience one frequently senses as it were an erotic-sensual tinge connected with a strong morbid-occult after-taste. Therefore his 'doctrine of Sophia' signifies . . . a danger since it, although 'sublimated', appears to be gnostic and naturalistic."[105]

CHAPTER FIVE

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

Before documenting and discussing the problem of a direct relationship between the two thinkers, we would like to expand our view to include some questions which although related to the immanent structures of Solovyev's and Scheler's thought and its philosophical and cultural relevance do not belong to the essence of their affinities and their interpretation.

I. THE FEMINIST ISSUE AND THE IDEA OF GOD

One of the remaining questions which is closely linked with the previous systematic inquiry has to do with the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the "feminist issue." This involves a categorial revision, a conceptual-ideal de-virilization of the view and possession of the world, an essentially ontic polarization of the masculine-feminine correlation of being *(Sein)* and spirit in the sense of a total phenomenon and – as the basis for all these attempts – the task of clarifying the amazing differences between the West and the East in the appreciation of the existential and essential status of the woman. Because of their interest in this question both thinkers provide material for comparison.[1] Due to the attitudes of German writers towards this problem, an adjustment of the critical judgement of literary historians[2] seems appropriate. If one – for example – all too quickly mistakes the erotic behavior of the Russian woman as the irresponsible artifice of a parody, then the conclusions from such an "insight" into the essence of the feminine must lead to a questionable result. The hidden core of her status can hardly be more convincingly disclosed than in the variegated "love stories" of the leading literary figures, be it Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky or Chekhov. This can best be illustrated for our purposes by the central occurrence of *Eugene Onegin* where a loving maiden using her feminine intuition declares herself to the man she loves in a letter which has become famous in literary history. The same thing occurs in Dostoyevsky's masterful detective novel *The Brothers Karamazov*[3] as well as in Chekhov's *Rendezvous*[4] – and, if one wants, even in the deeply moving confession of Vera to Pechorin in Lermontov's *A Hero of Our Time.*[5]

In all these cases a first declaration of love by letter on the part of the

woman is present (even if a certain limitation is true for Lermontov's example[6]). Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy's tale of "Happy Married Life"[7] and Dostoyevsky's melodramatic early work (1848) "White Nights"[8] modify this situation in the sense of a spoken expression with unmistakable initiative on the part of the girl. Gogol clearly had this "tradition" as the basis[9] for the love relation between Ulinka and Tentetnikov.[10]

The presupposition implied by the ***Pushkin Studies*** that the unmistakable continuity between literary confessions of all great Russian writers and the lyricist of Decembrist ideas in Mikhaylovskoye is as much a parody as the assertion that the incident between Tatyana and Onegin is of the essence of the event cannot withstand criticism. There can be no doubt that in artistic fidelity to Pushkin an authentic tradition of experiential understanding has been formed which is essentially more than a parody.

Solovyev's statements about the "feminist issue" interpret the phenomenon of feminine activity and initiative as originally Russian. The Russian woman is by no means so passively and masochistically patient as she is often viewed in Western European literature. According to Solovyev the following is true of her:

> In . . . times . . . , when the old forms of the bases for life have been exhausted and have grown weak and when it has become necessary to make a transition to new sources of life, then the women sense, even if not before the man still they sense it more strongly and more decisively than the man, the unsatisfactory character of the traditional manner of living. They feel the impulse to leave the old and to face what is new and to come. Before they find what is right, they reach for everything which offers itself to them with enthusiasm.[11]

This may be illustrated by their unusually high degree of zeal for the occurrence of the Russian revolution. They were unconditionally certain of the "direction" of the goal even though its "content" was obscure, and of their chances – we mean the women's intelligentsia of the '70's and '80's.

Nikolay Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky (1828–1889) sketched the archetype of this new woman in Vera Pavlovna, the main female figure in his novel *What is to be Done.*[12] Her conversation (IV/VII) with her second husband, Alexander Matveyevich Kirsanov, is a characteristic expression of this. She explains: "We have often talked of the fact that as far as spiritual organization is concerned women should be on a higher level than men. Therefore in the spiritual realm women could one day banish men to second place if the reign of brute force were over."[13] And further: "Women have played such a subordinate role in spiritual life until now because the rule of force has robbed them of the means to develop themselves

further and has allowed the motives to die out which would induce them to strive for such a development."[14]

The ideas that Vera Pavlovna was concerned with here developed out of an insight which Chernyshevsky made basic to her third dream during her marriage to her first husband, Dmitry Sergeyevich Lopukhov: "Why have I recently felt something like boredom?"[15] Confronted with Kirsanov she soon felt a certain dissatisfaction with herself in spite of personal happiness. "And what a strange character this sensation presented after it became somewhat clearer to her: it was as if not she, Vera Pavlovna Kirsanova, personally felt dissatisfied, but as if she was the expression of the dissatisfaction of thousands and of millions; and as if she was not personally dissatisfied with herself, but as if these thousands and millions in her were dissatisfied with themselves."[16] Vera Pavlovna began nevertheless "to notice that whenever this dissatisfaction started up in her this sensation was always accompanied by a comparison which she drew, yes, that the dissatisfaction consisted precisely in the fact that she compared herself to her husband."[17]

It hurt her pride that during her previous marriage with Lopukhov, Kirsanov had obviously more easily fought off his passionate amorous desire for the wife of a friend, at least as opposed to her, and without the manifest signs of a strong internal struggle. And suddenly she thought she knew the secret of that "vexing difference" between herself and Kirsanov. It only consisted in the unconventional insight that one must have an occupation which one cannot drop or put off, for women are by far more capable of resistance.[18]

> For does a person ... still have sense of another if he does not feel good about himself? Can he summon up interest for the ideas [of another] if he is tormented by his [own] feelings? No, what is necessary for me is a personally meaningful occupation, an actually necessary occupation, one on which one's own life must depend, a job which would be more important for me personally, for my mode of living, for my capability of living, for my whole position in life, for my whole fate than all that towards which my passions can transport me. Only such an occupation can serve as a support in the struggle with the passions. It alone is not forced aside by passion, but can itself silence passion. It alone grants strength to resist and makes it possible to improve.[19]

This viewpoint which is at first sexually and ethically tinged is linked meanwhile for Vera Pavlovna unexpectedly with an all-encompassing social emancipation of women from all traditional restrictions. Her further thoughts make this evident.

> Almost all paths are blocked for us women which could lead to participation as a citizen. Very little – almost nothing actually – comes practically into question for us even in those regions of public activity which are not denied us formally by law.

Of all spheres of life only the one sphere of family life, which is narrow enough, is assigned to us. We are allowed to be a member of a family and nothing more . . . . No, as long as women do not make it their business to find jobs in the most diverse professions, they will also not acquire independence . . . . The regions in which one can independently work and which are not closed off by law from us are inaccessible for us because such work also contradicts prevailing views. But I can enter each of these regions if I can only muster up the courage to defy the opposition which will result from these prevailing views.[20]

One could almost suppose that the Russian woman's understanding of herself as was previously phenomenologically described is not basic to Vera's erotic behavior towards Kirsanov which corresponds to the literary tradition of Pushkin; but what is basic rather is her social demand for independence. Vera had already said to Lopukhov: "The main issue is independence! To do what I want, to live as I want, to have to ask no one, to demand nothing from anyone, to need no one, no one! This is how I would like to live!"[21] This assumption is, however, contradicted by the fact that the intuitive resoluteness with which Vera breaks Kirsanov's rationally determined opposition against his love for her anticipates by far all of her social insights. These social claims were first the result of her analyzing her dissatisfaction with herself, a dissatisfaction which she gradually began to feel although she completely possessed the love of Kirsanov and in spite of her being happy with him. The wish for an equally strong support against the strength of her feelings ". . . lies in the future and had suggested to me my idea. However what I now need in the present, that must naturally also be attacked. Therefore what do I need? The answer is: I want to be equal to you in everything, that is the main thing. And therefore I have found myself a job."[22]

Unconsciously faithful to Russia's literary traditions, Chernyshevsky has nevertheless changed nothing in spite of his intention to break with all existing social conditions. We would like to demonstrate this directly by recapitulating the events which occurred. After the suicide of Vera Pavlovna's first husband, Lopukhov, she seeks out the apartment of her lover, who still does not know of her passion for him, in order to make herself known to him. Kirsanov is not yet back from the hospital where he is on duty as a young doctor. She waits for him.

Then it [the doorbell] rang. She blushed a little and smiled. Steps came closer. The door opened. "Vera Pavlovna!" He staggered, yes, staggered and tried to catch hold of the door knob. But she already has rushed to him and embraced him: "Dearest, dearest! How good you are! How I love you! I could not live without you!" And then, what happened then? How did they go through the room? She could no longer remember. She only remembered that she rushed to him, kissed him, but how they went through the room neither she nor he later remembered. They only knew how

it had been as they had already passed the armchair by the table but how they [came] from the door ... Yes, for a few seconds both of them were dizzy, the kiss had obscured their vision ....[23]

If one considers Solovyev's references to the intensity and resoluteness with which the Russian woman feels dissatisfaction with the traditional manner of living and the impulse to leave the old and to face the new, that which is coming as political, then some surprising things come to light.

In the historical, political-economical thought of the Bolsheviks there has been no authentic Marxism since Lenin's *What is to be Done*? (Stuttgart 1902) and *One Step Forward–Two Steps Back* (Geneva 1904). The cause of this gap is already present in Chernyshevsky's novel on the life of Vera Pavlovna *(Čto delat'?, [What is to be Done?])* which Lenin "ploughed his way through" in the summer of 1887 while at Kokushkino near Kazan, the country home of his mother. From here the clues to Lenin's revolutionary ideas lead back to Pyotr Grigoryevich Zaychnevsky (1842–1896).[24] The latter, a student of the faculty of physics and mathematics at Moscow University (since 1858), had written the underground proclamation "Molodaja Rossija" (Young Russia)[25] while in pre-trial confinement during April and May 1862. This proclamation was circulated in St. Petersburg and Moscow in mid-May 1862.

V.I. Romanenko reported in his preface to the re-print of "Molodaja Rossija" by P.G. Zaychnevsky in *Sketches on the History of Philosophy in Russia – Second Half of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Century* (Moscow 1960) among other things the following:

On the way home in the summer vacation of 1861 Zaychnevsky spoke at the farmer's assembly in Podolsk as well as in villages in the Orel region. In July of 1861 he was arrested along with some of his comrades ... and was brought before the police. He was later transferred to Moscow for further investigation and judgment. However the police never found out who the author of "Molodaja Rossija" was. In 1863 in the Sixth (Moscow) division of the Senate Pyotr Grigoryevich Zaychnevsky was condemned for distributing illegal writings and was dispatched to Siberia for forced labor.[26]

The proclamation "Molodaja Rossija" appeared at that time on behalf of the "Central Revolutionary Committee," a handful of Moscow students who were also in jail. It was directly based upon Chernyshevksy's *Letter From the Province (Pis'mo iz provincii)* which he had published under the signature "A Russian" *(Russkij Čelovek)* in March 1860 in Herzen's London "Kolokol."[27] Zaychnevsky later became the leader of the "Party of Russian Jacobinian-Blanquists" *(Partija russkix jakobincev-blankistov).* His most faithful comrade-in-arms (from 1882 until Zaychnevsky's death in 1896), M.I. Yasnyova,[28] passed on to Lenin the political ideas of "Molodaja Rossija" at the beginning of the '90's.

Significantly all the members of the Zaychnevsky group other than Yasnyova – Mitskevich,[29] A. and L. Romanova, Artsybashev, Orlov and others – followed this logical convergence and became Bolsheviks. Mitskevich confirmed the usurpation of Chernyshevsky's conception expressly when he wrote in 1925 that the October Revolution had actualized many of the solutions of the "excellent *'Molodaja Rossija'*" of 1862.[30] Since the fall of 1904 Lenin had irrevocably decided to orient himself on this model. As P.B. Axelrod said in January 1905 during a conversation with Nikolay Vladislavovich Volsky (Valentinov), who at that time belonged to the Bolsheviks: "The time has not yet come for you to see that side of Lenin which makes him a dangerous man within the Social Democratic Party, which is a democratic party."[31] Since 1904 the latter had definitively rejected the Marxist program of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as unrealistic and had cold-bloodedly replaced it with the conception of a dictatorship of his own wing of the party – the later CPR(b) – tacitly a dictatorship of himself.[32]

According to Valentinov's testimony Jasnyova played an essential role in this connection. This seems to follow also from the fact that Lenin's letter to Jasnyova from the fall of 1904, published in the complete collection of his works, is missing in later editions.[33] "As Zaychnevsky was banished to Siberia, Yasnyova who was [also] indicted for criminal activity was placed under municipal police supervision in Samara the place of exile assigned to her, after she had served a prison sentence in 1891. There she met Lenin and associated with the Ulyanov family."[34] At that time she was 30 years old (born 1861) and certainly far superior in revolutionary experience and practical underground knowledge than Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, who was nine years younger (born 1870). Thus, one may assume that in their private conversations about questions of methods of seizing power it was not she who had something to learn from him but on the contrary he from her. "Lenin was at that time especially interested in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement and he tried to personally become acquainted with its participants. He was also very interested in Zaychnevsky's party of the 'Jacobinian-Blanquists' as well as in its program and historical development since the appearance of 'Molodaja Rossija.' Yasnyova informed him about these things."[35]

As Valentinov has commented here one may in fact

find various substantiations for the fact that the thought of seizing power and of dictatorship was actually brewing then in Lenin's head. It took shape regardless of the fact that this intention ran counter to Plekhanov's criticism of the idea of seizing power, which appeared in the work *Naši raznoglasija* (Our Differences of

Opinion, Geneva 1884). Lenin began his independent study of Marxism by reading this work in 1889.

Lenin undoubtedly suppressed the memory of these conversations with Yasnyova about "Molodaja Rossija," Zaychnevsky and the party of the Jacobinian-Blanquists. This is indicated by the following fact: Lenin suddenly remembered Yasnyova again in the fall of 1904 after having forgotten her for twelve years during which there had been no written contact between them. From Geneva he wrote her in Saratov. He was "extremely happy" to know that she was still "alive" and "wanted very much to renew his friendship [with her]." What had happened? What moved him to remember her? This question is easy to answer. While writing *One Step Forward–Two Steps Back* Lenin became completely convinced that an orthodox Marxist social democrat must necessarily be a Jacobinian, that Jacobinianism requires dictatorship, that it "is impossible to carry out the revolution without a Jacobinian purge" and that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is a mere slogan lacking any content without a Jacobinian use of force."

Now this is completely faithful to the call of "Molodaja Rossija" to take up arms,[36] which follows Chernyshevsky's appeal. It is also extremely similar to the conceptions developed in the "Jacobinian-Blanquists" program as Yasnyova presented it. Why then should one not remember her! And more so as Lenin learned that Yasnyova had joined the Bolshevik current and had "taken [a] standpoint of solidarity with us." This almost unknown history of the "Molodaja Rossija," the party of "Jacobinian-Blanquists" and the conversations between Lenin and Yasnyova casts a particular light on some of Lenin's explanations [in connection with *One Step Forward–Two Steps Back*].[37]

Chernyshevsky's heroine, Vera Pavlovna, has referred us to the historical existence of M.I. Yasnyova, an activist of the populist group. She transmitted the radical thought of the politically rebellious author to the later great instigator of the October Revolution. One could find many other examples of that "intensity and resoluteness with which the Russian woman feels dissatisfaction with the traditional manner of living." And it is not of great importance that Yasnyova undoubtedly is closer to Rakhmetov, Lenin's rigorous model in Chernyshevsky's *What is to be Done* than to Vera Pavlovna, her feminine comrade as projected by literary fantasy. For *both* female figures provide sufficient verification for the fact touched upon by Solovyev.

Walter Schubart has much emphasized and also very speculatively expressed the total meaning of this phenomenon, which encompasses the ontic of essence, culture and history; the phenomenon, namely, of the Russian woman's unconditioned "directional certainty" of the goal as well as her impulse to abandon the old and to enthusiastically face the new or that which is coming. The phenomenon reveals to him

[a unique] characteristic of Russia as the *Christian* part of Asia. Extraordinary results are to be expected when the impulsively Asiatic inclination to the feminine nature coincides with its consciously Christian value. The result of this harmony which has only occurred once on this globe is the Russian woman. She is one of the strokes of luck of our planet. Many visitors to Russia take back the impression that the Russian woman is more valuable than the Russian man . . . . Other peoples have created other

typifications of the human: China the wise man, India the ascetic, Rome the ruler, England and Spain the gentleman, Prussia the soldier; Russia takes its place with its women. Dostoyevsky was right to pin great hopes on them.[38]

Transferred into the language of historical, political prognosis this means for him that Communism and the feminine nature according to the Russian understanding are completely opposed. For Communism must be considered as "an authentic branch of Promethean culture." "The comment which Aliya Rakhmanova in her novel *The Factory of New Men* puts into the mouth of the writer, Kusnetsov [is very appropriate]. 'I find that an age has now dawned in which masculine morality rules exclusively. Not a single feminine idea may be found among the ideas which make up the essence of communistic thought.'"[39] For Schubart, therefore – that is, on account of this misuse of the Russian woman's nature which is cognitively more and more penetrated and of the betrayal of her image which threatens her spiritually integral truthful and vital existence – "the female . . . is the deadly enemy of Bolshevism – and the female will conquer it. A world task is indicated here for the Russian woman."[40]

As far as Scheler is concerned, he reached the insight using his act-phenomenological method that "even in Russia . . . the Christian religion excludes this dreadful doctrine of the non-personality of the female."[41] The interrelation between sexual and spiritual individual love and the ". . . idea of a pure and absolute monogamy" which was disclosed in his contributions to the *Phenomenology and Theory of the Feelings of Sympathy and of Love and Hate* (Halle 1913) makes it even clearer that this idea can never be deduced from naturalistic presuppositions or appear evidentially in consciousness. Monogamy has a final phenomenological foundation only if one considers the matrimonial partnership as an institution for reproduction which is grounded in a *spiritual* relation of love. Similarly sexual love is not thought of as a uniform love which only two real bearers of different sexes practice. Instead it is considered a kind of love which already possesses *purely spiritually* a characteristic quality.[42] However Scheler makes a questionable attempt to justify Germany's position in World War I by arguing that it was to protect Europe's culture from its greatest enemy, Russia. He also tries to define "constant guard against Russia" as "the goal of German and European politics" as well as a fundamental element of the Western political way of thinking.[43] This means that we must be reserved and distant about his ability to judge since the objects of his knowledge are clearly inadequate here.

For the author of the writings on war[44] "that profound association of Greek Orthodoxy, Caesaropapism, Byzantinism, religious quietism, knout

and schnapps, scourge and sweet bread, the brutal sadism of a crude, low-browed ruling class and the effeminate masochism of a knout-happy inorganic mass, the effeminate exuberance of feeling and the contempt for reason"[45] falls out of the "cultural breath" of the West. Therefore it is Scheler's opinion that precisely in regard to the most basic differences of those constants (see Schubart), on the basis of which all historical life moves, the differences in the spiritual relation of female and male – in spite of all influences on the part of the Christian religion – the following holds true. Within the Russian "continent the patriarchal character [predominates] in the relations of man and woman over the character of a hallowed partnership in love and life of two independent persons." "This one great constant in the relation between sexes . . . of a spiritually qualified and personal, individual love . . . appears again in all national differences within Europe."[46] According to Scheler's view in Russia, on the other hand, moral relations may not be measured by the European ethos: "The principle of chaotic, lawless power is constantly balanced out by the principle of an equally chaotic lawless patriarchy of love, which is just as inseparable from all Russian ideas of authority as the principle of power."[47]

This view would have, if it were correct, theoretically well thought out grounds even for Russian philosophy's understanding of itself in that which V.V. Zenkovsky and K.V. Mochulsky call Solovyev's anthropological impersonalism.[48] According to this anthropological conception of total-unity there may exist only formal independence and autonomy of the person. The person would only be actually independent and autonomous when it confirms itself as the bearer of something else which is higher.[49] While Zenkovsky finds the "deepening of the impersonalistic motif in Solovyev not particularly surprising" as soon as one "fixes one's eyes on [his] general conception of pantheism, which is influenced by Spinoza,"[50] Mochulsky and L.M. Lopatin are of the opinion "that Solovyev's new doctrine [in the *Theoretical Philosophy*] contradicts his whole earlier philosophical system, all of his basic convictions of the past."[51] We will speak more of this in the summary.

However, the doctrines of androgyny and Sophia of Plato, Jakob Boehme, Franz von Baader and German Romanticism play a significant role in Solovyev's "erotic utopia"[52] – that is, the belief that the individual only has power in connection with everyone to overcome, by means of the reintegration of love, death as the disintegration of the whole of human nature which is made manifest in the separation of man and woman.[53] Just as in regard to impersonalism, the Russian interpreters also express different opinions about this. For Zenkovsky "in Solovyev, androgyny is

very closely linked in his doctrine of Sophia with some of his utopian ideas."[54] Mochulsky objects that although the elements of the philosophy of Eros, of Sophia-mysticism and of the doctrine of the "eternally divine feminine nature" are joined into an organic unity with N.F. Fyodorov's cosmic theurgy, the conception of androgyny, however, represents a sudden and unexpected invasion in Solovyev's metaphysics of love.[55]

Mochulsky holds the view that a basic change in Solovyev's thinking begins to make itself evident with the experiences of his last, passionate love for Sofiya Mikhaylovna Martynova in the summer of 1892. His interpretation, which differs from that of Zenkovsky, in regard to the question of the influence of von Baader's erotic philosophy on Solovyev's sexual metaphysics, as well as of the understanding of the theory of androgyny[56] which goes back via von Baader to "Boehme's doctrine of the divine virgin, Sophia," corresponds to this view. However what primarily corresponds to it is the consequence of a whole series of contradictions in the progressive design of the philosophy of total-unity. For according to the judgment of his critics, Solovyev makes a dubious attempt to assimilate Boehme's and von Baader's doctrine of the androgynous virgin Sophia in a form which conforms to the presuppositions of his own idea of the eternal, divine feminine, that is, in a *revised form.*

He does not notice that these two doctrines are intrinsically incompatible and that the "view of androgyny" lacks any foundation in his sophiological theory of love. The paradox of Solovyev's *Meaning of Love* [five essays, 1892–1894] consists in a unity of opposites, in the linking of extreme eroticism with extreme ascetism. Solovyev maintains that only sexual love possesses a transformative power; no other is in a position to defeat death. God's kingdom is only created by two lovers; sexual love is the only entrance to it. This contradicts the Saviour's words: "greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his soul[57] for his friends." Solovyev requires that one should not lay down one's soul for one's friends, but only for one's loved one. He does not even once mention Christian love which is of course different from sexual love. In this context he denies the Christian family and rejects with disgust the procreation of children. He is completely influenced by the elementary erotic and does not see the love of compassion and mercy. The equally extreme postulate of asceticism accompanies this *apotheosis of sexual love.* Although love should be sexual it should at the same time be without result. The erotic excitement may not be discharged in a bodily union. A hidden distrust or contempt of the flesh is present in Solovyev in spite of his doctrine of the divine matter and the spiritual corporeality of the world [or perhaps precisely on account of this doctrine?]. The flesh does not participate in the process of transforming the world; its nature is animal and an enemy of the spirit, its law the bad infinity of reproduction and of death.[58]

One may disregard these contradictions and paradoxical statements which are unmistakably contained in Solovyev's theory of love. We cannot however omit *a side-glance at some parallels in Scheler* who ultimately forces against his phenomenological intentions the most elementary

form of feeling oneness, the act-phenomenon of sexual love as a creative force of life, up to the spiritual blind urge. What remains noteworthy here is the fact that Solovyev assigns to love the task of creating the true human being as the free unity of the male and female principle in such a way that although both preserve their individuality they overcome their differences and their dissociation. A *theological* androgyny corresponds to this essential understanding of humanness: "The image of God is not related to a component of man, but to the whole man, to the totality of man and woman."[59]

Since God, as the one, distinguished from himself his other, that is, all beings which are not he himself, and therefore created the world as the unity of *Sophia* which is passive and feminine compared to him, he must lead it back and up to him in that he realizes the higher in the lower. For being actual belongs in God only to total-unity.[60] Sophia is thus the idea brought into expression and as such the body of God, the matter of the divinity. It is thus simultaneously the *principle of humanity,* of the ideal human being of an a-temporal intuition. Neither the generic concept "man" nor the natural humanity as an additive characteristic corresponds to this principle, but only the universal and individual humanity in God. The universal and individual humanity in God, however, represents the eternal body of God and the eternal *world-soul.*[61]

If one assumes this as given, then there is a not inessential difference between Solovyev's *conception of Sophia,* on the one hand, in the *Lectures on God-manhood* (1877–1881) and, on the other hand, in his French work *La Russie et l'Église universelle* (1889).[62] For Sophia was at first that ideal human nature or the world-soul, but this identification is now manifestly given up. "The world-soul is no [longer] Sophia [itself], but only [still] the bearer, the field of possibility and substrate of its actualization; it is the antithesis of divine wisdom, the first of its creations, *materia prima.*"[63] Its blind desire for anarchical chaotic reality "*exists from all eternity in God* in the state of pure potentiality, as the concealed ground of eternal wisdom."[64]

According to Mochulsky, Solovyev's view of the *fall of the world-soul* also changed significantly. In the *Lectures* this mysterious process was understood as an act of rebellious freedom by means of which the world-soul revolts against God and constitutes itself outside of God, asserting itself in the forms of space, time and mechanical causality. In *La Russie et l'Église universelle* God permits this expression of rebellious chaos without checking it. In effecting his omnipotence he does not oppose this expression with an act of force, and he does not suppress the blind desire of the extra-divine nature-world for anarchical existence, a desire which exists potentially from all eternity.[65] Even more:

God loves chaos in its non-being and *He wills that it exist,* since He is able to lead back into unity the rebelling existence and He is able to fill the infinite void with His overflowing life. Thus God gives chaos its freedom. He denies Himself in the first act of divine being *(Sein)* ... the reaction against it with His omnipotence and in this manner lets the world come forward out of its nothingness. If one does not want to deny the idea of God itself, then one cannot admit a real and positive existence, which is in itself and which exists outside of God. *That which is outside of God can therefore only be the transformed or per-verted divine.*[66]

As Mochulsky explains in his critical comment, Solovyev encounters here

the basic problem of sophiology: How does the many arise from the one? How does the world which exists beyond God emerge in addition to him, who is "all in all"? We find the first answer in the *Lectures:* the world originated as a result of the fall of the world-soul. But then new questions arose: If the world-soul is divine Sophia, how is its fall possible? And is it conceivable to equate the creation of the world, about which its creator said "that it was good"[67] with sin? Another answer is given in *La Russie et l'Eglise universelle:* chaos exists potentially in God. He himself wills that chaos receive actual being *(Sein).* Solovyev was obviously prompted to this answer by Schelling who taught the dark un-ground *(Ungrund)* in God and who maintained that the fall of the creature from God and the genesis of evil is an intrinsic necessity for God. The second answer was just as unsatisfactory as the first. It introduced division into the divine life itself, contradicted the idea of "total-unity" and made God responsible for evil. Solovyev had in fact not solved this antinomy. It remained a limit for him which his thought was unable to pass beyond.[68]

We have just noted that Zenkovsky considers Solovyev's conception of androgyny as very closely linked to the doctrine of Sophia. In his opinion the anthropology and the metaphysics of the philosophy of total-unity mutually correspond. In agreement with this is the conclusion that Solovyev saw himself prevailed upon on account of the metaphysical dualism of God and the primordial ground also to disclose both principles in man. In Zenkovsky's judgment this necessity may sufficiently explain why Solovyev so urgently emphasizes the principle of chaos as "the other in the divinity." In this connection he refers to Solovyev's examination (1895) of Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev's poetry, according to which "the same dark ground which has disclosed itself in the life and consciousness of man at a new and higher level [must] be conquered by an internal manner *in humanity itself and with its proper cooperation.*"[69] For "'the fateful inheritance' of the dark powers in our soul is not personal. It is characteristic of the whole of humanity in the same way"[70] and consequently makes the cosmos an "emerging absolute."[71]

According to Solovyev's new doctrine in *La Russie et l'Eglise universelle* – that this doctrine is different from that of the *Lectures* is equally self-evident to both Zenkovsky and Mochulsky[72] – Sophia which is now differentiated from the world-soul as the bearer of the chaotic powers is no longer only the "true cause of creation" but "also its goal."

Consequently, "Sophia possesses *idealiter* as content 'the unifying force of the separated and divided being of the world' and reveals itself at the end of the world process 'as the Kingdom of God'."[73] However in Solovyev's philosophy of man this ideal *prior givenness* occurs in a remarkable context since it obviously begins to presuppose certain characteristics of Schelling's doctrine of freedom (the second phase of theosophy beginning in 1809): the absolute "primordial chance"; the dark striving in the unground of the divine essence; and *God's* eternal *bringing forth of himself.* As Zenkovsky comments here:

> Usually the doctrine of androgyny is connected with the concept of the original androgyny of man. Sexual diamorphism is considered a corollary which appears later (mystical writings frequently give the fall as the reason for this). Plato already taught the priority of androgyny. The dissociation of this original unity of the male and female principle represents so to speak a "polarization" of the primary androgyny. This conception is likewise mentioned by Solovyev even if only in passing. For him androgyny is not [already] given but instead *not yet* given. It does not relate to the past but to the *future.*[74]

However if "the mysterious image of God" corresponds only to the true unity of both fundamental principles, the male and the female, if it is – "in other words . . . 'written into' man as his *task* not however as reality [and] therefore the word 're-establish' does not properly belong here,"[75] then the meaning of love in Solovyev acquires an *act-deifying* significance which appears to be thoroughly comparable to the thoughts of the later Scheler. In his lecture at the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Berlin Lessing Academy on the forms of knowledge and culture Scheler certainly does comprehend incarnation as the "becoming of a self-concentration of the large world, the 'macrocosm' in an individual, personal, spiritual center, the microcosm" or as the "world-becoming of a human person in love and knowledge;" as "a love which is a burning thirst and the highest objectivity directed at real value."[76] This incarnation also appears in the same process as an "attempt at continuous 'self-deification' – seen from that which reigns *over* man and all finite things and which commands reverence."[77] If the statement "the person in man . . . [is] an individual, unique self-concentration of the divine spirit"[78] is to hold true from now on in Scheler, then "self-deification [means] at the same time *co-actualization of the eternally only 'essentially existing' idea of the spiritual divinity"* – Solovyev's concept of Sophia may be inserted here – "in the substrate" – as the world-soul – "of the urge, which as one and the same underlies all forms of natural life and any kind of becoming."[79] "Every historical action ends in this well and nobly formed being *(Sein)* of man, in the *co-actualization of God by man."*[80] Thus "that *velle, amare in Deo,* that *cognoscere in*

lumine Dei" takes place and accomplishes itself "in the process of his life in the world, with the world and in the active victory over its and his own passions, obstacles, in love and deed . . . – and ultimately in the intention of true act-*deification,*"[81] the becoming of the human totality at once with the actualization of the ideal prior givenness of Sophia.

Against this background the question associated with the metaphysics of urge of the so-called de-virilization of the image of God begins to form itself in a clearly discernible fashion. In his speech at the yearly festival of Berlin's Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (Nov. 5, 1927)[82] Scheler refers to the similarly directed tendencies of Solovyev in order to demonstrate the necessity of a cleansing of the idea of God of the monopolistic ideas of man and its enrichment with correlatively feminine essential values.[83] Solovyev's first work, *The Mythological Process in Ancient Paganism* (1873),[84] which was composed when he was twenty, offers some interesting parallels. Based on the original copy we can establish the following:

1. For Solovyev the essential ontic of both elements – the male-spiritual and the female-spiritual – is contained in the idea of God. This corresponds to his intuitive synthesis of the "whole" man.

2. The sexual – or vital-attributive urge-like – God represents an obscuring of an adequate idea of God.

3. The sequence of phases of the *Mythological Process* suggests a surprisingly clear comparison with individual, personal development as well as with the transformation of the idea of God in Scheler which corresponds to this development – and in the following descending levels:

a) Purely spiritual God,

b) Heroic mediator between heaven and earth (act-deification),

c) God of divinized All-Life equivalent to Dionysian ecstatic metaphysics.

Whether and to what extent such a change in the thought of Solovyev himself took place since *La Russie et l'Eglise universelle* on the basis of the Sophia conception which becomes discernible there as a metaphysics of freedom as well as in consideration of his impersonalistic motif in the *Theoretical Philosophy,* a change which took place before Scheler and is comparable to him, that may and must remain an open question because the new starting point of the Nineties broke off incompleted due to his early death. Bernhard Schultze considers false Lieb's assumption that Solovyev in the story of the Antichrist "sets in a pillory his own earlier attempts at a 'highest synthesis' on the path of gnostic speculation as an endeavor in the spirit of Lucifer."[85] However he quotes in agreement the views of Muckermann and Kologrivov about the status of the *Three*

Conversations.[86] According to them "everything [is] discarded which is foreign to the innermost nature of the author ['certain exuberances of romantic speculation'[87]]."[88] Solovyev could "finally wipe out and overcome all of his earlier errors."[89] The doctrine of Sophia no longer occurs here and utopianism is exposed.[90] Leontyev, Arsenyev, Kologrivov, Lieb, Schultze and Muckermann completely agree that in any case the erotic-pantheistic elements of Solovyev's doctrine remain unacceptable for a Christian philosophy.

The critics of the total-unity gnosticism nevertheless have certainly overlooked up until now the fact that there are amazing phenomenological insights in the final phase of Solovyev's thought. Only one, Wladimir Szyłkarski, comments as following in the postscript to volume VII of the German collected edition of the works of Solovyev in regard to the second and third chapter of the *Theoretical Philosophy*: "Solovyev develops *thoughts* [here] *in which he essentially anticipates the basic ideas of German phenomenology – two years prior to the appearance of Husserl's Logical Investigations* and independent of Bolzano and Franz Brentano, whose objectivistic philosophy of essence and of being *(Sein)* was of great significance for Husserl's phenomenology."[91]

This fact holds true not only for the *Theoretical Philosophy* altogether but also for its "primordial ground," which was already discussed in the first essay, that "justification of the good" which was the great theme of the ethics of Solovyev which originated between 1894 and 1898, and as early as the five essays on *The Meaning of Love* which he wrote from 1892 until 1894. Even as early as then "the ability" (of man) above and beyond human intellect emerges "to value his states and acts and all facts in general," and "not only according to their relation to other individual facts but also to the universal ideal norms." This means: "His consciousness is determined by *reason of the truth* above and beyond the phenomena of life."[92]

The insight into the ability to distinguish two kinds of certainty which is proved later in the *Theoretical Philosophy* obviously already holds true for Solovyev's essays on the "meaning of love." What we mean here is first of all the certainty of the psychical presence, which does not – as Descartes teaches in the fourth part of his *Discourse on Method* (1637)[93] – demonstrate the *existence* of a thinking *subject,* but only the fact of a psychical process and consequently only signifies "that these presently existing perceptions and feelings, representations and concepts . . . exist as states which are becoming conscious *when* they are becoming conscious, or as psychic states *when* they happen."[94] Solovyev calls this certainty

that of mere present consciousness. The second kind of certainty which we mean is that of rational thought in the form of its universality. "This formal, objective essence of reason constitutes according to its indisputable certainty and in relation to an equally unconditioned certainty of the subjective givenness of the immediate consciousness the second starting point of theoretical philosophy."[95] However since merely formal rationality no longer satisfies the thinker, *the subject of philosophy proves itself to be the emerging reason of the truth, the personal spirit.*

The relation which is fundamental to the concept "the emerging reason of the truth" exists between the pure subject of thought as a phenomenological fact,[96] on the one hand, and the insubstantiality and trans-intelligibility of the integral person of the spirit, on the other hand. In short, the relation is the proper dimension of the field of possible intentional *act-phenomenology* since "I am always conscious of me myself only as the subject of my psychic states or affections, and never as their substance."[97] Therefore when Szylkarski asserts precisely in regard to Solovyev's *Theoretical Philosophy* and its results, which are difficult to imagine in respect to the fragment of ideas presented there, that it is nevertheless clear "that in the final period of his creativity the thinker left the path of the Augustinian-Leibnizian spiritualistic metaphysics, which he had travelled on up until then, and drew near the path of Platonic-Hegelian idealistic philosophy,"[98] then this statement remains at least very inexact from the standpoint of a phenomenological, historical view.

II. ON THE QUESTION OF INFLUENCE

We will dispense with the appropriation of other individual problems. In the following we have indicated only the sources of any actual contact with Solovyev in the work and thought of Scheler together with the central points of the East-West problems.

A. Scheler mentions Solovyev by name in the places indicated below and in connection with the ideas which we have briefly described:

I. M. Scheler, *Vom Umsturz der Werte (On the Overthrow of Values) Abhandlungen und Aufsätze (Treatises and Essays),* written between 1912 and the spring of 1914 (first edition 1915) – second revised edition Leipzig 1919, 2 vols.

1. Vol. II, page 343:

Essential spiritual units of different cultures in themselves

II. M.Scheler, *Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg (The Genius of War and the German War),*
Leipzig 1915, 2 parts.
Second part: the German War
2. page 207:
Philosophy of history
3. page 305:
Non-European mythic thought
4. page 379, footnote 127:
Nationalism and the Russian Spirit

III. M. Scheler, *Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart (Contemporary German Philosophy)*
In: Ph. Witkop, *Deutsches Leben der Gegenwart (Contemporary German Life),* Berlin 1922.
5. page 211:
Mystical movements of the East

IV. M. Scheler, *Der Mensch im Zeitalter des Ausgleichs (Man in the Age of Equalization)*
In: M. Scheler, *Philosophische Weltanschauung (Philosophical Perspectives),* Bonn 1929.
6. page 67:
On the question of a de-virilization of the image of God

B. Relevant thoughts of Scheler regarding Russia

I.M. Scheler, *Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg (The Genius of War and the German War),*
Leipzig 1915, 2 parts
second part: the German war
a) pages 169–176:
The question of the Orient
b) pages 206–210:
Russia opposed to the spiritual unity of Europe
c) pages 230–233:
Imaginary system of axioms
d) pages 248–249 and page 253:
Two visions
e) pages 268–271 and in part the following:
Essential difference between the "cultures" of Russia and Europe

f) pages 286–287:
The same as above
g) pages 297–313:
There is a particular "Russian idea" in the sense of essentially different spiritual units and essentially different ethos forms between Russia and Europe

II. M. Scheler, *Krieg und Aufbau (War and Reconstruction)*, Leipzig 1916.
1. see: on Eastern and Western Christianity pages 21–48
2. see: on the national ideas of the great nations
a) page 101:
The national idea as a Russian import
b) page 112:
The Russian understanding of their own national mission
3. see: comments on the spirit and the ideal foundations of the democracies of the great nations
a) pages 132–141:
Russian democracy: solidarity and fraternity
4. see: dispositional and purposeful militarism
a) pages 189–190:
The Russian attitude toward Germany during World War I
5. see: new sociological orientation
a) pages 248–250:
Pan-Slavi passions
b) page 335:
Tolstoy, Leontyev, Dostoyevsky and Merezhkovsky on the problem of Christianity and capitalism
c) page 357:
The foundations of Western Christianity in comparison to orthodoxy
d) pages 361–366:
The entrance of the Asiatic peoples into history: the Russian-Japanese War as the turning away from Peter the Great.
6. see: the meaning of suffering
a) page 388:
The Russian addiction to suffering

III. M. Scheler, *Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens (Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge)*
In: M. Scheler, *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens (Attempts at*

a Sociology of Knowledge), Schriften des Forschungsinstituts für Sozialwissenschaften in Cologne.
2 vols. Munich and Leipzig 1924,

a) pages 31–34:
Scheler's historical process of three phases [note the surprising similarity of this doctrine with that of Konstantin Leontyev: "an objective naturalist and sociologist . . . , 'theory of secondarily blended simplification'." (Cf. Iwan von Kologriwof, *Von Hellas zum Mönchtum,* Regensburg 1948, pages 151ff.: the theory of the trinitarian process)].

b) page 46:
Czarism and orthodoxy

c) page 65:
The unity of the style of the sociology of knowledge in regard to Russia

d) page 93
Judaism and the Bolshevik revolution

e) page 114:
The total man as the synthesis of the European and Asiatic cultures

f) page 128:
Russia before and after Peter the Great: freedom of the metaphysical-speculative spirit in the Byzantine-Russian lands

g) page 134:
The myth of Russian Bolshevism

h) page 141:
Russia's Western European apprenticeship

i) page 142:
On that which is common to the German and Russian spirit in "living alternatively in each of two zones of being" (*Seinszonen;* A. Weber): a metaphysical-religious zone and a mundane-practical zone

We must now draw some conclusions from these source indications. If we keep in mind thereby the thematic questions of this work, then a critical examination of the comparable texts shows that in spite of the irritating number of references in Scheler's works the latter hardly had a systematic understanding of the true founder of Russian philosophy. This is sufficiently guaranteed by the modest sum of six sentences in which Solovyev is explicitly named not to mention the fact that hardly more than his name

appears without any recapitulation or explanation of a concrete argument.

If it is true that Scheler is here and there brilliant[1] – and we feel that this is the case – then one must characterize his occasionally surprising empathy for the Eastern spirituality and world of ideas in general and his references to Solovyev in particular as extraordinarily able and quite accurate. As soon as one depends on Scheler's own sources, this is all the more remarkable since he probably read only four or five books about this. The following are among these: First, Dostoyevsky's *Brothers Karamazov* (frequently mentioned[2]); second, a work which compiles "the political writings" of the same author (the essay *Germany – The Protesting Kingdom*[3] is mentioned) and which is introduced by Merezhkovsky;[4] third, the *Three Essays* of Ivan Vasilyevich Kireyevsky[5] – or at least the second of these (in the sociology of knowledge Scheler refers to "a historical philosophical essay" of the older Slavophil,[6] which he probably read in Harald von Hoerschelmann's 1921 edition[7]); fourth, the most frequently used and the most extensive source of Scheler's reading knowledge of Eastern Europe is Thomas Masaryk's *Sociological Sketches on Russian Philosophy of History and Religion,*[8] which as far as we can see Scheler draws attention to a total of four times.[9]

The observation already referred to is characteristic, namely that the point of view and content of Scheler's interests which were determined by the Entente Powers of World War I actualized for him the problem of East and West. As far as sources are concerned this means that at the beginning of the war (1914) Scheler could hardly have looked into the first selection of Solovyev's works (Eugen Diederichs: Jena, 3 vols. which went to press at that time) for both of his own authoritative works on war.[10] Solovyev is, however, later – just – named only twice: in Scheler's essay on *Contemporary German Philosophy*[11] as well as on the occasion of the lecture *Man in the Age of Equalization.*[12]

From a biographical point of view the answer to our question about the facts of a real influence of Scheler by Solovyev is – we quote part of a letter from Maria Scheler (Scheu) to the author – "simple to the extent that I can give you no binding reply. The occupation with Solovyev's works probably occurred during the last years of World War I. I can only remember that my husband inspired a paper on Solovyev in a philosophical or sociological seminar. There are no longer any works of Solovyev in my library which was greatly reduced due to the events of the war. Thus I can conclude nothing significant for you from this as well."[13]

Thus we would arrive at a result – which is even demonstratable although only to a degree of hypothetical probability – which proves as unfounded

the many assumptions – my own originally included. This is primarily mentioned here in regard to Bernhard Schultze, a highly regarded and respected interpreter of Solovyev. He formerly wrote the author, so to speak to accompany the present book: "Although I have not worked on Max Scheler I have known for years of the fact that he was influenced by Solovyev."[14] As far as this "fact" is concerned, we can recognize it now more in the sense of an extensive and profound spiritual affinity of both thinkers and not on the basis of any fact of real influence.

CHAPTER SIX

RETROSPECT

We have called the present volume an "attempt at a comparative interpretation." The theme of the historical contribution of the philosophy of both Solovyev and Scheler to phenomenology has been explained on the grounds of and within the framework of a possible influence of Solovyev on Scheler. However it would be desirable once again to recapitulate the results of this investigation.

The comprehensive understanding of the surprising relationship of the philosophical evolution of both Solovyev and Scheler begins with a remarkable homology of the process of the spiritual development of both thinkers.

Solovyev starts with Spinoza, Hegel, Eduard von Hartmann and Schopenhauer. With a fine sense of the danger of hypostatizing logical metaphysics he quickly achieves the theosophical, gnostic turn of the later Schelling, which goes back to Boehme via von Baader. He ultimately arrives at Plato – noticeably using Leibnizean motifs particularly within epistemology – or more exactly at Plotinus as the continuation of Philo's Alexandrinian doctrine of Logos and at Augustine.[1] It is astounding to observe how much the exact reversal of these encounters is evident in the design of Scheler's thought. It starts with the same Plotinian Augustinianism – carried on its part also by an underground current of the *"Nouveaux essais"* – into which Solovyev's philosophy with its Sophia intuition of total-unity flows. Then it turns into phenomenology of religion, first into the pan(en)theism of Plata and Spinoza, later into the dynamic spirit and urge metaphysics of Hegel, Schelling, Eduard von Hartmann and Schopenhauer.[2] It gets critically entangled in their emanative and evolutionary confusion. At the end of his life Scheler is involved in a fateful struggle to balance the urge aspect and spiritual aspect of all being *(Sein)*.

The abundance of parallel statements and contacts along these countercurrent lines of thought is consequently presented and identified from the point of view of the history of ideas. At the top of the hierarchy there is the fact of metaphysics (Solovyev: emanation system; Scheler: evolutionary system) and of the theory of knowledge (the "innate ideas"

in their further developed philosophical historical significance varied from Leibniz's *Petites perceptions* to "involuntary forms of relational thought,"[3] and varied in Solovyev and Scheler to material apriority and functionality).

The beginnings of the ideas connected with these concepts lie for metaphysics in the final Pythagorean period of Plato and his followers. One already finds the *emanative* view represented in Xenocrates, that the One must be the good and the perfect and that which is derived from the One must be the imperfect and ultimately the bad. In Speusippos, Plato's nephew, on the other hand, the good is viewed only as the end product of a lengthy *evolution.* For the theory of knowledge one must first refer to Leibniz, more properly however to the Stoa *(ennoaémata haemétera),* the neo-Pythagorean break-through to the spirituality of the immaterial world, and the Plotinian reform of Plato's doctrine of ideas. With the latter one must bear in mind the Alexandrinian understanding of *lógos* interpreted by Philo, in which the duality of *sophía* as latent divine wisdom and *logos prophorikós* as the generative power of reason unfold into the two separated potencies of the transcendent and immanent God.

The attempt of gnosticism, which anticipates the Alexandrinian school of thought and which strives to surpass the dualism of God and matter by the projection of a theogonic-cosmogonic process results in the assumption of a dark primordial ground in Basilides from Syria. With the assistance of the world seed as well as of the material and spiritual powers the not yet existing God *(d ouk ōn theós)* develops out of this primordial ground into the perfect divinity. Scheler's *act-deificatio* has its profoundest roots here.

In Valentine's theory which represents a peculiar mixture of evolutionary and emanative motifs, the spiritual world of *plaérōma* begins at first to manifest itself out of the dark primordial depths of the *býthos* in order to progress generatively to further forms by the oriental mating of the male and female divinities. The theogonic-cosmogonic occurrence of this conjunction and opposition of primoridal ground *(býthos),* silence *(sigé),* thought *(énnoia),* truth and reason *(lógos),* life *(cōaé),* ideal man *(ánthrōpos),* commonality of life *(ekklaesía)* and wisdom *(sophía)* – the latter's sinful longing for the primordial ground of the chaos of powers gives rise to the projection of Sophia into the material void of *kénōma* in order to lead to the formation of the earthly world there[4] – is in comparison to Scheler's model, Basilides, clearly recognizable as the authentic model of Solovyev's "syzygy."[5]

Like a marker these two components of neo-Platonic metaphysics and theory of knowledge – emanation and evolution – travel through all

idealistic systems in the history of philosophy. At the present point of reflection on this path and on the various applications of its terms of thought they confront one another as mirror images in two representatives who are apparently completely independent of one another. Nevertheless the very finely shaded nuances of these mirror images show themselves as so remarkable to one who is trained in the study of their historical roots and genesis that an attempt at a comparative interpretation can scarcely do without retrospective views into the history of philosophy.

For what would Schelling signify as the common turning point in both Solovyev's and Scheler's metaphysics if this genius of German idealism did not represent the true development of a two thousand years old tradition? His fourth system, "religious idealism," and the first phase of theosophy, of his subsequent plan, belong quite obviously to Solovyev in respect to their influence on both thinkers under comparison and their philosophies. On the other hand, the crossing of the frontier over to the "doctrine of freedom," Schelling's last view, was carried out with certainty only by Scheler. The so-called act-deification in Solovyev must remain at least open in regard to the disputed question whether the latter did or did not give up the doctrine of Sophia at the end of his life and thought.[6]

The doctrine of freedom is also the place where the history of religion is considered as the historical result and phenomenal (not yet phenomenological) expression of act-deification. The result is that the "history of religion" has a completely corresponding meaning for Schelling and Scheler, which is different from how Solovyev understands it. Thus, *The Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation,* that is, knowledge of God from the whole history of religion, can only be understood as the task of an act-phenomenology in Scheler's sense. The phenomenology would have to disclose the progress in the self-actualization of God and by no means wants to be historical science.

Fichte's influence – even if significant for both thinkers – had perhaps a stronger effect on Scheler's philosophy although this statement appears at first sight to be contradictory. Scheler developed the intellectualistic starting point for his act-phenomenology from Fichte's concept of perception as a groundlessly free, consciousness-transcending activity with an intentional directional experience. Even in his crisis he fell back upon Fichte's "productive power of imagination" to construct his Spinozistic modal spirit-urge form. Act-phenomenology "continues the basic intentions of Fichte's doctrine of *'Tathandlung'* in the theme of the person."[7] Its existential mode, characterized in Scheler's version as the unity of all

essentially possible acts, as act-"center," clearly reflects the attempt of the science of knowledge to take from the category of substance its fundamental significance; this means ultimately the problem area of the *Atheismusstreit* which was personally so important to Fichte.

The paradox of the effect of these views of Scheler lies less in their valid further development than in the observation that the functions of theoretical reason which are radically subordinated by Fichte to the practical science of knowledge are raised by Scheler to a monistic autonomy. Thereby they receive a significance which is extensively derived from Scheler's dispute with Kant which is in typical counterpoint.

As far as the relation between Fichte and Solovyev is concerned it is sufficient to refer to the religious final turn in Fichte's thought from which Solovyev possibly borrowed some things for his philosophy of state. In the latter the "image of the ideal cultural state of the future more and more [takes] on theocratic characteristics: the scholar and artist have now become the priest and visionary."[8]

The profound awareness of indebtedness of both Solovyev and Scheler for and against Kant is also significant for a comparison of their spiritual positions. This is a confession – and a demand which should dissolve the spell of his philosophy and should start up again the task of a pertinent discussion which was interrupted by German idealism. Kant's second "critique" led to a unique hybridization of the idea of man in Solovyev and Scheler due to its doctrine of the primacy of practical reason over theoretical. Solovyev took over the distinction of an intelligible and an empirical character which was originally accomplished by Kant and had an after-effect in Schopenhauer's principle of causality. He took away its Kantian elements by organically incorporating it into his doctrine of total-unity. Scheler referred to this process with his differentiating specifications of *"ordo amoris"* and of "individuation," which can naturally only occur while preserving the laws of functionalization of emotional life which are essentially proper to his philosophy, on the one hand, and of purely spiritual ideations, on the other.

Within the philosophies themselves the concurrence of the factual statements of Solovyev and Scheler crystallizes itself only through a conscientious and careful analysis which cleanses all inessential impurities from them. The concurrence shows for the interpretation of philosophy in general "as a task" – or we should say: of a "life" philosophy – the common nature of the idea of metaphysical act-cooperation with the absolute being and the founding character of this idea as compared to the idea of man[9] as well as to the consequent idea of knowledge.[10] Assuming the

central idea of an absolute totally-one (Solovyev) in which the personal idea as a spiritual value-datum is eternally pre-loved and preconceived (Scheler), man distinguishes himself in this "position" as an essence which as preparing the relation of existential participation in the idea of knowledge knows how to answer to all forms of effects by which he finds himself in his specificity affected through the act-center of the spirit of the absolute being. With this view of the world-ground as origin and source of all being *(Sein),* of the idea of man and of that of his knowledge as well as from the context of the fact that the person does not just know but also loves with feeling, the necessity of the self-limitation of philosophy is forced to the extent that love transcends the cognitively founded relation of existential participation of man in the essence of things.[11]

This reference already makes evident the urgency of a systematic inquiry on method. And with this the presentation of the epistemological problems sets in. Their appropriation – with anticipatory comments on Solovyev's phenomenology about the already investigated objective regions[12] – makes evident concepts like "essential apriority," *"ordo amoris,"* "phenomenal unbracketing," and even starting points for a comparative treatment of the question of reality's mode of givenness in general.[13] As its classical theme metaphysics deals with the idea of a "spiritualization of matter and materialization of spirit" which motivates both Solovyev and Scheler to think of the world-ground itself as both spirit and primordial urge (chaos).[14] Their positions in this intuitive-speculative hypothesis of specificity are principally distinguished by an opposite accentuation of the power relation.[15] In this context the uniquely materialized ontological content of Solovyev's "idea-synthesis" is remarkable, the essential understanding of which in the sense of material apriority readily suggests itself.

Ethics and the philosophy of love work out the basic principles of a realistic theory of value. The demonstration and determination of the functions of feeling which disclose the material a priori of value follow in the framework of a phenomenology of the sympathy feelings shame, pity (feeling-with) and reverence which are correspondingly grounded in Solovyev and Scheler.[16] Finally the discussion of the question of *"ordo amoris"* as an emotional structure prepares a theme which reaches its high-point in the "metaphysics of sexual love" and which juxtaposes Solovyev's idea and actualization of the immortality of the "whole" man with the vitalistic selection theory of Scheler's book on sympathy.[17] In general Solovyev's speculative perception here – in regard to the intuition of the most secret metaphysical significance of the evidence of death – points far beyond Scheler's phenomenological insight which is endangered by a fateful passion.

It should also be mentioned that the striking emphasis in the above-mentioned three disciplines on the moral solidarity of all finite personal beings, which are determined in their specificity by the meaning of love and by their "conversion" of God's love to man, likewise belongs to the doctrines of a true spiritual relation of both thinkers.[18]

As far as the extraordinarily finely termed differences between the total systems of Solovyev and Scheler with their world images is concerned we have already discussed what is most essential to the metaphysics of being *(Seinsmetaphysik)* at the start of our book. There it is characterized by the results of the analysis of both positions in their individually different structural formulae: *maè ón (dynámei ón)* – *tí* as potencies of *óntōs ón* (Solovyev); *ouch ón-tí-óntōs ón* (Scheler). This means that in Solovyev's thought a primary and indubitable evidence of *tí* stands in opposition to Scheler's primary evidence of that awareness of the groundlessly profound absolute nothingness and the wonder about it which is grounded in the awareness "that there is something at all and not rather nothing." As a result not only the intuition of the absolute being but also the philosophical *thaumácein* of both metaphysics are specified differently.[19]

The interpretation of the epistemologies has to accomodate itself to the difference that – although both thinkers follow the act of intellectual participation in the being back to the ground roots in the vital sphere and their analyses agree in starting with the doctrine of perception – Solovyev (as opposed to Scheler) commences with a concept of impulse and sensation which is extensively determined by experimental psychology. This, nevertheless, does not prevent him from grasping the content of vegetative processes within the epistemological dynamism of impulse and sensation – as Scheler. The qualities of these processes have their source in the essence of a "re"-sistance which the cognitive intellect considers as its object. The indices of these sensations in accordance with – or on the basis of – their encounter with the intellect's ideation give a quite definite reason to assume even logically a being or that which is unconditioned "which in all relations always remains in itself." This is because they – according to Solovyev's view – "correspond to that ideal image which is imposed upon them by our intellect."

Thus, there is in Solovyev's thought a precursory analogon not only for Scheler's doctrine of the objectivity of qualities but also for that which is basic to this doctrine, the "immediate belief that there *is* a certain independent object;" this means, the trans-intelligibility of the experience of reality. Solovyev's solution to this problem rests on a devitalized value of the idea of life and not on Scheler's assumption of panemotionalism.[20]

From a metaphysical standpoint the specific hypothetical determination of the nature of the world-ground manifests itself as the distinctive task of the thought of both Solovyev and Scheler. Following their comparable interpretations, the world-ground is ultimately constructed in the two active natures, spirit and urge. Their relatedness to one another appears as varying modes of the reversal of the relations of power and powerlessness. The starting point of the original total power of each individual active nature of this dualistically hypothesized world-ground – Scheler accentuates urge and Solovyev spirit – bears the problem of the specific validity of the metaphysical whole even into the starting point of the integrating thought process.

The crises, especially that of Scheler, first become clearly observable by the leap from the spiritual-theoretical understanding of the world to the living and practical understanding of it and by the tacit assumption of a reciprocal influence or dependence of both active natures. *Praxis* urges the reconstruction of the theoretical design, and the new starting point of an "ecstatic" metaphysics results in an all-encompassing change in the specificity of the experiential understanding of the world. The "a-temporal becoming" of the "in"-absolute first being overshadows the ingenious intuitions of the "material ethics of value" once more making its achievements questionable.

The idea of the good in the mid-point of moral philosophy is sacrificed to de-materialization.[21] The philosophical animation of the idea of personal God-manhood, which is also an essential element in Scheler's thought "since only the Christian religion corresponds to the unique ontic relatedness, the unique related consciousness of Christ with God,"[22] must give way for the attempt at a "latent self-defense" as opposed to its position in the total power of the ecstatic metaphysics. It must allow itself to be reinterpreted into a "theory of the deification of the founder."[23] The levels of the objective-material ordered ranks of value (holy – cultural – vital – civilizing) in regard to the absolute claim of the urge aspect of all being *(Sein)* are delivered over to a panemotional monism or at least seriously endangered.[24]

In the phenomenology of hate, Scheler is no longer able to advance to the personalization of a negatively "absolute" act-center[25] (we mention for comparative purposes this significant projection of the final phase of Solovyev's thought).[26] We have examined in detail the effects of this omission in regard to the phenomenology of the act of love, on the one hand,[27] and of the individuation problem of the "doctrine of *ordo amoris*," on the other hand.[28]

Within the metaphysics of sexual love Scheler's omission of the phenomenology of hate results in the certain conviction of an absolute theoretical reliability of the emotional structure and its functionalization "laws." This result allows the supposed large projection of the revision of the book on sympathy[29] to slip away into a vitalistic theory of selection. The assertions of this theory – although conceived of while venturing out into the "transcendence" of the total power of life and metaphysically grounded by it – fail when measured against the facts of practical experience and thus make evident the erroneous determination of the essential facts of metaphysics.

Since Wladimir Szyłkarski's postscript to the *Theoretical Philosophy* in volume VII of the German edition of Solovyev's works contains some noteworthy statements of the translator (Szyłkarski) on the problem of substance, we would like to utilize the results of our interpretation to form an opinion about the consequences of this phenomenologically new starting point of Solovyev's epistemology during the last decade of his life.

Wladimir Szyłkarski concludes – in our opinion without knowledge of Scheler's great achievements in the domain of act-phenomenology – from Solovyev's formulations about the problem of the starting point of theoretical philosophy in general – "that I am always conscious of me myself only as the subject of my psychic states or affections, and never as their substance"[30] – that a "denial of the substantiality of the human *soul*"[31] must necessarily be basic to such a conception. Szyłkarski considers the significance of this alleged statement of the revered thinker and the difficulty of opposing its consequences "so great that one must ask oneself whether even Solovyev's superior philosophic genius could possibly overcome them."[32]

On the occasion of our interpretation of Solovyev's concept "reason" or "emerging reason of the truth"[33] we have explained that with this concept "epistemologically the insubstantiality of the person as the center of the execution of intentional acts [is] meant."[34] Having given the reasons for the validity of this statement we stand by it. If one critically examines this interpretation one notices above all the strictly phenomenological demonstration of the intentional character of the relation between the thinking subject and truth itself – that is, between act and object – which is the crowning contribution of Solovyev's statements in the third article of the *Theoretical Philosophy*.[35] One also particularly notices here the fact that he is concerned with an illumination of the existential form of the spirit in a way which one only finds in Scheler among German phenomenologists.[36]

Here we refer only to the central points which have resulted from the investigation:

1. there are acts;
2. they are intentional;
3. the center of their execution manifests itself in the person or in the spirit – and
4. this person or spirit only lives and exists in executing intentional acts.

Szyłkarski, on the other hand, always speaks of a "denial of the substantiality of the human *soul,*"[37] while Solovyev explicitly assigns the task of an "emerging reason of the truth" only to the *philosophical* subject which he strictly differentiates from the empirical subject or the soul as well as from the logical subject or the intellect.[38] However he says of this "properly philosophical subject" that it is *spirit.* "Thus one must distinguish in the one who knows: first, an empirical subject, second a logical subject and third the properly philosophical subject. It is permissable to characterize this three-fold substrate *(podležaščee)* by three different names and to designate the first as soul, the second as intellect and the third as spirit."[39] In its at first merely abstract logical sense the trinity of this substrate determines the cognitive intellect only in its formal rationality, but not however in its characteristic as emerging reason of the truth, *not as the personal principle of unity of all acts associated with the three named subjects.* The latter would properly correspond to the philosophical intention of the intellect to know the truth itself and to seize as its living form the unconditioned content of the truth. In conformity to this philosophical subject the person as existential mode of the spirit, the cognitive subject as spirit should "not occupy itself with itself but with its unconditioned future content; it must determine itself not by itself but in accordance with its unconditioned object in order to become the reason of the truth. It must not revolve around itself but must circle around its actual center. It should qualify itself not to itself but to the truth and thus should go out for the further and fuller knowledge of this its characteristic which is sealed by truth and adorned in truth's colours not as from its own principle but as from the true principle."[40]

In his opinions on the *Theoretical Philosophy,* Wladimir Szyłkarski fosters the serious apprehension in respect to such results that the new starting points when pursued to their consequences "lead to great difficulties for the construction of the Christian philosophy of total-unity"[41] "which Solovyev represented his whole life long."[42] As opposed to this we may adopt the judgement of Johannes Hessen, a philosopher of religion.

In his *Kritische Einführung in die Philosophie Max Schelers,* he said: *"If . . . the theory of actuality rejects the view of the person as a substance, which exists behind the acts, then it is completely justified.* However it does not follow from this that the person is only the 'connection' of its acts. For then the person would become a mosaic of acts whereas in actuality it is *the real principle of unity of the different acts."*[43]

Hessen's justification in objecting to the assumption that personal insubstantiality can only mean a mosiac-like connection of acts is clearly emphasized by two of Scheler's explanations which occurred at two widely different times. The latter developed the act-phenomenological concept of person, which has become so characteristic of Solovyev's *Theoretical Philosophy*, already during the creative storm and stress period of his early Scholastic Augustinian orientation. In his projection for a new formulation of the "idea of man" around 1913[44] Scheler said the following under exactly the same intentional view point, which is fundamental to the phenomenological starting point of Solovyev's *Theoretical Philosophy:* "'Man' is not to be brought under the unity of an idea from his *terminus a quo,* but only from his *terminus ad quem,* that is, as the 'one who seeks God,' as the point of break-through of a form of meaning, value and effect which is superior to all other natural existence, of the 'person.' This idea confronts the concept which we as natural scientists and psychologists can form of man as at first unmediated."[45] A much later statement of the book on sympathy (1922) makes it clear that this "at first unmediated" idea of person which appears and registers itself as a consciousness transcending impression must be actually comprehended by means of a method appropriate to its appearance instead of by means of a rationalistic epistemology which proceeds according to quite different principles. This statement which follows concerns the "phenomenal facts" of the givenness of all "that is spiritually real," a givenness which is different only in specificity and which once again makes clear how necessary it is earnestly to comprehend the idea of person by the appropriate method and to carry this out with a method which is strictly delimited. Only this can allay the fear of a "denial of the substantiality of the human soul." "The spiritual personal substances or act substances are thus the sole substances which possess an individually true nature. Their existential differences first follow from their specificity which is individuated in itself. Each spiritual substance has its individual 'determination' from this nature. Man, however, whose center has this [individual determination], can intentionally and actively fall behind in any degree."[46]

CHAPTER SEVEN

RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY FROM SOLOVYEV TO SHESTOV*

Revision of a Soviet Taboo

It is well known that Friedrich Engels considered the 'relationship between thought and being [Sein], mind and nature' to be the 'supreme question in the whole of philosophy'.[1] This was undoubtedly a grave error on his part and one that has affected the subsequent consideration of the history of philosophy. Engels classified all philosophical systems which postulate the supremacy of the mind over nature, as idealistic, and all opposite systems, which postulate the supremacy of nature over the mind, as materialistic.

But although it has been effectively demonstrated that this antithetical classification is simply not applicable in the countries of Western Europe, it is applicable in Russia since, with very few exceptions,[2] Russian thinkers have eschewed critical realism. Given this, however, the question arises as to whether we are justified in speaking of an independent Russian branch of philosophy.

I. THE ARGUMENT OVER RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY

Reputable Russian historians such as Ernest Radlov (1854–1928; co-editor of the works and editor of the letters of Vladimir Solovyev), Mikhail Gershenzon (1869–1925; editor of the writings and letters of Pyotr Chaadayev), Gustav Shpet (1878–1940) and Boris Yakovenko (1884–1948) have emphatically maintained that we are not.[3] According to Gershenzon, nineteenth-century Russian philosophy was made up entirely of ideas borrowed from successive foreign schools. Thus, it faithfully reflected the transition from Schelling to Hegel, from Hegel to Saint-Simon and Fourier, then the advent of positivism and finally of Nietzsche. In his book, *Fundamental Problems in the Criticism of the History of Idealistic Russian Philosophy,* Viktor Malinin subsequently pointed out that only one philosophical trend was not represented in this 'kaleidoscope' of foreign

* Previously published in *Russia Enters the 20th Century – 1894–1917* (eds. Oberländer, Katkov, Poppe, and von Rauch, trans. Gerald Onn), New York 1971, pp. 236ff., 329ff. The original title and the remaining footnotes have been restored to this text. Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Schocken Books, Inc., New York.

influences, namely materialism. But as far as the various forms of idealism were concerned, Malinin tells us that in Gershenzon's view the Russian nineteenth-century thinkers had made no independent contribution to their development.[4] This deprecating attitude, which was shared by other Russian bourgeois historians, was forcefully stated by Yakovenko in his *Outlines of Russian Philosophy,* where he wrote: 'Everything that Russia possessed and expressed in the sphere of philosophical thought was produced either as a conscious imitation or as a result of the unconscious assimilation of foreign influences or by a process of selection . . . .'[5]

All that these bourgeois critics were able to discern in Russian philosophy was a pale, trivial and vulgar reflection of the full-blooded and original philosophy of Western Europe. As Malinin has pointed out, 'not only Yakovenko but Shpet, Radlov and Gershenzon considered it right and proper to regard the subject matter of Russian philosophy (at one particular stage in its development) as a derivative of French philosophy and (at a later stage) as a derivative of German philosophy. For, according to them, not only were there no independent philosophical ideas [in Russia], but the discussion of Western European ideas, although conducted with passionate enthusiasm, was not calculated to produce a national school capable of original philosophical thought. We may say, therefore, that for Yakovenko, Shpet, Radlov, Gershenzon and other bourgeois historians of Russian philosophical thought there could not be a specific science devoted to the history of Russian philosophy because, in the strict sense of the word, there was no history of Russian philosophy.'[6]

Those who adopted this extremely derogatory attitude were supported in their view by a man of great eminence and unquestioned authority: Vladimir Solovyev (1853–1900). In Part III of a review of the works of Danilevsky and Strakhov, which was published in 1888 under the title 'Russia and Europe', Solovyev dealt with the question 'What has Russian philosophy achieved?' His answer was far from encouraging: 'During the last two decades writings of greater or lesser seriousness and interest have appeared in Russia on a variety of philosophical subjects. But everything that is philosophical in these works is completely un-Russian whereas everything that is Russian has nothing whatsoever to do with philosophy and, in some cases, is completely unsubstantiated. We are unable to detect any real signs of an independent Russian philosophy; everything that has laid claim to independence has turned out to be a mere pretence.'[7] Solovyev contended that up till then the Russians' undoubted talent for speculative thinking had been demonstrated only at a receptive level: 'Although we have understood and assimilated foreign philosophical ideas

extremely well, we have not produced a single important philosophical work because we have either been satisfied with fragmentary schemes or have subscribed to the extremist and unbalanced ideas of European thinkers.'[8] In Solovyev's opinion, the fact that Nikolay Stankevich (1813–40) and his associates had adopted the Hegelian viewpoint was an indication that Russian thinkers lacked the 'positive drive' that was needed if they were to develop an original philosophy: 'This philosophical movement of select minds (of the 1830s and 1840s), which began in such splendour and with such high hopes, has ended – from the point of view of philosophy at least – with literally nothing.'[9]

Malinin considered this 'severe judgement' to be unobjective only in so far as it 'swept away the materialist tradition' along with everything else and because it formed the basis for 'Solovyev's own pretence' that the 'beginning of . . . Russian philosophy could be dated to the precise point of time when his own mystical-philosophical works had appeared.'[10] But there are a few Soviet historiographers who have tried to reconcile the disturbing phenomenon of Vladimir Solovyev with the Marxist view of Russian philosophy and who have interpreted his works in accordance with Marxist criteria.[11] In their *History of Russian Philosophy,* Anatoly Galaktionov and Pyotr Nikandrov concede that Solovyev, who was undoubtedly the most important of the nineteenth-century Russian philosophers, created a 'metaphysical system of integral knowledge', in which the 'synthesis of knowledge, philosophy, and religion is presented as man's highest duty and the ultimate objective of all intellectual development.'[12] They also refer to Solovyev's 'large and thematically complex literary heritage', which included translations into Russian of foreign works such as Kant's *Prolegomena* and a number of Plato's Dialogues.[13] In their concluding remarks these two Soviet writers point out that Solovyev's system found many imitators and was already being confronted with Marxism in the last decade of the previous century. It seems that the members of the *Vekhi* group were influenced by Solovyev.[14]

II. FROM THEOSOPHY TO PHENOMENOLOGY

In 1877, in its March, April, June, October and November issues, the periodical published by the Ministry of Education in St. Petersburg printed Solovyev's *Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge.* In the second part of this work, subtitled 'On the Three Types of Philosophy', Solovyev defined 'free theosophy' as an 'organic synthesis of theology, philosophy and the science of experience.'[15] The proposed synthesis covered a very wide range, but this Solovyev regarded as essential if it was to produce

'true integral knowledge'. However, he considered that this wider synthesis had to be preceded by a narrower synthesis, which would unite the three basic trends within the philosophical sphere, namely: empiricism (with its affinity to the science of experience), rationalism (with its affinity to philosophy) and mysticism (with its affinity to theology).[16] According to Solovyev's 'general analysis' the 'subject' of this 'integral knowledge' was 'that which truly is', not only 'within itself' but also 'in its relationship to the empirical reality of the subjective and objective world', in other words the 'absolute principle of that world'.[17] From the relationship of 'that which truly is' to 'empirical reality' Solovyev developed the three fundamental components of his philosophical system of integral knowledge: 'For if two elements, namely the absolute principle and the second reality arising out of that principle, form the subject matter of philosophy, these two elements can only be conceived in three relationships. First, in direct unity, secondly, in antithesis [to one another] and, thirdly, in actual, differentiated [recognised] unity or synthesis. Thus, we acquire three philosophical sciences: the first of these considers the absolute principle in its own general and necessary terms, which embrace their opposite, namely finite and contingent existence . . . The second [philosophical science] considers the absolute principle as that which produces or brings forth, outside of itself, finite reality. . . . And, finally, the third [philosophical science] is concerned with the absolute principle as that which reunites the finite world in actual, systematic unity.'[18] The 'condition of direct unity' corresponded to 'organic logic', the 'condition of disintegration' to 'organic metaphysics' and the 'condition of reunification or synthesis' to 'organic ethics.'[19]

Solovyev regarded theosophy as the logical, theocracy as the ontological and theurgy as the ethical components of this total organic system. Like Marx in his Theses on Feuerbach, he considered it was not enough 'to look upon the absolute totality of being[20] as a [mere] idea'.[21] He argued that, unlike earlier generations, 'the new world' could not 'restrict itself to contemplation', it had to 'live and act with the force of the divine principle [which had been manifested in the world] by refashioning itself after the image and example of the living God'. According to Solovyev, this active 'collaboration between the deity and humanity [which was designed] to raise humanity from its corporeal or natural condition to a condition of spirituality and godliness' did not involve an original act of creation or 'creation from the void' but merely the theurgical transformation of the world for the purpose of 'transforming matter into spirit'.[22]

In his *Biographical Sketch* Ernest Radlov pointed out that 'Solovyev completed only *one* part of his philosophical system, namely the ethics.'[23] Not surprisingly, we find that he dealt with ethical questions already in his *Critique of Abstract Principles* (1877--1880). Solovyev's interest in ethics was promoted by the conviction that it was only through morality that man could approach the absolute. Consequently, when Sergey Bulgakov maintained that Solovyev's ethics were not particularly original and represented the Achilles' heel of his philosophy, he was really saying that Solovyev's whole philosophy was of little or no consequence.[24] Radlov did not agree and pointed out that in Solovyev's view, man constituted the essential 'link between two worlds' (namely, between personal and universal being on the one hand and empirical reality on the other): 'God and creation must unite in man, which is why both the life of the individual and the historical development of humanity are essentially meaningful.'[25]

But by the time he came to write his most important work, *The Justification of the Good* (1894–8), Solovyev regarded ethics as a completely independent discipline and not simply as an appendage to religion or theoretical philosophy.[26] He justified this view in the opening pages of his new work by providing a phenomenological description of the feelings of shame, compassion and reverence, which he subsumed under the general heading of feelings of sympathy and defined as the 'principal components of morality.[27] Despite religion and theoretical philosophy, Solovyev contended, man would be incapable of moral actions unless his nature was structured in such a way as to allow objective goodness to impinge on him. From this he argued that moral philosophy – by which he understood the objective assessment of the ethical relationship between the individual and his environment – must be based on an analysis of the 'fundamental moral factors in man's consciousness'. For it was man's feelings of sympathy that determined his relationship to all things. Thus, his attitude to everything inferior to himself (all material things) was regulated by his sense of shame; his attitude to everything equal to himself (his fellow-men), by his sense of compassion; and his attitude to everything superior to himself (God) by his sense of reverence. As for man's ability to recognise in the objective factors present in his own feelings of sympathy the universal and necessary principles underlying all morality, this was vouchsafed by his power of thought.[28]

And so, at the end of *The Justification of the Good,* Solovyev summarised his thesis as follows: 'These feelings [of sympathy] and the sense of conscience to which they testify contain the corporate or, to be more precise, the tripartite basis of the process of moral perfection.

Reason, which is guided by conscience, gives universal validity to the impulses emanating from [man's] good nature and raises them to the status of a general law. [And so] the content of the moral law is simply an abstraction of the factors present in man's good feelings which appears in the form of a universal and necessary (or binding) demand or commandment.'[29]

Consequently, Solovyev maintained, man's 'moral duty must lie in the perfection of the factors present [in his good nature]', which means that his relationship to the tripartite value datum has to be 'transformed' into an appropriate 'norm of mental and volitional activity'. In other words: 'Man's preordained subservience to the highest power must be changed into a conscious desire to serve [the cause of] perfect goodness; his natural sense of solidarity with his fellow men must develop into active collaboration based on sympathy and understanding; and his inherent superiority over physical nature must be transformed into a rational control of nature, both for our and for its sake.'[30]

In his *Theoretical Philosophy* (1897–9) Solovyev applied the phenomenological approach – which he had already used in *The Justification of the Good* for the investigation of man's feelings of sympathy and which had been preceded by a draft version of an *ordo-amoris* theory in *The Meaning of Love* (1892–4) - to the basic principles of cognition. His chief concern at that time was with the immanent contents of human consciousness. Previously Solovyev had subscribed to the Cartesian view that cognition presupposes not only perception of external forms, but also of essences, on the grounds that 'that which truly is' forms the real basis of human consciousness and consequently the basis of thought. ('Je vois très clairement que pour penser il faut être'.)[31] But in the first essay of his *Theoretical Philosophy* (1897) Solovyev criticised the Cartesian view: 'The evidence of the immanence of consciousness as an inner fact does not vouchsafe the *external reality* of the objects which impinge on consciousness. But then is it not [also] impermissible to deduce from the fact of consciousness the actual reality, the special and independent essence of cognitive substance, of the *subject* who possess this consciousness? Descartes considered such a conclusion to be both permissible and necessary and, until now, many [including, amongst Russian thinkers, Lev Mikhailovich Lopatin (1855–1920)] have agreed with him. For a while I too subscribed to this view, in which I now detect a crucial fallacy.'[32]

Thus, in Solovyev's later view, the feeling of self-certainty induced in the individual by the fact of consciousness did not provide any reliable guarantee of the reality of either the subject or the external world. In

putting this argument Solovyev was not trying to deny that the fact, or the objects, of consciousness possess a certain phenomenological reality. But he insisted that this phenomenological datum does not necessarily presuppose the existence of a subject conceived as an initiator of ideas: 'The pure subject of thought is a phenomenological fact which is neither more nor less credible than any other [fact]; in other words, although it certainly exists, it exists only as a content of consciousness or as a phenomenon in the strictly literal sense of the word.'[33] Thus, the subject in the act of thinking appears, not as the originator of ideas or states of consciousness but merely as their insubstantial executing centre. And Solovyev insisted that nobody is entitled to attribute unequivocal certainty to this subject or, for that matter, any degree of certainty that exceeded the 'limits of its phenomenological condition.'[34] For no matter how many different states of consciousness were associated with this static centre 'it in no sense follows that this "ego" is not [merely] a thought but something different,' namely the real or sufficient cause of its ideas or states of mind.[35] From this Solovyev concluded that he was only ever conscious of himself as the subject of his psychic states or affects and never as their substance. Consequently, he maintained, there 'are no grounds for attributing to the subject of consciousness as such anything but a phenomenological reality.'[36]

From the psychic certainty of consciousness and the facts of consciousness Solovyev advanced via the logical certainty of formal abstract thought to the phenomenological certainty of the personal mind which 'transforms thought into the emerging reason of truth.'[37] The relationship underlying this concept of the 'emerging reason of truth' was that between the pure subject of thought as a phenomenological fact on the one hand, and the insubstantiality and transintelligibility of the total person as the mode of existence of the spirit on the other. In short: it was the actual dimension of the potential field of intentional phenomenology.

In Solovyev's moral philosophy the points of reference for this dimension were provided by those objects whose immanence and structure tend to promote the feeling functions of shame, compassion and reverence. In acts of thought and volition these objects are transformed into intentional objects of truth and goodness and consequently into ideas. 'Ideas as objects or as the content of that which is'[38] embrace on the one hand '*objects of contemplation* for us'[39] (in other words, all objects of perception, both our own and other people's, which are relevant to the theory of knowledge and which can be related to a psychic ego) and on the other hand '*subjects of existence* as such.'[40] In this second sense, namely as

subjects, ideas in phenomenological sense are *'actually that which the being wills, thinks, feels or perceives'*,[41] they are 'his actual object or content'.[42] Through his partial acts of will, imagination or feeling, which merge with one another because of the affinity of love and perception within the total act of loving,[43] the person who is actually becomes 'the subject or bearer of ideas'.[44] Initially he had no more in common with being *(Sein)* than the ideas. Both *'receive their being only as a result of their reciprocal relationship or interaction,'* for 'in themselves' they merely constitute 'forces of being *(Sein)*'.[45]

And so we find that whereas will, reason and feeling are component forces of a unifying spirit,[46] the objects of whose intentional acts appear as 'various forms of love',[47] the 'bearer of an idea, or *that idea as a subject,* is a person'.[48] For the bearer of this idea or its subject (to be more precise: the idea as subject) has to distinguish itself from others [other bearers] *subjectively or existentially;* in other words, it must possess its own separate reality and be its own independent centre. Consequently, it must possess *self-awareness and a personality.'*[49] If this were not the case, in other words if 'the ideas were distinguished merely *objectively,* merely *in terms of their recognisable properties,* and not in terms of their inner being, then they would simply constitute concepts for another [person who is] and not real essences, which, as we know, is unacceptable.'[50] Thus the proposition that a person who is becomes the bearer of an idea[51] (as a result of the existential illumination of its knowledge-transcending centre in its acts of volition, imagination and feeling) appears as the *phenomenological definition of the mind:* concrete mind, in other words 'a process of thought'[52] which refers 'in the [very] act of thinking' to an object (purposiveness),[53] becomes a person as a result of volition, imagination and feeling or, alternatively, as a result of the total act of loving, for 'every being is what it loves'.[54] 'This notional person or *this idea that has become a person* is merely one individual form of the total system of all-encompassing unity, which is indivisibly present in all of its individual forms.'[55]

The passages quoted above show beyond all doubt that the ideas evolved by Solovyev, especially in the seven-year period from 1892 to 1899, anticipated the essential methodology of German phenomenology. His *Meaning of Love* appeared twenty-one years before Max Scheler's eleven treatises on the *Overthrow of Values (Der Umsturz der Werte,* 1915*)* while his *Justification of the Good* (1894–8) pre-dated Scheler's *On the Phenomenology of the Feelings of Sympathy (Zur Phänomenologie der Sympathiegefühle,* 1913) by fifteen years and Scheler's major work *The Formalism in Ethics and the Material Value-Ethics (Der Formalismus*

in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 1913–16) by eighteen years. But most important of all was the fact that Solovyev's essays on *Theoretical Philosophy* (1897–9) were completed two years before Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen,* 1900–1), which are generally regarded as the starting-point of phenomenology.

However, this is not the popular view of Solovyev. Both bourgeois Russian scholars, such as Vasily Vasilyevich Zenkovsky (1881–1962) and Nikolay Onufriyevich Lossky (1870–1965),[56] and Soviet scholars have failed to appreciate his revolutionary significance.[57] Only Wladimir Szyłkarski (1884–1960) has referred to this aspect of his work, to which I had drawn his attention. In the postscript to Volume VII of the German edition of Solovyev's collected works Szyłkarski stated: 'In the second and in part of the third chapter [of his *Theoretical Philosophy*] Solovyev developed thoughts which anticipated the essential ideas underlying German phenomenology – two years before the publication of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and independently of Bolzano and Franz Brentano, whose 'objectivistic' philosophy of essence and being *(Sein)* was extremely important for Husserl's phenomenology.'[58]

But in his commentary on the *Theoretical Philosophy* Szyłkarski cancelled out this positive assessment. There he maintained that if Solovyev's new ideas are carried to their logical conclusion, they must inevitably 'lead to great difficulties in the construction of the Christian conception of "all-encompassing unity", to which Solovyev had always subscribed.'[59] This criticism was prompted by Solovyev's statement that man is only ever conscious of himself as the subject of his psychic states and never as their substance.[60] Szyłkarski – who was evidently ignorant of Scheler's intentional phenomenology – interpreted this as a 'denial of the substantiality of the human soul'.[61] In actual fact, of course, Solovyev attributed the 'emerging reason of truth' to the *philosophical* subject, which he distinguished both from the *empirical* subject or soul and from the *logical* subject or intellect.[62] And the *'philosophical* subject in the real sense' he defined as spirit.[63]

Commenting in his *Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Max Scheler* on the insubstantiality of the spirit, which he distinguished from 'anthropological impersonalism', the religious philosopher Johannes Hessen wrote: 'If . . . the theory of actuality rejects the view of the person as a substance which stands behind human acts, it is perfectly right to do so. But it does not follow from this that the person is simply a "link mechanism" for its acts. If this were the case, the person would simply be a mosaic of acts, whereas in actual fact it is the real unifying principle of

those acts.'[64] In his book *On the Phenomenology of the Feelings of Sympathy* Scheler himself stated that spiritual persons are by no means devoid of substance. On the contrary, they are 'act-substances' and, as such, are in fact the 'only substances which possess a genuine individual nature and whose diversity of *Dasein* derives in the first instance from their individuated *Sosein.*'[65]

By now it should be clear that Solovyev was not the mystic he has been made out to be and that anybody who still insists on classifying him as such cannot possibly have understood his writings. Ludolf Müller's observation that the German philosopher especially should ask himself whether it would not be simpler to study Schelling's works at first hand rather than read them in a Russian adaptation loses its point once Solovyev's work is considered from a *phenomenological* point of view.[66]

The sudden shift in Solovyev's thinking produced a certain amount of irritation amongst his contemporaries, which led to misunderstandings. As a result Solovyev was accused of anthropological impersonalism and pantheism. Zenkovsky, for example, stated that he did not find 'the greater prominence accorded by Solovyev to impersonal motifs particularly surprising' in so far as his general outlook had 'always been pantheistic' and 'revealed the influence of Spinoza.'[67] Mochulsky and Lopatin, for their part, considered that Solovyev's new doctrine contradicted the whole of his earlier philosophical system.[68]

Evgenij Ryškov, a Soviet scholar, holds a very similar view. In an article published in the Moscow periodical *Nauka i religija* in November 1968 he stated that initially 'Solovyev placed all his energy and knowledge in the service of the religious conception of universal salvation.' But Ryškov then went on to outline Solovyev's subsequent development, which appeared to him to constitute a direct antithesis to his early phase: 'But life destroyed the illusions which Solovyev had created and induced in him a growing sense of disappointment and alienation from earthly pleasures. In the end Solovyev realised that his hopes for the realisation of the "kingdom of God" on earth were vain and would come to nothing. With this, life lost all meaning for him. His fear of death, which had never left him, was transformed into a fear of life, a fear of the future.'[69]

Incidentally, Ryškov spoke highly of Solovyev as a philosopher and is the first Soviet scholar to attach importance to his work. He opened his article with the following appreciation: 'Of the many names in the history of philosophy there are few as illustrious as that of the Russian idealist and theosophist Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyev. . . . That is why Solovyev's writings are also of interest to us atheists. We have to examine Solovyev's

ideas and, by subjecting them to the Marxist philosophical methods, trace their earthly origins and establish their actual significance and their position [in the history of philosophy].'[70]

III. THE NEW RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

In the preface to a series of articles, published in 1903 under the title *From Marxism to Idealism,* Sergey Nikolayevich Bulgakov (1871–1944) wrote: 'I must confess that for me Kant was always less dubious than Marx. That was why I considered it necessary to check Marx by reference to Kant and not vice versa.' Bulgakov's object in making this comparison was to establish 'an acceptable form for the positivist doctrine of economic materialism' and 'to free it from its absurdities'.[71] His preference for Kant will doubtless have been due in part to the influence of Solovyev, for in a study which he produced on his compatriot in the same year he wrote: 'Solovyev's philosophy offers the contemporary mind a total and consistent Christian *Weltanschauung.*'[72]

But unlike Pyotr Berngardovich Struve (1870–1944) and Nikolay Alexandrovich Berdyayev (1874–1948), with whom he had previously been associated in the 'legal Marxist' movement, Bulgakov soon abandoned the new philosophical orientation which he had adopted in the early years of the century. Immediately following the breakdown of tsarist society he made a radical switch to a theological view of the world. In *Quiet Thoughts,* a collection of articles published in Moscow in 1918, Bulgakov suggested that, with his wide and unusual mystical experience, Solovyev was 'far more important, original and interesting as a *mystic* than as a *philosopher*'.[73] Between these two assessments of Bulgakov's lay the epoch of the 'new religious philosophy'. For Bulgakov himself the peak of this development came between 1911 and 1916 when he was writing his *Immortal Light,* which appeared in Moscow in 1917[74], and in which he turned once again to the Slavophil-theosophical conception of 'all-encompassing unity' which Solovyev had discarded as a spent force during his final phenomenological phase. *And so the opportunity created by Solovyev of establishing a new realistic school of Russian philosophy that would have been capable of breaking away from theology and asserting its independence by evolving a sound and convincing methodology remained unexploited because nobody had recognised it.*

On 31 July 1900 Vladimir Solovyev died in the arms of his friend Sergey Nikolayevich Trubetskoy (1862–1905), on the estate of Uzkoye.[75] Sergey Trubetskoy, who was then Professor of the History of Ancient Philosophy at Moscow University, became the first elected rector of this

University on 2 September 1905[76] and even previously acquired a reputation as a liberal politician because of his speech before czar Nikolay II on 6 July 1905 at Petercourt.[77] Sergey and his younger brother Yevgeny (1863–1920), who was Professor of the Philosophy of Law in Kiev and later in Moscow,[78] entered into the intellectual heritage not only of Kireyevsky and Khomyakov with regard to the Slavophil-theosophical conception of Total Unity, in which both ecclesiastical and national considerations played their part, but also of Solovyev's early thinking in the 70's and 80's of the 19th Century.

In his own works – *Metaphysics of Ancient Greece* – (dissertation for Master's degree in 1889),[79] *On the Nature of Human Consciousness* (1889–91), *The Foundations of Idealism* (1896)[80] and *The Doctrine of the Logos in its History* (dissertation for Doctorate in 1900)[81] – Sergey Trubetskoy tried to reconcile the autonomy of the individual human consciousness with the 'impersonalism' of 'universal consciousness' by evolving a metaphysical system based on an absolute essence. Unlike Hegel, however, he did not identify thinking and being. This philosophical system, which Lapshin described as 'concrete idealism' or 'critical metaphysics',[82] is summed up in Trubetskoy's 'hypothetical' formulation that 'consciousness' can be neither 'impersonal nor personal (individual)' because it is 'more than personal', namely 'integral' *(soborno).*[83] Consequently, in all our ethical and theoretical acts we 'maintain within ourselves the link *(sobor)* with all things'.[84] The conception of the 'integral character' *(sobornost')* of consciousness, which Sergey Trubetskoy developed into an individual system of 'metaphysical socialism',[85] also constituted one aspect of 'communal personalism'[86] which Berdyayev used at a later date, and of Lossky's supposedly 'intuitive' but in actual fact 'constructive' view[87] that 'everything is immanent in everything'.[88]

While Sergey Trubetskoy was content to write a 'biography of Solovyev' (which was published by the Moscow *Vestnik Yevropy* in 1900), Yevgeny Trubetskoy produced a work in two volumes, *The World-View of Vl. Solovyev* (which appeared in 1913).[89] Yevgeny's two dissertations (for his Master's and Doctor's degrees) were devoted to 'the Socio-Religious Ideal of Western Christianity in the Fifth Century' (Augustine; 1892) and the 'Eleventh Century' (Gregory VII; 1897).[90] These publications were followed in 1917 by *The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge: An Attempt to Overcome Kant and Kantianism*[91] and in 1918 by Yevgeny's major philosophical work, *The Meaning of Life.*[92] This development gives a clear indication of Yevgeny's spiritual affinity to the Slavophil-theosophical conceptions of the new religious philosophy. Not

surprisingly, therefore, he paid little attention to Solovyev's *ordo-amoris* theory, his material value-ethics or his act-phenomenology. Consequently, the claim made by Yevgeny in his *Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge* that his thinking was 'directly and consistently in line with Vl. Solovyev's *Theoretical Philosophy*' and constituted an attempt to 'carry out the exact programme announced by Solovyev'[93] was largely unfounded.

In his *Theoretical Philosophy* Solovyev developed certain ideas which he had first stated in his *Lectures on God-manhood* (1877–81) and so arrived at his conception of the philosophical subject as the living form of the spirit. Later, in his *Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge* and his *Meaning of Life,* Yevgeny Trubetskoy sought to clarify the relationship between conditional or human consciousness and unconditional or absolute consciousness. He argued that 'every act of cognition is an assertion that a specific content of consciousness is true, that is, unconditional'[94] and consequently that the quest for truth consists of 'seeking unconditional consciousness in my own consciousness'.[95] Thus, 'unconditional consciousness' appears as a precondition which, although unable to explain 'the origin of cognition' does confirm its 'certainty'.[96]

From the striving of conditional knowledge after unconditional truth Yevgeny Trubetskoy assumed the participation of human consciousness in an unconditional or absolute consciousness, whose reality he considered to be vouchsafed by the fact that without such participation true cognition would be impossible. Since 'all temporal phenomena really are given in enduring form in unconditional consciousness, either there is a truly unconditional consciousness that regards both the past and the future in an infinite realm or else the whole of the temporal world is a lie.'[97]

In his development of the philosophical subject as the living form of the spirit Solovyev had also considered this argument and rejected it. His phenomenological approach, which he first outlined in the *Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* and the *Lectures on God-manhood* and subsequently amplified in *The Justification of the Good* and the *Theoretical Philosophy*, was firmly based on the intentional nature of man's relationship to objects. But if objects can be apprehended by intentional acts and if all acts, no matter how disparate, have their origin in the being of a person, then it follows that any world that is conceived as a totality of intentional objects must be the world of a person.[98] Thus, the personal counterpart to the cosmos would be furnished by what Max Scheler called 'the conception of an infinite and perfect spiritual subject, whose acts would be given for us in intentional act phenomenology in accordance with the

conditions governing their essence'[99] (which would of course apply to the acts of all conceivable persons). But, as Scheler subsequently pointed out, 'we would never be prompted to form this conception of God by philosophy but only by a more concrete person who was in direct contact with something corresponding to this conception and whose concrete being would itself be "given". Thus, the reality of "God" is invariably grounded in a possible manifestation of God, [i.e.] in a concrete person.'[100]

These views of Scheler's, which had been anticipated in all essential respects by Solovyev, were based on the ontological links between acts and objects, between the individual person and the world, between God and creation. But Yevgeny Trubetskoy seems not to have noticed these phenomenological links. He regarded the relationship established by Solovyev between God and creation – which arises by analogy with the correlation between the individual and the world – as a pantheistic amalgam of the absolute and the essence of the world. In order to correct this pantheistic aberration and draw attention to the radical difference between God and creation he insisted that, although God is the omnipresent centre of the world and of its evolution, He is 'not its subject'.[101] Yevgeny Trubetskoy argued this view, which led away from phenomenology towards transcendental philosophy, not only in his *Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge* and *The Meaning of Life*, but also in his two-volume work, *The World-View of Vl. Solovyev.*[102]

At the same time as Bulgakov and the brothers Trubetskoy were evolving their religious philosophy, a 'new religious spirit' began to emerge, which was prompted in the first instance by the need to overcome the antinomy between secularist decadence and historical Christianity. This new spirit found expression in the neo-romanticism of the younger Berdyayev and in the utopian 'religious community', which was proclaimed by Dmitry Sergeyevich Merezhkovsky (1866–1941) and his followers (Ternavtsev, Gippius, etc.) and was conceived in terms of Solovyev's 'free theocracy'. Both these movements formed a link between the Russian neo-Kantians and Russian metaphysical transcendentalism.

The best known representatives of the Russian neo-Kantian movement were Alexander Ivanovich Vvedensky (1856–1925), Georgy Ivanovich Chelpanov (1863–1936), and Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin (1870–1952).

Between them, the cognitive approach of the neo-Kantians and the ontological approach of the new religious philosophers provided the necessary basis for metaphysical transcendentalism, whose principal exponents were Pavel Ivanovich Novgorodtsev (1863–1924), Pyotr Berngardovich Struve (1870–1944), Boris Petrovich Vysheslavtsev (1877–

1954), and Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin (1883–1954). Boris Yakovenko (1884–1948) and Fyodor Stepun (1884–1965) occupied a position midway between the neo-Kantians and the transcendentalists. There was also a Russian Leibniz school, which was led by Alexey Kozlov (1831–1901) and Nikolay Bugayev (1837–1903) and from which a personalist movement subsequently developed under Lev Mikhaylovich Lopatin (1855–1920) and a pan-psychist movement under Sergey Alexeyevich Askoldov (1871–1945). Nikolay Lossky (1870–1965), who later founded Russian intuitionalism in conjunction with Semyon Lyudvigovich Frank (1877–1950), also belonged to the Leibniz school during his early phase. The theosophical metaphysics of the great sophiological systems of Sergey Bulgakov, Semyon Frank, Lev Platonovich Karsavin (1882–1952) and Pavel Alexandrovich Florensky (1882–1943), which also owed much to Solovyev, were evolved from intuitionalism, although they did not assume their final form until after the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty.

By and large, the representatives of these idealistic trends tended to close their ranks in opposition to the often naive positivism of the Russian 'scientific philosophers', who were entirely empirical in their approach, would not hear of metaphysics and insisted on the relativity and historicity of all knowledge. The best known of the academic spokesmen for this movement were Vladimir Viktorovich Lesevich (1837–1905), Nikolay Yakovlyevich Grot (1852–99), Ilya Ilyich Mechnikov (1845–1916) and Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky (1863–1937). Their positivism and the naturalism of a number of leading Russian scientists – such as the physiologists Ivan Sechenov (1829–1905) and Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936), the chemist Dmitry Mendeleyev (1834–1907) and the botanist Kliment Timiryazev (1843–1920) – acted in the sense of the anthropocentrism of Nikolay Chernyshevsky (1828–89), Pyotr Lavrov (1823–1900) and Nikolay Michaylovsky (1842–1904), which was to make such an enduring impression on the radicals and socialist revolutionaries. The unmistakable influence exerted by these socially critical trends, especially on the Russian students, led to concerted resistance on the part of various secular and scientifically-minded groups to the autocratic and Orthodox régimes, which was subsequently exploited by Marxist thinkers like Georgy Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856–1918), Vladimir Il'ič Lenin (1870–1924) and Alexander Malinovsky-Bogdanov (1873–1928).

But at the turn of the century this social criticism provoked an idealistic reaction, which appeared quite spontaneously and assumed one of two forms. There were those who sought to revive Solovyev's theocratic conception while others were fascinated by the highly individualistic

ideas of the 'Russian Nietzsche', Vasily Vasilyevich Rozanov (1856–1919). whose biocentric aphorisms with their sexual, metaphysical and psychopathic connotations exerted a considerable appeal at that time. In the spheres of cultural philosophy and anthropology Rozanov espoused the views of Konstantin Nikolayevich Leontyev (1831–91) but in the religious field he went very much his own way.[103] In St. Petersburg in 1901 Merezhkovsky organised the first public discussions of religious and philosophical questions, which were reported in the periodical *Novy put.* These were followed, after certain initial difficulties had been overcome, by the founding of Religious and Philosophical Meetings in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Kiev.[104]

It was at about this time that the *Bogoiskatelstvo* or 'Search for God' was instituted. Most of the members of this movement, who included Berdyayev, Bulgakov, Filosofov, Gippius, Merezhkovsky and Minsky, were centred around the St. Petersburg religious and philosophical meetings and published their views in various periodicals: *Novy put* (St. Petersburg 1903–4), *Voprosy zhizni* (St. Petersburg 1905), *Vesy* (Moscow 1904–9) and *Pereval* (Moscow 1906–7). The 'Godseekers' argued that the Marxist doctrine was a distorted form of religion and consequently could only be overcome by 'true' Christianity, in other words by a new form of Christianity that had been set free from the restrictive influence of the historical and institutionalised church. Thus, while opposing revolutionary secularism, the Godseekers also indulged in social criticism on their own account.[105] Their 'true' Christianity, incidentially, was based on a new interpretation of Solovyev's *Lectures on God-manhood.*

Although this movement had little to do with philosophy, it proved so effective and caused such a stir that during the 'reactionary period' (1907–10) a section of the Social-Democratic intelligentsia considered it necessary to compete with it on its own terms and so founded a new 'religion without God'. The principle spokesmen for this athestic trend – who were known at the time as the 'God builders' *(Bogostroiteli)* – were Vladimir Bazarov-Rudnev (1847–1939)[106] and Anatoly Vasilyevich Lunacharsky (1875–1933).[107] For a while Maxim Gorky (Alexey Maximovich Peshkov; 1868–1936) was influenced by their ideas.[108]

The ever-increasing polarisation of Russian philosophical and sociological thought into an idealist and a materialist camp had its origins in a development of the late-nineteenth century. The Russian 'intelligentsia', who are defined in the *Soviet Philosophical Encyclopedia* as a 'social group made up of persons concerned in a professional capacity with intellectual work',[109] had evolved from the *raznochintsy*, who had come into prominence in the

course of the 1860s. These *raznochintsy* were intellectuals 'from different social class' who played an important part in the ideological and political struggle against the tsarist autocracy of their day. Initially, the political and social ideas adopted by this group were based on nihilist and anarchist theories but subsequently these were displaced by populist and Marxist conceptions. By the end of the nineteenth century revolutionary populism *(narodničestvo)* and Marxism were firmly established and commanded the support of the socially and politically active sections of the educated classes of Russia. At the same time positivism and materialism began to dominate the philosophical sphere, atheism (or indifference) the religious sphere, utilitarianism the ethical and aesthetic spheres and democratic or critical realism the sphere of social protest.

In 1901 Berdyayev published a book entitled *Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy,* for which Struve wrote a very long and detailed preface.[110] This joint production, which announced the transition from positivism to metaphysics, outlined a programme for a series of future books to be undertaken on a collaborative basis which were designed to protect the state against seditious doctrines. The first of these, *Problems of Idealism,* was published in Moscow in the following year. This work, edited by Pavel Novgorodtsev and furnished with a brief preface by Lopatin, contained contributions from twelve different authors including the philosophers Askoldov, Berdyayev, Bulgakov, Frank, Novgorodtsev, Struve and Sergey and Yevgeny Trubetskoy.[111]

Essentially, this anthology constituted an attempt to come to terms with recent trends in positivism and to defend metaphysics in religious-metaphysical terms. It assigned only a limited function and consequently only a limited significance to the science of experience, rejected dogmatic judgements in favour of the critical approach developed by students of the theory of knowledge, denied utilitarianism by insisting on absolute principles and stressed the importance of morality for the understanding of idealistic philosophy.

These arguments were, of course, by no means new. Boris Nikolayevich Chicherin (1828–1904), who held that no really important questions in the sphere of political theory could be solved without recourse to philosophy, and Vladimir Solovyev, had already subjected positivism to similar criticisms in the 1870s.[112] But in his introduction to the second edition (Paris 1967) of the anthology *From the Depths* (Moscow 1918), in which he provided a comprehensive review of the three most important literary products of the 'intellectual renaissance in Russia', Nikolay Poltoratsky maintained that there was none the less a considerable difference between these two

periods, since by the early years of the twentieth century idealism was no longer being considered in purely philosophical terms but in close conjunction with social and political questions.[113]

Problems of Idealism were followed by *Signposts* (Moscow 1909), in which Mikhail Gershenzon and six other authors, including the philosophers Berdyayev, Frank and Struve, tried to win over the Russian intelligentsia, whose philosophical and socio-political beliefs had been severely undermined meanwhile, and to secure their support for the state.[114] 'The intellectual attitude,' Berdyayev observed in his article on the theoretical truth of the philosophers and the practical truth of the intelligentsia, 'needs to be reformed, and philosophy has been chosen to play the not insignificant part of the cleansing fire in this important operation. It would seem from a detailed analysis of the relevant historical and psychological factors that the Russian intelligentsia can only acquire a new mental attitude from a synthesis of knowledge and belief. Only a synthesis of this kind would be able to gratify the positive need felt by the intelligentsia for an organic link between theory and practice, between "real truth" and "real justice".'[115]

Struve took a similar view. In his article, which dealt with the essential connection between man's belief and his sense of responsibility, between his philosophical and political attitudes, he suggested that the 'apostasy of the Russian intelligentsia [and their defection] from the state' was the 'key to the [correct] understanding of the revolutionary movement both in the past and in the present.'[116] Although he conceded that the majority of the people considered that the kind of attitude adopted by the intelligentsia to religion could not possibly have any effect on political developments, Struve contended that this view was based on a fallacy. In his opinion, it was by no means 'accidental that – in the inner sense with which we are concerned – the Russian intelligentsia were *both* irreligious *and* politically fanatical, unobjective and frivolous. They were credulous but had no faith, they worked hard but were uncreative, they were fanatical without enthusiasm, intolerant without reverence. In a word: they displayed all the outer forms of religion but none of its inner meaning. Although this contradiction is encountered in every materialistic or positivist form of radicalism, nowhere is it as pronounced as in the case of the Russian intelligentsia. Radicalism or maximalism can only be justified by revering and serving some higher principle.'[117]

In his memoirs Frank stated that the contributors to *Signposts* had planned to publish a further collection of articles in the following year (1910), in which their new philosophy would have been expressed in

positive and programmatic terms. (Previously, of course, their writings had been more concerned with the ***negative*** aspects of revolutionary and secularist thought.) In the event, however, this project was not carried out.[118]

After being appointed Governor of Grodno in 1902 and of Saratov in 1903, Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin (1862–1911) became Minister of the Interior under Goremykin in April 1906, and finally, in July of the same year, Prime Minister. He remained head of the tsarist government until he was shot by the Socialist Revolutionary Bogrov during the interval of a gala performance at the Kiev Opera on September 1, 1911. Four days later, on September 5, 1911, he died from his wounds in the Makovsky hospital.[119]

The death of Stolypin put an end to the aspirations of the religious-philosophical thinkers. Their hopes of an intellectual revival and socio-political reforms that would have lent stability to the constitutional monarchy, were completely dashed by this tragic event. Stolypin's daughter, Mariya Petrovna Stolypina-Bok, explained the reasons for this in the closing pages of her *Recollections.* She tells us that by 1911, although her father had then been in power for some five and a half years, his ideals had not really taken root: 'They had not yet been absorbed by the Russian people. And once he was dead, the whole edifice that he had created fell to pieces.'[120]

The festivities held in 1913 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the founding of the Romanov dynasty, were staged in the artificial atmosphere of 'marble palaces', full of illusion and self-deception.[121] In this calm before the storm of the First World War, when the court and the aristocracy were living in the eye of a hurricane, the sedition then rampant throughout Russia caused no apparent concern to those most affected. In his memoirs, published under the title *In the Marble Palace,* Grand Duke Gavriil Konstantinovich analysed this condition of paralysing uncertainty and dark foreboding with considerable perspicuity: 'I gained the impression that the jubilee of the House of the Romanovs was greeted without any special enthusiasm. And it seems to me that the reason for this was that the revolution was already in the air at that time. Of course the invited audience in the theatre shouted hurrah and the orchestra played the [tsarist] hymn. But the mood of the people was very different. Everything was conducted in a bureaucratic manner and one did not have the feeling that the whole Russian nation had joined together to celebrate the anniversary of the dynasty.'[122]

Five years later, after the overthrow of the monarchy, the authors of the third book published under the auspices of this group of religious-

philosophical thinkers, who had been opposed both to the utopian rationalism of the revolutionary intelligentsia and to the irrationality of the monarchy, could only try to explain what had happened and why. The collection of articles on the Russian revolution of 1917, edited and compiled by Struve under the title *From the Depths,* was printed by the Kushnarev publishing house in Moscow and was ready for despatch to booksellers by the autumn of 1918. But due to the wave of Bolshevik terror that followed Kaplan's unsuccessful attempt on Lenin's life, the anthology (which contained articles by eleven authors including the philosophers Askoldov, Berdyayev, Bulgakov, Frank, Novgorodtsev and Struve)[123] could not be distributed at that time, and when it did eventually appear in 1921, sales were almost entirely restricted to Moscow.[124]

These were the three chief phases of the religious-philosophical renaissance in Russia. The point of departure for this development was provided by the critique of povitivism (*Problems of Idealism,* 1902). This was followed, after the revolution of 1905, by a critique of philosophical and political secularism and radicalism and a defence of the intellectual and moral foundations of the state (*Signposts,* 1909). Finally, the Bolshevik coup of October 1917 prompted a critique of the atheist ideology and a defence of the religious principles underlying social and cultural life. According to Poltoratsky this development marked the 'transition in socio-political terms from the residue of legal Marxism to the national philosophy that was later described as "conservative liberalism" or "liberal conservatism".'[125]

The cadre of the religious, philosophical and socio-political renaissance movement in Russia was formed by four philosophers: Nikolay Berdyayev, Sergey Bulgakov, Semyon Frank and Pyotr Struve. The fact that they, and they alone, contributed to all three of the anthologies described above will scarcely have been accidental. Incidentally, these four men had already revealed their commitment to the new movement at the turn of the century when, under the influence of Solovyev's writings, they were 'converted' from materialism to idealism. Like Yevgeny Trubetskoy, however, they failed to perceive the change in Solovyev's thought which took place in the 1890s when he abandoned his philosophy of integral knowledge in favour of phenomenology and advanced from a theocratic conception of the state to a new ethic based on natural morality. And so the opportunity of creating a school of Russian philosophy that would have been independent of both theological and theocratic considerations was missed. Instead of embarking on this new venture, the Russian philosophers of the early twentieth century reverted to the traditional conception of a Slavophil

Utopia. Inevitably, this had an adverse effect on the development of Russian social and political life, for it blinded the conservative leadership to the real extent of popular discontent and persuaded the monarchy that it was far more powerful than it actually was, with the result that the Tsar refused to entertain even legitimate demands for reform.

Although the shadow of the great Solovyev lay over the contrasting philosophies of idealism and materialism which dominated this period, the reception accorded to Western philosophy by the modernists was so stereotyped that any specifically Russian contributions to philosophical thought made at that time were almost entirely disregarded. The article on philosophy in the nineteenth volume of the *Great Encyclopaedia* (Ed. Sergey Nikolayevich Yuzhakov; 1849–1910) accurately reflects the kind of attitude adopted in Russia to original native thinkers, for the only Russian achievements listed in this article are translations of philosophical works by foreign authors.[126] Thus, one result of the new importance attached to traditional theosophy by the twentieth-century religious-philosophical thinkers was the revival of the antithesis between Slavophil and Western thought.

The more recent antithesis between the increasingly speculative intuitivism of the religious-philosophical school, on the one hand, and the 'strict objectivity', claimed by the positivist school on the other, assumed such proportions that it appears to have blurred the perceptive faculties of contemporary philosophers. Consequently, we find that even Gustav Gustavovich Shpet (1878–1940) and Alexey Fyodorovich Losev (born 1893),[127] who were disciples of Husserl and the only representatives of phenomenology in tsarist Russia, failed to perceive the revolutionary significance of Solovyev's work, although some of the ideas advanced by Shpet in his theory of personality were in fact very similar to those expressed by Solovyev in his *Theoretical Philosophy*.[128]

Another equally incomprehensible and no less serious omission on the part of the early twentieth-century Russian thinkers was their almost total neglect of philosophical anthropology, whose essential principles had also been anticipated by Solovyev in a variety of works including *The Meaning of Love* (1892–4), *The Justification of the Good* (1894–8), *The Life Drama of Plato* (1898) and *Three Conversations* (1899–1900). The living core of this magnificent ethic is to be found in the revolutionary stipulation that man is 'on no account to be regarded as a means to an end for others'. He should not be used 'either for the benefit of another person or for the benefit of a whole class or for the so-called common good, in other words for the benefit of a majority of other persons'.[129]

Significantly, contemporary Marxist writers, who are opposed to the existing socialist régimes in Eastern Europe, are making the same sort of demands today. They are now trying to make good the deficiencies of philosophical anthropology at the turn of the century – which passed unnoticed by the leaders of the intellectual renewal movement in Russia until it was too late – by pressing arguments which clearly show that they too are determined to defend man as the 'principal criterion', as 'an end in himself and never as a means'.[130] The similarity between the social conditions obtaining then and now is obvious. Incidentally, this also seems to be the reason why present-day Marxist thinkers are beginning to show a greater interest in Solovyev's anthropological writings.[131]

In 1905/6 Viktor Ivanovich Nesmelov (1863–1920), a Professor of Religious Philosophy at the Theological Academy in Kazan, published a two-volume work on the *Science of Man,*[132] which was based in all essential respects on the ideas formulated by Solovyev in his *Lectures on God-manhood* nearly thirty years before. By contrast, Solovyev's material value-ethics which he evolved in the 1890's and which was completely independent of both theology and theoretical philosophy was not mentioned by Nesmelov.

It was only after the calamitous events of the First World War had shown the full extent of the terrifying malaise of Russian society that contemporary thinkers began to consider the problem of human existence in the kind of terms suggested by Solovyev. Berdyayev, especially, focused his attention on questions of personal ethics. His book, *The Meaning of Creation,* which appeared in Moscow in 1916, was the first recent attempt to establish a justification of man. In his preface Berdyayev explained why he had undertaken this task: 'Many justifications of God, many theodicies, have been written. But now the time has come to write a justification of man, an anthropodicy. Perhaps an anthropodicy is the only way to approach a theodicy, the only way that has not yet been tried and is still open to us.'[133]

Both Berdyayev and Lev Isaakovich Shestov (Shvartsman: 1866–1938) embarked on this anthropological experiment, from which they developed a form of religious existentialism after their emigration to Western Europe. Berdyayev's major works in this field were: *On the Destiny of Man* (Paris 1931). *The Fate of Man in the Modern World* (Paris 1934), *Selfknowledge* (Paris 1945) and *The Existential Dialectic of the Divine and the Human* (Paris 1952) while Shestov is best known for *The Power of the Keys (Potestas Clavium;* Berlin 1923), *Kierkegaard and Existential Philosophy* (Paris 1939) and *Speculation and Revelation* (Paris 1964).[134]

It is worth noting in this connection that I.F. Balakina, a Soviet researcher into the history of philosophy, has also traced Russian existentialism to Solovyev.[135]

It only remains for us to assess the importance of this period of Russian philosophy and to compare it with the Marxist ideology of the Soviet period.

This is best done perhaps by recounting the story of Mihajlo Mihajlov, a young Yugoslav philosopher who visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1964 when he was employed as an assistant in the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Zadar, Croatia. After his return Mihajlov wrote a critical report of his visit under the title 'Moscow Summer 1964', which was accepted for publication by the Belgrade periodical *Delo*. But the first part of this report, which appeared in the January 1965 issue of *Delo*, was far too truthful for the Yugoslav authorities, who confiscated the entire February issue, which contained the second part, and forbade the editors to print the third. They also had Mihajlov arrested. Later, after his release, the Jugoslav weekly *NIN* (a supplement to the Belgrade newspaper *Politika*) carried an unsigned article, in which Mihajlov was accused of denigrating the Soviet Union and branded as an 'agent of White Russian and anti-Communist circles'. He responded to this attack with an open letter to *NIN*-editor Toshovich in which he said: 'I make no secret of the fact that I consider Vladimir Solovyev, Shestov and Berdyayev to be more profound thinkers than any of the Marxist philosophers writing today. Nor do I deny that I regard myself as a Christian and that in my opinion only Christianity, as a free religion, offers a [viable] basis for a just social order on earth. By contrast, the so-called "inevitable laws" of "scientific" socialism are not suitable for this purpose.'[136]

Mihajlov's choice of philosophers from the period when Russia was entering the twentieth century could not be bettered. Nor could his assessment of their importance as compared with their Marxist successors.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SOVIET JUDGEMENT AND CRITICISM OF SOLOVYEV

I. 'THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA', 1ST EDITION 1947

Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Ėnciklopedija (The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia), volume 52 (edited by S.I. Vavilov, K.E. Vorošilov, A.Ja. Vyšinskij, P.I. Lebedev-Poljanskij, A. Lozovskij, F.N. Petrov, F.A. Rotštejn and O.Ju. Šmidt), Moscow 1947: SOLOV'EV, Vladimir Sergeevič (columns 59–60):

SOLOVYEV, Vladimir Sergeyevich (1853–1900), was a well-known idealistic Russian philosopher of a mystical bent, a writer and a poet. He was a son of the historian Sergey Mikhaylovich Solovyev [1820–1879]. Following the publication of his dissertation, *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (Krizis zapadnoj filosofii [1874]), Vladimir Solovyev lectured on philosophy first at the University of Moscow, and later at the University of St. Petersburg. In a public lecture in 1881 he called for clemency for the revolutionaries who were being tried by the czarist government as responsible for the murder of Alexander II. Because of this lecture Solovyev was forced to leave the university. From 1882 until 1888 he occupied himself with questions of theology and church history. After ecclesiastical censorship prohibited the publication of a series of works relating to the above, Solovyev as a writer criticized the views of the younger Slavophils from 1888 until 1895. From 1895 until 1900 he devoted himself anew to philosophical themes. His basic philosophical works are: *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* (*Filosofskaja načala cel'nago znanija,* 1877); *The Justification of the Good* (*Opravdanie dobra,* 1894–1897) and *A Critique of Abstract Principles* (*Kritika otvlečennyx načal,* 1877–1880).

The starting point of Solovyev's views is constituted by the conviction that the developmental process of Western thought has lead philosophy into a contradiction between theory and practice, between academy and life. The questions which have occupied Western philosophy are of an exclusively theoretical character. This is because they have been asked by a subject which only knows but which does not also act – and without any relation to the will. Western philosophy has retained this one-sided [rational] character from Medieval Scholasticism up until the most sublime achieve-

ment of Western thought, which Solovyev understood as Hegel's teachings. Even the systems of Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann were unable to overcome the abstraction of Western philosophy in spite of their doctrines of the will as the foundation of what is. Feuerbach's anthropological principle turns out to be an attempt to pass beyond the abstract idea to man. Feuerbach's "man" is nevertheless "man in general"; this means: "an abstraction, the actuality of which [is] represented by each individual man." However because only his own happiness has immediate significance for each individual man, the anthropological principle turns out actually to be the principle of egoism. Moreover the theories founded on this principle – for example the doctrines of Max Stirner – prove to be individualistic.

In his works Solovyev developed a series of accurate opinions about the social contradictions and grievances of bourgeois society. In particular he maintained that although the French revolution "confirmed democracy in principle," "in actuality it primarily brought about only a plutocracy," and that the people "only rule themselves *de iure*, while *de facto* a decreasingly small part of the people – namely the rich bourgeoisie, the capitalists – exercise power over them" (*Sobranie sočinenij, izdatel'stvo "Obščestvennaja pol'za,"* volume I, p. 250). As opposed to this, Solovyev's opinions about socialism were false. He identified the latter with a petty bourgeois and individualistic misrepresentation and refused to recognize the socialistic movement and its theory as the way out of the crisis of social existence and philosophical consciousness. This was a consequence of Solovyev's philosophical idealism. From his point of view, socialism was a doctrine according to which ethical norms were determined "exclusively [by] one element of human life – namely by the economic element"; that is, "only by the facts of the material order" (cf. *Ibid.*, volume II, p. 129). Consequently even it expresses an abstract principle – because it considers "man as a subject who is only economically active without taking into account all other aspects and elements of his existence and life" (*Ibid.*, p. 130). Solovyev sought to overcome the abstraction and the contradiction of theory and practice in mysticism, that is, in the recognition of an unconditioned divine world, which transcends man and external nature and which is held by Solovyev to be more actual, more comprehensive and more full of life than the world of appearances. In his opinion, truth consists neither in a logical form of knowledge nor in the latter's empirical content – it does not consist in a theoretical achievement, but rather in mystical knowledge, which corresponds to the will for salvation and the feeling for the beautiful. Solovyev understands the mystical as communion with a higher world by means of internal, creative activity. Solovyev saw in the revelation of the

divine world the power which should succeed in winning back for the spiritual life its lost integrity. According to Solovyev the levels of the ideal world were: 1. the mystical in the realm of creativity, 2. theology in the realm of knowledge and 3. the church in the realm of social life. Although the church would not be permitted to interfere in state and economic matters, it would give to the state and to society their higher goal and to their activities the unconditioned norm. Solovyev advocated the consolidation of Christian churches into a single and all-encompassing total church.

Solovyev's doctrine was reactionary not only because of its idealistic and mystical nature but also because of its attempt to substitute for the concrete act of the revolutionary struggle against the social foundations of the bourgeois society the apparent overcoming of its contradictions by means of mystical consciousness. Solovyev himself was affiliated with none of the socio-political and spiritual trends dominant in his time. He was closely related to the convictions of the older Slavophils but dissociated himself completely from their younger successors. He fought against great power chauvinism and anti-Semitism with particular severity. In spite of his mystical and theocratic views which correspond to an ecclesiastical organization of society, Solovyev rejected the official church because it did not pardon him his love of freedom and his spiritual independence of prevailing views. Solovyev called for "complete freedom of belief as well as freedom of opinion and speech for all people."

Solovyev's philosophical lyrical poetry and his critical essays influenced the younger symbolic poets – Andrey Bely, Alexander Blok, Sergey Solovyev – as well as the development of their philosophical and aesthetic ideas.

Literature

Solovyev's works: Sobranie sočinenij, pod redakciej i s primečanijami S.M. Solov'eva i Ė.L. Radlova, t. I–IX, izdatel'stvo "Obščestvennaja pol'za," SPB [1901]–1907 (*Collected works,* St. Petersburg). Vtoroe izdanie, t. I–X, izdatel'stvo "Prosveščenie," SPB [1911–1913] (Second edition). The publication of Solovyev's poetry did not take place in the framework of the collected works, but in independent publications: *Stixotvorenija* (Poems), Moscow 1891. Sed'moe izdanie, "Russkij knižnik" (7th edition), Moscow [1921].

Biography: The *Collected Works of Solovyev* contain a biography of Solovyev written by Ė. Radlov which is in volume IX of the 1st edition and in volume X of the 2nd edition.

Monographs: The idealistic philosophers, Ė. Radlov and E. Trubetskoy, wrote monographs on Solovyev: Radlov, Ė.L., *Vladimir Solovyev – Žizn' i učenie* (Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings), St. Petersburg 1913. The same, *Xarakter tvorčestva Vl. Solov'eva* (The Nature of the Work of Vl. Solovyev), St. Petersburg 1909. Trubeckoj, E.N., *Mirosozercanie Vl. S. Solov'eva,* t.I–II, izdatel'stvo "Put'" (The World-View of Vl.S. Solovyev), Moscow [1913]. *V. Asmus*

Valentin Asmus: The first edition of *Sobranie sočinenij Vladimira Sergeeviča Solov'eva* (Izdanie Tovariščestva "Obščestvennaja pol'za") was not arranged by S.M. Solov'ev and Ė.L. Radlov, but by Sergej Solov'ev's father M.S. Solov'ev and G.A. Račinskij in the following order: volumes I–VII by Mixail Sergeevič Solov'ev, volumes VIII and IX (dopolnitel'nyj [supplementary volume]) by G.A. Račinskij.

See also Sergej Solov'ev's statements in Predislovie ko vtoromu izdaniju (preface to the second edition, Selo Dedovo, July 5, 1911), Knigoizdatel'skoe Tovariščestvo "Prosveščenie", vol. I, 2nd edition, St. Petersburg 1911, pp. V–VI; here p. V.
(Translated from Russian by the author)

II. 'THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA', 2ND EDITION 1957

Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Ėnciklopedija (The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia), vol. 40 (edited by B.A. Vvedenskij). Moscow 1957: SOLOV'EV, Vladimir Sergeevič (page 41).

SOLOVYEV, Vladimir Sergeyevich (1853–1900), Russian idealistic philosopher, theologian, writer and poet. Son of the well-known historian S.M. Solovyev. Vladimir Solovyev completed his studies at the University of Moscow in 1873. The next year he defended his master's dissertation *The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists. (Krizis zapadnoj filosofii: Protiv pozitivistov)* and in 1880 his doctoral dissertation *A Critique of Abstract Principles (Kritika otvlečennyx načal).* From 1877 until 1881 he lectured on philosophy at the universities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. In 1881 he held a public lecture in which he called for clemency for the revolutionaries who were being tried by the czarist government as responsible for the murder of Alexander II. Because of this lecture he was forced to leave the university. As of 1881 he was active in literature and journalism.

Religious and idealistic characteristics are basic to Solovyev's philosophical views. In his dissertations he correctly criticized Western European bourgeois philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries, especially the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. He reproached them, on the one hand, for conceding too much room to reason and, on the other hand, for bestowing on faith too little consideration. Solovyev endorsed the mysticism of the German philosophers Eduard von Hartmann and Arthur Schopenhauer. He considered the synthesis of science, philosophy, and religion – in which science and philosophy should be subordinate to theology – as the supreme goal and the ultimate result of the intellectual development of humanity. In reference to the factual limitation of bourgeois philosophy as well as its inability to furnish an integral theory of knowledge and to connect sense knowledge with rational knowledge, Solovyev criticized the gap between theory and practice characteristic of bourgeois philosophy and called for the foundation of a system of "integral knowledge" – theosophy. Solovyev's theory of knowledge was religious and mystical. He characterized faith as the first and founding level of knowledge and thereby obliterated all existing boundaries between scientific knowledge and religious revelation.

Solovyev's interests applied to the theology and history not only of Christianity but also of other religions. He announced the founding of a Christian theocratic world monarchy. He developed this reactionary idea from the views of the Slavophils. Solovyev considered the actualization of this idea "the historical assignment of the Russian people" and the means to overcome "the enmity between the East and the West." Between 1887 and 1888 he polemicized against the neo-Slavophils. He opposed their extreme nationalism with the cosmopolitan message of a "national self-renunciation" of the Russian people in the sense of a service to the religious idea of the Orthodox and Catholic churches.

Solovyev proclaimed peace between classes. He recommended that the exploiters transform the riches obtained through exploitation into "material for the actualization of the highest religious principle." In a demagogic manner he called for the elimination of social and national contradictions but pointed to the false path of religion instead of to revolution. Thus, for example, he was against the pogrom of the Jews, but instead of the struggle for a democratization of the social life in czarist Russia he required a "religious solution to the Jewish question," that is: the union of Judaism and Christianity.

Solovyev's ethical views are closely related to his religious and mystical world-view. He believed that it is impossible to speak of morality without recognizing a religious principle. In his opinion, the feelings of shame, pity

and reverence are basic to morality. Solovyev also occupied himself with aesthetic questions and even wrote poetry which is closely related to the Symbolists in its spiritual content although he rejected the poetry of the decadents. Solovyev's aesthetic views were also religiously and idealistically grounded. His ideas enjoyed great popularity in the noble and middle class circles of czarist Russia. During the period of reaction (1908–1911) they were propagated by the members of the liberal "Vekhi" group and were set over against the progressive materialistic philosophy of the Russian revolutionary democrats as "the authentic Russian philosophy."

Solovyev's works: Sobranie sočinenij, t. 1–10, vtoroe izdanie, SPB (*Collected Works,* St. Petersburg [1911 until 1913], [without specifying the author]).

(Translated from Russian by the author).

III. 'AGAINST CONTEMPORARY FALSIFIERS OF THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY', 1960

I. JA. ŠČIPANOV (ed.): *Protiv sovremennyx fal'sifikatorov istorii russkoj filosofii.* Sbornik statej (*Against Contemporary Falsifiers of the History of Russian Philosophy.* Collected articles), Moscow 1960 (456 pp.). Here P.S. ŠKURINOV: "*K ocenke idealizma VI. Solov'eva*" ("On Judging VI. Solovyev's Idealism"), chapter 15, pp. 388–403.

There has been a considerable increase in the "interest" of bourgeois historians and sociologists in the ideal heritage of Vladimir Solovyev recently. Mass editions of the works of this Russian philosopher and mystic have appeared in the U.S.A., in West Germany, England, France, Italy, and in the Netherlands. Voluminous monographs have been dedicated to Solovyev's personality and philosophy. Magazines have published hundreds of articles [about him].

But why have Solovyev and his philosophy become objects of particular attention and reverence today in certain circles of the bourgeois world? To whom does it appear at the moment profitable to popularize the views of this philosopher and theologian? To answer this question we must fundamentally and briefly analyze the spiritual heritage of Vladimir Solovyev and his school. We must also investigate the character of the commentaries and conclusions of the modern converts of the Russian mystic.

Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyev [1853–1900] is well-known not only within our country but also outside of it as a religiously engaged idealistic philosopher, as a writer for the bourgeoisie and the nobility as well as a

theologian and mystical poet. He was a son of the historian S.M. Solovyev [1820–1879]. He studied at the University of Moscow, but soon preferred the ecclesiastical academy of St. Sergius (Zagorsk). Vladimir Solovyev later wrote that the theological spiritualists P.D. Yurkevich [1827–1874] and V.D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov [1828–1891] were the teachers whom he revered the most. They are well-known for their enmity towards the Marxist and democratic world-view as well as for their struggle against Russian revolutionary democracy.

He published a great number of articles and books as a constant contribution to the journals "Vestnik Yevropy" [Moscow 1802–1830 and 1866–1918], "Pravoslavnoye obozreniye" [Moscow 1860–1891], "Bogoslovsky vestnik" [Sergiyev posad 1892–1918], "Rus'" [ed. Ivan Sergeyevich Axakov; Moscow 1880–1885/86], and "Nedelya" [St. Petersburg 1866–1901]. Among these are the following main works: *The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists (Krizis zapadnoj filosofii: Protiv pozitivistov,* 1874), *A Critique of Abstract Principles (Kritika otvlečennyx načal,* 1880), *Lectures on God-manhood (Čtenija o Bogočelovečestve,* 1877–1881), *The History and Future of Theocracy (Istorija i buduščnost' teokratii,* 1885–1887), *The National Question in Russia (Nacional'nyj vopros v Rossii,* 1883–1888), *China and Europe (Kitaj i Evropa,* 1890), *Theoretical Philosophy (Teoretičeskaja filosofija,* 1899) and *Three Conversations (Tri razgovora,* 1899–1900).

In their struggle to preserve their status the aristocracy, the nobleman and the bourgeois circles of Russia made use of the person of Solovyev as the originator of those ideas, which appear to be suitable to unite the reactionary forces under the conditions of the rapid growth first of the revolutionary-democratic movement, then of the proletarian movement. Solovyev's views represented a reaction against the fact that the democratic powers in the country grew stronger and the sympathy of the progressive intelligentsia increased for materialism and atheism. This was precisely the reason why Solovyev's ideas were so clearly followed by the contributors to the journal "Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii" [Moscow 1889–1918] and the authors of the [collected articles] "Vekhi" [Sbornik statej o russkoj intelligencii ("Signposts," collected articles on Russian intelligentsia, Moscow 1909)], the members of the "Black Hundreds" [1905–1917] and of the Constitutional Democratic Party [October 1905–December 1917], that is: all those who at the time of the first Russian revolution and after its defeat lead a filthy war against democracy and its world-view.

Many modern bourgeois "scholars" of Solovyev's heritage (E. Benz, E. Münzer, H. Kohn, F. Muckermann, L. Müller, etc.) refer their readers to

the "childhood illness" of the later author of the *Theoretical Philosophy* when they discuss the evolution of his philosophical views. They usually characterize this period of Solovyev as "the great error of the genius" and as his "spiritual drama" and his mature views as "suffered while struggling with the evil of the age." N. Lossky [1870–1965], V. Zenkovsky [1881–1962] and S. Bulgakov [1871–1944] emphasize in their books the "evolution" of V. Solovyev's views from materialism to idealism and from socialism to the moderate ideas of "progress."

However, neither the early biographical sources on Solovyev nor his theoretical heritage itself confirm this version of the Russian idealist's "youthful sins." It is true that one can trace signs of an evolution in his world-view from his youthful poetry via his diary on up to the works of the final years of his life. However this development takes place only on the foundation of idealism and in the direction of an increasing approximation to religion and mystical doctrine. Even such biographers of Solovyev as K. Mochulsky,[1] W. Szyłkarski [1884–1960][2] and others do not hide the fact that he could hardly have been a materialist and atheist since he had always represented views which are foreign to these forms of social thinking.

Bourgeois "Christian" historians of Russian philosophy – neo-Thomists and neo-Scholastics – try to demonstrate, in reference to Solovyev's "spiritual drama," that the "thinking man" must inevitably hit upon idealism, religion and the liberal principles of "social evolution." They maintain that entrance into the church, religion and mysticism are the way of salvation for the really talented. Progressive scientists who were contemporaries of Solovyev thought differently. Thus, K.A. Timiryazev [1843–1920] commented that precisely mysticism and religious spirit had put Solovyev's undeniable talents in the service of the Scholastic reaction against science and thereby destroyed them.[3]

From the very first day he entered philosophy, Solovyev declared war on philosophical materialism, modern science and the socio-political movement of the progressive people of Russia.

In Solovyev's master's dissertation, *The Crisis of Western Philosophy,* his interest in theology was very obvious. It was not by chance that "Pravoslavnoe obozrenie," a journal notorious as the pugnacious propaganda instrument for mysticism and religion, first published this work. Solovyev linked his investigation of 19th century philosophical systems, among others especially the views of A. Comte [1798–1857], not only to a "rightist" criticism, but also to a constant approximation of philosophy to theology. He tried to prove that "the subject of philosophy [is] essentially the individual I as knowing."[4] Solovyev asserted that philosophy could not be the world-view

of larger groups of men, of peoples and of nations. At the same time he held the thesis that religion was inextricably connected with the world-view of peoples. He tried to demonstrate that this connection was bound by rules and immortal.

In their struggle against Marxism, modern "Christian" historians of Russian philosophy take advantage of these ideas of Solovyev. They characterize Leninism as a "revolutionary utopia" of individuals and juxtapose to it religion as the "universal ideological form of the human understanding of the world."[5]

Vladimir Solovyev endeavored to theologize philosophy. The entire logic of his treatises on the object and the task of philosophy makes this evident. Religion was allowed to form the fundamental content of philosophy. The latter had to "use all its means to attain the universal and highest goal of knowledge which is determined by theology."[6]

Solovyev saw the escape from the "crisis" of Western philosophy in a further development of the mystical religious systems of A. Schopenhauer [1788–1860] and E. Hartmann [1842–1906]. In his opinion, the greatest achievement of the "most recent philosophy" of Hartmann consisted in the fact that it expressed "the same truths in the form of rational knowledge which were expressed in the form of faith and of spiritual vision in the theological doctrines of the East."

Solovyev represented a "philosophy of the trans-conscious," which should be actualized in a universal synthesis of science, philosophy and religion. He tried to create a "universal" epistemological system which claimed to unite science, philosophy and religion and which was called "free theosophy." In Solovyev's opinion, idealistic philosophy was inseparably linked with theology.

To actualize his principle of the "synthesis of science, philosophy and religion," the Russian mystic referred apprehensively to the scientific theories and hypotheses of Kant [1724–1804] and Laplace [1749–1827], to the teachings of Darwin [1809–1882], to the discoveries of Sechenov [1829–1905], etc.

Bourgeois "Christian" historians of philosophy justify this relation of Solovyev to the sciences. In accordance with the Pope's encyclicals, they call for "interpretations"[7] of scientific truths, of the most recent discoveries of natural science, by their accommodation to religion. However, if arguments corresponding to the modern results of science directly or indirectly contradict the "Holy Bible," and are not adaptable to a "religious synthesis," then the contemporary Scholastics reject them as heretical. Up until now not only the teachings of Darwin, the discoveries of Sechenov, Pavlov

[1849–1936], and Haeckel [1834–1919], but also the teachings of Marxism-Leninism belonged to this category of knowledge. Solovyev saw the task and the goal of his theoretical research as the necessity to "report" and to "justify"[8] Christian faith in its fundamental statements as well as "to bring religious truth into the form of free and rational thought."[9]

Modern European neo-Thomists – in particular the Western German and the Italian – consider Solovyev's claim to "rationally" refashion religious dogmatism in the name of saving the "faith of the Fathers," as well as his endeavour to transform philosophy into a handmaiden of theology *(ancilla theologiae)* to be a "scientific requirement." E. Benz, G. Wetter, L. Müller, J. Pieper, R. Keller, B. Schultze, V. Sechkaryov and others in their works actualize the theological principles of the Patristics in a modern way. Their judgements about the social thought of Russia demonstrate this impressively.

The Catholic, F. Muckermann, sees in the fact that Solovyev gave a theological determination to the commission and purpose of philosophy, a determination which is very much like the spirit of the Middle Ages, "the daring attempt to create the true understanding of the world."[10] The Protestant theologians, E. Benz, and L. Müller, are of the opinion that Solovyev's ideas are "extraordinarily significant." They speak of the "mystery" of his influence in our time. Finally such an odious "researcher" of the orthodox direction as Zenkovsky values the theological determination of philosophy as the "true achievement" of Solovyev in the history of Russian social thought.[11] Zenkovsky's judgement, that the "approximation of philosophy and faith in Solovyev was of greater benefit to philosophy than to faith" – "in other words [that] in him philosophy took more from faith than the other way around"[12] – can excite only irony.

Vasily Zenkovksy conceals from the reader the important fact that Russian representatives of the natural sciences, such as Sechenov, Mendeleyev [1834–1907], Pavlov, Mechnikov [1845–1916], Timiryazev and Michurin [1855–1935], have rejected Solovyev's philosophy. Vladimir Solovyev maintained that being *(Sein)* is a product of the "supreme" divine "principle." For him God and world are related as cause and effect to one another. Following the example of Plato [427–347 B.C.] visible nature is also founded in Solovyev on a "world-soul," on a "realm of ideas," on an "ideal cosmos," which allegedly manifest themselves simultaneously in that "being," which is "one" and "all," in atoms and in the planets, in man and humanity, in the universe and in God. Nevertheless, neither Solovyev nor his disciples succeed in forgetting that God as the "first cause" and "primordial ground" of all beings has "predetermined" them.

Bourgeois commentators of Solovyev's philosophy present "contradictory

views" in regard to the question as to which element of his doctrines has priority: ontology, cosmogony, epistemology or anthropology (including sociology). A. Vvedensky [1856–1925], N. Lossky [1870–1965], W. Szylkarski [1884–1960] and L. Müller are of the opinion that the "ontological attitude" dominates in Solovyev. S. Bulgakov [1871–1944], L. Zander [1893–1964] and J. Pieper consider the "sophiological attitude" as decisive. L. Lopatin [1855–1920], F. Muckermann and E. Benz, on the other hand, hold the opinion that the "heuristic (God-human) attitude" of Solovyev is to be considered essential, etc.

Since we need not act as an arbiter for the religious historians of Russian philosophy, we would like merely to say the following. Many bourgeois scholars of Solovyev's ideas have long since agreed to grant priority to the "theological attitude" of this Russian religious seeker of truth. It is certainly true that during his life Solovyev devoted himself to various questions of philosophy, science, politics and society. However, the theological principle of demonstrating the dogmas of faith always and constantly had priority for him.

The *ontology* of the Russian idealist was based on the following assumptions: in nature "only another interrelation of the same elements, which does not belong to [nature]" is actualized "which [elements] also constitute the being *(Sein)* of the divine world"[13]; divine will gives order and "form" to this "contingent" world of "chaos." Consequently, what we are dealing with here is pure theological thinking.

We discover the same thing in Solovyev's *epistemology.* In trying to ask and answer the question of the cognitive possibilities of man, and of the nature of the cognitive process, the theological "motif" takes the upper hand – and not only in *The Crisis of Western Philosophy,* but also in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge,* in the *Lectures of God-manhood* and in the *Three Conversations.* For example, in the *Lectures on God-manhood,* everything which the author relates to ontology, cosmogony and anthropology is unified by the concept of "divine incarnation." Thus, philosophy (and especially epistemology) proves to be completely permeated by faith. In fact, in Solovyev's opinion, there is no limit between the mystical and the natural.

However, since he did not want to share the lot of the agnostics, he sought to defend the view that man is able to know not only nature and society but also divine nature. However, Solovyev simultaneously approached Kant's view – and not just in regard to the "critique of empirical knowledge" but also in regard to the critique of "pure reason" and the apologetic of the beyond as that which is unknowable in its essence. Knowledge of the "existing

totally-one," that is, God, represented in Solovyev's opinion true understanding and true knowledge. However, since the empirical sciences had proved to be "inadequate" for such purposes, philosophy "sterile," and theology in its earlier form "weak," Solovyev considered it necessary to "revive" the traditional understanding of object and of the means for knowledge – by linking them to a whole, which he called "positive total-unity." Solovyev tried to prove that truth could only be obtained by the union of all cognitive powers, namely, faith, science and philosophy. Still, he believed that in this combination absolute priority belongs to faith. He designated this "mystified cognitive process" as the "realization of the possibility of integral knowledge."

Since "communion with the absolute" represented the major task of knowledge for this mystic, mystical means also corresponded to these mystical goals: the "act of faith," "religious feeling," and "revelation."

Without dealing more closely with Solovyev's writings on epistemological questions, we would like to emphasize that contemporary foreign bourgeois-clerical historians of philosophy reproduce his epistemology even to its minutest details in their propaganda for the views of the Russian philosopher of religion. Some commentators of Solovyev's heritage, who with delight choose one or another metaphysical principle of their teacher and make it their own, interpret his thought as they please. Among these are not only S. Bulgakov, N. Berdyayev [1874–1948] and D. Merezhkovsky [1865–1941] of sad memory, but also W. Szyłkarski, G. Valts, L. Zander, M. Winkler, I. Haller, G. Freier, B. Schultze, G. Wetter, H. Falk, etc. They write and often ascribe to their "spiritual father" values and virtues, which the latter had never in fact possessed. S. Bulgakov, N. Berdyayev, V. Zenkovsky, W. Szyłkarski and others go as far as to maintain that the Russian mystic had "developed Hegel's dialectic."

However, Solovyev, by attempting to use Hegel's dialectic to found his "system of integral knowledge," that is, theosophy, constantly erred in abstract forms of historical analogies, in arbitrary antitheses, in the "transcendental deduction," in a prejudiced connection of facts and in an unnatural "reconciliation" of such concepts as God and man, nature and divine Sophia, earth and "world-soul," etc.

There can be no doubt that the bourgeois-clerical historians of philosophy [only] make use of the authority of the German thinker [Hegel] because they want to protect the Russian fabricator of God [Solovyev] and thus to oblige contemporary Christian "philosophy."

Solovyev could not have "developed Hegel's dialectic." He was a declared enemy of the progressive ideas of the science of his time, an enemy

of dialectical materialism. Scientific thought undermines the roots of every religious-idealistic world-view. As far as dialectical materialism is concerned, it is, in the words of G. Plekhanov [1856–1918], "completely unsuitable for the fabrication of God."[14] Even P. Milyukov [1859–1943] had to admit that "Solovyev's methodological procedures" were extraordinarily "removed from the universal methods of scientific thought." This liberal historian of Russian philosophy, whom it is impossible to suspect of a prejudiced relation to Solovyev's views, wrote that "in a word, the contemplative ability of the Medieval mystic is linked with the Scholastic casuistry of an experienced Talmudist in Solovyev's doctrine .... One would seek these methods in vain in modern logic. To find them it is not even sufficient to turn away from the logic of Mill [1806–1873] and to turn to the logic of Hegel [1770–1831]. For this purpose, one must return to the logic of Origen of Alexandria [185–254]."[15]

Nevertheless, one must emphasize that Solovyev could masterfully manipulate "his method" in pursuing "his goals." At times he brought some of his inexperienced opponents into difficult situations. Sophistical devices belonged to his most preferred form of "argumentation," of his pugnacious defense for a religious understanding of the world. In criticizing the views of the Russian Darwinists, Solovyev characterized them as "nihilists" preaching a belief based on a "peculiar syllogism": "Man descended from apes, therefore we must love one another." The absurdity of this "critique" is clear to anyone who is familiar with the basics of Darwin's teachings and who knows the arguments with which Pisarev [1840–1868], Mechnikov, Timiryazev and others propagandized for Darwinism in Russia. Only the Christian historians of Russian philosophy do not want to notice this because they want to use Solovyev's views to demonstrate the "religious character" of Russian materialism during the second half of the 19th century. The principles of the *philosophy of religion* "developed" by Solovyev are fundamental to his religious-idealistic view of man, of society and of history. According to them, the "becoming of the absolute" in the "chaos of being *(Sein)*" is justified by the "divine principle" (Logos, Sophia). This becoming leads to the perfection of the "cosmic process": to the birth of the "natural man," to the genesis of the "historical process" and ultimately to the appearance of the "spiritual man."[16] In Solovyev's opinion, Christ was the creator of "divine-human history" on earth and simultaneously the incarnation of Logos and of Sophia.

W. Szyłkarski sees in this mystical view of nature, man and his history the "absolute synthesis of finite and infinite," while V. Zenkovsky maintains that "in Solovyev the historical and the logical coincide."[17] Theoretically it

is difficult to locate anywhere else a more erroneous understanding of the problem of the connection between the historical and the logical than that of contemporary Christian historians of philosophy.

Solovyev believed that the actual history of humanity began with the "birth of Christ" and would end with the establishment of the "kingdom of God" on earth. He considered the "moral," or more precisely, the religious-mystical principle, the most essential element in the developmental process of society, that is, in its "historical ascent toward the unconditioned goal." He considered economic and juridical relations, on the other hand, of secondary importance as factors of social history. Solovyev wrote [in the preface to *A Critique of Abstract Principles*]: "Normal society must be founded on a spiritual covenant or on a church which sets unconditioned goals for society. The realms of the state and of the economy should serve as the formal and material environment in which the divine principle represented by the church is actualized."[18]

Solovyev concludes from this that "true normal society [must] be determined as free theocracy."[19] He considers the "moral principle," that is, his theosophy, the instrument for the practical actualization of theocracy. In accordance with this projection of the development of social life, Solovyev demanded recognition of the church as the highest social principle. He saw in the church a power competent to solve all the major problems of human existence. Still K.A. Timiryazev was correct in stating that although this philosopher of faith for awhile represented the view of the "antithesis Christ-Xerxes," he soon progressed to "an identity of cross and sword."[20] In the name of the union of material and spiritual factors, the church must according to Solovyev, enter into a "free alliance" not only with the monarchial power which embodies the "formal" legal principle but also with the aristocratic-bourgeois social classes which prove to be the bearer of the "material element" in the life of society.

When the moderns translated Solovyev's "Christian" sociology into the language of politics, they understood that he led his battle to restrict czarist power with the weapons of "church authority" and with the rights of the regional self-governing organizations *(zemstva)*. That is, he came forward as a defender of monarchial power which was religious in form and which was only slightly diminished by a constitution.

Solovyev's Christian philosophy defended "mundane" political goals. His ideas about transforming Russia's social and state organization by an alliance among the bourgeoisie, the nobility and the czarists, an alliance consecrated by the church and its rationalized faith, represented the ideological counterpart to the political program of the Populists *(narodniki)*

of the seventies and later to Marxism-Leninism. The reactionary content of Solovyev's ideas was clearly recognized at the end of the 19th century as well as before and after the first Russian revolution. The political blocks of the "upper classes" used Solovyev's code of ideas to justify their apostasy. In regard to the masses which had arisen to fight for democracy, the nobility, the bourgeois, and the clerics began to call the czarist power for help and to praise it [czarist power] as "patriotic."

Solovyev's ideal of "theocracy" impressed many contemporary European bourgeois sociologists who work on projects for "healing" the social relations in their countries. The Christian sociologist, Gustav Canoval, predicts a quick triumph of religious monarchial thought in his book *The Future Monarchy*. He prophetically announces that "the religious state – is tomorrow's reality!" Characteristically, the content of Canoval's book is completely satiated with Solovyev's ideas of "free theocracy," of progress, and of the "ideal, divine construction of society."[21]

Another Christian sociologist, Heinrich Falk, presents few differences when compared to G. Canoval. He frightens the European bourgeoisie with "Soviet atheism" in his book, *The Bolshevik World-View,* and in his article "Church and Communism."[22] The conclusions which present-day neo-Thomists try to suggest to their readers speak for themselves: learn from the history of Russia, which "suffers" so much under the ideas of communism, because it was unable to actualize the ideas of its Christian thinkers.

Just as Solovyev did in his time, Christian philosophers of our day similarly recommend rationalized faith and the church as the means to "overcome" class-conditioned and national contradictions. Thus, it is clear that the defenders of capital are mortally afraid of the increase in the democratic movement and that they try to use the powers of clerical reaction to prevent the victory of democracy.

In our time making the state and the social order clerical is the method approved of by the monopolies in their struggle to isolate and weaken democratic forces. The dream of a fusion of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism into one religion under the direction of the Roman Pope and the Russian czar is the concrete expression of Solovyev's "theocratic utopia." In Solovyev's opinion, the "kingdom of God" on earth could only be actualized with the aid of such an alliance. Contemporary Catholic historians of philosophy, including G. Wetter, M. Winkler, F. Muckermann, W. Szyłkarski and G. Canoval, proclaim precisely this "papal religious principle of clerical monarchy" found in Solovyev. It is not by chance that F. Muckermann characterizes Solovyev's sympathies for Catholicism and

the Papacy as "the great rediscovery of the 19th century,"[23] while W. Szyłkarski praises him as the "great apologist of the Catholic faith and church unity."[24]

Thus, the "19th century Augustine," as the contemporary followers of Solovyev like to call him, saw his task not in opening the way for the new forces of Russian social life, but rather in reviving the faint powers of the old order and in giving them a new color. His philosophical system clothed the actual social relations in a mystical and religious garment. The defenders of autonomy tried to conceal with this those contradictions which resulted from the growing social crisis in Russia in the last quarter of the 19th century. The hopes and the dreads of the disintegrating forces of Russian society at the end of the 19th century are reflected in the repugnant forms of Solovyev's mystical prophecies. For him man could enter into happiness not by destroying the foundations of the old order but by "reforming" its individual elements.

Solovyev's comment, which is frequently quoted by bourgeois historians of philosophy, that "the momentary state of mankind . . . [must] be changed, transformed,"[25] first takes on its true meaning in the light of the reactionary content of the socio-political ideals of this philosopher of religion. The true significance of these ideals becomes still clearer when one takes into consideration that Solovyev fought in general the ideals of socialism and in particular Marx's ideas of scientific socialism.

This aspect of Solovyev's views is emphasized again and again by contemporary bourgeois historians of philosophy. They tirelessly remind their readers that Vladimir Solovyev devoted hundreds of pages in his works to a "refutation" of socialism and a "critique" of Marxist theory.

The method Solovyev uses to "dethrone" Marxism is extraordinarily instructive for the bourgeois spokesmen for a "refutation" of scientific socialism. Like all enemies of communism, Solovyev also attempts "to strike" Marxism at its crucial point, namely, its doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the principle of true democracy. He explained that to actualize the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat would inevitably lead to an "unbearable rule by the collective." His attempt to prove that "the despotism of an individual [is] by far more pleasant than the despotism of the masses"[26] by misrepresenting the nature of the interrelations of person and society in socialism amounted to nothing.

Modern historians of philosophy, such as E. Benz and L. Müller, endeavor in vain to convince their readers that Solovyev "worried about the fate of the person"[27] and was "apprehensive about bourgeois freedoms."[28] In reality the prospect of the masses awakening to a self-consciousness of

their class disturbed the Russian idealist. He feared for the aristocratic-bourgeois privileges. The outlines of a bourgeois individualism inimically disposed to a democratic world-view clearly emerged in his judgements about the future of democracy. It is not without reason that at the end of his life Solovyev saw the omen of the "coming of the Antichrist" *(Three Conversations)* in the active manifestations of Russia's democratic forces. Therefore, he stubbornly asserted that Marx's theories were "imperfect," "doomed to fail," and "anti-intellectualistic." At the same time he called on the Russian intelligentsia to turn towards faith and religion.[29]

Any unprejudiced observer recognizes today that the illusions of the enemies of scientific socialism have collapsed. In the meantime history itself has proven that the teachings of Marx are a power which conquers everything. Socialism has become a world system. Under its standard more than a third of mankind aspires to a happy life. Under present conditions one must be not only deaf but also blind, if one is not afraid – even with the danger of appearing foolish – to borrow arguments from Vladimir Solovyev in order to attack Marxism-Leninism as the modern Scholastics do. They have learned absolutely nothing either from the lamentable fate of the "economists" or from the bankruptcy of "legal Marxism" or from the fiasco of the "Vekhi" authors. V. Zenkovsky and L. Zander would like to become famous for their "refutation" of Marxism-Leninism. The hobby of overturning scientific socialism was also to the taste of the Jesuits, G. Wetter and B. Schultze, who found "preheated" seats in the Papal Oriental Institute. Similarly Marxism-Leninism "allows no peace" to certain representatives of the ecumenical (Protestant) movement, such as W.A. Visser 't Hooft, S. Tompkins, R. Niebuhr, and others. They all refer frequently to Solovyev's ideas in their ugly insinuations against Marxism-Leninism, without being ashamed of the untenability and questionability of these "arguments."

In their effort to denigrate the role of Marxism-Leninism, contemporary falsifiers announce that Solovyev's views represent the "summit of Russian philosophy." According to Berdyayev, Solovyev's philosophy constitutes "the upper story of Russian culture, the pearl of the cultural renaissance of Russia in the 19th century."[30] Christian historians of philosophy explain that the ideas of the Russian mystic first began to exercise their presently detectable influence only after his death. These ideas would now "be experiencing their renaissance" in Europe and would "celebrate their triumph."[31] At the same time, completely meaningless phrases are repeated such as that the main reason for Solovyev's unpopularity in his native land at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century consisted in the "insufficient cultural level of Russia."

Bourgeois "scholars" of today juxtapose the reactionary ideas of Solovyev to Leninism. They maintain that the latter neither possessed a "foundation" nor corresponded to the "temper" of the majority of the population in Russia during the first quarter of this century. For this purpose they discover in Solovyev's works not only a "national spirit" but also a "profound expression of the Russian idea," "agreement with the progressive and thinking Russia," etc.

In their struggle with Marxism-Leninism modern Scholastics try to suggest to their readers a belief in the veracity of the Christian doctrine as well as a recognition of the authority of the church and of the rights of religion to control science. Solovyev's ideas are used for these purposes.

Towards the end of his life the Russian mystic intensified preaching the idea of the particular mission of Russia in the history of humanity "on the path of its religious development." He became the deliverer of the extremely reactionary ideas of the "yellow peril," which threatened civilization allegedly from the direction of Mongolia, Japan and China. At the same time Solovyev approved of the actions of the English in the Boer War. Thus, he openly defended the claims of the imperialistic powers to a partitioning of the world and justified wars of aggression.

It was not due to chance that in 1900 the students of the University of Moscow condemned the major part of the *Three Conversations* – the "Antichrist" – and denounced it as a clumsy piece of reactionary work.

K.A. Timiryazev, who recognized the enormous social harm of Solovyev's sociological conclusions, emphasized at that time that the mystical predictions of the author of the *Three Conversations* were inimical to the people. He wrote: "No, no religious philosophy, no transcendental ethics, will preserve us from being inspired by words which 'reek of blood' . . ."[32]

Towards the end of his life Solovyev contrived the reactionary prophecy that the collapse of humanity was imminent.

After Solovyev's lecture "On the End of World History" in March 1900 at Petersburg even the archreactionary, V. Rozanov [1856–1919] was compelled to distantiate himself from his supporter in the journal "Russkoye Bogatstvo" [St. Petersburg 1880–1918].

The completely reactionary press of Russia and Europe bitterly mourned the death of the Russian mystic. Monarchists, liberals, and theologians, in special journal editions, mentioned with a "good word" one who had served their ideals with his work.

The founding group of the "Vekhi" proved to be "followers of Solovyev." Lenin said that they were an "encyclopaedia of liberal renegades." N. Berdyayev [1874–1948] and S. Bulgakov [1871–1944] in the "Vekhi"

attacked the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia while praising Solovyev.

On the part of the Russian Marxists, Solovyev and his followers received a suitable rebuff. Lenin considered it necessary even during the founding of "Iskra" to subject the views of the religious-mystical philosopher to a Marxist critique.[33]

Even in his first works Lenin exposed the attempts "to attach" the Russian intelligentsia to mysticism and religion, to stupefy the working class by religious prejudices, and to divert them from class-warfare.

Lenin's works bear witness to the significance which the Marxists of Russia attributed to the struggle against idealism and mysticism in general and against the views of Solovyev in particular.lar.

One can determine the actual position of Solovyev as a representative of the idealistic trend in philosophy only from Marxist-Leninist positions. And it is only from these positions that all attempts of modern bourgeois ideologists to use Solovyev's ideas to defend decaying capitalism and to fight materialism can be exposed.

(Translated from Russian by the author)

IV. 'HISTORY OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY', 1961

GALAKTIONOV, Anatolij Andrianovič, and NIKANDROV, Petr Fedotovič, *Istorija russkoj filosofii (History of Russian Philosophy),* Moscow 1961 (459 pages).

Here VIIth section: *Krizis russkoj domarksistskoj filosofii:* Rasprostranenie marksizma v Rossii (70 – 80-e gody XIX v.). Glava pervaja: Osnovnye napravlenija idealizma. 1. V. S. Solov'ev (The Crisis of pre-Marxist Russian Philosophy. The Spread of Marxism in Russia ['70s–'80s of the XIXth century].

Chapter One: The Fundamental Directions of Idealism. 1. V.S. SOLOVYEV, pp. 382–387.

Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyev (1853–1900) was one of the most important representatives of religious-mystical idealism in Russian 19th century philosophy. The ideas not only of Khomyakov [1804–1860], Kireyevsky [1806–1856], and Yurkevich [1827–1874] but also the teachings of the European idealists Schelling [1775–1854], Schopenhauer [1788–1860] and Hartmann [1842–1906] are fundamental to the metaphysical system of "integral knowledge" created by Solovyev, which considers the synthesis of science, philosophy and religion as the supreme task as well as the ultimate result of the intellectual development of mankind. In this half-

philosophical, half-theological system ontology should reduce the material unity of the world to the divine "total-unity." Epistemology should substantiate irrational knowledge and sociology should make evident a worldwide Christian theocratic monarchy as the highest ideal of society.

Vl. Solovyev was a son of the Russian historian S.M. Solovyev [1820–1879]. In his early youth the socialist and materialist ideas of the [pre-Marxist] "theoreticians of the sixties" [of the 19th century: "šestidesjatniki"] exercised a certain influence on him. He read the essays of Pisarev [1840–1868] especially thoroughly. However, this youthful enthusiasm quickly disappeared. Solovyev soon turned to religion where he tried to find the answer to all philosophical, scientific and social questions. Following the completion of his studies at the University of Moscow he lectured for a short time in Moscow [1875–1877] and Petersburg [1880–1881]. From 1881 on he was for the most part active in scientific and literary journalistic areas. Solovyev left behind a large and thematically multifarious heritage. Translations also belonged to this; among others Kant's *Prolegomena* and some Platonic dialogues. He assisted in the publication of the encyclopaedic dictionary of Brockhaus and Yefron [*Enciklopedičeskij Slovar'* pod redakciej professora Ivana Efimoviča Andreevskago, t. 1–82 (St. Petersburg 1890–1904), dopolnitel'nye toma I–II v četyrex knigax (St. Petersburg 1905–1907)], of which he was the editor of the philosophy articles. Solovyev was also a constant contributor to various journals. Among these are "Pravoslavnoye obozreniye" [Moscow 1860–1891], "Bogoslovsky vestnik" [Sergiyev posad 1892–1918], "Rus" [ed. Ivan Sergeyevich Axakov, Moscow, 1880–1885/86], "Vestnik Yevropy" [Moscow 1802–1830 and 1866–1918] and others. Scattered throughout them is a great number of essays, discussions, treatises, etc. Moreover Solovyev wrote a whole series of significant philosophical works: *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (*Krizis zapadnoj filosofii;* master's dissertation, 1874), *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* (*Filosofskija načala cel'nago znanija,* 1877), *A Critique of Abstract Principles* (*Kritika otvlečennyx načal;* doctoral dissertation 1880), *Lectures on God-manhood* (*Čtenija o Bogočelovečestve,* 1877–1881), *The Spiritual Foundations of Life* (*Duxovnyja osnovy žizni,* 1882–1884), *The Great Dispute and Christian Policy* (*Velikij spor i xristianskaja politika,* 1883), *The History and Future of Theocracy* (*Istorija i buduščnost' teokratii,* 1885–1887), *L'Idée russe* and *La Russie et l'Église universelle* (*Russkaja ideja* and *Rossija i vselenskaja cerkov';* Paris, 1888 and 1889) and others. Shortly after Solovyev's death a ten-volume collection of his works appeared in two editions from 1901 until 1903 [07]. This was supplemented

later by three volumes of letters. In 1911 a second edition of Vl. Solovyev's works was published.

In the course of his life Solovyev repeatedly came into conflict with autocratic power and the Orthodox church. He condemned the striving of the ruling classes for "material enrichment" and recognized that many social abuses were based just on this striving. However he directed his sharpest attacks against the bourgeois order in Western Europe where "the people only rule themselves *de iure* while *de facto* a decreasingly small part of the people – namely the rich bourgeoisie, the capitalists – exercise power over them" *(Sobranie sočinenij,* vol. I, St. Petersburg 1911, p. 274). Solovyev writes elsewhere that in the bourgeois countries "the division of labor and capital manifests itself everywhere as the exploitation of labor by capital; the proletariat with all of its needs results from this exploitation as the product" (*Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 129).

However these kinds of judgements of Solovyev in no way diminish the extremely reactionary character of his thought. His philosophical and sociological constructions represented one of the forms of expression of the aristocratic-bourgeois reaction in the time when feudal relations fell apart and the contradictions of the young Russian capitalism matured. It was therefore natural that the system of Solovyev's views in its totality stood opposed to the ideas of freedom of the revolutionary democracy as well as to Marxism which had already spread in Russia. Solovyev tried to show that Marxism was a doctrine which only considered the coarse material needs of mankind and completely ignored its spiritual life. However what especially stirred up the Russian theologian was that the socialists wanted to organize mankind outside of religion and the church.

Solovyev juxtaposed socialistic doctrines with his theocratic utopia. He was of the opinion that men are naturally inimically disposed to one another. This enmity results from the struggle for existence, for the vital material necessities. The struggle would first cease when humanity leaves the realm of its natural condition and of the external material interests connected with this. Peace among the classes and universal prosperity among men could only be obtained on a purely spiritual basis. The gradual spiritualization of men, their moral perfection, their entrance into the natural element of the divine "Logos" are of decisive importance here. Solovyev maintained that morality does not depend to any extent on the material principle which holds sway in economic relations. It also does not rest on the rational principle which is expressed in the juridical and state relations. Since the economic and political relations taken in themselves only alienate man, they can not constitute the

true life of society. Solovyev represented the view that a spiritual alliance must provide the foundation for a normal society. This is most perfectly embodied by the church. The economic and state relations, on the other hand, should only serve as a material medium in which the actualization of the divine principle represented by the church takes place. Thus, the Russian idealist and theologian arrived at this favorite idea of "God-manhood."

Solovyev idealized religion and the state not in the way they existed in Russia at that time. Thus, his views contradicted not only the official policy of the autocracy but also the ideology of the Orthodox church. He considered a reform not only of the church but also of the state imperative. But how should this take place? Solovyev turned against the division of the churches into an Orthodox and a Catholic. His ideal was the "ecumenical [universal] church," the prototype of which he saw embodied in the Vatican. The union of the Eastern and the Western church would, however, only be possible if a world-wide monarchy were created at the same time – and on the foundation of Russian absolutism. Only in this way could the "alliance" between God and man or "free theocracy" arise, which would guarantee an actual "Christian peace," "true freedom," and "universal justice."

Solovyev's Christian-theocratic utopia was based on the Slavophil conception of historical progress – if not in letter, then still in spirit. Here one found the same appeal to Christianity which is almost declared the meaning of the people's life the same endeavor to overcome the enmity between the East and the West on a religious basis, and the same reference to a special historical mission of the Russian people.

Solovyev already set forth the *initial principles* of his religious-idealistic system in his master's dissertation *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* [1874]. Their further development and substantiation took place in *The Philosophy of Integral Knowledge* [1877], in the doctoral work *A Critique of Abstract Principles* [1880], and in many other works which were devoted to various particular areas of philosophy.

In Solovyev's judgement, Western European philosophy fell into a severe crisis not only with its speculative starting point but also with its empirical one. It was unable to get out of this crisis by means of its own efforts. Even in the systems of Kant and Hegel the extremes of speculative rationalism already came clearly to light. Further development made evident the inability to provide an integrated theory of knowledge, to combine the sensible with the logical, theory with practice. This forced philosophy to seek assistance from faith. It is shown that the final results of the philo-

sophical development – according to Solovyev the idealistic doctrines of Schopenhauer, E. von Hartmann, and others also belong to these – substantiated in the form of rational knowledge precisely those views which are fundamental to the theological doctrines of the East in the form of belief. From this Solovyev concluded that the most modern philosophy essentially strives to unify the logical form characterizing European thought with the spiritual vision of the Eastern mystic. Thereby the long awaited alliance of philosophy with religion will be finally actualized.

Since Solovyev shared the critical views of Kireyevksy, Khomyakov and other Slavophils, that the rationalistic principles of Western philosophy are "limited," he considered the turning of European idealism toward theology and mysticism completely natural and legal. He openly declared that "philosophy in the sense of abstract, exclusively theoretical knowledge [had] ceased developing" and had "irrevocably passed over into the world of the past" (*Sobranie sočinenij* [second edition], vol. I, p. 27). Philosophy can and must certainly remain in existence however only for the purpose of "concentrating all its means on obtaining that universal and supreme goal of knowledge, which is determined by theology" (*Ibid.*, p. 287 [the same thing is also true for "independent science" according to *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge*]). Thus, Solovyev denied philosophy its independence and the right to a true significance. The nature of truth is comprehended neither in experience nor in reason. It is given neither in sensation nor in logical thought. While the experience and the sensation of our knowledge manifest only a relative actuality of the world, reason and logical thought bear witness to only a relative rationality of what takes place. Not only experience, which shows us what takes place, but also reason, which determines what should be, belong to the realm of conditioned being *(Sein)*. The unconditioned principle of all being is first given beyond this region – as its determining cause.

The unconditioned, absolute, supra-being [that which transcends all being], or – what was the same for Solovyev – God, constitutes the object of true knowledge. Confronted with him only a mystical or religious perception is possible, from which our logical thinking obtains its rationality and experience its reality. Solovyev strongly emphasized that all is decided in faith and in a certain mystical vision. Faith and mystical vision impress an indelible seal not only on reason but also on the senses. Even scientific knowledge is ultimately founded on religious perception.

The Russian mystic, however, did not want to free himself completely from empiricism and rationalism. Even if the object of knowledge was not determinable either as fact or as the nature of things, either as matter or as

the world of phenomena, not even as a system of concepts which logically develop themselves, according to Solovyev of all these aspects belong as material and formal attributes to the substance of truth. The nature of truth – the "totally-one" – should be grasped in "integral knowledge," which is based on an all-inclusive synthesis of religion, philosophy, and science – or, expressed differently, of faith, thought, and experience.

Consequently, the "total-unity" of being *(Sein)* falls apart in Solovyev into an unconditioned and a relative or conditioned. The *unconditioned* is God whose creative will permeates everything. The *relative,* untrue and imperfect is nature, the world beyond God. Man occupies a certain middle position between the unconditioned principle and the transient world of phenomena. Solovyev takes considerable pains to clarify the question of the relation between the unconditioned and the relative. If God is "all in all," what then remains for the material world? Further if the world of appearances represents the product of an unlimited perfect divinity, where did the many imperfections of life come from? Solovyev's metaphysics is unable to give even half-definite answers to these questions which common sense raises quite naturally. Solovyev correctly reproaches Hegel for the fact that in spite of all his efforts he did not join the ideal and the real. But since Solovyev at the same time rejects pantheism he does not go beyond the horizons of the ideas inherited from Plato and the Medieval Scholastics.

Religious mysticism, which in Solovyev grew into an extensive philosophical system, had a persistent effect even on his scientific ideas. Just as with philosophy, Solovyev brought *natural science* into a relation of dependency on religion. In regard to the question of science and its position in the system of human knowledge at the end of the 19th century he revitalized the long since past Dark Ages. In reference to concrete realms of knowledge which he had to take into consideration in connection with the founding of his system, Solovyev reduced atomicity to spiritual monadology, while he gave a teleological interpretation to the theory of evolution and represented the doctrine of preformation, etc. His views also showed a deep enmity towards science.

Solovyev's system evoked numerous imitations and in itself gave witness to the transition from idealism into mysticism. It began to be opposed to Marxism during the last decade of the previous century. The members of the "Vekhi" group were influenced by Solovyev. Today in Western Europe and America Solovyev is not only presented as the greatest representative of Russian thought but he is also considered a pillar of bourgeois philosophy in an age of imperialism.

(Translated from Russian by the author)

The first essay on Solovyev's philosophy published in the Moscow journal *Voprosy filosofii* has been translated into German by me and is available in: "Ost-Probleme" (Bonn), XI, 11 (1959), pp. 338–344. The original article was: L.A. Kogan, *K kritike filosofii Vl. Solov'eva* (For a Critique of the Philosophy of Vl. Solovyev), in: *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), XIII, 3 (1959), pp. 102–113.

CHAPTER NINE

SOVIET APPROPRIATION OF SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY

In early 1967 G.K. Bušurov, a Soviet philosopher who belongs to the Leningrad Institute of Pedagogy, correctly stated in "The Character of the Philosophical-Historical Views of Vl. Solovyev" that "Marxist literature [has] not had until recently any special investigation of Vl. Solovyev."[1] The same thing is even more true in regard to philosophical-historical research on German phenomenology, especially Husserl and Scheler. The historiographical work of the intellectual-historical relations in both cases remains equally fragmentary. The Marxist writing of the history of philosophy exhibits as much as ever considerable gaps in regard to Slavophil thought, on the one hand,[2] and German philosophy from Schopenhauer to Scheler, on the other.[3] Twentieth century (German) phenomenology first began to enter the field of vision of East European[4] and Soviet[5] Marxist research in the middle of the Sixties.

As the Soviet works, for example, of Motrošilova, Ojzerman, Gajdenko, Tavrizjan, Gubin and Kissel' indicate, the appropriation clearly concentrates on Edmund Husserl (1859–1938).[6] In G.L. Belkina's anthology of German bourgeois philosophy following the socialist October revolution (translated from German and published in 1960) there was still no mention of Max Scheler.[7] The work on contemporary philosophy by Konstantin Bakradze limited itself likewise to Husserl in Chapter VI ("Psychologism and 'Pure Logic'").[8] The Soviet anthology of modern existentialism, which was published in Moscow in 1966 and which is the most noteworthy thus far, gives only meager information about Max Scheler, who is referred to altogether five times.[9] His name was mentioned only once by Myslivčenko at the beginning of the essay on existence and being *(Sein)* as the central categories of German existentialism.[10] Gajdenko is satisfied with only a few references to Scheler's distinction between a "world of being" *(Sein)* and a "world of that which has meaning" (thought) in her significant contribution to the problem of intentionality.[11] In this context she asserts that an opposition exists between Scheler's sociology of knowledge, which considers each spiritual structure under the aspect of "social interests," that is, "social desires," and Scheler's axiology. For as soon as man passes from the realm of knowledge into the realm of action, he is no longer guided by the "world of being" and its observation, but instead by the "world of ought" and its

directives. Thus a world of values takes the place of a world of the real. In Gajdenko's judgement, "this view of Scheler represents a continuation of the Kantian tradition in modern philosophy."[12] Gajdenko further quotes from a footnote from Scheler's treatise, *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge,* some comments about the powerlessness of the spirit – against Hegel's apologetic view that reality (that of the German society of his time) is also the true ideal.[13] Apart from being named once in Saxarova's essay on the problem of man in the conceptions of the French existentialists, the relation to Scheler is otherwise completely neglected.[14] While Narskij dealt chiefly with the views of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre in his study of existentialism's concepts of "nothingness" and "nihilism,"[15] Gabitova dealt with those of Karl Jaspers in her contribution to the conception of the person in German existentialism.[16] The above-mentioned Soviet authors silently passed over the thought of Scheler, who is essential for the areas inquired about in these treatises. Even Ojzerman did not make up for this failure to consider Scheler in his introductory essay on the philosophy of crisis and the crisis of philosophy.[17]

While in the Soviet Union the first signs of a serious appropriation of German phenomenology, and here in particular of Scheler's epistemology, theory of value, and sociology of knowledge, began to be evident from 1967 on, two informative works on both most significant representatives of German phenomenology existed in Polish since 1962. They are among the articles in the work compiled by Bronisław Baczko on 20th century philosophy and sociology.[18] The first study, written by Leszek Kołakowski, was dedicated to the thought of Husserl.[19] The second work written by Zbigniew Kuderowicz, had as its subject Scheler's ethical personalism.[20]

Following a short description of Edmund Husserl's career, Kołakowski dealt with "the question of psychologism," "autonomous philosophy," "the description of the phenomenon and the eidetic analysis," "the phenomenological reduction" as well as "the constitution of the world in consciousness." The presentation of these elements of Husserl's thought is accurate and unbiased.[21] Kołakowski first compares "Husserl's work" with the "Marxist tradition" in the last section of his study.[22]

In regard to this he explains that the hope of reaching an epistemological absolute is foreign to dialectical thinking, since the latter doubts the possibility of a starting point which is final and not further analysable. Consequently, it must consider all suggestions which imitate the Cartesian *cogito* as fictions which can only be interpreted as results of a mystified consciousness in an illusion which wants to be independent not only of

acquired thought but also of the world which expresses consciousness.[23] In conclusion, Kołakowsky explains:

If, however the attempt [by Husserl] to construct a total world-image were not successful and if the substance of pure consciousness were unable to reveal to him the ultimate secrets of being *(Sein)*, still his work would not be in vain. Husserl enriched the concept of experience around the eidetic intuitions and joined an enormous quantity of phenomena into a science according to the principles of equality. These phenomena had never previously been comprehended in any scientific discipline. Consequently, he handed over to us a world, which was richer and more differentiated than the one he possessed before his work. However since that "egalitarianism" of phenomena, which extends our perception and allows us to notice an abundance of new facts, is based in Husserl's thought on the method of transcendental reduction, we can view this method today as a historical ladder which one may discard as soon as one has climbed it. In spite of his reduction, the world in the 20th century is more manifold after Husserl, just as it was more manifold in the 17th century after Descartes, and in the 18th century after Kant.[24]

Following a brief description of the career of Max Scheler, Kuderowicz presents the following elements of his philosophy: "critique of bourgeois morality," "man and the world of values," "person and moral solidarity" as well as "the conception of 'total-man' and the philosophy of history."[25] This contribution also corresponds to the requirements of objectivity and intellectual integrity. Kuderowicz forgoes a special section on the relation of Marxist philosophy to Scheler's thought. Instead he condenses his judgment of German phenomenology into the following concluding statements:

Scheler characterized his position as ethical personalism. He emphasized in this way that the question of the moral specificity of a person's acts, the matter of premises and of a guarantee for the valued moral action of the person, is the central problem of his world-view. Scheler's philosophy is an expression of rebellion against utilitarian ethics as well as against an ethics based on the concept of "common good." It is at the same time also an expression of rebellion against the subjective Kantian tradition. Scheler continued Husserl's anti-positivistic program by making its [Husserl's program's] uselessness evident in the area of ethics and by applying the phenomenological method to the analysis of the feeling life. Thus, Scheler's philosophy became one of the footbridges which lead from phenomenological solutions to existentialistic philosophy. However Scheler did not remain a true imitator of Husserl. The concentration on the area of ethical problems certainly contributed to the fact that he placed greater value on emotional phenomena in comparison to his teacher – and not only in respect to epistemological tasks but also in questions of interpersonal relations. Even the attempt to formulate a theory of the historical process seems consistent with the philosophical attitude of phenomenology. This fact bears witness not only to the self-sufficiency of Scheler's views within the phenomenological school. These traits brought him [beyond this] still closer to existential philosophy even if it is impossible – as we know – to consider Scheler a representative of existentialism.[26]

A year later, in 1963, Georgij Kursanov published in Moscow nine critical treatises on modern objective idealism. He wrote an introduction to this collection together with Nina Julina entitled, "The Crisis of Bourgeois Philosophical Thought and Contemporary Objective Idealism."[27] There was no mention of Scheler there. (Instead Vladimir Solovyev's name appeared in connection with Bergson, Boutroux, Croce, Lossky and Santayana. Both authors maintained that the above-named brought philosophy into opposition with science.)[28]

Among the treatises which Kursanov collected, the work written by N.V. Motrošilova on "phenomenological philosophy" picks up the theme "Husserl – Scheler", dealt with by Kołakowski and Kuderowicz in Baczko's compilation. However this relatively impressive Soviet contribution investigates almost exclusively the thought of Husserl. Twice the Soviet author came forth with critical opinions on German phenomenology. In Jaunary 1961, the journal *Voprosy filosofii* published her review of Gerd Brand's *Welt, Ich und Zeit* (The Hague 1955). Together with E. Ju. Solov'ev she wrote the article "From a Defense of 'Strict Science' to a Justification of Irrationalism – The Philosophical Evolution of E. Husserl and of German Existentialism", which appeared in May 1964.

If one disregards a small change in opinion which Motrošilova corrected in her 1968 book, *Principles and Contradictions of Phenomenological Philosophy,* then her contribution to the 1963 anthology edited by Kursanov on modern objective idealism contains the most extensive and most valid presentation of her views.[29] Following the introduction there is:

I. "Husserl and Psychologism,"

II. "Husserl and Irrationalism – The Transition From Overt Mysticism to Mystification of Reason,"

III. "Husserl's Idea of the Universal Subject,"

IV. "Philosophy as the Saviour of European Civilization,"

V. "Contemporary Followers of Husserl and Objective Idealism."

In her work Motrošilova tries particularly to show that Husserl's philosophy had changed gradually from its original apparently scientific and rationalistic form into irrational psychologism and subjectivism. According to the view expressed by Motrošilova in the introduction of her contribution to "phenomenological philosophy" this

evolution of Husserl [was] not due to chance, but inevitable. It is not only the case that the ideas developed in the last period of his life agree with the principles of Husserl's earlier thought; rather they are the immediate result of these principles. That idea of knowledge which characterizes phenomenology originated already in Husserl's early works. This idea was developed in the later works. Its rationalistic,anti-

psychologistic and frequently objectively idealistic shell concealed the irrationalism, psychologism and subjectivsm, which are a characteristic of contemporary bourgeois philosophy.[30]

In the first chapter Motrošilova investigates Husserl's relation to the logical psychologism of his day. It is well-known that the latter was concerned with two questions, namely:

1. how to explain the occurrence of logical forms,
2. what is governed by logical laws and principles.

These questions served in the search for the actual subject to which the principal insights of knowledge could be related as the heuristic starting points. These insights were obtained by the philosophical theory of knowledge. The following was said by the author on this point:

Some philosophers equate the cognitive subject with an isolated empirical individual, who is endowed with the capabilities of sensible or rational knowledge. Consequently, they are unable to explain the active, creative function of the knowing man. In these theories, the correspondence of ideas gradually replaces truth, while the individual capability for thought or intuition proves to be the criterion for the conformity of the thoughts. Other philosophers (those who immediately try to demonstrate the power of theoretical "universal" thought) set up an insurmountable barrier between the universal categories of thought, which are investigated by logic, and the cognitive process, as each concrete individual executes it. Thus, they have transformed true knowledge into the function of a certain ideal subject just as they have created a logical and epistemological utopia of the subject. However, in the first as in the second case, the understanding of the subject proves to be abstract. For here one disregards the specific determinations of the subject's mode of acting, the actual, active, transforming practical activity of men in the process of real historical development.[31]

In the second section of Chapter I, which deals with the apparent opponents and the actual enemy of Husserl's critique of psychologism, Motrošilova concludes from the premises mentioned above "that the actual opponent of phenomenology [had] by no means [been] psychologism,"[32] but "that Husserl's *Logical Investigations* [were] directed above all against materialism."[33] Husserl's struggle with psychologism, his attempt to conquer it, must be designated as mere rhetoric to a substantial extent for the "purification" of the subject sought for by phenomenology and its transformation into an abstract being takes place "in accord with the fundamental principles of psychologism." According to Motrošilova, the particularity of phenomenological idealism consisted in the fact that, hoping to escape the unmistakably subjectivistic, relativistic and irrationalistic consequences of psychologism, Husserl

proclaims the ideality of true knowledge, the independence of its content from each thinking individual. However Husserl does not wish to interpret the ideality of truth in the spirit of Plato or of Hegel. He opposes any attempt to attribute an existence to truths in the actual or transcendent world. From Husserl's point of view, Plato's

world of ideas represents a "metaphysical hypostatizing" of the universal. This theory is of no use to Husserl because of its mystical, mythological character. Similarly Hegel's construction of an absolute idea, of an absolute reason, only appears unscientific.[34]

As Motrošilova explains, any truth for itself – that is, as it is – remains in its ideal being *(Sein).* It does not exist somewhere in empty space, but constitutes instead the *unity of meaning* in the supra-temporal realm of the true. According to Husserl's *Logical Investigations,* truth belongs "to the realm of the absolutely binding, to which all of us relate. Its bindingness is indisputable for us or at least represents a well-founded supposition [to which we] also [relate] the whole sphere of indirect and indeterminate suppositions about existence, which are unclearly represented, thus, [to] the circle of all which is binding, even if we have not yet known this and perhaps never will know it."[35]

Motrošilova presents the view that, in spite of all of Husserl's efforts about the objectivity of truth, it is as it were imperceptibly identified with the *meaning* of truth, with its normativeness and bindingness. However the question why truth has *meaning* was rejected by Husserl with the argument that these kinds of inquiries deal with metaphysics or psychologism. Therefore, he accepted without question the *meaning* of truth as evidence. As Motrošilova critically explains: "Husserl characterized the relation of the subject to truth as the clear or as the confused individual experience, as the feeling of certainty, that the given truth is binding. This, however, is psychologism."[36] The following paragraph (3) and chapters II to III deal with key concepts of Husserl's phenomenology such as "pure essences," the "layers of thought," "intentionality" and "act" (correlation between object and thought), "emotional state" (expectation), "intellectual intuition" (intuition of essence), "phenomenological reduction," "transcendental reduction," "subjectivity," "intersubjectivity," etc.[37]

Chapter IV deals with Husserl's "excursion into the history of Europe" and the "crisis of European humanity." Motrošilova says the following about this:

When Husserl changed historical development into a development which is determined by spiritual motives, by a certain "rational goal," it already seemed logical to him to attribute to philosophy, to the science of the spirit, that role which in reality can only be perceived by the *practical,* transforming *activity* of men which is supported by philosophy. Here we encounter the true origins of Husserl's early theory of ideal "being" *("Sein").* The basically objectively idealistic theory of the "pure" essences had as its actual model the fact that ready-made knowledge in society assumes a definite form. This ready-made knowledge appears as well in the form of science, and in certain social institutions connected with it [science] as in developed standards of social life and of social psychology.[38]

Here are Motrošilova's conclusions about Husserl and his phenomenology:

> He came forward with the claim of delivering a logic of truth, a logic of scientific knowledge. The major result of his efforts consisted, however, in the fact that Husserl opposed to a subject, which unconsciously and habitually follows the rules of formal logic as its highest principles, a subject which consciously and "convincingly" maintains that an accomodation to these principles takes place through the higher form of *rational* activity.[39] Husserl intended to overthrow the extreme, unconcealed subjectivism of psychologism. However he himself propagated it even more effectively even though he was reputed to be one who was against psychologism. He fought against extreme irrationalism and agnosticism, mysticism and the belief in a "beyond," and "uncertain." However, in actuality he proved to be an even more formidable enemy of reason because he mystified it while coming forward under the banner of rationalism. Husserl's thought had [thus] passed judgment on itself before history and science.[40]

The last chapter (V) contains a report by Motrošilova on the continuation of phenomenology in the thought of the "best known students and followers of E. Husserl," especially of Max Scheler. In the judgment of the author, Scheler actualized Husserl's phenomenological starting point *ontologically* and *axiologically*. Basic to Scheler's ontology is "the idea of a totally-rational God as the perfection, the end and result of the whole movement of world-history." Scheler had noticed that Husserl's phenomenology, in spite of its anti-positivistic emotion, remained linked with positivism in various ways. This link consisted in an understanding of the subject which is similar in principle. The inevitable result of this was the transition from formalism to psychologism. This also would explain why Scheler had tried "to give a *different* interpretation to Husserl's doctrine of the mutual relation between the subject and object of knowledge. For this purpose he consciously made the *answer to the question of man* and of human nature the starting point of philosophy. The limits and the contradictions of Husserl's philosophy caused Scheler's 'turn' away from the logical-epistemological problems of phenomenology to 'social anthropology', to the doctrine of man as a social being."[41] As an *idealistic philosopher of religion,* however, Scheler was unable to replace Husserl's contradictory theory by an indisputable solution to the problem of the subject-object relation. "The evolution of Husserlianism characteristic of Scheler's philosophy is very remarkable. It shows that Scheler at once used and altered Husserl's ideas on the construction of a universal ontology."[42]

Motrošilova goes on to explain, that the construction of such an ontology as science of the world must, however, fail in Scheler's opinion if the determination of the characteristics of "world" as well as the "types of objective being *(Sein)*" are based on an understanding of "subjectivity" *in Husserl's sense.*

Scheler is of the opinion that ontology does not represent the *result* of an epistemological analysis of the "types of objectivity." On the contrary, an "ontology of the spirit and of the world" comes *before* any epistemology in his opinion. In his doctrine of being *(Sein)*, Scheler organizes the world into essential regions, which are not solely deducible from "subjectivity" but which instead possess an "ontic" specificity which is independent of individual consciousness. There are for him five basic regions "of being *(Sein)* and objectivity":

1. The absolute region of the actual and the valued – the region of the holy, God;
2. The region which Scheler calls in general "co-world" *("Mitwelt")*, pre- and post-world" *("Vor- und Nachwelt")* and which one can characterize as the region of the "social," of society and history;
3. The region of the external and internal world as well as the particular region of man's body and of the world surrounding him;
4. The region of the "living";
5. The region of the "dead" and the world of bodies which appear "dead."[43]

After this theory of the levels of being *(Sein)*, Motrošilova treats the question of the role which the subject plays in respect to the knowledge of the previously named regions of being; that is, the position of man in this system of being *(Sein)*.

Man, who always appears in union with the world in Scheler, is essentially isolated from organic nature and is distinguished from it by the free manner of his life activity. As opposed to animals, he is able to devote himself to a vision of the "pure" forms which is not limited by needs. Consequently, man possesses *spirit* and precisely spirit first makes him man. Spirit represents the determinative factor of human activity. Simultaneously, the possibilities of its [spirit's] realization are resolved in the *voluntary* and *emotional* totality of the human person. Spirit is unable to actualize itself and to realize itself, to become cultured. Nevertheless, spirit is not determined in a fateful manner by economic and other social conditions – thus Scheler asserts against Marxism (which he misrepresents). It acquires its possibilities and its organization from itself. Consequently, an idealistic "philosophical anthropology" is basic to M. Scheler's philosophy, which begins with the idea of a *spiritual, emotional and voluntary* essence of man, of the individual.[44]

Therefore, man proves to be that being in which the regions of being *(Sein)* corresponding to him and subordinate to him link themselves with absolute actuality and value. In regard to this, Motrošilova especially emphasizes that "the region of the divine, of absolute being *(Sein)*, is for Scheler the highest and the most basic. Here the objectively idealistic content of Scheler's ontology becomes manifest wherein the idea of a first ideal divine essence is created. According to Scheler's thought, God embodies in himself not only spirit but also aspirations of the will and drives. He represents a unique center of spirit and will."[45]

In these discussions of Motrošilova, the relation of Scheler's anthropology to Solovyev's *Lectures on God-manhood* and his *Justification of the Good*, further the transition from Husserl's formalistic-phenomenological transcendental philosophy to the substantial-phenomenological essential

ontic of being, thus the affinity of Scheler's thought and Solovyev's doctrine of the existent total-unity become clearly evident. The author's blindness for these relations remains incomprehensible unless it is based on the circumstance that she was ignorant of Solovyev's philosophy.

Motrošilova addresses all of her attention to trying to work out the difference between Husserl's and Scheler's program of phenomenology. She emphasized that Scheler "considered knowledge itself as a 'being' *('Sein')* existing as it were outside of the subject." Since he did not start from "consciousness as the absolute and primary region" he also could not consider it possible to establish "'identity', the correspondence of being *(Sein)* and knowledge." Scheler's knowledge determined "as such the 'relation of participation' of the being with the 'specificity' *(tak-bytiju)* of another being" by means of which there is no change in the "specificity." "This determination is to be understood such that that 'which has been made conscious' becomes a 'part' of the 'one who knows' without leaving its place or changing itself."[46]

The clarification of the idea of knowledge makes it possible for the author to characterize for the most part correctly the specific difference of Scheler's ontology from Husserl's:

> Husserl endeavors to determine the nature of knowing and of knowledge by deducing their laws from impersonal "pure consciousness." Actually, however, he gains knowledge of such laws from an analysis of "subjectivity," of the formal structure of individual consciousness. Scheler, on the other hand, who disregards the specificity of "subjectivity," wants to make evident the objective relation between being *(Sein)* and knowledge such that he proves both as regions independent of *individual* consciousness. However since he, like Husserl, dispenses with bringing the socio-historical process of human knowledge into play for deducing the laws of knowledge, Scheler chooses another way. His "ontological" structures represent the results of a formalized, basically empirical description of some relations of being *(Sein)* and knowledge. This description is supplemented by the mystification of certain emotions of the human person by their endowment with a universal, ontological meaning. In Scheler's opinion, the main characteristic of being is participation in other being (participation of the world in God, of the world in the one who knows). Scheler calls this characteristic, which produces the interrelation of being *(Sein)* and makes possible the expansion of the limits of each being, "love." "Love," the mutual participation of beings, exists *prior* to all knowledge and conditions the relation of being *(Sein)* and consciousness as well as the action of human intuition, of thinking, and of spirit. Consequently, the anthropologizing of man also leads here to psychological consequences and presses towards theological mystification.[47]

Motrošilova only briefly goes into the particulars of Scheler's *theory of value.* She explains that the "meanings" inherent in truths and norms are based on their affiliation with certain essential regions. This relation is grasped in value-judgments. Scheler said: "Truth is a supra-temporal idea which is absolutely independent of knowledge. Values, on the other hand,

arise in the execution and as a result of knowledge of the truth *in different regions.*"[48]

This distinction is very instructive since by means of it Scheler attributes to the truths themselves an *existence* independent of individual consciousness, the evaluation of which takes place by participation in these truths. It makes the truths values which should form as it were the permanent realm of objectivity. "This is how the 'objective' ('material') structure of values looks according to Scheler's thought. Their significance and bindingness prove to be deduced from their objective existence."[49]

As Motrošilova explains in conclusion:

> The short characterization of Scheler's ontological ideas and theory of value shows that he had continued Husserl's ontology in *his own* way. However he understood that the interpretation of the world as a correlate of subjectivity already undermines the possibility of grounding an ontology. Therefore he began to separate *objective* regions "ontically" existing in the world. How could these regions be investigated? In this respect Scheler completely took over Husserl's method of "intuition" of essence. However it is evident from that which has been explained that this method changes in reference to the world and its laws into intuition and empirical description of some particularities of the development of the world, which are often second-rate and already familiar from pre-scientific experience.[50]

What was ultimately decisive for Motrošilova's judgement not only of Husserl's phenomenology but also of Scheler's was that "the 'interface' between the subject and the world [occurs] not by [the subject's] *active* appropriation, but by 'intuition of essence'." Thus, "some dogmas of everyday consciousness, to which one gave a curious scientific form" were offered "as scientific ideas of 'objective' regions."[51]

Petr Vladimirovič Korneev of the University of Moscow has supplied the most conscientious presentation of contemporary German philosophical thought. In the fall of 1967 he produced a short book which deals with "modern philosophical anthropology," in particular the works of Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, Rothacker, Landmann, Hengstenberg, Wein and others devoted to this area of inquiry.[52]

In the second chapter of his work, Korneev presents the view that "Max Scheler [is to be considered] the immediate precursor of existentialism and *the founder of modern anthropology.*"[53] "In comparing Scheler's anthropology with existentialism what is particularly evident is that both are very close to one another in their assertion of a demonic, irrational principle as well as in the thesis closely related to this of the powerlessness of reason, of spirit. The whole philosophy of existentialism is permeated by the conviction that the knowledge and will of man is weak and that he lacks the ability to comprehend and direct the course of events in this chaotic and hostile world."[54] This essential characteristic according to Korneev is

related to a second no less important trait: "The essential similarity of Scheler and existentialism is expressed [further] in the statement that the fundamental and basic states and experiences of man are *of an a priori nature.*"[55] "The relation between Scheler and existentialism, however, does not remain limited [only] to these two basic characteristics – the assertion of the powerlessness of reason and the apriority of experiences. By carefully separating the 'spiritual person' not only from its empirical perceptions and experiences but also from its own body, Scheler to some extent anticipates the most important concept of existentialism, *the concept of existence.* In general the similarity between Scheler and existentialism in the *understanding of the person* is particularly great."[56]

These and other results permit the author a much more accurate evaluation of Scheler's position than had been the case in previous Soviet investigations of modern philosophical anthropology.[57] An exception to this was the author's own article in the journal *Filosofskie nauki* (July–August 1966, Number 4).[58] In Korneev's judgement, *"no anthropology can help literally but take a definite stand in relation to Scheler's ideas, in relation to his view of the general problems of anthropology and his concrete solutions to these problems."*[59]

Shortly before the publication of Korneev's work, the journal *Voprosy filosofii* published an article in July 1967 (7) by Lev Efimovič Xoruc on 'Max Scheler's Theory and Sociology of Knowledge.'[60] This account remains until today the only detailed opinion about the thought of the German phenomenologist and sociologist of knowledge published in a professional Soviet journal. As far as the critical investigations of modern philosophical anthropology taken up by Konstantin Ljubutin and Ivan Antonovič three years later (1970) are concerned,[61] they failed to achieve the objectivity in presenting Scheler's thought, which distinguishes Xoruc' article. Thus, the views presented by Xoruc should be particularly taken into account here as a paradigm.

The work starts with this distinction. Scheler's gnoseology represents *in its form* the occurrence of the knowledge of really existing objects by men, but *in its content* it describes the process of the participation of the individual in "institutionalized knowledge."

Scheler paid particular attention to the individual man, who knows actuality only "by way of his collective." Concrete man proves to be an individual who comprehends the world thus and only thus as his group sees it, an individual whose encounter with his world is impersonal. He finds himself thrown into a world of "ready-made knowledge," of organized group ideas, of "mass culture." In order to acquire independent knowledge

man must, therefore, free himself from his personal empirical experience, from those ideas which are connected to those objects of daily life known to him. Instead he must turn towards those essences which science offers him. The individual frees himself from "available being *(Sein)*" and can attain a pure intuition of primordial phenomena only by way of an act of excluding acts, which give an instant, or only an aspect of the real object.

Usually the individual man as a normal consumer of spiritual culture has no other choice than to accept in trust and faith the theoretical truths set before him. He is offered a concept or an association of concepts without any explanation of the relation of this conceptual structure to objective reality. Thus, Scheler's subject illustrates the contemporary form of the "unhappy consciousness." The individual man acquires the concept as an essence which has nothing in common with available being *(Sein)*. After these explanations Xoruc maintains:

> Thus Scheler is forced to confess that the human person lives in a divided world. On the one hand, it is concerned with *ideal factors* (with pure knowledge), on the other hand, however, with *real factors* (with the "available being *(Sein)* of things"). Correspondingly, two *closely related* goals occur in man: *knowledge* as participation in the atemporal world of ideas, and *practical activity* which leads to a result embodied in things. The new determination of knowledge sharply marks off thing and essence from one another. It makes it necessary to consider *knowledge* and the *scholarly activity* of reason as opposites.[62]

In Scheler's opinion, the intuited content of essence is independent of all possible observations and inductions. Thus, true knowledge can only be acquired by *experience*. The transition to experience constitutes for a philosopher of the phenomenological school the crucial source of the disclosure of the content of the world. Thus, Scheler sees in experience the ultimate result of the "phenomenological reduction," which does not take into account all available characteristics of objects. This reduction makes possible what Scheler calls "phenomenological experience." Man can only know things as they actually are, that is, in their in-themselves, not mediated by any symbols, signs and proofs, by the intuition of phenomenological experience. Xoruc has the following to say about this: "Scheler thinks of true knowledge as an essence free of any determinations of available being *(Sein)*, which one can completely appropriate to oneself in experience. In this manner knowledge transforms itself from a process into an act."[63]

As Xoruc correctly comments, the efficient moment of the act which makes possible any forms of the participation of man in the nature of things can only consist in a cooperation which exceeds itself and its own

being *(Sein)*. Scheler characterized this kind of "participation" in the most formal sense as "love." "Love" attends solely to the function of directing our attention to certain objects. Only it is allowed to "select the object." It excludes thereby not only any thought activity but also any experiments.

While the nature of things is completely and immediately grasped in the execution of acts, knowledge of the available being *(Sein)* of things first comes about in a lengthy process. The different levels of this process correspond to the fact that although the information about the world accumulated by society is extremely great, it is by no means able to be used by all men since the educational level and the developmental state of their subjectivity does not suffice for this.

Xoruc explains this as follows:

> In fact the disproportionately rapid accumulation of ready-made knowledge results in the fact that the thing sensibly given appears for the individual ever more frequently as a symbol instead of as an object. A concept is concealed behind it [the symbol] which has absorbed into itself the history of the knowledge of the object in question. This object is an object of knowledge [only] for the society as a whole, [only] for the totality of social institutions which answer the purposes of knowledge. As the source of its knowledge the individual person basically has available [only] the information prepared and offered by society. It follows from this that in sensibly perceiving an object we know much more about it than we can grasp ourselves. Thus, we do not consider the moon which we observe a flat disc although what we see speaks in favor of this. The knowledge which we have collected and which has become a part of our internal world attaches itself to the sensation which we receive directly from the object. However, since different people are prepared differently in the knowledge accumulated by society, the sensible object serves for them as a symbol for various concepts.[64]

Xoruc concludes from this that according to Scheler the really existing world ultimately represents something which transcends the things of available being *(Sein)*. Only that aspect of the available being of things which corresponds to the educational level and developmental state of the individual's subjectivity is disclosed to him.

An *axiological* selective principle is closely related in Scheler to his *epistemological* one. Among the possible values the functions of feeling grasp only certain ones. Thus, groups of people form an available system of their own world of values from the ideal realm of values. Scheler called this "ethos." Although the values themselves are immutable, the "ethos" forms prove to be changing. *"Love"* is again the *major force* of this dynamic of preferring (and not preferring). Scheler said that the most radical form of the renewal and increase of "ethos" consists in that disclosure of higher values which develops through love.

In Scheler *the biological factor* appears as the *second moving force* of knowledge. He means by this the so-called "instinctual structure of the

person." It played a significant role even in Freud. Scheler substituted for Freud's "eros" and "thanatos" the instincts of power, of deliverance, of construction, of play, etc. Whatever these instincts may be in the individual, their nature is always biologically founded, that is, "vitally-conditioned."

In accordance with the character of the instinctual structure, the person directs its glance at a certain region of the hierarchy of knowable essences and selects correspondingly determinate objects of knowledge. Thus, the biological factor of the instinctual structure, which is according to Scheler genetically based, proves to be together with ethos one of the forces giving direction to knowledge. *The specific "selection of objects" suitable to each subject in a particular manner comes about through the common action of "ethos" and the "instinctual structure."* Scheler characterizes this as *"world-view."* It determines the total direction of the person's spiritual activity.

According to Xoruc, the decisive principle of this conception of Scheler is basically the partitioning of knowledge into that of essence and that of available being. As soon as the object descends the ladder of relativity and *forms itself into a subject,* there is nothing to prevent a pragmatic understanding of the person choosing the region of its activity. Knowledge becomes rational through this descent and is subjected to the laws of logic. *Man appears from now on as subject while the relation to the available being (Sein) of things occurs in the objects. This knowledge loses its most essential attribute: truth. Knowledge is transformed into opinion.*

It follows from Scheler's view of "relative objects," that different types of "world-views" are not only equally *possible* but are also equally *justifiable.* This is also true for the highest kinds of knowledge which result from the "world-views": for *religion* which arises from the striving for deliverance, for *metaphysics* which is based on the feeling of wonder about the world, and for *science* which articulates the will to have power over nature. Thus, the question arises for Scheler about the transformation of the different kinds of knowledge in the history of culture. He tries to answer it in the "sociology of knowledge." Its task should consist in producing the interrelation of the knowledge of the individual with social consciousness.

Thus, Scheler makes formally evident three possible fundamental relations which knowledge has to society:

Knowledge of the members of any group of each other and the possibility of their mutual "understanding" is first of all not something which is added to a social group, but instead something which *co-constitutes* the object of "human society."

That which is only objectively comprehended by our thinking is *not* a sociological object. *Knowledge* of its existence, even if still very vague, and of its commonly recognized *values and goals* belongs to a "group." (Therefore no class without class-consciousness, etc.) All knowledge, and, above all, all common knowledge about *the same* objects, somehow further determines the *specific character* of the society in all possible respects. Finally, however, all knowledge is, on the contrary, determined *by* society and *its* structure.[65]

The cultural history of the person and of persons arises according to Scheler from the fact that the one-dimensional culture, which is based on only *one* of the fundamental kinds of knowledge, develops itself further into a three-dimensional culture, which includes and mutually supplements not only religion but also metaphysics and science. The "instinctual structure" as well as the epistemological and axiological principle of "selection" founded on it are completely valid in this cultural movement. The development of man's spiritual world presupposes instinctual biological (vitally-conditioned) factors. Without the existence of an *elite,* these biological constants would therefore exclude any possibility of a cultural change. The elite takes over the function of the "selection" of determinate areas of objects based on its *vitally conditioned* advantage. It creates various social institutions according to its *particular* instinct and value structure. The institutions participate as negative factors of realization in the process of forming a culture.

Scheler has the following to say about this:

The spirit in the subjective and the objective sense, further as the individual and collective spirit, only and exclusively determines the *specific* character of the *cultural* contents which can *emerge.* The spirit as such has however in itself *originally* and by nature *no trace* of "force" or "efficacy" also to put into existence this its content. It is to be sure a *"factor of determination"* but not a "factor of realization" of the possible genesis of culture. The *real, instinctually conditioned relations of life* are always rather the *negative* factors of realization or the real factors of *selection* from the objective range of that which is possible through the spiritually understandable motivation. That is, these relations of life include the particular combinations of real factors: of the power relationships, of the factors of economic production, and of the qualitative and quantitative population relations, along with the geographical and geopolitical factors which are individually present. The "purer" the spirit, the less powerful it is in society and history in the sense of dynamic effect. This is the great common element of truth of every sceptical, pessimistic, naturalistic view of history, of the economic as well as the racist, of the power-political as well as of the geopolitical. It is first where "ideas" of whatever sort *unite* with interests, instincts, collective drives or as we call the latter, "tendencies," that they *indirectly* acquire power and the possibility of efficacy; e.g., religious, scientific ideas. However the *positive* factor of realization of a purely cultural significant content is always the *free act* and the free will of a "small number" of *persons,* primarily the leaders, models, pioneers who are imitated by a "great number," a majority, due to the well-known law of contagion of voluntary and involuntary imitation (aping). Thus, culture "extends" itself.[66]

These statements induce Xoruc to judge that in Scheler's system social institutions are characteristically models according to which thought forms and ultimately the total model of thought are constructed. It follows from this "that not only the subjective forms of thought and intuition but also the classificatory division of the world into categories, that is, the classification of knowable things in general, is co-conditioned by the division and classification of groups (e.g., of class) of which society consists."[67] *Thus, at any given time the region of objects which joins a social individual proves to be pre-determined in order.* Correspondingly, the highest axiom of Scheler's sociology of knowledge is that *social* consciousness, that is, every man's knowledge that he is a member of society in general, genetically *precedes* the levels of his consciousness of himself and the value of himself.

Xoruc establishes the fact that according to Scheler the ability basic to the individual of becoming conscious of a certain region of objects before another conditions the dependence of the model of the world on the structure of society. However, since this structure corresponds to the "available knowledge" of the social institutions developed by the thought of the elite, *society is by no means an active factor in the creation of forms, but instead an inanimate model after which the person who is not only epistemologically but also axiologically vitally conditioned constructs its world.* It is, therefore, Xoruc' view that such presuppositions make the progress of social consciousness into something independent of society. *Progress "becomes a series of objective regions. The social collectives participate in them because they submissively follow the elite."*[68]

These ideas form the starting point of the sociological *theory of idols* (theory of deception) of thought, intuition and evaluating. According to Scheler, sociologically conditioned "idols" are more than errors. "They concern not only *what* already happens to a member of a class as the intuitional content of the world itself, but also the *objective forms* in which it happens to him in general." Since "idols" are traditionally absorbed by different classes so to speak with their mother's milk, to this extent the principle of economy of knowledge is correct.

> Error first arises if one considers these class-conditioned systems of idols ... not only "necessary" as thought *tendencies* and intuitional *motives* – as they in fact are – but moreover considers it *causally necessary* that all individuals belonging to the class must follow these tendencies and motives in their supra-automatic, conscious *spiritual* activity of knowing. Class prejudices as well as the formal laws of the constitution of class prejudices are, rather, *surmountable in principle* by each individual of the class. They can – the more their sociological regularity is recognized by the sociological theory of idols – be set aside by each man whatever his class situation may be.[69]

According to Scheler, what is required is a "new development of good and methodologically rational metaphysics in connection with the positive sciences."[70] He considered as the greatest enemy of this the "hollow emotional democracies of the large masses" wherever they historically occur, above all then, "when they inscribe the system of so-called 'direct action' on their banners." The enmity towards the total knowledge of essential research and towards rational, positive science makes the mass emotional democracies the victim "of vague myths which one can characterize as prospective 'class myths.'"[71] Scheler refers in this regard to "the Fascist movement" and to the "myth of Russian Bolshevism."

The ideologies of such "class myths" characterize definite formal ways of thinking which only allow a distorted knowledge of the world and guarantee no true knowledge. *To this extent ideologies are not only "class prejudices" but also more than that, "namely formal laws of the formation of prejudices," "which are solely and only rooted in the class situation* – completely disregarding the individuality, the profession, and the extent of the person's knowledge." Thus, when one speaks of "class consciousness," then one is dealing "with *living forms of thought* and *forms* of intuition *even in their functions* – and not with reflexive knowledge about these forms."[72] Xoruc emphasizes that it is precisely for this reason that Scheler considers ideologies not merely as an error of individual thought. As opposed to some bourgeois authors, he was convinced rather that ideologies are *a necessary element in social life.* Certainly they remain also for him basically a deception, however one conditioned by social and psychological causes. In this respect Scheler presents the view that the particular instinctual and value structure of contemporary bourgeois elitist thought is basic to the predominant faith in the absolute possibilities of science and of the mechanical technology connected with it. However this thinking runs the risk of absolutizing *one* of the three fundamental kinds of knowledge, namely, the social institution of technical science. The true cause of all of the Western world's difficulties consists in this. Consequently humanity can only *overcome the ideology of the "scientific-technological revolution"* and acquire true essential knowledge by means of a *new elite* which is capable of resisting the spontaneously generated prejudices of the masses.

In conclusion Xoruc sums up his opinion of Scheler's "sociology of knowledge" as follows:

> The sociology of knowledge constitutes the "third circle" of Scheler's philosophy. The subject of knowledge is considered here as a social being connected with a

certain class, a certain state, and a certain kind of activity; its knowledge is explained as socially conditioned. The fact that he equates the social conditionedness of knowledge with the prejudice and historical perishability of a class or group constitutes however the heart of Scheler's way of looking at things. According to Scheler, knowledge as a product of society is a deception (even if supra-individual and socially justified). Therein lies the basic difference between Scheler's sociology of knowledge and the Marxist analysis of social problems of knowledge which puts into the center of attention the question of the social subject of a true (scientifically objective) reflection of reality.[73]

In May 1970 the philosophical faculty of Moscow University held a conference which was devoted to the problems of modern philosophy of religion and a critique of it. The journal, *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta – Filosofija* published an informative report[74] on it in October 1970 (No. 5). This emphasized that "the content and the structure as well as the functions of the philosophy of religion [are] as ever barely researched."[75]

The authors of the conference report, L.N. Krasnopolskaja and A.P. Moiseeva, explained that "modern philosophy of religion [represents] a many-coloured bouquet of different currents of idealism with an abundance of nuances." The following belong to this in their opinion: "Neo-Thomism, neo-Augustinianism and the Christian evolutionism based on Catholicism, the 'philosophy of total-unity' of Vl. Solovyev and S. Bulgakov, Lossky's intuitionism and the Christian existentialism of N. Berdyayev on an Orthodox foundation as well as the 'theology of crisis' in Protestantism."[76]

The principal concern of the Moscow conference was Solovyev's philosophy, especially his ethics, existentialism, the evolutionary theory of Teilhard de Chardin, modern philosophical anthropology – above all the question of the person – and the contemporary echos of Russian philosophy of religion of the 20th century – especially that of Berdyayev, Bulgakov and Frank.

Since most of these patterns of thought hardly have the towering positions in the West that the Soviets attribute to them, one can hardly be mistaken in assuming that for a time they will gain more and more importance in the Soviet Union. This impression is also confirmed by the remark of the conference report that "in our country official Orthodox theology ever more frequently declares its solidarity with Solovyev in a series of questions, especially in the area of moral theology."[77] The same applies to the personalism of Scheler's philosophical anthropology as well as his material value ethics.

The breakthrough of this thinking into the Soviet variety of Marxist philosophy can hardly be delayed much longer, if only because of the undercurrent of an active Russian spiritual tradition.

POSTSCRIPT

In January 1971 after a three year delay (since the publication of the 4th volume in 1967), the Soviet Encyclopaedia press began the delivery of the last volume of the *Philosophical Encyclopaedia* (volume 5, Moscow 1970). The first copies of the 5th volume arrived here at the end of March 1971. It contains (pp. 51–56) an extensive, surprisingly fair and to a great degree objective discussion of *Vladimir Solovyev* (by V. Asmus, E. Raškovskij, I. Rodnjanskaja and S. Xoružij). Disregarding the unpretentious attempt of the first Soviet Encyclopaedia (Asmus, volume 52, Moscow 1947, columns 59–60 [see Chapter 8]), this is the first time the life and thought of the great Russian thinker has been appropriately and accurately reported in a Soviet reference work. The same thing occurs – within limits – in regard to *Max Scheler* (by D. Djalikov, pp. 499–501). As far as Scheler is concerned, he is represented for the first time in a Soviet reference work by his inclusion in the *Philosophical Encyclopaedia.* Soviet interest especially in the ethics and philosophical anthropology of both thinkers, which these articles manifest, should not be of minor significance for the spiritual development of Russia.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

[1] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/7. Cf. n. 1 on p. 7 to p. 337 where the context of this quotation from Aristotle is restored (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. A, chap. II, 12).
[2] Max Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, trans. Bernard Noble, London 1960, 98. This is a translation of the fourth edition of *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* which is included in vol. 5 of the *Gesammelte Werke*, Berne 1954. We rely on this translation in spite of the fact that the author (H. Dahm) uses the third edition of (*Vom Ewigen im Menschen* Berlin 1933) since there are no substantial differences in the material referred to.
[3] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/87–88; *II*, 1/110.
[4] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/292; *I*, 2/347.
[5] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/71.
[6] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/88 and 233.
[7] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/88 and 303.
[8] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/287.
[9] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/289; cf. *II*, 2/304–305; *I*, 2/332–333.
[10] Cf. Solov'ev, *V*, 2/94–99.
[11] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/333.
[12] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/407 (n.).
[13] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/99–100; 109–110; 127; 143 and 149–150.
[14] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/289–290.
[15] The presuppositions for this statement will be explained in the discussion of systematic philosophy.
[16] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/75; 81 and 307.
[17] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/225.
[18] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 100.
[19] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 100.
[20] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 102.
[21] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/302.
[22] One notices the "striving" tendency of the cognitive relation, which is related to Scheler's thoughts.
[23] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/117; *I*, 1/111.
[24] Author's addition.
[25] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/380.
[26] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/273.
[27] *Ek-sistens (bytie)* means "manner of being *(Sein)*."
[28] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/280.
[29] "Salvation" is the highest form of the good.
[30] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/380.
[31] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/90–92.
[32] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/118–119.
[33] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/118.
[34] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/118–119.
[35] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 95.

[36] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/97.
[37] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/99.
[38] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 95.
[39] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 95.
[40] Scheler's conversion of love should be compared with this interpretation.
[41] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/321; *IX*, 2/157.
[42] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 95.
[43] Cf. Solov'ev, *Asketičeskoe načalo v nravstvennosti* (The Ascetic Principle in Morality), *Voprosy Filosofii i Psixologii*, Moscow, January 1895, 68–88.
[44] Solov'ev, *The Ascetic Principle in Morality*, 77.
[45] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/99.
[46] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/331–347; *II*, 1/274–281; 281–292. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 100–113.
[47] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/117; *IX*, 2/91. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 74.
[48] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/7 (n. 1 to p. 7 on p. 337).
[49] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/347; *II*, 1/292; *IX*, 2/102–105.
[50] Cf. Solov'ev, *O dejstvitel'nosti vnešnjago mira i osnovanii metafizičeskago poznanija – Otvet K.D. Kavelinu* (On the Actuality of the External World and the Foundation of Metaphysical Knowledge: Reply to K.D. Kavelin), (1875) in *I*, 2/216–226.
[51] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 98–100.
[52] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 100–104.
[53] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 104–107.
[54] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/321; *IX*, 2/157.
[55] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/64–65.
[56] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/97.
[57] Cf. Solov'ev, *The Ascetic Principle in Morality*, 66–68: further Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/99.
[58] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 95.
[59] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 74.
[60] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/7.
[61] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/95.
[62] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/95–96.
[63] Logic and epistemology are identical here.
[64] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/387.
[65] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/110.
[66] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/100.
[67] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 98.
[68] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 1/174; *IX*, 2/117.
[69] L. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus* (chapter II: Schelling und Solovjev) Freiburg i. Br. 1951, 93–123.
[70] L. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus*, 97–98.
[71] K. Leese, *Die Krisis und Wende des christlichen Geistes* (chapter V: Leib-Seele und Geist-Wille – Tragismus: 1. Max Scheler), Berlin 1932, 293–339.
[72] K. Leese, *Die Krisis und Wende des christlichen Geistes*, 337.
[73] Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling, *Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung*, in *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. I, Stuttgart and Augsburg 1858–1859, 8. Cf. L. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus*, 97–98.
[74] Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus*, 99–100.
[75] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/89–166.
[76] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/27–28; 64–65.
[77] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 101.
[78] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/346; *III*, 1/44.
[79] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/346.
[80] Solov'ev designates (Western) European thought since John Scotus Eriugena (circa 810 to 880) as "rationalist philosophy."

[81] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/346–347.
[82] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/94.
[83] The "von" is missing in the Russian text.
[84] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/143.
[85] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/388.
[86] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/349.
[87] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/32.
[88] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/388.
[89] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/32 and 388.
[90] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/350 and 387.
[91] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/333.
[92] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/387.
[93] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/110; cf. *IX*, 2/100–118.
[94] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/116.
[95] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/291.
[96] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/291.
[97] Author's addition.
[98] Author's addition.
[99] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/388.
[100] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 101.
[101] Scheler, *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens*, Munich and Leipzig 1924, 43–44. Scheler's article in this anthology is entitled "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens" (5–146). This work will hereafter be abbreviated as *SdW*.
[102] Scheler, *SdW*, 42.
[103] Scheler, "Erkenntnis und Arbeit," *WuG*, 352–353.
[104] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 100.
[105] Scheler, *SdW*, 43
[106] Scheler, *SdW*, 44
[107] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/123–124; 260; *MiK*, 1/21. The author is using the first edition of *MiK (Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos)*, which the translator was unable to obtain. Since no quotations are included in this and the subsequent "comparative" references, it was impossible to locate the corresponding pages in the English translation *(Man's Place in Nature)*. When quotations are available (e.g. chapter three of this volume) we refer to this work by its English title. Otherwise it appears as *MiK*.
[108] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/96–97 (Emotionaler Panentheismus); *WuB*, 44 (n. 16); *MiK*, 1/82–83.
[109] Scheler, *WuG*, 458.
[110] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 98ff.
[111] Cf. Scheler, *WuG*, 461 and 470.
[112] Cf. Scheler, *MiK*, 1/64.
[113] Cf. Scheler, *WuG*, Part II, chap. 6, 455ff.
[114] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/143–145.
[115] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/89ff.
[116] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 98.
[117] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 99.
[118] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 98.
[119] Cf. Solov'ev, *Teoretičeskaja filosofija* (Theoretical Philosophy), I–XXII in *IX*, 2/89–129 (Part I of the *Theoretical Philosophy*).
[120] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/108.
[121] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/130 and 115.
[122] Aleksandr Gizetti, "O mirosozercanii Vladimira Solov'eva" (On the World-View of Vladimir Solovyev) in *Zavety*, St. Petersburg, February 1914; II/1–21; here: 15.
[123] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 104.

[124] Johannes Hessen, *Max Scheler – Eine kritische Einführung in seine Philosophie,* Essen 1948, 130 (n. 12 to chap. II).
[125] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 89.
[126] According to the Greek self-understanding.
[127] In the sense of: the content of the primordial essence as an infinite act of creative and merciful love.
[128] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 77–78.
[129] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/349; *II,* 1/294.
[130] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/296.
[131] Cf. Solov'ev, *VII,* 2/45: ". . . this living ideal of God's love, which precedes our love, contains the secret of its idealization."
[132] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/134.
[133] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/154.
[134] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/165.
[135] For example, Plato's understanding of *ὄντως ὄν.*
[136] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/263; also cf. n. 6, *ibid.,* as well as Solov'ev, *I,* 2/264–265.
[137] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/288.
[138] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/304.
[139] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/304–305.
[140] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/71ff.; 133–136.
[141] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/165.
[142] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/171–172.
[143] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/167.
[144] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/263–264; cf. 190–192.
[145] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/387.
[146] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 98–103.
[147] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/346–347.
[148] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 98.
[149] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/117.
[150] Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/102.
[151] Schelling, *Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung,* in *Gesamtausgabe,* vol. I, 8. Cf. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus,* 97–98.
[152] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 98 and 103.
[153] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/110; 388.
[154] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/346–347; 349.
[155] Author's addition.
[156] Author's addition.
[157] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/346–347.
[158] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 80–81; Solov'ev, *II,* 1/171–172.
[159] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/71ff.; 133–136; Solov'ev, *II,* 1/304–305.
[160] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/177; cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/167.

CHAPTER II

[1] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/307.
[2] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/306.
[3] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/256.
[4] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/259–260.
[5] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/302 and 305.
[6] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/256; 265; 288–289.
[7] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/252–253.

[8] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/265–266.
[9] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/228–231.
[10] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/231–273.
[11] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/228; 237–239; 284–285.
[12] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/265–266.
[13] Scheler would have said instead of this: without any functionalizing modality of its structure principle.
[14] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/266–267.
[15] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/276–279.
[16] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/279–280.
[17] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/264; 267; 286–288.
[18] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/238–239; 284–285; 288.
[19] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/336.
[20] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/337.
[21] Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, 2 vols., Leipzig 1919, vol. II, 343. Cf. Scheler, *Genius des Krieges* (Part II), Leipzig 1915, 206–210; 268–271; 286–287; 297–313.
[22] ". . . the talented Russian is characterized by an extreme distrust of all powers and possibilities of the intellect in general and especially of his own" (Solov'ev, *V*, 2/98).
[23] ". . . il faut pour tout de bon abandonner l'idée de la puissance et de la grandeur extérieure de la théocratie comme but direct et immédiat de la politique chrétienne." Solov'ev's letter to his friend Eugen Tavernier (1896). The original is quoted by Wladimir Szyłkarski, *Solowjew und Dostojewskij*, Bonn 1948, 62–64.
[24] Wladimir Szyłkarski, *Solowjew und Dostojewskij*, 62.
[25] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/227ff.
[26] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/250–406.
[27] Author's addition.
[28] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/407 (editor's comment).
[29] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/267.
[30] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/288.
[31] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/264–265.
[32] Leo Kobilinski-Ellis characterizes the diagram of integral life as "the complete world-view of Solovyev."
Leo Kobilinski-Ellis, *Monarchia Sancti Petri*, Mainz 1929, 72.
[33] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/263 (n. 6).
[34] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/263 (n. 6).
[35] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/263.
[36] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/303.
[37] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/306.
[38] Cf. Scheler, *SuW*, vol. I., 18–19.
[39] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/165. Cf. also Solov'ev's thoughts in *Smysl ljubvi* (The Meaning of Love) in *VII*, 2/3–60 as well as in *Žiznennaja drama Platona* (The Life Drama of Plato) in *VIII*, 1/246–290.
[40] Author's addition.
[41] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/29; cf. *II*, 1/324, 327.
[42] Where faith has previously been mentioned.
[43] A more detailed investigation of this question will take place in the epistemology.
[44] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/324; in this connection cf. also Louis J. Shein, "V.S. Solov'ev's Epistemology: A Re-examination," *Canadian Slavic Studies – Revue canadienne d'études slaves*, IV, Montreal (1970), 1–16.
[45] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. I, 27–28.
[46] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. I, 41.
[47] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. I, 26.
[48] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, 168–169.

CHAPTER III

[1], Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 146–160.
[2] Cf. J. Hessen, *Max Scheler – Eine kritische Einführung in seine Philosophie,* 60–66.
[3] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 131–132.
[4] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 152.
[5] Cf. Solov'ev, *Mifologičeskij process v drevnem jazyčestve* (The Mythological Process in Ancient Paganism, 1873) in Solov'ev, *I,* 2/1–26 as well as his view that "philosophical thought [must serve] as the control of instructive religion" (*IX,* 2/90).
[6] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/364. He comments here that "all these dogmas, because they are absolutely rational in their original sense, [could] be developed into a complete philosophical system." The previous statements should be compared here.
[7] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/29–33.
[8] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/138–140.
[9] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 143–144 (Kant – Mach). Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/138–140 (Kant – Positivists).
[10] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/322–328.
[11] Cf. to point 1: Solov'ev, *II,* 1/7 and 337; *I,* 2/260.
Cf. to point 2: Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/91: *III,* 1/271 and 281–368.
Cf. to point 5: Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/93–94.
Cf. to point 6: Solov'ev, *I,* 2/117; *IX,* 2/92–93 as well as *Duxovnyja osnovy žizni* (The Spiritual Foundations of Life, 1882–1884) in Solov'ev, *III,* 1/270–382.
Cf. to point 7: Solov'ev, *I,* 2/118; *III,* 1/347–380.
Cf. to point 8: Solov'ev, *I,* 2/342–343.
[12] Cf. to point 3: Solov'ev, *I,* 2/316; *III,* 1/61 and 293.
Cf. to point 4: Solov'ev, *III,* 1/64–65.
[13] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 134.
[14] Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/93.
[15] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/284ff.
[16] Cf. the interpretation below in chap. IV "Systematic Philosophy" (78ff.).
[17] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/333.
[18] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/291.
[19] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/263 (n. 6).
[20] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/324.
[21] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/304.
[22] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/165.
[23] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/171–172.
[24] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/67.
[25] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/321; *IX,* 2/157.
[26] Wilhelm Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* ed. Heinz Heimsoeth, 14th edn., Tübingen 1950, 228–229 (with a concluding chapter "Die Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert" and an "Übersicht über den Stand der philosophischen Forschung").
[27] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 74.
[28] Cf. Solov'ev's summary of his epistemology in Solov'ev, *II,* 1/320–324.
[29] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 150–151.
[30] L. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus,* 102.
[31] L. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus,* 103.
[32] Author's addition.
[33] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/324; cf. further Louis J. Shein, "V.S. Solov'ev's Epistemology – A Re-examination," 1–16.
[34] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/188–189.

[35] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/188.
[36] Solov'ev, *II*, 2/298.
[37] Solov'ev, *II*, 2/302.
[38] Solov'ev, *II*, 2/304–305.
[39] Solov'ev, *II*, 2/306–307.
[40] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/29–30.
[41] Solov'ev, *II*, 2/196.
[42] One must bear in mind that Solovyev understands "humanity as a whole as the eternal body of the divinity and as the eternal world-soul." Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/116.
[43] Cf. the epistemology of "organic logic" below in chapter four, section one.
[44] In regard to the transcendental relation of "phenomenal corporeality" cf. the discussion of ethics and the concept of "reverence" below in chapter four, section three.
[45] Ct. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/413ff.
[46] The discussion of metaphysics below in chapter four, section two will show that Solov'ev's concept of "*javlenie*" ("phenomenon") does not contradict this.
[47] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/342–343.
[48] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/194.
[49] Cf. pp. 24–27 and 29–40 above.
[50] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/194.
[51] The discussion of metaphysics in chapter four, section two below will explain this manner of expression which appears to contradict Solov'ev.
[52] Author's addition.
[53] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/269.
[54] Author's addition.
[55] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/70.
[56] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 149–150.
[57] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/178ff.; 235.
Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, art. 1 ("Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis"), 39–42; 46; 49–50; 56–57; 59–60;
Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 1/260–272; 2/384–522.
Cf. Scheler, *PhdG*, 196–202.
Cf. Scheler, *MiK*, 1/46–47; 53; 57–58 and 75.
[58] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/389–390.
[59] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/397–398.
[60] Author's addition.
[61] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/408–411.
[62] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/411–413.
[63] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/412.
[64] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/412 and Solov'ev, *III*, 1/269.
[65] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/151–168.
[66] Cf. the diagram of opposites in Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/145.
[67] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/389–390.
[68] Cf. Walter Schubart, *Europa und die Seele des Ostens*, Lucerne 1938; 6th and 7th edns. Lucerne 1947, (317 pp.).
[69] Cf. W. Schubart, *Europa und die Seele des Ostens*, 6–7/32.
[70] Schubart's book was published in 1950 in New York under the title *Russia and Western Man*.
[71] Cf. "Ost-Probleme," Bad Godesberg, November 1950, 1526–1527 (reviewer: Hans Kohn).
[72] Cf. Fulton J. Sheen, *Communism and the Conscience of the West*, Indianapolis-New York 1949.
[73] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/389.

[74] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/189.
[75] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/189.
[76] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/194.
[77] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/261.
[78] Cf. Scheler, *WuG*, 408–409.
[79] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/77.
[80] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/218.
[81] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/102.
[82] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, art. 1 ("Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis"), 45.
[83] Cf. Thomas G. Masaryk, *Zur russischen Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie – Soziologische Skizzen*, 2 vols., Jena 1913, vol. II, 248–253.
[84] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/314ff.
[85] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/316.
[86] Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, vol. I, art. 1 ("Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend").
[87] Cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen*, Regensburg 1932); cf. the three essays on Max Scheler (317–387), especially 353–354.
[88] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/64.
[89] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/27–28.
[90] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/189.
[91] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/24ff.
[92] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/29.
[93] Author's addition.
[94] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/72.
[95] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/73.
[96] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/92.
[97] D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen*, 326.
[98] D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen*, 326–327.
[99] Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, 2 ("Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens").
[100] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, 168–169.
[101] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, 189.
[102] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, 189.
[103] Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, 189; negative: *WuG*, 307.
[104] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, 170.
[105] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/319.
[106] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/263 (n. 6).
[107] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/342.
[108] Cf. W. Brugger, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, 3rd edn., Freiburg i. Br. 1950, 167–168.
[109] Brugger, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, 167.
[110] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/319.
[111] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/320.
[112] W. Brugger, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, 168.
[113] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/316–317; *III*, 1/61 and 259.
[114] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/357–380; *II*, 1/302–305 (*II*, 1/106–136); *La Russie et l'Église universelle*, 1–4 Paris 1889–1922, bk. III, chap. 4.
[115] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/350 and 353; *II*, 1/297.
[116] Cf. B. Schultz, "Das Gewissen Russlands," *Wort und Wahrheit*, Vienna 8 (1950), 586.
[117] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/407.
[118] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/388–389.
[119] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, art. 1 ("Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis"), 45.
[120] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/180.
[121] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/405.

[122] Cf. Franz Josef Brecht, *Bewusstsein und Existenz – Wesen und Weg der Phänomenologie,* Bremen 1948 (habilitation work 1932), 82.
[123] Brecht, *Bewusstsein und Existenz – Wesen und Weg der Phänomenologie,* 83.
[124] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/73.
[125] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/27–28.
[126] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/73.
[127] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/73.
[128] Cf. Scheler, *UdW,* vol. II, art. 1 ("Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis"), 49–50.
[129] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 1/220; *IX,* 2/165. Cf. *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe der Werke von Wladimir Solowjew,* ed. Wladimir Szylkarski, vol. VII, Freiburg i. Br. 1953, 103–104.
[130] "For man is not perception, but the one who perceives; not thought, but the one who thinks; not will, but the one who wills; in a word, not being *(Sein),* but the one who is," Solov'ev, *II,* 1/302.
[131] "Just as will, reason, and feeling are powers of one spirit, unifying them, so also the objects which correspond to them are only different modes (ideas) of the one absolute principle, unifying them, which in its actuality is the proper object of religion." Solov'ev, *III,* 1/29; cf. *II,* 1/302.
[132] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/302.
[133] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/371.
[134] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/62 and 65–66.
[135] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/63.
[136] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/64.
[137] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/66 (n. 1).
[138] W. Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* 14/100.
[139] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/66.
[140] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/65.
[141] "Those who occupy themselves in the proper way with philosophy, strive for nothing else than to die and to be dead." Plato, *Phaedo,* 64 a (author's translation).
[142] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/66.
[143] Cf. Plato, *Phaedo,* trans. A. Hübscher, Munich 1948, chap. 12, 13, and 27.
[144] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/66.
[145] Cf. the epistle of James 2: 17–18.
[146] Cf. I. Corinthians 13:1–13; John 14:21; Mark 12:28–31.
[147] Literally: "receive".
[148] This means, by the effect of this other.
[149] Related to "powers".
[150] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/49.
[151] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/50.
[152] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/50.
[153] Cf. Scheler's *"ordo amoris"* doctrine.
[154] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/50.
[155] This is a reference to the problem of individuation.
[156] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/59–60.
[157] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/63.
[158] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/64.
[159] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/63–64.
[160] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/65.
[161] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/65.
[162] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/99.
[163] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/63.
[164] Cf. above pp. 43–46.

[165] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/99; cf. *I*, 2/363.
[166] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/27.
[167] "Forces" are meant here in the sense of acts.
[168] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/29.
[169] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/53.
[170] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/101.
[171] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/165.
[172] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/53.
[173] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/174.
[174] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/99; cf. *I*, 2/363.
[175] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/63.
[176] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/63.
[177] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/53.
[178] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/363.
[179] "The being" *(das Seiende)*.
[180] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/373.
[181] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/64.
[182] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/363 and 373: "The idea is properly that which the being wills, what it thinks, what it feels and perceives – this is its proper object or content" (363). "Every self-determining activity of the being brings . . . forth another or an idea. The being becomes the subject or bearer of the idea" (373).
[183] "The being in the three subjects [spirit, intellect and soul] is not being *(Sein)*. Likewise the idea itself for itself is not being *(Sein)*. They have being *(Sein)* only in their reciprocal relation or in their reciprocation. However for themselves they are powers of being *(Sein)* – and spirit, intellect and soul are positive powers while the idea is a negative and passive force." Solov'ev, *I*, 2/373.
[184] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/404.
[185] Solov'ev, *On the Actuality of the External World and the Foundation of Metaphysical Knowledge*, in Solov'ev, *I*, 2/216–226.
[186] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/218.
[187] Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, art 1 ("Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis"), 56.
[188] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/418.
[189] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/428–429.
[190] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/321–322.
[191] For example Solov'ev, *I*, 2/77.
[192] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/432.
[193] Author's addition.
[194] Author's addition.
[195] Author's addition.
[196] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/266.
[197] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/265.
[198] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/262.
[199] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/155–157.
[200] Cf. Solov'ev, *The Ascetic Principle in Morality*, 78.
[201] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/262.
[202] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/265.
[203] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/493.
[204] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, art. 1 ("Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis"), 40.
[205] This is not quoted in the text.
[206] Author's addition.
[207] Author's addition.
[208] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/72.
[209] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/405.

[210] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/73.
[211] Cf. *Kritika otvlečennyx načal* (A Critique of Abstract Principles; 1877–1880) in Solov'ev, *II*, 1/147. Cf. also *Ponjatie o Boge* (The Concept of God; 1897) in Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/19–20.
[212] Author's addition.
[213] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/397 (n.).
[214] The nature of Scheler's "external perception" and the "direction-determination of perception as an act" (*Ethics*, 2/388–389) in the concepts "internal-psychic" and "external-physical" appear to correspond to Solov'ev's understanding of "external experience."
[215] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/363 and 373.
[216] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/404.
[217] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (New York: The Noonday Press, 1961), 38.

The English translation of *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* relies on the first edition (1928) and especially upon the fourth edition (1948). In order to conform to the author's quotations, which are consistently from the first edition, this translator has had to occasionally delete portions of the English translation (indicated by an ellipsis) as well as marks of emphasis (no indication).

[218] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 38.
[219] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 38.
[220] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 38.
[221] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 38–39.
[222] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 39.
[223] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 39.
[224] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 40.
[225] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 46.
[226] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 40.
[227] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 47.
[228] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 40.
[229] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 43.
[230] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 43.
[231] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 48.
[232] Cf. Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 50.
[233] Cf. Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 50–51.
[234] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 51.
[235] Cf. Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 54.
[236] Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, vol. II, art. 1 ("Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis"), 41.
[237] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/412.
[238] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/154.
[239] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/27–28.
[240] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/63–64.
[241] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/65.
[242] The meaning of the concept of state which has just been explained is assumed here.
[243] Author's addition.
[244] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/222–223.
[245] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 296.
[246] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/397–398.
[247] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 296–297.
[248] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 297 (n.).
[249] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/223.
[250] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/347; cf. *II*, 1/292 and *I*, 2/315.
[251] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/155 and 150; further chapter IV A (2e and 2f), above all

"Leib und Umwelt" (413ff.); in particular "Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung" in Scheler, *WuG*, 5/363 (II).
[252] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 261.
[253] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 296.
[254] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 296.
[255] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/30–31; *IX*, 2/14–15.
[256] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/33; cf. *III*, 1/31.
[257] Author's addition.
[258] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/15.
[259] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/14.
[260] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 149.
[261] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 247–248.
[262] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/19–20.
[263] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/27–28; *III*, 1/64–65.
[264] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 150–151. Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/31.
[265] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/270–271.
[266] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/347; *II*, 1/292.
[267] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/347; *II*, 1/292.
[268] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/66.
[269] Epistle of James 2:20.
[270] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/175ff. and *Ethics*, 2/524ff.
[271] Cf. D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen*, 321.
[272] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/199.
[273] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/199.
[274] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 134–135.
[275] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 141.

CHAPTER IV

Section I

[1] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/307–308.
[2] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/339.
[3] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/308–343.
[4] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/309.
[5] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/311.
[6] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/316.
[7] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/316.
[8] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/321.
[9] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/337.
[10] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/341.
[11] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/341.
[12] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 225f.
Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/133–136.
Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/508ff.
[13] Cf. Scheler, *WuG*, part II, 354ff. ("Erkenntnis und Arbeit").
[14] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 200–202.
Cf. Scheler, *PhdG*, 196–202 in Ph. Witkop, *Deutsches Leben der Gegenwart*, Berlin 1922.
Cf. Scheler, *SdW*, 111–113; further *WuB*, 20f. and 30f.

Cf. Scheler, *WuG,* 247–248.
Cf. Scheler, "Idealismus-Realismus" in *Philosophischer Anzeiger,* 1927, vol. II, 256–257.
[15] Johannes Hessen's presentation in *Max Scheler – Eine kritische Einführung in seine Philosophie* should be consulted.
[16] Cf. Katharina Kanthack, *Max Scheler – Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht,* Berlin/Hannover 1948, 167–169 and 217.
[17] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/84–92; *II,* 1/304–306.
[18] For the doctrine of reality cf. Scheler, *Das Realitätsproblem,* Berlin 1912 as well as Scheler, *WuG,* 457ff.
For the concept of "metaphysical empiricism" cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/308–309; 324–327; *III,* 1/29–33; 45–47.
[19] Cf. Scheler, *WuG,* 457.
[20] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/116ff. as well as *La Russie et l'Eglise universelle,* bk. III, chap. 4. Cf. Bernhard Schultze, "Das Gewissen Russlands", 585ff.
[21] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/320–324; *III,* 1/60–63.
[22] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/136.
[23] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/509ff.
Cf. Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, 263 ("Zum Phänomen des Tragischen").
[24] "Materia non quomodolibet accepta est principium individuationis, sed solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatum, quae sub certis dimensionibus consideratur" (Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia,* C. 2.).
[25] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia,* C. 5.
[26] Joseph Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* 2 vols., Münster 1863, vol. II, 667–668.
[27] Joseph Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* vol. II, 677–678.
[28] Joseph Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* vol. II, 679.
[29] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles,* 1. 2c. 50/2.
[30] Joseph Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* vol. II, 670.
Compare Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima,* Art. 1. ad. 2; *Summa theologica,* Pars tertia, Q. 77. art. 2.
[31] Joseph Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* vol. II, 680.
Cf. Francisco Suarez, *Disputationes metaphysicae,* (1695), Disp. 5, sect. 6.: ". . . haec opinio . . . ideoque in hoc sensu dicit unamquamque entitatem per se ipsam esse suae individuationis principium."
[32] Joseph Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* vol. II, 681.
[33] John Duns Scotus, cf. in *Opus Oxoniense Sententiarum,* I.1. (Dist. 2. q. 7.; dist. 5. q. 1.; dist. 8. q. 4.); cf. in II. (Dist. 3. q. 1.).
[34] Joseph Donat, *Ontologia (Summae tertius liber),* 9th edn., Innsbruck 1940, 94–95.
[35] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/160–161.
[36] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/159.
[37] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/159 (n.).
[38] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/159–160.
[39] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 228.
[40] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 229.
[41] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 238.
[42] Cf. Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie,* 5th edition, Frankfurt/M. 1948. Cf. also the additional information in the 2nd edition (see "Vorwort zur 2. Auflage" in 5/X) as well as Scheler, *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass,* Halle 1913.
[43] Scheler, *WuG,* 429.
[44] Scheler, *WuG,* 434.
[45] Scheler, *WuG,* 360.
[46] Scheler, *WuG,* 363.

[47] Cf. Solov'ev, comments about the empiricist doctrine of representation *I*, 2/327–328.
[48] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/259.
[49] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/76 (n. 48).
[50] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/70.
[51] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/81.
[52] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/82.
[53] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/106; *um* (intellect).
[54] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/259.
[55] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/259.
[56] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, 50.
[57] Scheler, *WuG*, 285; cf. 284.
[58] Scheler, *WuG*, 279; cf. Scheler, *WuB*, 30–39.
[59] One notices Solov'ev's critical and reserved attitude towards "abstract realism" in Solov'ev, *II*, 1/186ff.
[60] Scheler, *WuG*, 278.
[61] Author's addition.
[62] Author's addition.
[63] Scheler, *WuG*, 247–248; cf. Scheler, *WuB*, 30–31.
[64] Scheler, *WuG*, 343.
[65] Scheler, *WuG*, 343.
[66] Hessen, *Max Scheler – Eine kritische Einführung in seine Philosophie*, 39–40.
[67] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/87–88.
[68] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/116ff; 504.
[69] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/136.
[70] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/110.
[71] In this context Scheler speaks of the "spiritual side of the *'ordo amoris'*."
[72] More exactly, of each personal being *(Personwesen)*.
[73] This also pertains to Schelling and Schopenhauer. Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/109.
[74] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/110.
[75] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/147.
[76] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/162.
[77] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/162.
[78] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/164. Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/142 (in reference to a-cosmic personal love and divine love) as well as *WuFdS*, 5/112 (in reference to *"Amare Deum in Deo"*).
[79] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/164.
[80] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/165.
[81] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/166–167.
[82] Cf. Theoretical Philosophy (1897–1899) in Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/156ff.
[83] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 101ff.
[84] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/125, 127; *III*, 2/136, 138.
[85] Author's addition.
[86] Author's addition.
[87] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/319.
[88] Author's addition.
[89] Author's addition.
[90] *Cognitio fit a cognoscente et cognito.* Cf. Thomas Aquinas: In Jo. c.1. 1/1; De pot. q. 9. a. 5. (accordingly Duns Scotus and Suárez).
[91] Author's addition.
[92] Author's addition.
[93] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/320–322 and *II*, 2/337–339.
[94] Scheler, *WuG*, 408–409.

[95] Author's addition.
[96] Author's addition.
[97] Author's addition.
[98] This statement cannot refer to the Scholastic or critical realist "species" theory.
[99] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica,* Pars prima: Q. 84. art. 6. *conclusio*: *"Intellectiva cognitio fit a sensibili . . . ."* Q. 87. art. 4. ad 1.: *"Nihil enim cognoscitur ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquo modo praesens in intellectu."* Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate:* "*. . . scientiam a sensibilibus mens nostra accipit.*" (Q. 10. art. 6.).
[100] Solov'ev himself places "intellectus" in parentheses following "*um*" in *I,* 2/106.
[101] In the sense of the "spiritual side of the *'ordo amoris'*."
[102] This text makes Ludolf Müller's historicizing interpretation of Solov'ev and his doubt about Solov'ev's intellectual independence from Schelling seem questionable. For the German, "the question [certainly is not] whether it is not easier for him to obtain Schelling's works than to let these ideas be reported to him by a Russian" (L. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus,* 120).
[103] Author's addition.
[104] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/322–324 and *II,* 2/339–342.
[105] Scheler, *WuG,* 278.
[106] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/322.
[107] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/322.
[108] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/323.
[109] Author's addition.
[110] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/322.
[111] Scheler, *WuG,* 279.
[112] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/323.
[113] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/140.
[114] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/141.
[115] Author's addition.
[116] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/141.
[117] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 201; cf. 200–204; further Scheler, *WuG* 419.
[118] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 201.
[119] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/323.
[120] Author's addition.
[121] Author's addition.
[122] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/240.
[123] Cf. Scheler, *WuG,* 284–285.
[124] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/251.
[125] Author's addition; cf. Solov'ev's view of individuation as well as Solov'ev, *I,* 2/402 (the essential perspective of the forming intuition).
[126] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/251.
[127] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/255.
[128] Scheler, *WuG,* 456; cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/342–343.
[129] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/XVI (preface to the 2nd edition).
[130] Scheler, *WuG,* 457.
[131] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/141.
[132] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/342.
[133] Cf. Wladimir Szyłkarski, *Solowjews Philosophie der All-Einheit,* Kaunas 1932, 39–40.
[134] Cf. *Opravdanie dobra (The Justification of the Good)* in Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/23.
[135] Scheler, *WuG,* 437(–449).
[136] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/323.
[137] Scheler, *WuG,* 442.

CHAPTER IV

Section II

[1] Author's comment.
[2] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/357–358.
[3] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/358 (n. 30.).
[4] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/359.
[5] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/360.
[6] Author's addition.
[7] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/360–361.
[8] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/362.
[9] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/367–368.
[10] Author's addition.
[11] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/369.
[12] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/363.
[13] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/379.
[14] Wladimir Szyłkarski, *Solowjews Philosophie der All-Einheit*, 63.
[15] Solov'ev, *La Russie et l'Église universelle*, Paris 1906, 2/212–213.
[16] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/167.
[17] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/150.
[18] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/350.
[19] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/354.
[20] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/397–398 and 404.
[21] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/124ff. especially the statements about the "consciousness of being-able" (128–129).
[22] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/371.
[23] "Striving itself has internal directional differences of a phenomenal nature" (Scheler *Ethics*, 2/28).
[24] Cf. Scheler, *MiK*, 1/66–83.
[25] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/371; *II*, 1/297.
[26] Cf. Scheler, *Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung* (lecture at the 10th anniversary of the Berlin Lessing Academy), Bonn 1925 (3rd edn. Frankfurt/M. 1947).
[27] Wladimir Szyłkarski, *Solowjews Philosophie der All-Einheit*, 52.
[28] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/110.
[29] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/3. Cf. to Solov'ev's "*Verteidigung der Philosophie Spinozas*" *Ponjatie o Boge* (The Concept of God) in *IX*, 2/3–29. Cf. Scheler's 1927 Amsterdam lecture on Spinoza in *Philosophische Weltanschauung*, Bonn 1929 (quoted under Scheler, *PhW*, 124–139).
[30] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/27.
[31] Cf. *A Critique of Abstract Principles*, (1877 until 1880) in Solov'ev, *II*, 1/189.
[32] Cf. *Filosofskija načala cel'nago znanija* (The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge, 1877) in Solov'ev, *I*, 2/332–333. Cf. further Solov'ev, *II*, 1/289.
[33] Author's addition.
[34] Scheler, *WuB*, 44 (n. 6).
[35] Scheler, *WuB*, 44 (n. 16).
[36] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/99.
[37] Cf. Scheler, *WuB*, 48 (n. 26).
[38] The temporal determination "a little later" refers to a comment in the preface to *A Critique of Abstract Principles*. Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 1/III (preface) (n. 1).
[39] Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 14/574.
[40] Vladimir Solov'ev and Max Scheler are meant.

[41] Cf. Solov'ev, *La Russie et l'Église universelle,* bk. III, chap. 5. Cf. the *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe der Werke von Wladimir Solowjew* (ed. Wladimir Szyłkarski): *Una Sancta – Schriften zur Vereinigung der Kirchen und zur Grundlegung der universalen Theokratie,* (vol. 2). *Gesamtausgabe,* vol. III., Freiburg i. Br. 1954 (145–419); here 351–357.
[42] Quoted according to Leo Kobilinski-Ellis, *Monarchia Sancti Petri – Aus den Hauptwerken Wladimir Solowjews,* Mainz 1929, 83–84. Cf. the *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe der Werke von Wladimir Solowjew,* ed. Wladimir Szyłkarski, vol. III, 354.
[43] Scheler, *WuB,* 43 (n. 15).
[44] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/87–88.
[45] Scheler, *WuB,* 43 (n. 15).
[46] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/296.
[47] Scheler, *WuB,* 21–22.
[48] Author's addition.
[49] Author's addition.
[50] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/128.
[51] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/294ff.
[52] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/135.
[53] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/147.
[54] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/39.
[55] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/135.
[56] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/134.
[57] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/135.
[58] Cf. Solov'ev, *La Russie et l'Église universelle,* bk. III, chap. 5. Further *Tri razgovora* (Three Conversations, 1899–1900); here *Razgovor tretij* (Third Conversation) in Solov'ev, *VIII,* 1/524ff.
[59] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/150.
[60] Cf. Bernhard Schultze, *Russische Denker – Ihre Stellung zu Christus, Kirche und Papsttum,* Vienna 1950, 280–281.

The following authors present the opposite interpretation: Fritz Lieb, *Russland unterwegs – Der russische Mensch zwischen Christentum und Kommunismus,* Bern 1945, 124 (cf. Schultze 278 incl. n. 99).

Friedrich Muckermann, *Wladimir Solowjew – Zur Begegnung zwischen Russland und dem Abendland,* Olten 1945, 155 (cf. Schultze 278, n. 100).

Iwan von Kologriwof (Ivan Kologrivov), *Von Hellas zum Mönchtum – Leben und Denken Konstantin Leontjews,* Regensburg 1948, 226 (cf. Schultze 278, n. 100).

Cf. further K. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solov'ev – Žizn' i učenie* (Vladimir Solov'ev – Life and Teachings), Paris, 2nd edn., 1951 (here chap. 14: The polemic with Rozanov. The conversion of Feb, 18, 1896. Solov'ev in the Nineties: 1893–1896), 208–226. (The first edition of Močul'skij's book on Solov'ev appeared in 1936 in Paris under the same title).
[61] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/178; cf. 177.
[62] Cf. Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, 110–113 ("Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen"). further Scheler, *KuA,* 413–414 ("Liebe und Erkenntnis").
[63] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 225ff.
[64] Scheler, *KuA,* 413 ("Liebe und Erkenntnis").
[65] Scheler, *WuB,* 43 (n. 15).
[66] Scheler, *WuB,* 43 (n. 15).
[67] Scheler, *Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus* (lecture at the Reichswehrministerium, Berlin, January 1927, as well as at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, Feb. 1927 – published by Maria Scheler from the estate Berlin 1931), 21–22(n.).
[68] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature,* 70–71.
[69] In reference to Schopenhauer's work *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* (1841).

[70] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/83.
[71] Scheler, *Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus,* 21–22 (n.).
[72] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature,* 71.
[73] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/167.
[74] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature,* 70.
[75] The contradiction of the Fall of Sophia.
[76] For example the contradiction of knowledge of "freedom" prior to all existence of ideas (cf. Scheler, *WuB,* 48, n. 26) or the contradiction of the knowledge of the end under the assumption of both a blind urge and an absolutely powerless spirit, etc.
[77] K. Kanthack, *Max Scheler – Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht,* 302.
[78] K. Leese, *Die Krisis und Wende des christlichen Geistes,* 338.
[79] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/99–100; 109–110; 127 and 149–150.
[80] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/99–100.
[81] Cf. Scheler, *Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus,* 22 (n.).
[82] Scheler, *Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus,* 22 (n.).
[83] This explanation was rejected by Scheler for the theory of the "other-I" in his interpretation of the feeling of sympathy; cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/5ff. and 228ff. (Th. Lipps' theory of imitation).
[84] The same problem area is present here which Solov'ev critically discussed in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* (1877) in respect to the logical relation of the subject-apriorism and formless matter as well as the presupposition of an essential independence of both regions in Kant. Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/325–326.
[85] In the master's dissertation *Krizis zapadnoj filosofii: Protiv pozitivistov* (The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists, 1874) in Solov'ev, *I,* 2/94–95.
[86] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/94–95.
[87] Scheler's appeal to "directed impulses of the originally spiritually blind creative urge" cannot free him from this fatal situation. For the "directedness" remains a *deus ex machina* of the world-ground. To understand it as intentionality belonging to urge is excluded. But how else is it to be thought of in Logos, if the "differentiation of ideas" first occurs under the "directed" impulses of the creative urge? Clearly the ideas should possess the directional function!
[88] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/174; cf. the foreword to the 2nd edn., in Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/X.
[89] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/172.
[90] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/174.
[91] Scheler, *KuA,* 393ff.
[92] Cf. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen,* 352 and 377.
[93] Cf. Scheler, *WuB,* 30–31; further Scheler, *WuG,* 248.
[94] Cf. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen,* 344.
[95] Cf. Schultze, "Das Gewissen Russlands," 585ff.
[96] F. Van der Meer, *Augustinus der Seelsorger,* Cologne 1951, 652–653. Cf. É. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de St. Augustin,* Paris 1929, 274.
[97] F. Van der Meer, *Augustinus der Seelsorger,* 653.
[98] Cf. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen,* 317ff.
[99] Cf. Leese, *Die Krisis und Wende des christlichen Geistes,* 414.
[100] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/94.
[101] Cf. Solov'ev in *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* in *I,* 2/250ff.
[102] Solov'ev, *The Ascetic Principle in Morality,* 76.
[103] Author's addition.
[104] Solov'ev, *The Ascetic Principle in Morality,* 76.
[105] Cf. Scheler, *SdW,* 26ff.
[106] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/116.
[107] *The Life Drama of Plato* in Solov'ev, *VIII,* 1/246ff.; Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/194ff.
[108] Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/243.

[109] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/359; *II*, 1/299.
[110] In his master's dissertation, *The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists*, 1874.
[111] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/143.
[112] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/333.
[113] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/347.
[114] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/346–347.
[115] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/349 and 351.
[116] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/359.
[117] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/350.
[118] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/358–359. Further: *La Russie et l'Église universelle*, 2/219–221 (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). Cf. *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe* (Szyłkarski), vol. III, Freiburg i. Br. 1954. Here: *Russia and the Universal Church*, bk. III, chap. 2: The three divine hypostases. The true meaning of their names (333–338); bk. III, chap. 3: The divine essence and its threefold expression (339–343).
[119] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/358 (n. 30).
[120] Author's addition.
[121] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/359.
[122] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/358 (n. 30).
[123] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/296.
[124] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/296.
[125] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/343.
[126] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/296.
[127] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/299.
[128] Solov'ev, *II*, 2/314.
[129] Wladimir Szyłkarski, *Solowjews Philosophie der All-Einheit*, 50–51.
[130] Cf. Plato, *Philebus*, 54c; cf. further: Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 14/110.
[131] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima*, II, 1/412a9 *et passim*. For a definition of matter cf. Aristotle, *Physica*, I, 9/192a31.
[132] Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 14/119.
[133] Aristotle, *Physica*, I, 9/192a31.
[134] Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, C. 2, 3 and 4.
[135] Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, C. 4.
[136] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/383. The work, *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge*, remained incomplete; cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/407 on this (footnote of the editor).
[137] The human intellect is meant.
[138] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/383 (the root of apriorism).
[139] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/397ff.
[140] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/70–73; 128–129; 140–141; 221–223 and 312–321.
[141] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/316–320.
[142] Influences of Schelling's philosophy from the time of the "system of identity": (1801–1809); *Presentation of my System of Philosophy* (1801); *Bruno or on the Natural and Divine Principle of Things* (1802); *Lectures on the Method of Academic Study* (1803); *Philosophy and Religion* (1804).
[143] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/316.
[144] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/317.
[145] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/316.
[146] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/317.
[147] Cf. Scheler's definition of "productive power of imagination" in *WuG*, 449.
[148] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/319.
[149] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/319–320.
[150] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/404.

[151] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/404.
[152] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/51; 75; 327.
[153] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica,* Pars prima, Q. 14. art. 6. Conclusio – Ad primum: "Cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in cognoscente. Quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente, tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis."
[154] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/396–397.
[155] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/373 and 378.
[156] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/404.
[157] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/403.
[158] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/403.
[159] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/404.
[160] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima,* II, 1/412a9.
Cf. Joseph Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* vol. II, 2/VII (236–266).
Cf. Joseph Donat, *Ontologia,* 9/n. 441–445.
[161] Cf. Joseph Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* vol. I, 157, n. 92. Cf. Joseph Donat, *Psychologia,* Heidelberg, 1946, 9/n. 207–216 (De prima origine idearum) as well as n. 217–229 (De acquisitione idearum ex experientia).
[162] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/318–320 (observations on the relation between art and philosophy).
[163] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/403–404.
[164] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/51, 75 and 327.
[165] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/26–29; *VIII,* 2/170–171 and 454ff.(intuiting by means of the "exaltation of love").
[166] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/139–140.
[167] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/322.
[168] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 201.
[169] Author's addition.
[170] Author's addition.
[171] Author's addition.
[172] Author's addition.
[173] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/70.
[174] Solov'ev, *II,* 1/323.
[175] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Monadologie,* 21. Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Welträtsel und Lebensharmonie – Erkenntnis und Weisheit im Spiegel seiner Werke,* selected and translated by Wilhelm Hendel, Wiesbaden 1949 (2nd edn. 1950). Die Monaden und das Weltall. From *Die Monadologie* (1714), here 58 and 65 (confused or unconscious ideas).
[176] Cf. Immanuel Kant, *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis,* 1770. *Ibid.,* §6.
[177] Cf. Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* 14/399.
[178] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 200–201.
[179] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/240, 255 and 348–349.
[180] Solov'ev, *I,* 2/402.
[181] Cf. K. Kanthack, *Max Scheler – Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht,* 167–169, and 217.
[182] Cf. Scheler, *Abhandlungen und Aufsätze* (Treatises and Essays), Leipzig 1915.
[183] Cf. Solov'ev, *III,* 1/66 for the opposite view.
[184] Cf. K. Kanthack, *Max Scheler – Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht,* 241, 242, 246.
[185] Cf. Scheler, *Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus,* 34. Further Scheler, *SdW,* 109–114.
[186] Cf. K. Leese, *Die Krisis und Wende des christlichen Geistes,* 331.
[187] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature,* 62.
[188] K. Leese, *Die Krisis und Wende des christlichen Geistes,* 335–336.
[189] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/351.

[190] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/351 and 354.
[191] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/66. This sentence is completely independent of axiological interpretations in the sense of the "categorical imperative" or of the objectivity of "value-essences."
[192] Fritz Joachim von Rintelen, "Die Bedeutung des philosophischen Wertproblems" in *Philosophia perennis,* ed. Fritz Joachim von Rintelen, 2 vols., Regensburg 1930, vol. II, 953.
[193] Cf. Scheler, *MiK.*

CHAPTER IV

Section III

[1] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 225–261.
[2] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 238.
[3] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 238.
[4] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/162–166; 304–306 (total-unity and the idea of man).
[5] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 239.
[6] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 239.
[7] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 238.
[8] Cf. Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, art. 3 ("Zum Phänomen des Tragischen").
[9] Cf. Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, 3, 263–265. Cf. Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/73.
[10] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/85. Cf. to this Manfred S. Frings, "Der Ordo amoris bei Max Scheler – Seine Beziehungen zur materialen Wertethik und zum Ressentimentbegriff," in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,* XX, Meisenhein/Glan, 1 (1966), 57–76.
[11] Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, 267 ("Zum Phänomen des Tragischen").
[12] Cf. Scheler, *SdW,* 14–15.
[13] Cf. Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, art. 2 ("Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen").
[14] Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, 72 ("Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen").
[15] Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, 195.
[16] Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, 195–196.
[17] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/124ff.
[18] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/125–126.
[19] Cf. Scheler, *UdW,* vol. II, art. 5, 6, 7.
[20] Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, art. 2, 67.
[21] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/160–161.
[22] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/175.
[23] Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, art. 1, 16 ("Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend").
[24] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/72.
[25] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/529.
[26] Cf. D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen,* 322 and 337–338.
[27] Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/527ff.
[28] Scheler, *SdW,* 14.
[29] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/529.
[30] Scheler, *WuB,* 48 (n. 26).
[31] Scheler, *Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus,* 22 (n.).
[32] Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature,* 48.
[33] Scheler, *WuB,* 48 (n. 26).
[34] Cf. Scheler, *WuG,* 343 as well as *WuB,* 48 (n. 26).
[35] This diagram is supplementary because it also includes the laws and functions of the discovery of values in their basic structure.

[36] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/22.
[37] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/26.
[38] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/26.
[39] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/32–33.
[40] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/38.
[41] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/45.
[42] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/46,
[43] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/46.
[44] Cf. Solov'ev, *The Spiritual Foundations of Life.* Here part II, chap. 1: "On Christianity", in Solov'ev, *III*, 1/319–346.
[45] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/135.
[46] Solov'ev, *I*, 2/150.
[47] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/23.
[48] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/117 (n.).
[49] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/216.
[50] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/225.
[51] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/225.
[52] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/277.
[53] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/277.
[54] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/277.
[55] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/92ff. (Paul and St. Francis).
[56] Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 177.
[57] Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 177.
[58] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 177.
[59] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/X (foreword to 2nd edn.).
[60] Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 212–213.
[61] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/102.
[62] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/100.
[63] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/102.
[64] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/103.
[65] Cf. Scheler, *Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung*, Bonn 1925.
[66] D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen*, 349.
[67] Scheler, *SdW*, 60.
[68] Scheler, *SdW*, 60.
[69] Scheler, *SdW*, 60.
[70] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/223–224.
[71] Cf. Scheler, *SdW*, 59–60.
[72] Scheler, *SdW*, 44–45.
[73] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/246.
[74] Leo Kobilinski-Ellis, "Platon und Solowjew", in *Wladimir Solowjew – Das Lebensdrama Platons*, ed. Leo Kobilinski-Ellis, Mainz 1926, 97.
[75] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/26.
[76] Here what is meant is the practical intelligence of animal awareness.
[77] Author's addition.
[78] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/12. Here within *Smysl ljubvi* (The Meaning of Love, 1892–1894).
[79] Author's addition.
[80] Author's addition.
[81] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/157.
[82] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/156.
[83] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/163.
[84] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/20–21.
[85] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/261.
[86] Cf. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/262.

[87] Cf. *The Spiritual Foundations of Life*, part I, chap. 1: "On Prayer," in Solov'ev, *III*, 1/284–303. Here especially the fourth solicitation of the "Lord's Prayer": Give us our daily bread. Solov'ev, *III*, 1/288ff.
[88] Solov'ev, *III*, 1/342.
[89] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/153.
[90] Cf. Solov'ev, *I*, 2/268.
[91] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/221.
[92] Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, vol. I, art. 4, 272ff. ("Zur Idee des Menschen"). Cf. Scheler, *MiK*, 1/46–53.
[93] Cf. J. M. Bocheński, *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus*, München, 1950, 115–118.
[94] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/411ff. (microcosm-macrocosm and the idea of God).
[95] Cf. *The Life Drama of Plato*, 1898 in Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/194ff.
[96] Lev. 19:18; Mark 12:31.
[97] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/68 (n. 1); *II*, 1/163–164; *III*, 1/27–28 and 64–65; *VII*, 2/3–60 (*The Meaning of Love*).
[98] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/B: I, II, III, IV (158ff.). Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/303–305 and 384–413. Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 246ff. Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 225–261.
[99] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/194ff.
[100] Cf. Justinus Martyr in: Ap. I/46, (59; 60); Ap. II/6, 7 (7, 8; 8, 3; 10). ". . . not as if the teachings of Plato were foreign to those of Christ, but because they were not completely identical to them, and just as little identical to those of the others . . . " (Ap. II/13). Cf. G. Rauschen, *Grundriss der Patrologie*, Freiburg i. Br. 1913 (in the chapter "Justin der Märtyrer"). "The philosophers were therefore in a certain sense already Christs before Christ because they taught and lived according to reason" (42).
[101] Ernst Wiechert, *Missa sine nomine*, Munich 1950, 452.
[102] Cf. Leo Kobilinski-Ellis, "Platon und Solowjew – Die alte Philosophie und die neue Weisheit," in *Wladimir Solowjew – Das Lebensdrama Platons*, ed. Leo Kobilinski-Ellis, Mainz 1926 (epilogue: 110–124).
[103] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/224–225, 228 and 231.
[104] Cf. Scheler, *UdW*, vol. I, 110–111 ("Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen"). Cf. Scheler, *KuA*, 413–414 ("Liebe und Erkenntnis").
[105] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/164–165.
[106] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/20–21, 23 and 24.
[107] Cf. D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen*, 321.
[108] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/183–184.
[109] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/175.
[110] Solov'ev, *The Ascetic Principle in Morality*, 88.
[111] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/177–178.
[112] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/175ff.
[113] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/183.
[114] Cf. Reinhard Lauth, *Ich habe die Wahrheit gesehen – Die Philosophie Dostojewskis in systematischer Darstellung*, Munich 1950.
[115] Reinhard Lauth, *Ich habe die Wahrheit gesehen – Die Philosophie Dostojewskis in systematischer Darstellung*, 375. Cf. the Russian context: *Son smešnogo čeloveka – Fantastičeskij rasskaz* (The Dream of a Ridiculous Man – A Fantastic Story), first published in *Dnevnik pisatelja*, an independent monthly connected with the weekly *"Graždanin,"* St. Petersburg, April 1877. Dahm quotes from the 1958 Moscow edition of the *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works). Our translation is from *The Best Stories of Dostoevsky*, trans. by D. Magarshack, (New York: Modern Library n.d.), p. 316.: "Yes, yes, it ended in my corrupting *[razvratil]* them [the children of the sun, of a paradisical earth] all! How it could have happened I do not know, but I remember it

clearly. The dream encompassed thousands of years and left in me only a vague sensation of the whole. I only know that the cause of the Fall was I. Like a horrible trichina, like the germ of the plague infecting whole kingdoms, so did I infect with myself all that happy earth that knew no sin before me. They learnt to lie, and they grew to appreciate the beauty of a lie. Oh, perhaps it began innocently, with a jest, with a desire to show off, with amorous play, and perhaps indeed only with a germ, but this germ made its way into their hearts and they liked it. The voluptuous was soon born, voluptuous begot jealousy, and jealousy – cruelty . . .."

[116] For the relation between Solov'ev and Dostoevskij cf. Wladimir Szyłkarski, *Solowjew und Dostojewskij,* Bonn 1948 and Bernhard Schultze, "Solowjew und Dostojewskij," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica,* XV, Rome 1–2 (1949).

[117] Cf. Wladimir Szyłkarski, *Solowjews Philosophie der All-Einheit,* 408–409.

[118] L. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus* (here: "Schelling und Solovjev"), 109. Cf. Solov'ev, *La Russie et l'Eglise universelle,* 4/251. Cf. the *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe* (ed. Szyłkarski), vol. III, Freiburg i. Br. 1954. Here *Russland und die Universale Kirche,* bk. III, chap. 4 ("Die Weltseele als Prinzip der Schöpfung, des Raumes, der Zeit und der mechanischen Kausalität"; 344–351); chap. 5 ("Die höhere Welt. Die Freiheit der reinen Geister"; 351–357) and chap. 6 ("Die drei Hauptstufen des kosmogonischen Prozesses"; 357–362).

[119] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/221.

[120] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/222.

[121] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/232.

[122] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/166 and 232.

[123] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/204.

[124] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/507.

[125] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/512–513.

[126] Cf. Scheler, *UdW,* vol. I, 37 ("Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend").

[127] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 55–148 ("Über Scham und Schamgefühle").

[128] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/1–157 ("A Das Mitgefühl").

[129] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/63; 164ff.; 175.

[130] Th. Müncker, *Die psychologischen Grundlagen der katholischen Sittenlehre,* Düsseldorf 1948, 3/160.

[131] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 80.

[132] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/49–57; 66–84; 164–175.

[133] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/50–51.

[134] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/166.

[135] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 56 ("Über Scham und Schamgefühle").

[136] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 57 ("Über Scham und Schamgefühle").

[137] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/31–38.

[138] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/2 (cf. 5/110).

[139] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 1/36–38.

[140] Cf. Solov'ev, *VII,* 2/26 and 28.

[141] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/54–55.

[142] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/41–42.

[143] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/62.

[144] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/72.

[145] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/57–59; 85–103.

[146] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/98.

[147] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/57.

[148] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/96.

[149] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/98.

[150] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/38.

[151] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/190.

[152] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/190.
[153] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/167.
[154] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/177.
[155] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/72. According to the "preliminary remark on the fifth edition" (Maria Scheler, 1948), this reprint of the book on sympathy is based essentially on the second, third and fourth editions (Bonn 1923, 1927 and 1931). "A great number of misprints and inconsistencies were corrected" in this fifth edition (cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/V).
[156] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/59–60; 105–118.
[157] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/59.
[158] Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 80 ("Über Scham und Schamgefühle").
[159] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/191.
[160] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/191.
[161] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/191–192.
[162] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/193.
[163] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/194.
[164] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 261.
[165] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 263.
[166] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/267–268.
[167] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/87.
[168] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/87.
[169] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/511–512.
[170] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/268.
[171] Solov'ev, *II*, 1/165.
[172] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/130.
[173] Author's addition.
[174] Solov'ev, *A Critique of Abstract Principles* (chap. XLVI: The totally-one system of knowledge. Its basic elements. The abstract dogmatism of theology. Free theosophy) in *II*, 2/342–353; here 345.
[175] L. Kobilinski-Ellis, "Platon und Solowjew," in *Wladimir Solowjew – Das Lebensdrama Platons*, ed. Leo Kobilinski-Ellis, Mainz 1926, 101.
[176] Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/102.
[177] Scheler, "Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart," in P. Witkop, *Deutsches Leben der Gegenwart*, Berlin 1922, 201–202.
[178] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/66.
[179] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 225–261. Cf. further M. Frings, "Der Ordo amoris bei Max Scheler – Seine Beziehungen zur materialen Wertethik und zum Ressentimentbegriff," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, XX, Meisenheim/Glan 1(1966), 57–76.
[180] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/64–65.
[181] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/267–268.
[182] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/86.
[183] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/267.
[184] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/267–268.
[185] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/267.
[186] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/267.
[187] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/87.
[188] Italics mine.
[189] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/268.
[190] Quoted from Katharina Kanthack, *Max Scheler – Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht*, 323 (n. to p. 280 l. 9). Cf. J. Geyser, *Max Schelers Phänomenologie der Religion*, Freiburg i. Br. 1924, 104ff.; cf. further E. Przywara, *Religionsbegründung Max Scheler*, Freiburg i. Br. 1923, 178.

[191] This determination of the act-phenomenological position of the idea of "person" agrees not only with the original insights of Scheler but also with Solov'ev's descriptive starting point in his *Theoretical Philosophy;* cf. Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/155–163.
[192] For Scholastic thought, Boethius' (d. 524) determination of person, "persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia" (in his work *De persona et duabus naturis,* C. 3), remained binding. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica,* Pars prima, Q. 29. art. 1. Ad primum. Cf. further J. Donat, *Summa philosophiae christianae III: Ontologia,* Innsbruck 1940, 9/186–187.
[193] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/401.
[194] "It is rather the person itself which in each of its acts also vitally and completely permeates each [act] with its specificity" (Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/401).
[195] Cf. Solov'ev, *Theoretical Philosophy,* in *IX,* 2/155–163. Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/137.
[196] Cf. the ideas on spiritual–physical androgyny in Solovyev and Scheler:
Solov'ev, *The Meaning of Love,* in *VII,* 2/42ff.; *The Justification of the Good,* in *VIII,* 2/454ff. (on the metaphysics of a life partnership).

Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/198ff. (individual love and the idea of absolute monogamy).

Cf. further D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen,* 135–157; here especially 143 (the "meaning of husband and wife for one another in marriage").

Cf. Plato, *Symposium,* trans. W.R.M. Lamb, London 1961, 135–145. Here Aristophanes' speech:

"You must begin your lesson with the nature of man and its development. For our original nature was by no means the same as it is now, In the first place, there were three kinds of human beings, not merely the two sexes, male and female, as at present: there was a third kind as well, which had equal shares of the other two, and whose name survives though the thing itself has vanished" (189 D. E).

"Thus anciently is mutual love ingrained in mankind, reassembling our early estate and endeavouring to combine two in one and heal the human sore" (191 D). "'The cause of it all is this, that our original form was as I have described, and we were entire; and the craving and pursuit of that entirety is called Love.'" (192 E).

Cf. Vasilij Vasil'evič Rozanov (1856–1919), *Izbrannoe* (Selections), ed. Jurij P. Ivask, New York 1956. Here Jurij Ivask's introduction, 7–59, especially sec. 8 (religion and sexuality; 29–33) and sec. 11 (the idea of God; 37–40).

CHAPTER IV
Section IV

[1] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/155ff.
[2] Cf. the structure of the fundamental moral acts in the introductory chapter above: the idea of philosophy.
[3] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 74.
[4] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 73.
[5] Cf. Solov'ev, *I,* 2/321.
[6] Cf. Solov'ev, *VII,* 2/48; *VIII,* 2/454ff.
[7] Nikolaj Vasil'evič Gogol', *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works); eds. N.S. Ašukin, V.F. Pereverzev and M.B. Xrapčenko, 6 vols., Moscow 1937, vol. V, [*Mertvye dušy* (Dead Souls)], 290–291.
[8] Plato, *Phaedrus,* trans. H.N. Fowler, London 1966, 246A.

[9] Scheler, *WuG*, 460.
[10] Scheler, *Nachlass*, vol. I, 130–131.
[11] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/99.
[12] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/102.
[13] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/90ff.
[14] Cf. the "strongly believing words of Abbot Isaac of Syria" (Slova podvižničeskija otca Savvy Isaaka Sirijanina) in Solov'ev, *II*, 1/37–38; *VIII*, 2/95.
[15] Cf. Iže vo svjatyx otca našego Savvy Isaaka Sirijanina, podvižnika i otšel'nika, byvšago episkopom xristoljubivago grada Ninevii, *Slova podvižničeskija* (Strongly believing words of our holy father Abbot Isaac of Syria, a confessor and an hermit, once the bishop of the city of Nineve loved by Christ), Moscow 1858, 299.
[16] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/89.
[17] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/89–90.
[18] Cf. R. Lauth, *Ich habe die Wahrheit gesehen – Die Philosophie Dostojewskis in systematischer Darstellung*, 408.
[19] Author's addition.
[20] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/91 (n. 1).
[21] Cf. F.M. Dostoevskij, *Son smešnogo čeloveka – Fantastičeskij rasskaz* (The Dream of a Ridiculous Man – A Curious Story), in *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works), eds. L.P. Grossman, A.S. Dolinin, V.V. Ermilov, V.J. Kirpotin, V.S. Nečaeva and B.S. Rjurikov, 10 vols., Moscow 1958, vol. X, 420–441; here 432–433 and 441. Cf. R. Lauth, *Die Philosophie Dostojewskis*, 405–415.

Cf. further F.M. Dostojewski, "Der Traum eines lächerlichen Menschen" (9–45), and "Aufzeichnungen des Stáretz Sossíma" (47–126), *Entscheide dich fur die Liebe*, trans. F. Ottow, Munich 1956, 29–31 and 45. Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/114 (the text as well as the reference given in n. 2).
[22] Cf. pp. 282–283, n.115 above.
[23] Cf. Dostoyevsky, *The Dream of a Ridiculous Man, Sobranie sočinenij*, vol. X, 432–433 and 441. Cf. R. Lauth, *Die Philosophie Dostojewskis*, 408.
[24] Dostoyevsky, *The Dream of a Ridiculous Man, Sobranie sočinenij*, vol. X, 433. Cf. R. Lauth, *Die Philosophie Dostojewskis*, 408.
[25] Cf. R. Lauth, *Die Philosophie Dostojewskis*, 405–415.
[26] Cf. R. Lauth, *Die Philosophie Dostojewskis*, 480–487.
[27] Cf. W. Szylkarski, *Solowjew und Dostojewskij*. Cf. B. Schultze, *Solowjew und Dostojewskij*, in *Orientalia christiana Periodica*, vol. XV, Rome 1–2 (1949).
[28] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 377. Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/167; *VIII*, 2/173.

Cf. F.M. Dostoevskij, *Brat'ja Karamazovy* (The Brothers Karamazov) in *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works), parts 1–3 in vol. IX, Moscow 1958; part 4 and epilogue in vol. X, Moscow 1958. Here from part 2, "O molitve, o ljubvi i o soprikosnovenii miram inym" (On prayer, on love and on sympathy into other worlds) in vol. IX, 398–401.
[29] Cf. Dostoevskij, *Brat'ja Karamazovy* (The Brothers Karamazov). Here from part 2 "Možno li byt' sudieju sebe podobnyx? O vere do konca" (Can a man be the judge of his own like? On consequent faith) in vol. IX, 401–403; here 403.

Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII*, 2/383ff. (the idea of work).
[30] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/17; 24; 34–35; 81; 89–90; 92ff. 106; 113 and 141.
[31] K. Kanthack, *Max Scheler – Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht*, 68. Cf. *UdW*, vol. I, art. 2, 191 (n. 2). For the text referred to in Scheler.
[32] Cf. Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, 357–403.
[33] Cf. F.M. Dostoevskij, *Brat'ja Karamazovy* (The Brothers Karamazov), *Sobranie sočinenij*. Here from part 2, "O molitve, o ljubvi i o soprikosnovenii miram inym" (On prayer, on love, and on sympathy into other worlds), vol. IX, 398–401.
[34] Dostoevskij, *Brat'ja Karamazovy* (The Brothers Karamazov), *Sobranie sočinenij*, vol. X, 400.

[35] Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man,* 377.
[36] Dostoevskij, *Brat'ja Karamazovy* (The Brothers Karamazov), *Sobranie sočinenij.* Here part 2, "Možno li byt' sudieju sebe podobnyx? O vere do konca" (Can a man be the judge of his own like? On consequent faith), vol. IX, 403.
[37] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/383.
[38] Scheler's thoughts on this subject agree substantially with those of Solov'ev. Cf. Scheler, "Arbeit und Ethik" (his Kantian periods in 1901) as well as "Arbeit und Weltanschauung" (a lecture delivered in 1920 and first published in 1921). Both texts are found in *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre,* 3 vols., Leipzig 1923–1924. Here vol. III, "Arbeits- und Bevölkerungsprobleme," 48; 65; 68; 79; 80–81; 84; 91; 96; 98–99; 102–103; 106 and 108.
[39] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/369; cf. 384 and 386.
[40] R. Lauth, *Die Philosophie Dostojewskis,* 406. Lauth quotes from Dostoevskij, *Brat'ja Karamazovy* (The Brothers Karamazov), published by I.P. Ladyžnikov 1919, vol. II, 76.
[41] Iwan von Kologriwof, *Von Hellas zum Mönchtum – Leben und Denken Konstantin Leontjews,* 244. Leont'ev lived from 1831–1891.
[42] Plato, *Phaedo,* trans. A. Hübscher, Munich 1948, chap. 54 and 55.
[43] Cf. *The Life Drama of Plato,* 1898 in Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/194–241.
[44] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 3–51.
[45] Cf. Solov'ev, *The Meaning of Love* in *VII,* 2/3–60.
Cf. Solov'ev, *The Justification of the Good – Moral Philosophy* in *VIII,* 2/170–171; 454ff. (on the metaphysics of life partnership).
Cf. Solov'ev, *The Life Drama of Plato* in *IX,* 2/194–241.
[46] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 14.
[47] Cf. Scheler, *WuB,* 44 (n. 16); 45–46 (n. 19); 48 (n. 26), further Scheler, *WuG,* 342–343; 460.
[48] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 20–21 ("Tod und Fortkeben").
[49] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/277, *The Spiritual Foundations of Life,* written in the period 1882–1884, begins in *III,* 1/270.
[50] Solov'ev, *III,* 1/320.
[51] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 22 ("Tod und Fortleben").
[52] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 23.
[53] The certainty of religious faith is disregarded here.
[54] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 26–27 ("Tod und Fortleben").
[55] Cf. in this context Scheler's comments on "Zum Phänomen des Tragischen" in *UdW,* vol. I, art. 1.
[56] Cf. D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen,* 378–379.
[57] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica,* Pars prima: Q. 14. art. 1. Conclusio; Q. 80. art. 1. Conclusio.
This position is found several times in Aristotle's third book of *De anima;* first in chap. 4 in the parallel of the ability of thinking and perception, next in chap. 5 on the active mind and finally at the beginning of chap. 8 which summarizes the preceding statements about perception and thinking. He says there: "Let us now summarize our results about the soul, and repeat that the soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either sensible or thinkable, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable and sensation is in a way what is sensible: . . . " (Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. R. McKeon, New York 1941, 595).
[58] Cf. D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen,* 382–383.
[59] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 32–33 ("Tod und Fortleben").
[60] Cf. Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 45ff.
[61] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 45–46.
[62] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/129.

[63] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/124.
[64] Literally: " . . . according to this theory we should expect even more remarkable descendents from them" (Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/6–7).
[65] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/7. Cf. Schopenhauer, *Gesammelte Werke*, 2nd edn., vol. III, Wiesbaden 1949, 607–643 (chap. 44: The metaphysics of sexual love).
[66] Author's addition.
[67] Author's addition.
[68] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/9.
[69] Cf. Scheler, *KuA*, 393ff. ("Liebe und Erkenntnis").
[70] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/15–16.
[71] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/322–323.
[72] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/304; *III*, 1/127.
[73] Cf. *Theoretical Philosophy* in Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/148ff. Here III, "Forma razumnosti i razum istiny" (The Form of Rationality and the Reason of the Truth). Cf. *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Szylkarski, vol. VII: epistemology – aesthetics – philosophy of love, 82–105; here emerging reason of the truth, 91–95.
[74] Cf. Solov'ev, *II*, 1/162; 165; 167 and 283.
[75] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/14.
[76] Scheler, *WuG*, 335–336.
[77] Cf. Scheler, *WuG*, 336.
[78] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/120ff.
[79] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/19.
[80] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/19.
[81] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/24.
[82] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/24.
[83] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/27.
[84] This statement bears witness further to the fact that Solovyev assumed an intentional and material a priori.
[85] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/26 (there it literally says: "In fact the one who loves sees, seeing perceives not what the others see.").
[86] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/170; cf. 164–174.
[87] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/33.
[88] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/34.
[89] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/40. Solov'ev is repeatedly suspected of hostility toward the body. Thus, for example, A. Gizetti explains in *O mirosozercanii Vladimira Solov'eva* (On the World-View of Vladimir Solov'ev): "The ascetic fear of the 'sin' of sexual love oppressed this doctrine of Solovyev and transformed it into a, to a certain extent, dualistic, almost pathological utopia. The hymn to the ecstasy of love was linked to a sharp negation of its right to a real completion" (*Zavety*, St. Petersburg February 1914, part 2, 20).
[90] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/42. Cf. *The Life Drama of Plato*, in Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/234: "It is clear to me that man can only become divine by means of the force of a god which is not becoming, but which is rather eternally existing."

Further Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/241: "In order to go further and higher than Socrates, not only in speculation and in striving, but also in the actually great act of life, one must be more than a man. Only the one who possesses the power to rise up to eternal life can go further and higher than Socrates who taught by word and example the death worthy of man." Cf. *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Szylkarski, vol. VII, 273–334; here 326 and 334.
[91] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/42.
[92] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/43.
[93] Author's addition.
[94] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/44.

[95] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/45.
[96] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/180.
[97] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/181.
[98] Cf. Karl Pfleger, "Das Wesen der Liebe nach der neurussischen Gnosis," *Theologie der Zeit*, Vienna, No. 1, 1937, 24ff.
[99] K. Pfleger, in *Theologie der Zeit*, 33: "Max Scheler did not deal with modern gnosis, although he wrote about Eastern Christianity and not always correctly – in spite of his ingenious intuitions. One sees from his essay 'Liebe und Erkenntnis' that he had dismissed without any hesitation Russian gnosis as a new edition of the Greek type of gnosticism." However, Russian gnosis is "on the other hand, precisely in Scheler's sense originally Christian because of what it calls the creativity of love."
[100] Cf. K. Pfleger, in *Theologie der Zeit*, 32–33.
[101] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/45–46.
[102] Cf. *Stixotvorenija Vladimira Solov'eva: Tri svidanija* (Poems of Vladimir Solovyev: Three Encounters). Cf. also Solov'ev's story published in *Russkaja Mysl'* in May 1892: *Na zare tumannoj junosti* (In the Dawn of Nebulous Youth) in *Pis'ma Vladimira Sergeeviča Solov'eva* (Letters from Vladimir Sergeevič Solovyev), ed. E.L. Radlov, vols. I–III, St. Petersburg 1908 (I), 1909 (II), and 1911 (III). Here vol. III, 283–298 especially 295. Cf. further Fedor Stepun: *Mystische Weltschau – Fünf Gestalten des russischen Symbolismus*, Munich 1964. (1) Wladimir Solowjew (13–92), here on the "Three Encounters" (41–48).
[103] Cf. *Ideja čelovečestva u Avgusta Konta* (The Idea of Man in Auguste Comte [1798–1857]) in Solov'ev, *IX*, 2/172–193; especially 187–188.
[104] I. von Kologriwof, *Von Hellas zum Mönchtum – Leben und Denken Konstantin Leontjews*, 117.
[105] I. von Kologriwof, *Von Hellas zum Mönchtum*, 223. In regard to the erotic-sensual components in Solovyev's thought, cf. also his "Belaja lilija ili Son v noč' na Pokrova: Misterija-šutka v trex dejstvijax" (Mystery Comedy in Three Acts: White Lily), in *Pis'ma* (Letters) ed. E. Radlov, vol. III, 299–335. This early work of Solovyev was published for the first time in *Na pamjat'*, an aesthetic and literary volume. The editor was F.A. Duxoveckij and the publisher was T.I. Gagen Verlag, Moscow (1893).

CHAPTER V

Section I

[1] Cf. Solov'ev, *Ženskij vopros* (The Feminist Issue) in *Voskresnyja pis'ma – Pasxal'nyja pis'ma* (Sunday Letters – Easter Letters) I–X and XI–XXII, 1897–1898 in Solov'ev, *VIII*, 1/75–146; here 111–112 (XIII). (Cf. here also for the sources for section IV of chapter four above). Cf. Scheler, "Zum Sinn der Frauenbewegung" in *UdW*, vol. II, 4.
[2] Cf. *Solange Dichter leben – Pushkin Studies*, ed. Arthur Luther, Krefeld 1949. Therein:

Ludolf Müller, "Schicksal und Liebe in *Jewgenij Onegin* – Versuch einer ideologischen Interpretation" (148–163). Müller follows the explanation of Dmitrij Čiževskij ("Puschkin und die Romantik" in *Germanoslavica*, V/1–2, 1937, 1–31). This explanation refers to the concept of love and according to it the determination of love has had absolute character. For Müller, Pushkin's view of love has "romantic origins, but the romantic ideology becomes more profound due to the moral force of his character and the fate of love is seen in his tragedies. Thus, he overcomes the one-sidedness of the romantic view of love, even in its distorted form basic to Belinskij's criticisms. He

joined the eternal achievements of the romantic movement, which had discovered the individual in its profundity, and had thus disclosed individual love in all its fulness, with the moral force of the Christian idea of love which considers the eternal character of the relation of love not so much as determination and fate but rather as a demand and task" (162–163).

Maximilian Braun, "Der hintergründige Puschkin" (104–128). According to Braun, the plot of the novel *Evgeny Onegin* is not entirely "free of elements of parody. At first it [the plot] appears impoverished. If one disregards all the digressions, all the descriptions of the milieu, all the incidental comments, and all other accessories, then there is hardly anything left over other than enough for a good anecdote or in any case what is required for a short ironic novel. A young girl lets herself write a young man a love letter, whereupon he turns her down (an absurd world!). He later meets her as a mature woman and falls in love with her. Now she rejects him. Note that this is not just the outline of the plot, but in fact the whole plot. Nothing else occurs between the two main characters. Everything else which otherwise fills the novel's chapters has either nothing to do with or only a loose connection with this plot. Schklowskij was certainly right when he said that the actual subject is 'not the story of Onegin and Tatjana, but rather the playing with this plot.' One cannot overlook a slight parody. It only remains unclear what it is directed against: against literature or against life itself. Moreover, the purely literary composition is constructed on a similar idea of parody. It is based on the parallelism of both love letters and the refusals, which in many respects parody one another. In an age when novels based on letters were highly fashionable (such a novel is mentioned as Tatjana's reading!) there could be an intent to parody with this construction" (115–116).

[3] Cf. Dostoevskij, *Brat'ja Karamazovy* (The Brothers Karamazov), part I, book III, chapter XI: *Ešče odna pogibšaja reputacija* (Another Reputation Ruined). *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works) 10 vols., Moscow 1958, vol. IX, 195–203. Here the letter from Lisa Xoxlakova to Aleksej Fedorovič Karamazov declaring her love (202–203).

[4] Cf. Anton Pavlovič Čexov, *Svidanie xotja i sostojalos', no* ... (The Rendezvous Occurred, but ...) in *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works), vol. I, Moscow 1950, 214ff.

[5] Cf. Heinrich Lützeler, "Zu Lermontows Roman 'Ein Held unserer Zeit'" in *Michail Jurjewitsch Lermontow – Ein Held unserer Zeit,* Recklinghausen 1947, 245–266.

[6] Even here the agreement with Russia's literary tradition is unmistakable and even more so in the dramatic force. Cf. M.J. Lermontov, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* (Complete Works), vol. V, Moscow-Leningrad 1937, 252 and 256–258.

[7] Cf. Lev Nikolaevič Tolstoj, *Semejnoe sčast'e* (Happy Married Life), in *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* (Complete Works), ed. V.G. Čertkov, vol. V, Moscow 1935, 67–143.

[8] Cf. F. M. Dostoevskij, *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works), vol. II, "Belye noči" (White Nights – 1848), 5–59, especially *Istorija Nasten'ki* (Nasten'ka's Story), 30–40.

[9] Cf. the gap before chapter 3 of book II of Dead Souls: in Russian this is in vol. V of Gogol's *Collected Works,* Moscow 1937, 342. The description of the engagement of Tentetnikov and Ulin'ka as well as a discussion between the two lovers is lost in the later version of the second volume of *Dead Souls,* destroyed by Gogol' himself. The initiative of Ulin'ka is, however, already unmistakably hinted at in the development of the characters.

[10] Cf. Nikolaj Vasil'evič Gogol', *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works), ed. N.S. Ašukin, V.F. Pereverzev and M.B. Xrapčenko, 6 vols. Here *Mertvye dušy* (Dead Souls), book II, in vol. V, Moscow 1937, 316–318.

[11] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 1/111.

[12] Cf. Nikolaj Gavrilovič Černyševskij, *Čto delat'?* (What is to be done?). First published in "Sovremennik", (March, April, May 1863). It was published as a book in 1905 in

St. Petersburg. The author began writing this novel while imprisoned in December 1862 in Petropavlov fortress in St. Petersburg. He finished the manuscript within four months.

[13] N. Černyševskij, *Čto delat'?* (What is to be done?), Novoe izdanie, Leipzig 1907, 353.

[14] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 353.

[15] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 230.

[16] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 351.

[17] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 351.

[18] Cf. N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 357.

[19] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 358.

[20] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 362–363.

[21] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 70. "Thus I do not know yet what I would feel if I were possessed by the love of a man. I only know that I want to subject myself to no one, that I want to be free, that I do not want to feel in any way indebted to anyone. Thus, no one would dare to say to me you are obliged to do something for me! I want to do only what I feel like doing; the others may do it just so. I do not want to demand anything from anyone. I do not want to limit anyone's freedom and I want to be free myself" (40).

[22] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 361.

[23] N. Černyševskij, *What is to be done?*, 347.

[24] Cf. *Malaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija* (Short Soviet Encyclopaedia), 3rd edition, vol. III, Moscow 1959, 975, for a biography of Petr Grigor'evič Zajčnevskij.

[25] The first Soviet reprint of "Molodaja Rossija" (Young Russia), a circular by P.G. Zajčnevskij, foreword and notes by V.I. Romanenko appeared in *Očerki po istorii filosofii v Rossii – Vtoraja polovina XIX i načalo XX veka.* (A Collection of Essays on the History of Philosophy in Russia – second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century), eds. A.D. Kosičev, S.F. Mamedov, M.G. Šestakov, and G.S. Vaseckij, Moscow 1960, 130–144.

[26] *A Collection of Essays on the History of Russia*, 131.

[27] Cf. Kolokol, *Pribavočnye listy k poljarnoj zvezde*, London, March 1, 1860; *Pis'mo iz provincii* (Letter from the Province), author: "a Russian" in *Kolokol*, eds. A.I. Gercen and N.P. Ogarev. Free Russian Press 1857–1867, London–Geneva. (Facsimile at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, vol. III. [1860 London] Moscow 1962, 533f.).

Nikolaj Vladislavovič Vol'skij (Valentinov) had no doubt that Černyševskij is the author of the letter to the editor published March 1, 1860 in "Kolokol". Cf. N. Valentinov, *Vstreči s Leninym* (Meetings with Lenin), New York 1953, 115.

[28] The *Great Lenin Biography (Vladimir Il'ič Lenin – Biografija*, Moscow 1960: the Samarskij period, May 1889–August 1893, 16–22), the *Encyclopaedic Dictionary Brockhaus–Yefron (Enciklopedičeskij slovar' Brokgauz–Efron.* St. Petersburg 1890ff., vol. XLI, 1904, the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, here vol. 65, 1931 and the 2nd edition, Moscow 1949ff., here vol. 49, 1957) as well as the *Short Soviet Encyclopaedia (Malaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, 3rd edition, Moscow 1958ff., here vol. 10, 1960) give no information about the revolutionary, Jasneva. The *Great Lenin Biography* does not mention her even in the period of *One Step Forward – Two Steps Back* (February until March 1904). Cf. *Biografija*, 111–115; 115–119.

[29] Among other things, Mickevič explained in 1925: "Russian Jacobinianism died in order to be resurrected in the new form of Russian Marxism, in the revolutionary wing of the Social-Democratic party, in Bolshevism." (Quoted from N. Valentinov, 118).

[30] Cf. N. Valentinov, *Meetings with Lenin*, 118.

[31] Cf. N. Valentinov, *Meetings with Lenin*, 70; cf. also 188–189 (n. 26).

[32] Lenin argued against Valentinov in March 1904 that: "The rejection of Jacobinian tactics leads *eo ipso* directly and logically to a denial of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Valentinov, 186). The "dictatorship of the proletariat" understood in such a sense is nothing other than Lenin's "baton." According to a comment by Valentinov, "it was completely clear from Lenin's words that only he deserved the right to a baton" (168).

[33] Cf. N. Valentinov, *Meetings with Lenin*, 118.

[34] N. Valentinov, *Meetings with Lenin*, 116.

[35] N. Valentinov, *Meetings with Lenin*, 116.

[36] "We will let out a cry 'To the axes!' And then, slaughter the imperial party just as mercilessly as they now do not spare us, slaughter in the squares, if this vulgar rabble dares to appear there, slaughter in the homes, slaughter in the narrow alleyways of the cities, slaughter in the wide streets of the residences, slaughter in the country and in the villages!" Quoted from *Očerki po istorii filosofii v Rossii* (A Collection of Essays on the History of Philosophy in Russia), Moscow 1960, here "Molodaja Rossija," 142.

[37] N. Valentinov, *Meetings with Lenin*, 117–118.

The reliability of Valentinov's source has been testified to by the Soviets in connection with the so-called *Zapis' Vorovskogo* (the Vorovskij memorandum). Cf. B.S. Rjurikov, *N.G. Černyševskij – Kritiko-biografičeskij očerk* (N.G. Černyševskij – Critical and biographical sketches), Moscow 1961, 164–165. Here Rjurikov quotes verbatim two passages from N. Valentinov's *Meetings with Lenin*, 103 and 108. These are substantiated in *V.I. Lenin, O literature i iskusstve* (V.I. Lenin, On Literature and Art), Moscow 1960, (2nd edition), 649–650 and 651–652. Cf. also Boris Rjurikov, "Ljudi vysokix idealov" (Men with High Ideals) in *Komsomol'skaja pravda*, March 23, 1958, 3.

[38] W. Schubart, *Europa und die Seele des Ostens*, 189.

[39] W. Schubart, *Europa und die Seele des Ostens*, 190.

[40] W. Schubart, *Europa und die Seele des Ostens*, 191.

[41] Scheler, *Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg*, Leipzig 1916, 271.

[42] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/198–199.

[43] Cf. Scheler, *Genius des Krieges*, 207; 228–229; 249; 261–262; 268–272; 297–298; 301; 305.

[44] Cf. Scheler, *Genius des Krieges*, Cf. Scheler, *Krieg und Aufbau*, Leipzig, 1916.

[45] Scheler, *Genius des Krieges*, 209–210.

[46] Scheler, *Genius des Krieges*, 271.

[47] Scheler, *Genius des Krieges*, 301.

[48] Cf. V.V. Zen'kovskij, *Istorija russkoj filosofii* (History of Russian Philosophy), vol. II, Paris 1950, 53–54 and 63.

Cf. K. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solov'ev – Žizn' i učenie* (Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings), Paris 1951, 2/234.

[49] Cf. *Ponjatie o Boge – V zaščitu filosofii Spinozy* (The Concept of God – A Defense of Spinoza's Philosophy), in Solov'ev, *VIII*, 1/1–26; here the reference is to *IX*, 2/20.

[50] Zen'kovskij, *History of Russian Philosophy*, vol. II, 54.

[51] Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings*, 2/234.

[52] Cf. Evgenij Trubeckoj (1863–1920), *Mirosozercanie Vladimira Solov'eva* (The World-View of Vladimir Solovyev), 2 vols., vol. I, Moscow 1913, 617–618.

[53] Cf. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings*, 2/204.

[54] Zen'kovskij, *History of Russian Philosophy*, vol. II, 56.

[55] Cf. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings*, 2/205.

[56] Cf. *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe der Werke von Wladimir Solowjew*, ed. Wladimir Szyłkarski, vol. VII (epistemology, aesthetics and philosophy of love), Freiburg i. Br. 1953. Translator's postscript (W. Szyłkarski), 434.

[57] Exegesis has equated the words *anima* and ψυχή in the Latin and the Greek text of John 15:13 with the concept "life."
[58] Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings,* 2/206–207.
[59] Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings,* 2/204.
[60] Cf. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings,* 2/204–205.
[61] Cf. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings,* 2/98.
[62] Cf. Solov'ev, *La Russie et l'Église universelle,* Paris 1889. Translated into Russian by G.A. Račinskij, *Rossija i vselenskaja Cerkov',* Moscow 1911. German translation by Wsewolod Setschkareff and Ludolf Müller according to the 4th edition (Paris 1922) in *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe der Werke von Wladimir Solowjew* [henceforth *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German)], vol. III: Una Sancta – Schriften zur Vereinigung der Kirchen und zur Grundlegung der universalen Theokratie (2), 145–419. See especially book III, chapter 4: the world-soul as the principle of creation, of space, of time, and of human causality (344–351).
[63] Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings,* 2/103. Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. III, 348.
[64] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. III, 348.
[65] Cf. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings,* 2/103–104; *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. III, 342–345 and 348.
[66] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. III, 345.
[67] Cf. Genesis 1:31.
[68] Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings,* 2/104.
[69] Solov'ev, *VI,* 1/475 (*Poëzija F.I. Tjutčeva* [The Poetry of F.I. Tjutčev] 1895). Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 2/117–134. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 365. Cf. Zen'kovskij, *History of Russian Philosophy,* vol. II, 55.
[70] Solov'ev, *VI,* 1/476; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 366.
[71] Cf. Solov'ev, *II,* 2/318ff. (*A Critique of Abstract Principles:* chap. 44 "Absolute Being and Absolute Becoming." The chapter begins *II,* 2/315; cf. *II,* 1/299).
[72] Cf. Zen'kovskij, *History of Russian Philosophy,* vol. II, 48.
[73] Zen'kovskij, *History of Russian Philosophy,* vol. II, 48.
[74] Zen'kovskij, *History of Russian Philosophy,* vol. II, 58.
[75] Zen'kovskij, *History of Russian Philosophy,* vol. II, 58–59.
[76] Scheler, *WuB,* 12.
[77] Scheler, *WuB,* 13.
[78] Scheler, *WuB,* 24–25.
[79] Scheler, *WuB,* 21.
[80] Scheler, *WuB,* 22.
[81] Scheler, *WuB,* 23.
[82] Cf. Scheler, *PhW,* 47–83 (3rd article: "Der Mensch im Zeitalter des Ausgleichs").
[83] Cf. Scheler, *PhW,* 67–68 ("Der Mensch im Zeitalter des Ausgleichs").
[84] *Mifologičeskij process v drevnem jazyčestve* (The Mythological Process in Ancient Paganism; 1873) in Solov'ev, *I,* 2/1–26.
[85] Fritz Lieb, *Russland unterwegs – Der russische Mensch zwischen Christentum und Kommunismus,* Bern 1945, 136.
[86] Cf. B. Schultze, *Russische Denker – Ihre Stellung zu Christus, Kirche und Papsttum,* Vienna 1950, 278–279.
[87] F. Muckermann, *Wladimir Solowjew – Zur Begegnung zwischen Russland und dem Abendland,* Olten 1945, 155.
[88] B. Schultze, *Russische Denker,* 278.
[89] B. Schultze, *Russische Denker,* 278.
[90] Cf. I. von Kologriwof, *Von Hellas zum Mönchtum – Leben und Denken Konstantin Leontjews,* 226.
[91] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 433–434.

[92] Solov'ev, *VII*, 2/12.
[93] Je vois très clairement que, pour penser, il faut être.
[94] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 62.
[95] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 83.
[96] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 41.
[97] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 43.
[98] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 433.

CHAPTER V

Section II

[1] Cf. Theodor Haecker, "Geist und Leben – Zum Problem Max Scheler", in *Christentum und Kultur*, Munich 1927. In D. von Hildebrand, *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen*, 345–346.
[2] Cf., for example, Scheler, *UdW*, I/2, 191 (n. 2); Scheler, *KuA*, 37 ("Über östliches und westliches Christentum"); Scheler, *SdW*, 65.
[3] Cf. Scheler, *KuA*, 36.
[4] Cf. Scheler, *KuA*, 24 (n.).
[5] I. XIX-tyj vek ("Evropeec," Moscow 1832). (The 19th century).
II. O xaraktere evropejskogo prosveščenija v ego otnošenii k prosveščeniju Rossii ("Moskovskij Sbornik," Moscow 1852) (On the Character of European Culture in Comparison to Russian Culture).
III. O vozmožnosti i neobxodimosti novyx načal v filosofii ("Russkaja Beseda," Moscow 1856). (On the Possibility and Necessity of New Principles in Philosophy).
Cf. Zen'kovskij, *History of Russian Philosophy*, vol. I, chap. 4 on I.V. Kireevskij, J.F. Samarin and K.S. Aksakov (214–244), especially 214–235.
[6] Cf. Scheler, *SdW*, 65.
[7] Drei Masken Verlag, Munich.
[8] Cf. T. Masaryk, *Zur russischen Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie – Soziologische Skizzen*, 2 vols. Jena 1913.
[9] Cf. Scheler, *Genius des Krieges*, 303; 380 (n. 127; beginning 379). Cf. further Scheler, *KuA*, 33 as well as *SdW*, 128 (n. 123).
[10] Scheler's *Krieg und Aufbau* appeared in 1916. The first German version of Solov'ev's *The Justification of the Good* (Köhler/Engelhardt-Ausgabe) also appeared in 1916. The first German version of Solov'ev's *Lectures on God-manhood* (Köhler/Engelhardt-Fragment "Russland und Europa," Jena) appeared in 1917 and the complete text appeared in 1921 (Stuttgart).
[11] In Ph. Witkop, *Deutsches Leben der Gegenwart*, Berlin 1922, 211.
[12] Scheler, *PhW*, 67.
[13] Partenkirchen, January 29, 1952.
[14] Rome, January 14, 1951.

CHAPTER VI

[1] Cf. above 93ff., 109f., and 142. Further K. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solovyev – Life and Teachings*, 2/94–95.
[2] This is the sequence in which they affected Scheler.

[3] Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* 14/398.
[4] Cf. Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* 14/209.
[5] Szyłkarski, comments in a footnote in his translation of Solovyev's *The Meaning of Love* where the connection between the active human (personal) principle and the totally-one idea structured in a social, spiritual-bodily organism is described as "a living relation of syzygy" that he was forced to use the concept of syzygy (συζυγία-pair harmonic relation) because he could find no better concept in existing terminology even though the gnostics used this concept in another sense and, thus, there was a danger of misunderstanding it. Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 269 (and n. 2).
[6] Cf. above 173–174.
[7] Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* 14/611.
[8] Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* 14/522 (n. 130). Cf. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Werke,* 8 vols., Berlin 1845ff., vol. IV (*Wissenschaftslehre*), 453ff. Further Fichte, *Nachgelassene Werke,* 3 vols., Bonn 1834, vol. III, 417ff.
[9] Cf. above 17–18.
[10] Cf. above 18–19.
[11] Cf. above 16–17, 31–32.
[12] Cf. above 9–10, 14–15, 29–33, 37–38.
[13] Cf. above 30, 33–34, 74–86.
[14] Cf. above 91–92, 94–95, 172–175.
[15] Cf. above 91, 99, 101ff., 111ff.
[16] Cf. above 135–143.
[17] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/120–129.
[18] Cf. above 17f., 22f., 31–33, 152–154.
[19] Cf. above 1ff., 8, 9.
[20] Cf. above 52–54, 91f., 97–100.
[21] Cf. above 123–125.
[22] Scheler, *Nachlass,* vol. I, 177. Cf. above 123.
[23] Cf. above 124.
[24] Cf. above 92, 100, 143.
[25] The delimitation of this "absolute" takes place within the phenomenology of hate; cf. above 130–135.
[26] Cf. above 131–134, 159f.
[27] Cf. above 117, 126, 129f., 133.
[28] Cf. above 142–150.
[29] Cf. Scheler, *WuFdS.*
[30] Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/117; *VIII,* 1/174. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 43.
[31] W. Szyłkarski, translator's postscript to Solovyev's *Theoretical Philosophy* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 110.
[32] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 111–112.
[33] *Stanovjaščijsja razum istiny* (emerging reason of the truth). Cf. above 126f.
[34] Cf. above 126.
[35] Cf. Solov'ev, *IX,* 2/156ff.; 161ff.; 164–165; *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 91ff. and 102.
[36] Cf. Ludwig Landgrebe, *Philosophie der Gegenwart,* West Berlin 1957. Chapter 1: The Nature of Man (20–52); here especially 30 and 37–39.
[37] W. Szyłkarski, translator's postscript to Solov'ev's *Theoretical Philosophy in Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 110.
[38] Cf. Solov'ev, *VIII,* 1/219–220; *IX,* 2/164–165; *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 103–104.
[39] Solov'ev, *VIII,* 1/220; *IX,* 2/165; *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 103–104.

[40] Solov'ev, *VIII*, 1/220; *IX*, 2/165. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 104.
[41] Szyłkarski, translator's postscript to Solov'ev's *Theoretical Philosophy* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 107.
[42] Szyłkarski, translator's postscript to Solov'ev's *Theoretical Philosophy* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 107.
[43] J. Hessen, *Max Scheler – Eine kritische Einführung in seine Philosophie*, 51.
[44] Cf. Max Scheler, "Zur Idee des Menschen" in *Abhandlungen und Aufsätze*, vol. I, 4th article (1st edition 1915); 2nd edition *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Leipzig 1919 (a total of 11 articles in two volumes).
[45] Scheler, *UdW*, vol. I, 301.
[46] Scheler, *WuFdS*, 5/136.

CHAPTER VII

[1] F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, Stuttgart 1888, 16.
[2] Petr Mogila (1597–1647) transformed in 1631 the Kievan monastery (Pečerskij monastyr') into a Polish-Latin school. It had been a Greek-Slavic (theological) school since 1615. In 1635 King Ładysław IV authorized that it should become the later famous Collegium Kijoviense. At first only the two lower courses of the humaniora, thus dialectic and logic, were allowed. From 1672 on (Scholastic) philosophy also began to be a subject at the Collegium Kijoviense. Cf. Albert M. Ammann, *Ostslawische Kirchengeschichte*, Vienna 1950, 346–347; further A.V. Kartašev, *Očerki po istorii russkoj cerkvi* (Sketches on the History of the Russian Church), 2 vols., Paris 1959, vol. II, 281–285. Stefan Javorskij (1658–1722), professor at the Collegium Kijoviense and from 1700 on patriarchal representative of Peter the Great, prevailed upon the czar for progressive educational measures. The Kievan school became an academy. The school of the Moscow Zaikonospasskij-cloister was also changed "according to the Latin pattern." Teachers from the Collegium Kijoviense, who had in part acquired their knowledge at Rome's Gregorian University, took over the direction of the Moscow school. The form and content of the lectures in Moscow corresponded extensively with the Jesuit model for education at the Papal university in Rome. Cf. Ammann, 377; Kartašev, vol. II, 330–336; further *Enciklopedičeskij slovar'* (Encyclopaedic Dictionary) eds. F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron, 86 vols., St. Petersburg 1890–1907; here vol. 62 (1901), 638–641 (Stefan Javorskij). Dmitrij Sergeevič Aničkov (1733–1788), a Russian philosopher and mathematician, became involved in an "Atheismus-Streit" due to the Aristotelian line of his thought. Cf. Aničkov's dissertation "Filosofičeskoe rassuždenie o načale i proisšestvii bogopočitanija u raznyx, a osoblivo nevežestvennyx narodov" (Philosophical Treatise on the Origin and Fact of the Devotion to God by Different, and Especially by Ignorant Peoples), Moscow 1769; *Izbrannye proizvedenija russkix myslitelej vtoroj poloviny XVIII veka* (Selected Works of Russian Thinkers from the Second Half of the 18th Century), ed. I.J. Ščipanov, 2 vols., Leningrad 1952, vol. I; *Istorija filosofii* (History of Philosophy), eds. M.A. Dynnik, M.T. Iovčuk, B.M. Kedrov, M.B. Mitin, T.I. Ojzerman, A.F. Okulov and O.V. Traxtenberg, 6 vols., Moscow 1957–1965, vol. I, 630–636; A.V. Petrovskij, "Ateističeskaja dissertacija v XVIII veke" (An Atheistic Dissertation in the 18th Century), in *Voprosy filosofii*, IV, 1, (1950), 276–280.

Petr Jakovlevič Čaadaev (1794–1856) wrote to Count Adolphe de Circourt in 1846: "L'époque de notre véritable affranchissement de l'influence dès idées

étrangères ne datera que du jour où nous concevrons parfaitement les voies parcourues par nous, où la confession de toutes les erreurs, de toutes les fautes de notre passé s'échappera, malgré nous, de nos lèvres, où du fond de nos entrailles se fera entendre le cri de repentir et de douleur, dont de retentissement remplira le monde" (The time when we shall really be free from all influence of foreign ideas will begin only on the day when we have completely understood which paths we have started, when we have confessed against our will all our errors, our mistakes of the past, when one can hear from the depths of our bowels the cry of regret and of pain, the echo of which will fill up the world). This is quoted from Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa im russischen Geschichtsdenken*, Bern 1948, 84; cf. *Sočinenija i pis'ma P.J. Čaadaeva* (Writings and Letters of P.J. Čaadaev), ed. M. Geršenzon, 2 vols., Moscow 1913–1914, vol. I, 268–275, no. 105; Neizdannye "Filosofičeskie pis'ma" P.J. Čaadaeva. Vstup. st. V. Asmusa – "Literaturnoe nasledstvo," (Unpublished "Philosophical Letters" of P.J. Čaadaev. Introductory article by V. Asmus in *Literarisches Erbe* published since 1931, vols. 22–24), Moscow 1935; *History of Philosophy*, ed. M.A. Dynnik *et al.*, 6 vols., vol. II, 258–261. Čaadaev refers the Slavophils of his time, especially Aleksej Xomjakov (1804–1860), to the extraordinary achievements of the Catholic Middle Ages in spiritual and social respects.

Vladimir Il'ič Ul'janov (Lenin: 1870–1924) had, according to Gustav A. Wetter, endowed the consciousness of the Soviet people with "some healthy principles" "and in fact a healthy realism and intellectualism" through his contribution to dialectical materialism: According to Wetter's viewpoint, future Russian philosophy could be renewed if it could "free [itself] from the materialistic and positivistic attitudes." Cf. Gustav A. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus – Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion*, 2nd edition, Freiburg i. Br. 1953, 571. This statement is not contained in the 5th edition (1960).

[3] Cf. Mixail Geršenzon, *Istorija molodoj Rossii* (History of Young Russia), 2nd edn. Moscow-Petrograd 1923; Ernest Radlov, *Očerk istorii russkoj filosofii* (Outline of the History of Russian Philosophy), 2nd edn., Petrograd 1920; Gustav Špet, *Očerk razvitija russkoj filosofii* (Outline of the Development of Russian Philosophy), part I, Petrograd 1922; Boris Jakovenko, *Očerki russkoj filosofii* (Outline of Russian Philosophy), Berlin 1922.

[4] Cf. V.A. Malinin, *Osnovnye problemy kritiki idealističeskoj istorii russkoj filosofii* (Fundamental Problems of the Critique of Idealist History of Russian Philosophy), Moscow 1963, 135.

[5] B. Jakovenko, *Outline of Russian Philosophy*, 5–6.

[6] V.A. Malinin, *Fundamental Problems of the Critique of Idealistic History of Russian Philosophy*, 93–94.

[7] S.M. Solov'ev, and E.L. Radlov (eds.), *Sobranie sočinenij Vladimira Sergeeviča Solov'eva (Collected Works of V.S.S.)*, 2nd edn., 10 vols., St. Petersburg 1911–1913 (photostat copy Brussels 1966), vol. V, 94.

[8] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. V, 95.

[9] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. V, 95.

[10] Cf. V.A. Malinin, *Fundamental Problems of the Critique of Idealist History of Russian Philosophy*, 137.

[11] Cf. Mixail Iovčuk, "Ob istoričeskix osobennostjax i osnovnyx ėtapax razvitija russkoj filosofii" (On the Historical Specifics and the Fundamental Stages of the Development of Russian Philosophy), in *Iz istorii russkoj filosofii* (Out of the History of Russian Philosophy), ed. I.J. Ščipanov, Moscow 1952, 3–66; "Buržuazno-dvorjanskaja idealističeskaja filosofija, 60–90 gg. XIX v [v. Rossii]" (Bourgeois-Aristocratic Idealist Philosophy from the Sixties to the Nineties of the 19th Century

[in Russia]) in *History of Philosophy*, ed. M.A. Dynnik *et al.*, 6 vols., vol. IV, (1959), 61–88; "Idealističeskaja filosofija v. Rossii vtoroj poloviny XIX – načala XX v." (Idealist Philosophy of the Second Half of the 19th up to the Beginning of the 20th Century in Russia), in *Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii* (Short Outline of the History of Philosophy), eds. M.T. Iovčuk, T.I. Ojzerman, and I.J. Ščipanov, Moscow 1960, 577–594, here especially "Religiozno-mističeskaja filosofiia V. Solov'eva" (The Religious-Mystical Philosophy of V. Solovyev), 584–586; P.S. Skurinov, "K ocenke idealizma Vl. Solov'eva" (Towards a Judgment of V. Solovyev's Idealism), in *Protiv sovremennyx fal'sifikatorov istorii russkoj filosofii* (Against Contemporary Falsifiers of the History of Russian Philosophy), ed. I.J. Ščipanov, Moscow 1960, 388–403; "Osnovnye napravlenija idealizma – 1. V.S. Solov'ev" (The Basic Directions of Idealism – 1. V.S. Solovyev), in A.A. Galaktionov and P.F. Nikandrov, *Istorija russkoj filosofii* (History of Russian Philosophy), Moscow 1961, 381–387; "V.S. Solov'ev" in *Istorija filosofii v SSSR* (History of Philosophy in the USSR), ed. V.E. Evgrafov *et al.*, 5 vols., Moscow 1968ff., here vol. III, 378–392.

L.A. Kogan, "K kritike filosofii Vl. Solov'eva" (A Critique of the Philosophy of Vl. Solovyev) in *Voprosy filosofii*, XIII, Moscow 3 (1959), 102–113; P.S. Novikov, "Vl. Solov'ev i ego zapadnogermanskie počitateli" (V. Solovyev and his West German Admirers), in *Voprosy filosofii*, XIII, Moscow 4 (1959), 105–114; G.K. Buršurov, "K kritike social'nyx vozzrenij Vl. Solov'eva" (A Critique of the Social Views of V. Solovyev), in *Učenye zapiski Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Pedagogičeskogo Instituta imeni A.I. Gercena* (Scientific Writings of the Leningrad Governmental Pedagogical Herzen Institute), (1966), no. 284; G.K. Buršurov, "K xarakteristike istoriko-filosofskix vzgljadov Vl. Solov'eva" (Characterization of the Philosophical-Historical Views of V. Solovyev), in *Filosofskie nauki*, X, Moscow 1 (1967), 86–96; E.P. Ryškov, "Kritika 'xristianskogo gumanizma' Vl. Solov'eva" (Critique of the "Christian Humanism" of V. Solovyev), in *Filosofskie nauki*, XI, Moscow 5 (1968), 101–109; E.P. Ryškov, "Smysl čelovečeskogo suščestvovanija po Vladimiru Solov'evu" (The Meaning of Human Existence according to Vladimir Solovyev), in *Nauka i religija*, X, Moscow 11 (1968), 92–94; V. Spirov, "V tiskax xristianskoj dogmatiki – O social'no-ėtičeskix idealax Vl. Solov'eva" (Under the Spell of Christian Dogma – On the Social-Ethical Ideals of V. Solovyev), in *Nauka i religija*, XI, Moscow 5 (1970), 39–45.

[12] Cf. A. Galaktionov and P. Nikandrov, *History of Russian Philosophy*, 382.

[13] Cf. Galaktionov and Nikandrov, *History of Russian Philosophy*, 382.

[14] Galaktionov and Nikandrov, *History of Russian Philosophy*, 387.

[15] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 290.

[16] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 290 and 306.

[17] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 307.

[18] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 307–308.

[19] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 308.

[20] Cf. *Duxovnyja osnovy žizni* (The Spiritual Foundations of Life), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 355; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. II (1957), 74.

[21] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 376; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. II, 102.

[22] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 376–377; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. II, 102.

[23] È. Radlov, "Biografičeskij očerk" (Biographical Sketch), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. X, (page) XXXV.

[24] È. Radlov, "Biographical Sketch," in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. X, (page) XXX; cf. S. Bulgakov, *Ot marksizma k idealizmu. Sbornik statej*

(1896–1903) (From Marxism to Idealism. Collected Articles), St. Petersburg, 1903, 238 (n.); (Second [phototechnical] edition, "Posev" press, Frankfurt/M. 1968 [347 pp.]). V. Pirožkova, "Sergej Bulgakov. Ot marksizma k idealizmu" (Sergej Bulgakov, From Marxism to Idealism), in *Zarubež'e,* V, Munich 1 (1969), 22–23.

[25] È. Radlov, "Biographical Sketch," in *Collected Works of V.S.S.*, (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. X, (page) XXVII.

[26] *Opravdenie dobra.* Vvedenie: Nravstvennaja filosofija kak nauka (The Justification of the Good. Introduction: Moral Philosophy as a Science), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. VIII, 24–47; cf. È. Radlov, *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. X, (pages) XXXVI–XXXVII.

[27] Cf. *Opravdenie dobra.* Cast' pervaja: Dobro v čelovečeskoj prirode, Glava pervaja: Pervičnyja dannyja nravstvennosti (The Justification of the Good. Part I; The Good in Human Nature. Chapter 1: The First Givennesses of Morality), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. VIII, 49–65.

[28] Cf. the extensive treatment of the feeling of sympathy in chapter 2: *Asketičeskoe načalo v nravstvennosti* (The Ascetic Principle of Morality [The Feeling of Shame]), in chapter 3: Žalost' i al'truizm (Sympathy and Altruism) and in chapter 4: Religioznoe načalo v nravstvennosti (The Religious Principle in Morality [The Feeling of Reverence]), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. VIII, 66–84, 85–103 and 104–118; cf. further È. Radlov, *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. X, (pages) XLV–XLVI.

[29] *Opravdenie dobra.* Zaključenie (The Justification of the Good. Conclusion), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. VIII, 513.

[30] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. VIII, 512.

[31] Cf. *Theoretical Philosophy,* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 109, as well as René Descartes, *Discour de la méthode,* 4-ème partie; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII (1953), 38; cf. È. Radlov in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. X, (page) XXXIV.

[32] *Theoretical Philosophy,* First article: The First Principle of Theoretical Philosophy, X., in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 107–108; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 32.

[33] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 115; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 41.

[34] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 116; and *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 42.

[35] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 116, and *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 42.

[36] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 116, and *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 43.

[37] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 165, and *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 103: *Theoretical Philosophy.* Third article: The Form of Rationality and Reason of the Truth.

[38] *Čtenija o Bogočelovečestve* (Lectures on God-manhood), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 107; cf. *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 363.

[39] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 69.

[40] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 69.

[41] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 107.

[42] *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 363.

[43] *Lectures on God-manhood* in *Collected Works by V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 57.

[44] *The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 373.
[45] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 373.
[46] *Lectures on God-manhood* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 32.
[47] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 110.
[48] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 70.
[49] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 70.
[50] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 70.
[51] *Philosophical Principles* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 363 and 373.
[52] *Theoretical Philosophy* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 110; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 35.
[53] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 90; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 21.
[54] *Lectures* in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 57.
[55] *Smysl ljubvi* (The Meaning of Love) in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. VII, 45; cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 253.
[56] V. Zenkovsky, *History of Russian Philosophy;* N.O. Lossky, *History of Russian Philosophy.*
[57] Cf. the sources referred to in n. 11 as well as the article "Russkaja filosofija" (Russian Philosophy) in *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija,* ed. F.V. Konstantinov, 5 vols. (1960–1970), vol. IV, (1967), 533–541. The text is by V. Evgrafov, V. Malinin, and N. Utkina; literature by V. Karpačev.
[58] W. Szyłkarski, "Schlusswort des Übersetzers" (Translator's postscript), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 433–434.
[59] W. Szyłkarski, "Nachwort zur *Theoretischen Philosophie*" (Epilogue to *Theoretical Philosophy*), in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 107.
[60] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 116, and *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 43 (*Theoretical Philosophy.* First article: The First Principle of Theoretical Philosophy, XIV.).
[61] W. Szyłkarski, "Epilogue" to *Theoretical Philosophy*, in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 110.
[62] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 164–165, and *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 103–104 (*Theoretical Philosophy.* Third article: The Form of Rationality and Reason of the Truth, VII.).
[63] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IX, 165 and *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (German), vol. VII, 103–104.
[64] J. Hessen, *Max Scheler – Eine kritische Einführung in seine Philosophie,* 51.
[65] Scheler, *WuFdS,* 5/51.
[66] L. Müller, *Solovjev und der Protestantismus,* 120.
[67] V.V. Zenkovsky, *History of Russian Philosophy,* vol. II, 54.
[68] K.V. Močul'skij, *Vladimir Solov'ev – Life and Teachings,* 234.
[69] E. Ryškov, "The Meaning of Human Existence according to Vladimir Solov'ev" in *Nauka i religija,* X, Moscow 11 (1968), 92.
[70] E. Ryškov, "The Meaning of Human Existence according to Vladimir Solov'ev," 92 (introduction).
[71] S.N. Bulgakov, *From Marxism to Idealism. Collected Articles (1896–1903),* foreword (pages) XI–XII.
[72] S.N. Bulgakov, "Čto daet sovremennomu soznaniju filosofija Vl. Solov'eva?" (What does the Philosophy of V. Solovyev offer Contemporary Consciousness?), in *From Marxism to Idealism,* 262.
[73] S.N. Bulgakov, *Tichie dumy. Sbornik statej* (Quiet Thoughts. Collected Articles),

Moscow 1918, 73.
[74] Cf. S.N. Bulgakov, *Svet nevečernij – Sozercanija i umozrenija* (The Immortal Light – Thoughts and Insights), Moscow 1917; to nn. 71–74 cf. also A. Želnin, "Sergej Nikolaevič Bulgakov – Kratkaja bibliografičeskaja spravka" (Sergej Nikolaevič Bulgakov – Some Information about his Writings), in *Zarubež'e,* III, Munich 1 (1967), 13.
[75] Cf. Ol'ga Trubeckaja (Princess), *Knjaz' S.N. Trubeckoj – Vospominanija sestry* (Prince S.N. Trubeckoj – Memories of a Sister), New York 1953, 60.
[76] O. Trubeckaja (Princess), *Prince S.N. Trubeckoj – Memories of a Sister,* 156–157.
[77] O. Trubeckaja (Princess), *Prince S.N. Trubeckoj – Memories of a Sister,* 138–141.
[78] Cf. E.N. Trubeckoj, *Vospominanija* (Memories), Sofija 1921; cf. further *History of Philosophy,* ed. M.A. Dynnik *et al.,* 6 vols., vol. V (1961), 344.
[79] S.N. Trubeckoj, *Metafizika v drevnej Grecii* (Metaphysics in Ancient Greece), Moscow 1889.
[80] S.N. Trubeckoj, "O prirode čelovečeskago soznanija" (On the Nature of Human Consciousness; 1889–1891), "Osnovanija idealizma" (The Foundation of Idealism; 1896), both are in *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works), vol. II, Moscow 1908.
[81] S.N. Trubeckoj, *Učenie o Logose v ego istorii* (The Doctrine of Logos in its History), Moscow 1900.
[82] Cf. I. Lapšin, "Trubeckoj, Sergej Nikolaevič," in *Enciklopedičeskij slovar'* (Encyclopaedic Dictionary, ed. Brockhaus and Yefron), vol. 66, St. Petersburg 1901, 919–921.
[83] Cf. S.N. Trubeckoj, *Collected Works,* vol. II, 16.
[84] Cf. S.N. Trubeckoj, *Collected Works,* vol. II, 13.
[85] Cf. V.V. Zenkovsky, *History of Russian Philosophy,* vol. II, 335.
[86] Cf. N.A. Berdjaev, *"Ja" i mir ob'ektov. Opyt filosofii odinočestva i obščenija* (The "I" and the World of Objects. Attempt at a Philosophy of Loneliness and Relation), Paris 1934, 115.
[87] Cf. V.V. Zenkovsky, *History of Russian Philosophy,* vol. II, 203 and 336.
[88] Cf. N.O. Losskij, *Čuvstvennaja, intellektual'naja i mističeskaja intuicija* (Sensual, Intellectual and Mystical Intuition), Paris 1938, 156–157.
[89] E.N. Trubeckoj, *Mirosozercanie Vl. S. Solov'eva* (The World-View of V.S. Solovyev), 2 vols., Moscow 1913.
[90] E.N. Trubeckoj, *Religiozno-obščestvennyj ideal zapadnogo xristianstva v V veke – Mirosozercanie blažennago Avgustina* (The Religious-Social Ideal of Western Christianity in the 5th Century – The World-View of St. Augustine), Moscow 1892; *Religiozno-obščestvennyj ideal zapadnago xristianstva v XI veke – Ideja Božeskago carstva v tvorenijax Grigorija VII i publicistov ego sovremennikov* (The Religious-Social Ideal of Western Christianity in the 11th Century – The Idea of the Kingdom of God in the Works of Gregory VIIth and the Writers of his Time), Kiev 1897.
[91] E.N. Trubeckoj, *Metafizičeskie predpolozenija poznanija. Opyt preodolenija Kanta i kantianstva* (The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge. Attempt to Overcome Kant and Kantianism), Moscow 1917; cf. "Trubeckoj, Evgenij Nikolaevič," in *Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija* (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia), 1st edn., vol. 55, Moscow, 1947, 52.
[92] E.N. Trubeckoj, *Smysl žizni* (The Meaning of Life), Moscow 1918 (2nd edn. Berlin 1922; cf. a summary in German by N. von Bubnoff, *Russische Religionsphilosophen – Dokumente,* Heidelberg 1956, 249–364.
[93] Cf. E.N. Trubeckoj, *The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge,* 306.
[94] E.N. Trubeckoj, *The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge,* 23.
[95] E.N. Trubeckoj, *The Meaning of Life,* 23.
[96] Cf. E.N. Trubeckoj, *The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge,* 41.
[97] E.N. Trubeckoj, *The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge,* 33.
[98] Cf. Scheler, *Ethics,* 2/389–390, 397–398 and 408–411.

[99] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/411.
[100] Scheler, *Ethics*, 2/412.
[101] Cf. E.N. Trubeckoj, *The Meaning of Life*, 101.
[102] Cf. E.N. Trubeckoj, *The World-View of V.S. Solov'ev*, vol. I, 262; *The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge*, 321; *The Meaning of Life*, 211.
[103] Cf. *Russische Religionsphilosophen – Dokumente*, ed. and trans. N. von Bubnoff, Heidelberg 1956, "Word of Explanation," 9–20; *V.V. Rozanov – Izbrannoe* (V.V. Rozanov – Selections, introduction and revised by J.P. Ivask), New York 1956, 7–59.
[104] Cf. V. Zenkovsky, *History of Russian Philosophy*, vol. II, 271 and 296–297; Peter Scheibert, "Die Petersburger religiös-philosophischen Zusammenkünfte von 1902 and 1903," in *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Osteuropas*, XII, Munich 4 (1964), 513–560. Further James P. Scanlan, "The New Religious Consciousness. Merezhkovskii and Berdiaev," in *Canadian Slavic Studies – Revue canadienne d'études slaves*, IV, Montreal 1 (1970), 17–35.
[105] Cf. N. *Minskij* (Nikolaj Maksimovič Vilenkin; 1855–1937), *Religija buduščego – Filosofskie razgovory* (The Future Religion – Philosophical Conversations), St. Petersburg 1905; N. Berdjaev, *Novoe religioznoe soznanie i obščestvennost'* (The New Religious Consciousness and the Public), St. Petersburg 1907; G. Aref'eva, *"Bogoiskatel'stvo"* (Seeking of God), in *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*, ed. F.V. Konstantinov, vol. I, (1960), 178.
[106] Cf. V. Bazarov, '"Bogoiskatel'stvo' i 'bogostroitel'stvo'" (Seeking of God and Building God), in *Veršiny*, 1, 1909; "Xristiane tret'ego zaveta i stroiteli bašni Vavilonskoj" (The Christians of the Third Testament and the Building of the Babylonian Tower), in *Literaturnyj raspad*, 2, 1909; *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*, ed. F.V. Konstantinov, vol. I, 122.
[107] Cf. A. Lunačarskij, *Religija i socializm* (Religion and Socialism), 2 vols., St. Petersburg 1908–1911; *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*, ed. F.V. Konstantinov, vol. III (1963), 261–262.
[108] Cf. G. Aref'eva, "Bogostroitel'stvo" (Building God), in *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*, ed. F.V. Konstantinov, vol. I, 179.
[109] Cf. E. Ambarcumov, "Intelligencija" (Intelligentsia), in *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*, ed. F.V. Konstantinov, vol. II (1962), 285–291.
[110] Cf. N. Berdjaev, *Sub'ektivizm i individualizm v obščestvennoj filosofii. Kritičeskij ėtjud o N.K. Mixajlovskom* (Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy. Critical Studies of N.K. Mixajlovskij), foreword by P.B. Struve, St. Petersburg 1901.
[111] *Problemy idealizma* (Problems of Idealism), Collected articles by Bulgakov, Prince E.N. Trubeckoj, Struve, Berdjaev, Frank, Askol'dov, Prince S.N. Trubeckoj, Novgorodcev, Kistjakovskij, Lappo-Danilevskij, Ol'denburg and Žukovskij. The work was directed by P.I. Novgorodcev and edited by the Moscow Psychological Society), Moscow 1902, (521 pp.).
[112] Cf. B.N. Čičerin, *Nauka i religija* (Science and Religion), Moscow 1879; Solov'ev, *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* 1874 in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 27–151; further *Metafizika i položitel'naja nauka* (Metaphysics and Positive Science) 1875 in *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 197–205.
[113] Cf. N.P. Poltorackij, "Sbornik 'Iz glubiny' i ego značenie – Vstupitel'naja stat'ja ko vtoromu izdaniju" (The Compilation 'From the Depths' and its Significance – Introductory Article for the Second Edition), *Iz glubiny: Sbornik statej o russkoj revoljucii*, Paris 1967. The introductory article was reprinted in *Zarubež'e*, V, n. 1, Munich (1969), 12–16.
[114] *Vexi. Sbornik statej o russkoj intelligencii* (N.A. Berdjaev, S.N. Bulgakov, M.O. Geršenzon, A.S. Izgoev, B.A. Kistjakovskij, P.B. Struve, S.L. Frank) (Signposts: Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia), Moscow 1909 (6th edn. Frankfurt/M

1967). Gisela Oberländer, *Die Vechi-Diskussion (1909–1912),* Cologne 1965; cf. N.P. Poltorackij, in *Zarubež'e,* V, Munich 1 (1969), 14–15. Cf. A. Levin, *M.O. Gershenzon and Vekhi* in *Canadian Slavic Studies – Revue canadienne d'études slaves,* Montreal 1 (1970), 60–73.

[115] N. Berdjaev, "Filosofskaja istina i intelligentskaja pravda" (The Theoretical Truth of Philosophy and the Practical Truth of the Intelligentsia), *Vexi,* 1–22; here 21.

[116] P. Struve, "Intelligencija i revoljucija" (The Intelligentsia and the Revolution), *Vexi,* 156–174; here 164.

[117] P. Struve, "Intelligentsia i revoljucija," *Vexi,* 167–168.

[118] Cf. N.P. Poltorackij, *Zarubež'e,* V, Munich 1 (1969), 15.

[119] Cf. M.P. Stolypina-Bok, *Vospominanija o moem otce P.A. Stolypine* (Recollections of my Father P.A. Stolypin), New York 1953, chap. XLI, 335–344.

[120] M.P. Stolypina-Bok *Vospominanija o moem otce P.A. Stolypine,* 344.

[121] Cf. Velikij Knjaz' G. Konstantinovič, *V Mramornom Dvorce – Iz xroniki našej sem'i* (In the Marble Palace: From the Chronicle of our Family), New York 1955, chaps. 20 and 21, 171–189.

[122] Velikij Knjaz' G. Konstantinovič, *V Mramornom Dvorce – Iz xroniki našej sem'i,* 177.

[123] *Iz glubiny. Sbornik statej o russkoj revoljucii* (S.A. Askol'dov, N.A. Berdjaev, S.N. Bulgakov, V.I. Ivanov, A.S. Izgoev, S.A. Kotljarevskij, V.N. Murav'ev, P.I. Novgorodcev, P.B. Struve, S.L. Frank) (From the Depths. Collection of articles on the Russian Revolution. Foreword by the editor P.B. Struve), Moscow 1918, (2nd edn. Paris 1967).

[124] Cf. N.P. Poltorackij, *Zarubež'e,* V, 1 (1969), 12.

[125] N.P. Poltorackij, *Zarubež'e,* V, 1 (1969), 15.

[126] Cf. "Filosofija" (Philosophy), *Bol'šaja Enciklopedija* (Great Encyclopaedia), ed. S.N. Južakov, vol. 19, St. Petersburg 1904, 221–232.

[127] Cf. G.G. Špet, *Javlenie i smysl – Fenomenologija kak osnovnaja nauka i eja problemy* (Phenomenon and Meaning – Phenomenology as Fundamental Knowledge and its Problems [Dedicated to Professor Edmund Husserl in Heartfelt Devotion], Moscow 1914; A.F. Losev, *Filosofija imeni* (Philosophy of Name), Moscow 1927.

[128] Cf. G.G. Špet, "Soznanie i ego sobstvennik" (Consciousness and its Owner), *Sbornik statej v čest' G.I. Čelpanova,* Moscow 1916. (Collection of Articles in Honor of G.I. Čelpanov).

[129] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. VIII, 296.

[130] Cf. H. Dahm, *Meuterei auf den Knien – Die Krise des marxistischen Welt- und Menschenbildes,* Olten-Freiburg i. Br. 1969, 34–49, especially 39.

[131] Cf. E. Ryškov, "Smysl čelovečeskogo suščestvovanija po Vladimiru Solov'evu" (The Meaning of Human Existence according to Vladimir Solovyev) *Nauka i religija,* X, Moscow 11 (1968), 92–94; L.A. Kogan, "V.S. Solov'ev," *Istorija filosofii v SSSR,* ed. V.E. Evgrafov *et al.,* vol. 3, Moscow 1968, 378–392, especially 387–390.

[132] V.I. Nesmelov, *Nauka o čeloveke* (The Science of Man, Vol. I: Attempt at a Psychological History and a Critique of the Fundamental Questions of Life; vol. II: The Metaphysics of Life and Christian Revelation), Kazan' 1905–1906; Selections of this have been published in German in *Russische Religionsphilosophen – Dokumente,* ed. N. von Bubnoff, Heidelberg 1956, 185–245.

[133] N. Berdjaev, *Smysl tvorčestva. Opyt opravdanija čeloveka* (The Meaning of Creativity. Attempt at a Justification of Man), Moscow 1916, 15.

[134] Cf. N. Berdjaev, *O naznačenii čeloveka* (On the Determination of Man), Paris 1931; *Sud'ba čeloveka v sovremennom mire* (Man's Fate in the Contemporary World), Paris 1934; *Samopoznanie* (Knowledge of Self), Paris 1945; *Ekzistencial'naja dialektika božestvennogo i čelovečeskogo* (The Existential Dialectic of the Divine and the Human), Paris 1952; cf. L. Šestov, *Vlast'ključej* (Potestas Clavium – The Power of the Keys), Berlin

1923; *Kirkegard i ėkzistencial'naja filosofija* (Kierkegaard and Existential Philosophy), Paris, 1939; *Umozrenie i otkrovenie. Religioznaja filosofija Vladimira Solov'eva i drugie stat'i* (Speculation and Revelation. The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyev and Other Essays [collected after Šestov's death by his daughters]), Paris 1964; this is published in German as *Spekulation und Offenbarung. Essays und kritische Betrachtungen*, Hamburg-Munich 1963.

[135] Cf. I.F. Balakina, "O tak nazyvaemom russkom ėkzistencializme" (On So-called Russian Existentialism), *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, (Series VIII: Economics, Philosophy), XVIII, Moscow 6 (1963), 88–96; "Religiozno-ėkzistencialistskie iskanija v Rossii načala XX v." (Attempts at Religious and Existential Thinking in Russia at the Start of the 20th Century), *Sovremennyj ėkzistencializm. Kritičeskie očerki*, (Contemporary Existentialism. Critical Essays), ed. T.I. Ojzerman, Moscow 1966, 430–449.

[136] Quoted from *Zarubež'e*, I, Munich 2 (1965), 10. Part III of Mihailov's report "Zaključenie i perspektivy" (Conclusions and Prospects) was published in *Posev*, no. 21, Frankfurt/M. May 1965; it was reprinted in *Zarubež'e*, I, Munich 2 (1965), 11–12.

CHAPTER VIII

[1] Cf. K. Močul'skij, *Vl. Solov'ev*, Paris 1936, 17.
[2] Cf. W. Szyłkarski, *Solowjews Philosophie der All-Einheit*, 29.
[3] Cf. K. Timirjazev, *Sočinenija* (Works), Moscow 1938, vol. V, 22.
[4] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. I, 8.
[5] Heinrich Falk, *Das Weltbild P.J. Tschaadajews nach seinen acht 'Philosophischen Briefen,'* Munich 1954, 82.
[6] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 1st edn.), vol. II, 285.
[7] Cf. e.g., W. von Löwenich, *Der moderne Katholizismus – Erscheinung und Problem*, Witten 1956, 151–152.
[8] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. IV, 243.
[9] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. II, 350.
[10] F. Muckermann, *Wladimir Solowiew – Zur Begegnung zwischen Russland und dem Abendland*, 19.
[11] V. Zenkovsky, *History of Russian Philosophy*, vol. II, 25.
[12] V. Zenkovsky, *History of Russian Philosophy*, vol. II, 25.
[13] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 132.
[14] G.V. Plexanov, *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedenija* (Selected Philosophical Works), Moscow 1957, vol. III, 400.
[15] P. Miljukov, *Razloženie slavjanofil'stva* (The Disintegration of the Slavophils), Moscow 1893, 43f.
[16] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 1st edn.), vol. III, 138–168.
[17] Cf. W. Szyłkarski, *Solowjew und Dostojewskij*, and V. Zenkovsky, *History of Russian Philosophy*, vol. II, 27.
[18] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. II, (pages) VIII–IX.
[19] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. II, (page) IX.
[20] Cf. K. Timirjazev, *Works*, vol. V, 22.
[21] Cf. Gustav A. Canoval, *Monarchie nicht gestern, sondern morgen*, Vienna-Munich 1956, 107–124.
[22] H. Falk, *Die Weltanschauung des Bolschewismus*, Würzburg 1956; *Kirche und Kommunismus, (Religiöse Quellen)*, Düsseldorf 1956.
[23] Cf. F. Muckermann, *Wladimir Solowiew – Zur Begegnung zwischen Russland und dem Abendland*, 61.

[24] Cf. "Slavische Rundschau" [Autenried (Schloss)], no. 3/4, 1956, 109.
[25] Solov'ev, *Letters*, vol. III, 88.
[26] *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 10.
[27] Cf. E. Benz, *Die Ostkirche im Lichte der protestantischen Geschichtsschreibung von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart*, Freiburg-Munich 1952.
[28] Cf. L. Müller, *Russischer Geist und evangelisches Christentum – Die Kritik des Protestantismus in der russischen religiösen Philosophie und Dichtung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Witten 1951.
[29] Cf. *Collected Works of V.S.S.* (Russian, 2nd edn.), vol. III, 227–242.
[30] N. Berdjaev, *Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma* (Sources and Meaning of Russian Communism), Paris 1955, 91.
[31] N.O. Lossky, *History of Russian Philosophy*, New York 1951, 402.
[32] K. Timirjazev, *Works*, vol. IX, 249.
[33] Cf. "Kommunist," no. 16, Moscow 1956, 16. [*Neopublikovannye pis'ma V.I. Lenina G.V. Plexanovu* (Unpublished Letters from V.I. Lenin to G.V. Plexanov); Cf. "Kommunist," no. 16, Moscow 1956, 14–19.]

CHAPTER IX

[1] Cf. G.K. Bušurov, "K xarakteristike istoriko-filosofskix vzgljadov Vl. Solov'eva" (A Characterization of the Philosophical and Historical Views of V. Solovyev), *Filosofskie nauki*, X, Moscow 1 (1967), 86–97; here 86.
[2] Cf. Andrzej Walicki, *W kręgu konserwatywnej utopii. Struktura i przemiany rosykiego słowianofilstwa* (In the Sphere [of Influence] of the Conservative Utopia. Structure and Changes in Russian Slavophilism), Warshaw 1964. Further E.V. Osipova and V.F. Pustarnakov, "Issledovanie russkogo slavjanofil'stva" (Research on Russian Slavophilism), *Voprosy filosofii*, XXII, Moscow 7 (1968), 167–171. A.L. Janov, "Slavjanofily i Konstantin Leont'ev. Russkaja konservativnaja mysl' XIX v. i ee interpretatory" (The Slavophils and Konstantin Leont'ev. Russian Conservative Thought of the 19th Century and its Interpreters), *Voprosy filosofii*, XXIII, Moscow 8 (1969), 97–106.
[3] Cf. the complete lack of any Soviet sources for chapter VI: "Filosofskaja i sociologičeskaja mysl' v Germanii v period ot buržuaznoj revoljucii 1848 g. do načala ėpoxi imperializma – 1. Buržuaznaja filosofskaja i sociologičeskaja mysl'" (Philosophical and Sociological Thought in Germany during the Period of the Bourgeois Revolution of 1848 until the Start of the Imperialistic Era – 1. Bourgeois Philosophical and Sociological Thought [from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, Simmel and Wundt]), in *Istorija filosofii*, (History of Philosophy), 6 vols., Moscow 1959, vol. III, 320 (325)–366. Cf. also for chapter X: "Filosofskaja i sociologičeskaja mysl' v Germanii v ėpoxu imperializma s konca XIX v. do 1918 g. – 1. Nemeckaja buržuaznaja filosofija načala XX v. Neokantianstvo. Fenomenologija Ė. Gusserlja" (Philosophical and Sociological Thought in Germany in the Period of Imperialism from the End of the 19th Century until 1918 – 1. German Bourgeois Philosophy at the Beginning of the 20th Century. Neo-Kantianism. E. Husserl's Phenomenology), *History of Philosophy*, vol. V, Moscow 1961, 481 (483)–500. Cf. the same for the key-word "Fenomenologija" (Phenomenology), *Malaja Sovetskaja Ėnciklopedija* (Short Soviet Encyclopaedia), 3rd edn. vol. IX, Moscow 1960, 916.
[4] Cf. Marie Bayerová, "Husserlova fenomenologická metoda a její předmět" (Husserl's Phenomenological Method and its Object), *Filosofický časopis*, XIII, Prague 2 (1965), 214–227. Milan Průcha, "'Cogito' a první filosofie v marxismu' (The 'Cogito' and First Philosophy in Marxism), *Filosofický časopis*, XIII, Prague 3 (1965), 423–434. Al.

Boboc, "Fenomenologia lui Edmund Husserl şi irationalismul contemporan" (The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Modern Irrationalism), *Revista de Filozofie,* XII, Bucharest 10 (1965), 1337–1352. Vladimír Ruml, "Soudobá buržoazní filosofie a marxismus" (Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy and Marxism), *Nová mysl,* XX, Prague 11 (1965), 1256–1264. *Sovremennyj ėkzistencializm. Kritičeskie očerki* (Modern Existentialism. Critical Essays), eds. T.I. Ojzerman, L.N. Mitroxin and A.G. Myslivčenko, Moscow 1966. Jan Patočka, "Úvod do Husserlovy fenomenologie" (Introduction into Husserl's Phenomenology [parts I–VIII]), *Filosofický časopis,* XIII, Prague 1965, 5 (part I), 693–701; 6 (parts II–IV), 821–849; XIV (1966), 1 (parts V–VI), 1–21; 3 (part VII), 289–305; 5 (part VIII), 569–589. Henri Wald, "Fenomenologia – o filoxofie a ascezei" (Phenomenology as a Philosophy of Asceticism), *Revista de Filozofie,* XVI, Bucharest 7 (1969), 831–843.

[5] Cf. *Sovremennyj ob'ektivnyj idealizm. Kritičeskie očerki* (Contemporary Objective Idealism. Critical Essays), ed. G.A. Kursanov, Moscow 1963. S.I. Popov, "Aktual'nye problemy kritiki pravosocialističeskoj ideologii. V porjadke obsuždenija metodologičeskix voprosov obščestvennoj nauki. K Vsesojuznomu soveščaniju po problemam filosofii" (Current Problems in the Critique of Rightist Socialist Ideology. Contribution to the Discussion of Methodological Questions of the Social Sciences. At the Union Conference on Problems of Philosophy), *Filosofskie nauki,* VII, Moscow 4 (1964), 20–29. G.M. Tavrizjan, "Fenomenologija Ė. Gusserlja i francuzskij ėkzistencializm" (The Phenomenology of E. Husserl and French Existentialism), *Voprosy filosofii,* XXII, Moscow 1 (1968), 66–77. M.A. Kissel', "Kritika fenomenologičeskogo metoda Ė. Gusserlja" (Critique of the Phenomenological Method of E. Husserl), *Voprosy filosofii,* XXIII, Moscow 11 (1969), 67–76. V.D. Gubin, "Fenomenologija E. Gusserlja i ee sovremennye interpretatory" (The Phenomenology of E. Husserl and its Modern Interpreters), *Voprosy filosofii,* XXIII, Moscow 10 (1969), 171–177.

[6] Cf. n. 5 above as well as N.V. Motrošilova, "Fenomenologičeskaja filosofija i ob'ektivnyj idealizm" (Phenomenological Philosophy and Objective Idealism), *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* ed. G.A. Kursanov, Moscow 1963, 114–173 (Discussion of Scheler in chap. V, 154–162). T.I. Ojzerman, "Filosofija krizisa i krizis filosofii" (The Philosophy of Crisis and the Crisis of Philosophy), *Modern Existentialism,* ed. T.I. Ojzerman *et al.*, Moscow 1966, 5–44. P.P. Gajdenko, "Problema intencional'nosti u Gusserlja i ėkzistencialistskaja kategorija transcendencii" (The Problem of Intentionality in Husserl and the Existential Category of Transcendence), *Modern Existentialism* 77–107.

[7] Cf. G.L. Belkina, *Nemeckaja buržuaznaja filosofija posle Velikoj Oktjabr'skoj socialističeskoj revoljucii* (German Bourgeois Philosophy after the Great Socialist October Revolution. A collection of articles translated from German), Moscow 1960.

[8] Cf. Konstanty Bakradze, *Z dziejów filozofii współczesnej* (From the History of Contemporary Philosophy), trans. from Russian H. Zelnikowa, Warshaw 1964; especially chap. VI: Psychologizm a "czysta logika" (Psychologism and "Pure Logic").

[9] Cf. *Modern Existentialism,* 47, 95, 96, 98 and 281.

[10] Cf. A.G. Myslivčenko, "Ėkzistencija i bytie – central'nye kategorii nemeckogo ėkzistencializma" (Existence and Being as the Central Categories of German Existentialism), *Modern Existentialism,* 47–76; here 47.

[11] Cf. P.P. Gajdenko, "The Problem of Intentionality in Husserl and the Existential Category of Transcendence," *Modern Existentialism,* 77–107, here 95–96.

[12] P.P. Gajdenko, "The Problem of Intentionality in Husserl and the Existential Category of Transcendence," *Modern Existentialism,* 96.

[13] Cf. P.P. Gajdenko, "The Problem of Intentionality in Husserl and the Existential Category of Transcendence," *Modern Existentialism,* 98 (n. 1).

[14] Cf. T.A. Saxarova, "Problema čeloveka v koncepcijax francuzskix ėkzistencialistov" (The Problem of Man in the Conceptions of the French Existentialists), *Modern Existentialism,* 280–318; here 281.

[15] Cf. I.S. Narskij, "O ponjatijax 'ničto' i 'nigilizm' v filosofii ėkzistencializma" (On the Concepts of "Nothing" and "Nihilism" in Existential Philosophy), *Modern Existentialism,* 108–124.
[16] Cf. R.M. Gabitova, "Koncepcija ličnosti i obščestvennoj žizni v nemeckom ėkzistencializme" (The View of the Person and of Social Life in German Existentialism), *Modern Existentialism,* 125–147.
[17] Cf. T.I. Ojzerman, "The Philosophy of Crisis and the Crisis of Philosophy," *Modern Existentialism,* 5–44.
[18] Cf. *Filozofia i socjologia XX wieku. Seria Myśli i Ludzie II: Filozofia nowożytna i współczesna* (Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century. Series Ideas and Men II: Modern and Contemporary Philosophy), ed. Bronisław Baczko, Warshaw 1962.
[19] Cf. Leszek Kołakowski, "Husserl – filozofia doświadczenia rozumiejącego" (Husserl – The Philosophy of an Experience which Understands), *Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century,* 103–125.
[20] Cf. Zbigniew Kuderowicz, "Scheler, czyli personalizm etyczny" (Scheler or Ethical Personalism), *Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century,* 337–358.
[21] Cf. Kołakowski in *Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century,* 105–120.
[22] Cf. Kołakowski in *Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century,* 120–125.
[23] Cf. Kołakowski in *Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century,* 120.
[24] Kołakowski in *Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century,* 124–125.
[25] Cf. Kuderowicz in *Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century,* 340–358.
[26] Kuderowicz in *Philosophy and Sociology of the 20th Century,* 358.
[27] Cf. G.A. Kursanov and N.S. Julina, "Krizis buržuaznoj filosofskoj mysli i sovremennyj ob'ektivnyj idealizm. Vstupitel'naja stat'ja" (The Crisis of Bourgeois Philosophical Thought and Contemporary Objective Idealism), *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 3–42.
[28] Cf. *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 38.
[29] Cf. N.V. Motrošilova, "Fenomenologičeskaja filosofija i ob'ektivnyj idealizm" (Phenomenological Philosophy and Objective Idealism), *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 114–173. Further N.V. Motrošilova, "Gerd Brand, *Welt, Ich und Zeit.* Nach unveröffentlichten Manuskripten Edmund Husserls. Den Haag, 1955, 147 pp." in *Voprosy filosofii,* XV, Moscow 1 (1961), 178–179; "Fenomenologia E. Gusserlja i osnovnoj vopros filosofii" (The Phenomenology of E. Husserl and the Fundamental Question of Philosophy), *Voprosy filosofii,* XV, Moscow 12 (1961), 66–79; (together with Ė. Ju. Solov'ev) "Ot zaščity 'strogoj nauki' k utverždeniju irracionalizma – Filosofskaja ėvoljucija Ė. Gusserlja i nemeckij ėkzistencializm" (From a Defense of "Strict Science" to a Justification of Irrationalism – The Philosophical Evolution of E. Husserl and of German Existentialism), *Voprosy filosofii,* XVIII, Moscow 5 (1964), 92–103; *Principy i protivorečija fenomenologičeskoj filosofii* (Principles and Contradictions of Phenomenological Philosophy), Moscow 1968 (127 pp.). Cf. in this regard: T.J. Blakeley, "N.V. Motrošilova on Husserl," *Studies in Soviet Thought,* X, Dordrecht-Holland 1 (1970), 50–52.
[30] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 116.
[31] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 119–120.
[32] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 121.
[33] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 122.
[34] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 123.
[35] Ė. Gusserl', *Logičeskie issledovanija* (E. Husserl, Logical Investigations), Part I, St. Petersburg 1909, 112.
[36] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism,* 124.
[37] The convergence between Husserl's thoughts related to these concepts and those of Solovyev is, at least in starting points, unmistakable, although it was not noticed by Motrošilova.

[38] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 150.
[39] Solov'ev's concept of the "emerging reason of the truth" corresponds to this accommodation to the principles of thought which takes place through the higher form of the *rational* activity.
[40] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 152.
[41] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 154.
[42] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 155.
[43] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 156–157.
[44] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 157.
[45] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 157.
[46] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 159.
[47] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 159–160.
[48] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 160.
[49] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 161.
[50] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 161.
[51] Motrošilova in *Contemporary Objective Idealism*, 162.
[52] Petr Vladimirovič Korneev, *Sovremennaja filosofskaja antropologija – Nekotorye problemy i napravlenija* (Modern Philosophical Anthropology – Some Problems and Tendencies), Moscow 1967; cf. 3.
[53] Cf. "Max Scheler as the Immediate Precursor of Existentialism and as the Founder of Modern Anthropology," chap. 2 of P.V. Korneev's *Modern Philosophical Anthropology*, 18–37.
[54] Korneev, *Modern Philosophical Anthropology*, 34,
[55] Korneev, *Modern Philosophical Anthropology*, 35.
[56] Korneev, *Modern Philosophical Anthropology*, 35.
[57] Cf. K.N. Ljubutin, "Antropologičeskij princip v idealističeskoj nemeckoj filosofii XIX–XX vv." (The Anthropological Principle in the Idealistic German Philosophy of the 19th and 20th Centuries), *Filosofskie nauki*, VI, Moscow 5 (1963), 81–90. Ljubutin, "Starye idei v novoj odežde – K kritike zapadnogermanskoj 'filosofskoj antropologii'" (Old Ideas in a New Form – A Critique of West German "Philosophical Anthropology"), *Voprosy filosofii*, XIX, Moscow 7 (1965), 126–136.
[58] Cf. P.V. Korneev, "K kritike 'kul'turnoj antropologii'" (A Critique of "Philosophical Anthropology"), *Filosofskie nauki*, IX, Moscow 4 (1969), 76–84.
[59] Korneev, *Modern Philosophical Anthropology*, 36.
[60] L.E. Xoruc, "Gnoseologija i sociologija poznanija Maksa Šelera" (The Theory and Sociology of Knowledge of Max Scheler), *Voprosy filosofii*, XXI, Moscow 7 (1967), 57–67.
[61] K.N. Ljubutin, *Kritika sovremennoj filosofskoj antropologii* (Critique of Modern Philosophical Anthropology), Moscow 1970; here chap. II, section 3: The Search for a Unified Idea of Man – Max Scheler, 21–25. I.I. Antonovič, *Sovremennaja "filosofskaja antropologija" – Kritičeskij očerk* (Modern "Philosophical Anthropology" – Critical Discussion), Minsk 1970; here chap. 2, section 2: The Ideal-Theoretical Sources of Bourgeois Philosophical Anthropology – Max Scheler, 57–64.
[62] Xoruc, "The Theory and Sociology of Knowledge of Max Scheler," 59.
[63] Xoruc, "The Theory and Sociology of Knowledge of Max Scheler," 59.
[64] Xoruc, "The Theory and Sociology of Knowledge of Max Scheler," 61.
[65] Scheler, *Gesammelte Werke* (Collected Works), vol. 8 (*Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*), 2nd edn., Bern-Munich 1960, 52.
[66] Scheler, *Collected Works*, vol. 8, 21.
[67] Scheler, *Collected Works*, vol. 8, 58.
[68] Xoruc, "The Theory and Sociology of Knowledge of Max Scheler," 65–66.
[69] Scheler, *Collected Works*, vol. 8, 172–173.
[70] Scheler, *Collected Works*, vol. 8, 179.

[71] Scheler, *Collected Works,* vol. 8, 178.
[72] Scheler, *Collected Works,* vol. 8, 172.
[73] Xoruc, "The Theory and Sociology of Knowledge of Max Scheler," 67.
[74] L.N. Krasnopol'skaja and A.P. Moiseeva, "Problemy sovremennoj religioznoj filosofii" (Problems of Modern Philosophy of Religion [Report of the Moscow Conference on the philosophy of religion from May 12, 1970]), *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta – Filosofija,* XXV (VIII), 5 (1970), 93–96.
[75] L.N. Krasnopol'skaja and A.P. Moiseeva, "Problems of Modern Philosophy of Religion," 93.
[76] L.N. Krasnopol'skaja and A.P. Moiseeva, "Problems of Modern Philosophy of Religion," 93.
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V. *Postscript to the Works by Vladimir Solovyev*

The Brussel's publishing company "Žizn' s Bogom" has enlarged the phototyped (third) edition of the *Collected Works* (according to the second edition, St. Petersburg 1911–1913) by two further volumes: vols. XI–XII, Brussels 1969–1970. These contain not only poetry, letters and a substantial portion of the articles from the *Encyclopaedic Dictionary* (Brockhaus/Efron) but also the works originally written in French which were obtained by G. A. Račinskij and published in Russian by "Put'," a Moscow publishing company, in 1911–1913.

The four volumes of the *Collected Correspondence of Vladimir Solovyev,* obtained by E. L. Radlov (I–III St. Petersburg 1908–1911; IV Petrograd 1923) are also republished in two further supplementary volumes, XIII and XIV.

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